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The Institute, as such, is precluded by its rules from expressing an opinion on any aspect of international affairs. Any opinions expressed in the papers, discussions, or reviews printed in this Journal are, therefore, purely individual.

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HOW FRANCE IS DEFENDED[1]

By GENERAL MAXIME WEYGAND

I REMEMBER reading somewhere, though I have not verified the quotation, that in the eighteenth century the Prussian Ambassador wrote to his sovereign, Frederick II, complaining that his salary was too small. The money at his disposal was insufficient for the upkeep of many equipages, with the result that, when the horses were tired, he was often obliged to go through the streets of Paris on foot. He felt that this was detrimental to his prestige, and begged that the sum allotted for his expenses should be increased. Frederick II sent the letter back to him with these words written across it : " Let the Prussian Ambassador remember that whenever he walks through the streets of Paris he is always followed by the 30,000 bayonets in the service of His Majesty the King of Prussia." We have reached the point where statesmen and diplomatists are perpetually conscious of these facts. They cannot make a move without thinking of the number of bayonets behind them or even pushing them forward. We may be pacifists or believers in armed force, but we spend all our time matching against each other numbers of divisions, tanks, and aeroplanes. Much as we may regret it, such regrets are useless. This iron law has been imposed on us, and there is no alternative between strength and servitude.

Before speaking of the strength and resources of France, I should like to express France's sincere admiration for the effort that Great Britain has been making. This admiration has grown among the French reserve officers during their recent visit. Your preparations in the material sense have long been appreciated in France. These officers have within the last few days been able to study at first hand the degree to which this appreciation is justified. Allow me to say that what I admire far more, because I realise the resolution and courage which lie behind it, is your decision to introduce conscription. From what I know of your country, this represents a very great sacrifice both of principle and in a material sense. France thanks you for it.

[1] Translation of an address given at Chatham House on May 16th, 1939; Field-Marshal Sir Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., LL.D., in the Chair.

The defence of France is so vast a subject that in a short paper I can deal only with selected aspects of it. I shall not touch on the navy; I shall speak principally about the army, and will say something about the air force, but only on those points which I consider the most interesting for my purpose.

On the subject of land forces a distinguished Englishman once made a remark which we value very much. He said many years ago, and has repeated since, that the French Army is the guardian of the Peace of Europe. We see in these words of Mr. Winston Churchill two things. We see in them a significant commendation of France's desire for peace, and this touches us deeply. Further, we see in them a recognition of the fact that the French Army has never ceased to be strong—though strength is essentially a relative thing. Before discussing the different factors which go to make up this strength, I should like to submit certain general considerations concerning the French army, and rapidly to review the history of the last twenty years.

Our army is constituted on the following basis: it is our aim, and that aim is governed by absolute necessity for the defence of our country, to be able in time of war to utilise the whole of the resources of the nation. For this purpose we have made provision for an army at war strength—what we call the mobilised army (*armée mobilisée*). To bring this into being two things are required: a cadre, or permanent establishment, and time. The "standing army," or peace-time force, alone can assure these two things. It provides at one and the same time the cadre within which the mobilised army can be formed, and the time necessary for its formation by ensuring the inviolability of our territory. This is important, for once the country is invaded, the calling up and organisation of all the forces of the country become seriously handicapped. Expressed in military terms, the standing army fulfils the double function of serving as a "covering force"—*i.e.*, as a first line of defence of the territory—and of making it possible to effect mobilisation—*i.e.*, to bring the army up to war strength. It is clear that the greater the threat of a potential enemy, the greater must be the strength and preparedness of the standing army and the more rapid must be the process of mobilisation. I stress this point, because it is fundamental to my subject.

Now for a brief historical survey: our military laws of 1927–28, the "laws of one year's service" (we usually describe our military laws by the length of compulsory service imposed in them, since it is this obligation which is the most burdensome to the nation), provided an army which was quite adequate in a

Europe regulated by the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. Germany was practically disarmed, the Rhineland was to be occupied by Allied troops for some fifteen years and demilitarised for an indefinite period.

From 1929 onwards the situation changed, and a new period began. One would have had to be blind not to see that Germany was making preparations. Everything indicated a change of front. However, we, the Allied Powers, were remarkably long-suffering with her. At the time that the decision was taken to abandon the occupation of the Rhineland five years before the date prescribed in the Treaty, we soldiers realised that precautions must be taken and, between 1929 and 1934, we carried out a series of most important measures which I will summarise as follows: the construction of the line of fortifications generally known as the "Maginot Line," the training of special fortress troops to man these fortifications; the provision of a strong mobile reserve by the motorisation of a certain number of infantry divisions and the mechanisation of a considerable proportion of the cavalry.[1] These, then, are the measures which we adopted during the first period of rearmament.

In 1935 Germany threw off the mask, declared her intention to reintroduce conscription, and to build up an air force. In 1936 she carried through the military reoccupation of the Rhineland. We lost what I might describe as a kind of "battle of frontiers," by allowing this reoccupation to take place without opposition. I do not say that we could have acted otherwise. As I myself was at that time no longer in the service, I am not in a position to pass judgment, but there is no doubt whatever that this re-occupation by Germany without a blow gave her certain psychological and material advantages of which she has not failed to make use. The era of conquests lay before her. They are present in all our minds, so it is needless to enumerate them. From that moment the iron law of armed force was set up in Europe, and a further strengthening of the French forces became essential.

Had a modification of the structure of the French army become necessary? The question was extensively discussed at the time. One school of thought said that a national army with a short

[1] In military language we make a distinction between motorisation and mechanisation: we describe as a motorised unit, an infantry unit which, instead of marching, is transported by car to the scene of action, when it gets out and fights as an ordinary infantry unit. Mechanised divisions, on the other hand, are those troops which fight in the actual vehicles and machines which carry them.

term of service would be incapable of standing up to the German forces, and that in consequence we needed a professional army composed of volunteers only, strongly reinforced by war material. This argument was based on a fundamental error as far as our country is concerned. Faced with the necessity of resisting an enemy of great strength whose territory is adjacent to hers, France, as I emphasised at the beginning of my paper, will be obliged to call upon all her resources. For this she needs a national army—that is to say, one through which all young men have passed in order to be properly trained to play their part in the mobilised army from the moment of the outbreak of hostilities. Now, the system upon which our army is organised is supple enough to adapt itself to the solution of the new problem which has arisen, since by increasing the standing army you kill two birds with one stone: you strengthen the "covering force," and you decrease the length of time needed for mobilisation.

Let me underline the gravity of the situation in which we have been placed not only by Germany's rearmament, but by the new diplomatic and political technique. In 1914 prolonged political tension gave us time to prepare. War was declared. The laws of war had, generally speaking, been respected. Consequently mobilisation in Germany roughly synchronised with our own, so that we found ourselves face to face at full strength, at the same time. I would say, while craving indulgence for applying such a term to an event of this kind, that, compared with the methods of to-day, it was almost the Golden Age. Nowadays we have to take into account a contempt for treaties, a disregard of the plighted word, a policy of the *fait accompli*, and suddenness of execution. All this is made possible by the supreme powers of a dictator, by the permanent existence of an armed force strong enough in man-power and war material to begin operations immediately; by the threat of rapid invasion by armoured divisions, and the continual danger of aerial bombardment by a large air force unscrupulously used. Add to this completely changed situation the declaration of neutrality by Belgium, which has greatly extended the length of frontier threatened. The danger which we have to face has not been doubled, but multiplied a hundredfold, for if we lose the first battle, if we cannot confront the Germans with an invincible resistance from the beginning, our position will be far more seriously compromised than it was in 1914 under similar circumstances.

In order to meet this danger, we must, as a first step, increase our "covering force." For this purpose a part of the standing

army must be ready down to the last detail, always on the alert, with its full complement of men and material, all in position, so that we need not fear what we call a " surprise attack," a violation of the frontier in breach of all pledges given. We must also have means of speeding up mobilisation, to provide us more quickly with trained units, ready to be sent into action at the earliest possible moment. It would be criminal to send inadequately trained and equipped units on to a modern battlefield, where they would be confronted with all the dangers of the most up-to-date war material. The adequate preparation of units demands strong cadres; cohesion, which can only be achieved by a knowledge of each other and mutual confidence between the men who will go into action together; and training—*i.e.*, in familiarising them with the use of war material and with the terrain, in order that they may be able to carry out the tasks entrusted to them. It is also essential to give to the army as a whole a greater degree of mobility, as mobility can often remedy the deficiency of numbers—and in warfare numbers are always too small. Finally, the best possible protection is needed against air attack by the enemy.

I will now review rapidly the different factors in the land defences of France in the light of the general considerations I have just mentioned. I will deal with them under the following headings: (1) fortifications, (2) effectives, (3) war material, (4) the cadres and their training, (5) the financial effort, and (6) spirit and morale.

1. Let me begin with fortifications. Our fortifications, as I said earlier, were begun in 1929. That part which we call the " old fortified front "—the line of the Alps, the Franco-German frontier up to, and including, Luxemburg—was built between 1929 and 1934. It may be of interest to mention one problem that came up, though it is essentially a technical one, because it was so neatly solved by Marshal Pétain, a man who needs no commendation from me. Once the line of the fortifications had been decided on, the Commission had to make up its mind on the type of works to be constructed. Discussion became heated and delicate, because all the plans suggested had their good and bad points. One day Marshal Pétain accompanied the members of the Commission to the terrain. " Why do you want to put an emplacement here? " he asked. " To fire on such and such an objective." " Good! In that case what type of guns do you need, and where do you want them put? " " There, and there."

"Good!" concluded Marshal Pétain. "Put them in those positions in shell-proof emplacements, and link them up by underground passages." It is in this way that we have evolved our present system of fortifications, which differs radically from earlier ones, since it is founded, not on a uniform system, but on the treatment of each individual case as it arose.

In strengthening our "old fortified front" we increased the depth in front by building advance posts, and behind by second lines of resistance. We made conditions more comfortable for the men who had to be there at all seasons by installing electric plant for heating and air-conditioning in the forts. The living-conditions of the garrison have now become passable. Thanks to the intensive production of tanks in Germany, we had to provide very thorough anti-tank protection, to make doubly sure that the invading force should not be able just to walk in.

This process of strengthening existing fortifications was, however, not enough, since Germany alternately threatened the violation of Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland. Belgium's declaration of neutrality, by putting a stop to Franco-Belgian collaboration for the combined defence of the frontier, caused us to extend our fortifications up to the floodable districts in Flanders, which the British Army knows so well from the brave stand it made there during the last War. The same applied to Switzerland; we had to fortify the line of the Jura. Finally as the Italian claims on Tunisia, which we have no intention of handing over, became increasingly persistent, we strengthened the defences of Bizerta as a base for our fleet, and we built on the southern frontier a "Maginot" line to hold up an offensive from Tripoli.

One result of the building of all these fortifications has been the formation of special fortress troops. Had we not done this, we should have had to confine active divisions in ferro-concrete and would have been deprived of our best troops for open warfare. It would be a mistake to think that the existence of these fortress troops introduces an element of unwieldiness into our army. On the contrary, they enable us to use the whole of our excellent standing frontier units either for defensive or offensive measures. During the course of my recent journey I was able to talk to some of the commanders responsible for the defences in the Alps and in Tunis. I found them all calmly prepared to put up a successful resistance to any attack on our territory.

2. I now come to the important question of effectives. As I said before, mobilisation is the process by which peace-time

effectives are transformed into war-time effectives, which means that some 600,000 to 800,000 men may be increased to several million, according to requirements. It is obvious that the smaller the margin between peace- and war-time effectives, the quicker the mobilisation, so that mobilised units can be brought into action with the least possible delay. Therefore, by reducing the margin between peace and war effectives, you gain both in time and in quality, since the troops mobilised will contain a larger proportion of men from the standing army.

Here I should like to draw attention to a recent law which maintains the period of service with the colours at two years, in order to point out that this does not aim at keeping the numbers at the old level, but permits us, on the contrary, to dispose of a very important additional margin of effectives. The two years' period of service was originally introduced in 1935 on account of the decreased yield in the annual contingent due to the fall of the birth-rate during the War years. During the War families were separated or broken up, and the birth-rate reached a low level. Moreover, owing to insufficient feeding as children, many when called up were considered unsuitable for military service. Consequently at one moment what we call the " annual class " amounted to only half the contingent of a normal year and, to compensate for this, we needed two annual classes with the colours—in other words, a two years' period of service to produce the same number of effectives as we had previously obtained with one year's service. Families were reunited towards the end of 1918, and from 1939 onwards, and this will apply even more next year, the annual contingent becomes normal again. Thus the two years' period of service now gives us a very large increase in the number of effectives, and the law which maintains it is really designed to procure considerable reinforcement.

This increase now makes it possible for us to realise the desiderata described above concerning the peace-time and the mobilised army. When I was at school we were supplied with a pale liquid which was ironically described as " *de l'abondance* "—one small drop of wine in an enormous quantity of water. To apply my simile, when the standing army is weak, units may be described as " *de l'abondance* " to the proportion of the standing army they contain; whereas if the man-power of the standing army is sufficiently high, the war units are a " deeper colour "—*i.e.*, less diluted. We have facilitated mobilisation by creating new units. The two years' service has also made it possible for us to fill up certain gaps among men trained in the use of new weapons.

3. On the question of war material, I will just describe the main line of our organisation. Our plan of production in peace time is concerned with: (1) the adoption of different types of material, and (2) the fixing of the number of each type to be manufactured either for supply to the units, or for replacement purposes. Starting from this basis, the plan is executed with the collaboration of a number of different organisations: (a) the *Comité Permanent de Défense Nationale* which co-ordinates the establishment and carrying out of the armaments programme of the three defence Ministries; (b) the General Secretariat of the *Ministère de la Défense Nationale*, which assists the Minister in the matter of credits; (c) lastly, the *Comité de Production*, consisting of the works-directors of all three Ministries, whose function is to elaborate methods for intensive production.

Once these questions of planning and of credits have been settled, orders are allocated. Since nationalisation, a measure on which I prefer not to express an opinion but simply to indicate its results, we have four categories of factories manufacturing war materials: (a) the national arsenals, namely the old established munitions workshops and the naval and air-force arsenals, which are supplied from special credits in the budget, with staffs classed as civil servants, and of which the plant is State property; (b) nationalised establishments in which the State possesses a certain financial interest, in virtue of which it exercises complete control, while retaining the same methods of operation as those used by private firms; (c) private firms which specialise in the manufacture of war materials under State control, a control which is extended to their relationship with other industries, and their connections abroad; (d) private firms which have signed a State contract for the supply of certain types of war material, and are only subjected to a factory control of the processes of manufacture and to an inspection of the finished product on delivery.

Furthermore, the Government, in order to increase the manufacture of war material, has concentrated on the problem of developing the means of production by installing additional plant. In some cases firms have been induced to acquire new machinery, in others the Government has itself bought the machinery and leased it to the factories. These measures have immensely improved matters. The same is true of working hours. M. Daladier told me a few days ago that some factories are now working sixty hours a week. Thus the unwise law of the forty-hour-week is no longer causing the serious delay for which it was originally responsible.

Manufacture in war time must be capable of providing for the replacement of material destroyed in action, of supplying new units, since these are continually being formed in time of war, and lastly it must be able to manufacture such new types as the developments in the course of a war make it necessary to invent.

The law voted in 1938 on the "organisation of the nation in time of war," lays down the broad outlines of what we call the "mobilisation of industry." So far as war contracts are concerned the law defines the rights of the Ministries, and the obligations of industrialists. Here I must emphasise that, in spite of these preparations for the stimulation of home industry, France will never be independent of imports from abroad. For this reason the freedom of the seas is more necessary to us than ever. Even without the thousand other excellent reasons for wishing to foster good relations with Great Britain, the possession of this freedom which the British navy alone can ensure would render her help indispensable.

Plans have been discussed for pooling the resources of the two countries in certain theatres of operations. I do not know to what extent this programme has been worked out; it seems to me a most interesting one.

4. Cadres, and their training: the cadres in the standing army, as mentioned above, have been greatly increased. There are now over 30,000 officers, and more than 130,000 professional soldiers and non-commissioned officers, serving a voluntary term, and in some cases extending their period of service. In spite of this, officers in the reserve constitute five-sixths of the total. Many of those on the active list will be needed for the staff and administrative services in order to ensure smooth working, particularly at first; one may almost say that the proportion of reserve officers in command of troops in the field will be even higher.

The proportion of non-commissioned officers in the reserve is about three-quarters of those in the mobilised army. This will give you some idea of the importance to be attached to the training of reserve cadres.

The value of these cadres, recruited from all classes of the nation, lies in the fact that they have proved that they possess certain personal qualities for holding authority, and have been chosen for that reason. Their ability to command, however, depends largely on their degree of training. An important decision has just recently been taken in France on this point. Some time ago

we instituted special periods of training for reserve officers, but the complexity of modern armaments has vastly increased the difficulty of giving this training, and these periods for reserve officers have become totally inadequate to ensure the proper degree of instruction. To meet the difficulty "refresher courses" have been in existence for the last fifteen years and have proved satisfactory. Attendance was not compulsory, with the result that out of 125,000 officers, only 45,000 went to them regularly, and these were often older men. The younger ones attended less, probably because their positions in civil life were more junior than those of the older men and they had less free time. This difficulty had to be remedied. A recent law actually introduced on the advice of the National Union of Reserve Officers, who were alive to the necessity for it, has made attendance at these schools compulsory, and the penalty for non-attendance consists of an extra training period of varying length, either in camp or with a regiment.

5. All these developments involve heavy expenditure and can be realised only with a considerable financial effort. The general budget of the Ministry of War alone has increased from 5,467,000,000 francs in 1933 to 9,242,000,000 francs in 1939. Added to this, the manufacture of war material has necessitated the establishment of a special credit account, which has increased from 755,000,000 francs in 1933 to 9,320,000,000 francs in 1939. This will give some idea of the sacrifices which have been imposed on us.

6. My picture of the French Army would be incomplete if I did not say something of the spirit which animates it. Of what value are material considerations without a sound morale? The spirit of the serving soldier is excellent, no matter what may be his social background or political creed. In saying this I am naturally referring not only to the volunteers, but also to the average young man called up for compulsory service. In the cadres, officers and non-commissioned officers, whether they belong to the standing army or to the reserves, show the same enthusiasm in the service of their country. Many times in talking to the Minister I have applied the word "saints" to these men, the conditions of whose lives, both from the material and the military points of view, are often so hard. I find it difficult adequately to describe the dignity and nobility of the spirit which animates all our cadres.

I feel that I can speak of the higher ranks with a certain detachment, since I retired from active service some four years ago, having passed the age limit. The higher commands in the French army are held by generals who were captains or majors during the Great War. They were then in command of units of some importance; they themselves led their men into action, and thus acquired an unparalleled experience. Moreover since the War a great deal of work has been accomplished in the army on strategy, organisation and on armament. Experience gained in this work has brought to the front really remarkable leaders, men who in my opinion are superior to any we have had before. It is customary in France for the Commander-in-Chief to present to the Minister for War at the end of each year a "promotion list" of those officers whom he considers suitable for employment in the course of the following year in different ranks and capacities. During the last four years it has been my task to draw up this list of appointments. Throughout the last three months in the year, beginning in October, I have taken up this list again and again, in despair because the number of appointments vacant was too small for the number who deserved them. It is impossible for me to do full justice to our higher commands.

The morale of the mobilised army will be that of the nation as a whole. The partial mobilisation of September last year gave us a chance to confirm that this morale was excellent. I do not mean to imply that our men went light-heartedly to a new war; they went uncomplainingly, courageously, feeling that if it were necessary for them to go, go they would. I received many letters from young officers at the time which were really touching in the faith and enthusiasm they displayed. From that moment the tone of the morale has not ceased to rise all over the country. Everyone is convinced that the Franco-British friendship will do all it can to avoid war, or, if this fails, to win it. New material is reaching the regiments in larger quantities, and is producing an excellent impression there. Our Government has given proof of a firmness which is giving satisfaction.

Finally, the justice of our cause has become clear to all; this is a most important factor with our people, actuated as it is by an innate sense of justice, well read, intelligent, and capable of making up its own mind. The Germans have rendered us an inestimable service so far as this is concerned by all the acts contrary to the law of nature which they have committed.

The French army is far from perfect, no army ever is perfect,

particularly in the eyes of its commanders, who are always aware of its deficiencies. Your artillery regiments have a proud motto. I forget the exact Latin words, but it means: "Where right and glory lead, we shall be there."[1] It is the same with the French army; it is prepared to meet its destiny, whatever that may be. Its self-confidence is fervent, it knows neither fear nor hesitation. It realises the seriousness of the present situation, but it accepts it with resolution and faith in the outcome.

I will now say a few words about the air force. Even though my main theme is the army, I cannot neglect it altogether. You know of the theory of the Italian General Douhet, according to which the land army's sole duty will be to guard the frontiers, while the air force alone will be capable of taking the offensive, and of winning the war. This rather extreme doctrine has no partisans in France. Obviously a large and powerful air force will give a tremendous advantage to those countries which possess one, and will be a serious hindrance to those which do not. But the infantry remains "*la reine des batailles,*" since territory must be held, and the winner is he who succeeds in holding it. Germany, in developing her air force to the utmost of her ability, has provided herself with a weapon the real power and efficiency of which we cannot deny. But it also serves as a means of intimidation. I have just returned from the Near East, and I have brought back from there an impression that Germany's representatives incessantly proclaim the invincibility of her air forces, and the misfortunes to which those countries which join the opposite camp will expose themselves. It is clear that her air force can do us considerable damage, but it will not conquer us. I remember a passage in Ludendorff's Memoirs dealing with the year 1918: he is astonished that in spite of the aerial bombardment of London and Paris, day after day, and night after night, France and England would not own themselves beaten. The same thing would happen again. But in order to make sure that the enemy does not achieve his ends, we must be in a position to defend ourselves, and also to attack. By defence I do not mean those measures of "passive defence" which are known and taken by every country, such as providing shelters, gas-masks, trenches, black-outs, anti-aircraft batteries, etc. What is most important is so to arrange matters that a large bombing force cannot accomplish its mission without risking serious losses and leaving a large number of planes behind. From the moment that a country

[1] *Ubique quo fas et gloria ducunt.*

possesses a fleet of fighter planes sufficiently powerful to ensure that no large-scale enemy air attack could be launched without running the risk of losing 200 to 300 planes in a single raid, these expeditions will become more rare. There is something in these bombardments of defenceless people behind the front that smacks of a cowardice which is repugnant to the soldier. One suspects that people who order such actions cannot be very brave, and that their losses will soon prove a deterrent.

However, I will leave the realm of theories and come to practical considerations, for without practical application the most attractive theories are vain.

Everyone knows something of the internal crisis that we have been through. The newspapers have discussed it fully, for they neglect no opportunity of pointing out our weak points, always exaggerating them. We have recently done a great deal to improve our air force. I will give you a few figures. In 1937 the value of machinery in factories was calculated at the insignificant sum of 60,000,000 francs. The reason for this was that the manufacture of aeroplanes was considered as being the work of craftsmen and small-scale industry. In 1938 France spent nearly 1,000,000,000 francs on machinery, which is already installed and beginning to produce results. The productive capacity of industry has also risen considerably. It is true to say that as much can now be produced in one week as was produced in a month in 1938, and this figure will soon be doubled. Manufacture is progressing satisfactorily. I believe that in a short time it will reach the point where no enemy bombing force can fly over our territory without risking severe losses.

Our air equipment has suffered from the inferiority of our engines. But our engineers and builders, thanks to their particular talent for delicate workmanship (what we call "*la finesse*"), have always excelled in the construction of wing units which enables them to obtain adequate speeds with an inferior type of engine. We needed, however, good engines with a capacity of more than 1000 horse power. Happily we have found a good way of obviating this difficulty; we have purchased from you and from the United States the rights to obtain these engines. Our engineers, on their side, have made some very interesting discoveries, so that with our new 1200-horse-power engines we have been able to catch up our arrears. The armament of our planes leaves nothing to be desired.

A factor of capital importance in aviation is the number and disposition of landing-grounds. People often think that in

order to carry out strategic moves all that is required is that the squadrons should take the air and go to whatever place they are ordered. Nothing of the sort; they can set out, of course, but unless landing-grounds are provided, at which they can descend to re-fuel and to rest, they are like a navy without bases. In order to manœuvre an air force, bases are essential. Our work in this connection has already been carried out; France is amply provided.

In regard to the air force personnel, everything I have said about the morale of the land army applies equally to the air force. Pilots and cadres have shown dash, real knowledge of their work, and idealism. No crisis in the material sense has shaken their faith in their particular branch of the service or their mission. If anyone had mentioned the inferiority of his material to an air-force officer during the worst moments of the crisis he would have spent an extremely uncomfortable quarter of an hour.

To sum up, I believe that we shall soon be in a position to retaliate very effectively against air attack.

Having reviewed the principal elements which constitute our military strength, let us consider for a moment its use. Primarily it is for defensive purposes. Why? Because our policy is a peaceful one, and demands a strategy which is first and foremost defensive. Since we have no intention of being the aggressors, the initiative does not lie with us. This advantage will be in the hands of the enemy, forcing us, I repeat, at the outset to take the defensive. This is inevitable, since the inviolability of our territory is an essential factor for the successful carrying on of the war. We shall be able to summon forces which will be to all intents and purposes equivalent to those we had at our command during the last war.

These forces are far more powerful thanks to modern armaments; as this applies equally to the enemy, however, the relative proportions remain about the same. You must not forget that during the last war we did not have to take Italy into account, and there was no theatre of operations in Africa. Moreover in 1914 the Belgian and Russian armies came in at the very beginning. In 19—, not only shall we have to hold the frontier of the Alps, but we shall be obliged to maintain large forces in Africa. The situation on the Eastern front has not at the moment crystallised. Thus the initial task of the French army will be an extremely heavy one, and, on that account, we must be able to count on immediate support from Great Britain. Your assistance

in 1914 was immensely valuable to us, since it enabled us to win the battle of the Marne and to carry on the battle of Ypres. Your expeditionary force at that time amounted to six divisions. In 19—, owing to our vastly increased liabilities, we shall need twelve divisions. I quote these estimates of the divisions needed quite freely; I no longer share the secrets of the great and so I am at liberty to say what I like. But at that hour of the evening when old soldiers talk over these things as they pass the port or the brandy round the table, we always say that, if unhappily war comes, it is extremely desirable that your expeditionary force should be as strong as possible. The last statement of your Minister for War, Mr. Hore-Belisha, which has had wide publicity in France, as well as your courageous decision concerning conscription, leads us to hope that this will be the case.

In order to meet the eventualities of this defensive period, it is most important that we should have a solid front on the East. I can say without betraying any secrets, since I know none, that in my opinion it is very desirable to force Germany, if she wants war, to fight on two fronts. It is said that she is experiencing some difficulty at present in the upkeep of her railways, and in renewing her rolling stock and locomotives. It is quite likely, too, that certain psychological complications will arise in those countries which have been brutally stripped of their independence and incorporated in the Reich. In any case, clever as the Germans may be, a war on two fronts cannot fail to strain their resources. The prospects are calculated, I believe, to make her stop and reflect; even if these reflections do not prevent a conflict, she will at least be obliged to divide her forces. It is necessary, therefore, that we should have a front on the East as solidly welded together and as strong as possible. Germany, of course, describes the process as "encirclement," but until she has conquered the whole world she will continue to declare that she is being "encircled."

Finally there is the question of the use of these forces for offensive purposes. Not only must we avoid losing the war, we must win it, and win it as quickly as possible, since we know from experience the terrible waste of human lives and economic losses of all kinds which its prolongation would entail.

When Marshal Foch was given the Supreme Command of the combined Allied Forces, Mr. Lloyd George asked him this question: "Tell me, General, who is going to win, Ludendorff or you?" and the Marshal answered without hesitation, "I shall, because at present Ludendorff has a far more difficult task than I. I have only to defend, whereas he must attack to break our line, and this

he will not do." I could not help admiring then, as at other times, the quickness and preciseness of his mind. This is an illustration of the axiom that greater strength is required for attack than for defence, particularly with the help of modern defensive weapons. It does not alter the fact that in order to win the victory one must take the offensive, as we did in 1918. Without making prophecies, I can at least give you my own personal opinion, since it involves no one but myself.

At an early stage in 1914, operations on the Western front reached stalemate; from the battle of the Marne in 1914 onwards neither side made any real progress. This was accomplished with nothing but field fortifications, of earth, of wood, and of corrugated iron. What will happen in 19—? Armies face each other, even in peace-time, across fortified lines of steel and concrete. Though these fortified lines are not exactly the same, they are no doubt equally strong, and both are held by troops of equal fighting value, for I rate the German army very high. How can a rapid decision be reached on such a front? I believe we must broaden our strategic conceptions, and broaden them considerably. The Eastern front here presents new possibilities, not only as a valuable line of defence, but as a potential field for taking the offensive, capable by a combination of land, sea, and air forces, of giving us the victory.

The present crisis may last a long time. M. Daladier made a remark the other day which I cannot forget. I do not often quote from the speeches of politicians, but this sentence struck me particularly. The French Prime Minister said: "If, between peace and war, it is sought to wear us down, we shall hold out as long as need be." It could not have been better put; we shall hold out for as long as need be.

In conclusion let me say that our best hope lies in our common effort, but on two conditions: that no rift mars our friendship, and no weakness attends our actions. Our will, our union, and our strength constitute the only sound policy for the avoidance of war or, should this fail, for victory.

Summary of Discussion.

QUESTION: Would the lecturer say something about the plans for the defence of France outside France—*e.g.*, the Mediterranean?

GENERAL WEYGAND answered that France and her allies would have to include the Mediterranean in their field of action from the very outbreak of war; both on account of the transportation of troops and the Tunisian front, the theatre of operations for land, sea, and air

forces would stretch from the North Sea to the Sahara. We must attempt to obtain control of the Eastern Mediterranean as quickly as possible; naval success alone was capable of opening communications with the Eastern front of which he had spoken. These communications were indispensable both for the supply of war material and for the conduct of operations. The first essential, however, was to remain master in one's own house. If one's range of vision were limited to distant horizons, one ran the risk of being like La Fontaine's astrologer who, walking with his eyes fixed on the stars, fell into a well. When planning strategic operations on a large scale, it was important not to forget to guard one's own frontiers the defence of which was essential.

QUESTION: What was the lecturer's opinion concerning an attack by Spain, as an ally of Germany, upon France?

GENERAL WEYGAND agreed that an attack from Spain must be avoided at all costs. We held the trumps at present, since it was said that Germany and Italy had already aroused desire for their departure from Spain. What had happened in the past? Spain had always been fiercely jealous of her independence.

SIR EDWARD GRIGG said that not only had he been interested but heartened by the lecture, because he had been very anxious about the situation, and to have a realistic account of the position in France from a soldier of General Weygand's standing and to hear of the spirit of France and the quality of her army was a tremendous encouragement. He would also like to thank the lecturer for the too kind things which he had said concerning Great Britain's rather tardy effort. It was a great pity she had not started earlier, and it was to be hoped that she was not now too late. In any case, having started she was proceeding as fast as possible.

What part did the lecturer think Italy would be likely to play in a war? Could she be counted upon to engage on either side, or would the more dangerous possibility of her neutrality have to be considered?

To what extent did the lecturer think that the German Army was at present capable of fighting upon two fronts? Should she attempt to do so, what would be her probable strategy? Would she use most of her troops in the East, and adopt a purely defensive strategy in the West, leaving to the Western Powers the responsibility of using air warfare first against her, or would she attempt to take the initiative on two Fronts at once? If the latter course were chosen, how many German divisions would be available for the Western Front?

GENERAL WEYGAND said it was difficult to say beforehand what action Italy would take in case of war. He had been struck by the number of envoys which Germany had sent recently to Italy. First Marshal Goering, then General von Brauschitsch, Commander-in-chief of the Army, then Herr von Ribbentrop, all in one month. If the

Axis was working satisfactorily, surely the dispatch of so many envoys was a work of supererogation!

The neutrality of Italy would have great advantages for France, particularly in the early stages of a war, since it would obviate the necessity of defending either the Alps or her African frontiers, thus increasing her strength elsewhere. But as perfect happiness was not to be had in this world, France's ally, Great Britain, might well see things the other way round. Considered from the detached standpoint of the directing power of the war as a whole, it must be admitted that Italy's participation in hostilities put at the mercy of the Franco-British alliance certain weak points which might successfully be exploited. Italy had widely dispersed her forces, she had stationed some in Abyssinia, some in Tripoli, in Cyrenaica, and in Albania. This was a lot, and among them there could not fail to be weak points. Her coastline was extremely vulnerable. To sum up, her entry into the war, though it would impose a heavy strain on France at the outset, might offer the combined Powers of Great Britain and France a chance to cripple her seriously. To begin with, if Italy were involved, they could block up the Mediterranean at both ends, Suez and Gibraltar, and proceed against her by concerted action, whereas if she remained neutral, the Mediterranean would have to remain open, and she would be able to send supplies to Germany.

It was impossible to say whether Germany would be capable of sustaining a war on two fronts: but if she were obliged to envisage such a possibility it would impose so heavy a burden on her that, in spite of her great military genius, he (General Weygand) believed it to be sufficiently serious to make her hesitate. In the event of a war on two fronts, since Germany had constructed fortifications on her Western borders, she might feel adequately protected against the Western Powers, and thus able to launch an offensive to the East in order to obtain control of essential raw materials, such as wheat and petroleum. It was for this reason that the Eastern front was so important. The East possessed the raw materials which would enable Germany to prosecute a war of long duration.

SIR WALTER LAYTON said that whatever may have been the views expressed on conscription or national service in Great Britain, it was realised that in the event of war a greater contribution to the man-power of France than had hitherto been supposed would be necessary. On the other hand, it might not be easy under conditions of aerial warfare to maintain a great British army on the continent of Europe. In France it was generally expected that conscription in Great Britain would yield an army of continental dimensions. Speed, moreover, would be tremendously important should war unfortunately break out. From this point of view, and having regard to the two or possibly three fronts to be defended by France, did the lecturer think that it would be necessary for Great Britain quite soon to consider a still further increase in the numbers of divisions in her Expeditionary Force?

Concerning the Eastern Front, the lecturer had spoken of the possibility of a defensive deadlock on the West, whereas on the East there was a possibility of active warfare—which meant that the allies of Britain and France should be prepared for offensive action. Was the Polish army equipped to take such an offensive? What was the present state of the Polish army, particularly with regard to munitions? During the Great War it had been found extremely difficult to supply Russia or Roumania with munitions. If a country supplied its own type of munitions to another country, it was almost essential to send men with them. On the other hand, if an attempt were to be made to adapt our workshops to supply, for instance, rifles or guns of the Polish type the change over would mean many months of delay. What steps, if any, should be taken about this now?

General Weygand answered that it was not for him to say how many men Great Britain should put into the field, but he could at least tell them a little story which might illustrate the point. On October 31st, 1914, Marshal Foch had been present at a conference at Dunkirk attended by Lord Kitchener, M. Poincaré and M. Millerand. The British army in the field at that moment amounted to only six divisions. Lord Kitchener informed Marshal Foch that he would let him have thirty divisions in July, to which the Marshal replied that he would rather have ten at once. The more help that Great Britain could send to the Continent, and the sooner it got there, the more easily would our common task be accomplished.

He believed the Polish army to be of the first order. Poland was an extraordinarily patriotic country. In 1920, directly after her reconstitution as a nation, he had himself witnessed the ability of the Polish army to accomplish its task. Poland had now been in existence for more than twenty years, and had lavished every possible care on the maintenance of her army. From the moral and material point of view, she was well able to hold her own. Her soldiers were intensely patriotic, and her officers made excellent commanders. They were born with a keen tactical sense. The Polish army was undoubtedly less well provided with war-material than the Germans; this was a problem which her allies should help her to solve. Russia could probably provide her not only with raw materials, but also with armaments.

Field-Marshal Sir Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd (in the Chair) thanked the lecturer for his extremely clear and well-thought-out survey of the French military situation. Those who had heard the lecturer had been listening not only to one of the best military brains in Europe, but also to words which Marshal Foch himself might have used had he been in the same place. Everyone knew of the relations which had existed between Marshal Foch and the lecturer during the Great War; there had never been a finer military combination. This was largely because the two men had always thought alike on any large issue and this was one of the reasons why matters had proceeded so successfully after Marshal Foch had been given Supreme Command.

"MEIN KAMPF" AND EUROPE[1]

R. C. K. ENSOR

VERY few great men of action have ever disclosed beforehand so clearly as Adolf Hitler the principles and purposes that guide their acts. Building up a mass movement almost from the bottom, he had to be exceptionally frank with his disciples from quite an early stage. After the European War he began looking very far ahead. He sought to create, not an ordinary political party which might play a give-and-take rôle among a lot of others, but a revolutionary party which should sweep the national board and brush all the other parties away. Nor was even that revolution the goal of his aims. He desired power not so much for its own sake as for the subsequent course of national policy upon which it would enable him to launch the German people. When it is said sometimes that Hitler is sincere, I think that that is what is meant, and I think it is true. His course, as we shall see, would necessitate the people being ready to endure hardship, to strain every muscle, and eventually to fight a great war. It was not in Hitler's creed that a mass of 60 or 80 million human beings could be carried successfully through an ordeal like that in ignorance. If they were to achieve the journey they must know why they marched. He must enable them to adopt his motives as their own. Therefore he had got to show them what his motives were. It meant much more than attracting them to a political programme in the ordinary sense. He had to give them a whole new *Weltanschauung*, a new way of viewing the universe; a new interpretation, that is, of the meaning of life and the objects of national policy. Of that *Weltanschauung*—pardon my using the word, but there is no compact word in English that quite gives the meaning—*Mein Kampf* is the exposition. It is not, on the face of it, a systematic exposition. It was written in two parts, separately; the first in 1924, during a period of detention in a fortress to which Hitler was sentenced for his part in the Munich *Putsch* fiasco of November 1923; and the second after his liberation. The last page of it is dated November 1926.

[1] Address given at Chatham House on May 4th, 1939; Dr. G. P. Gooch in the Chair.

It is a hotch-potch of the most varied ingredients. Much of it is autobiography, much is doctrine, a good deal is history (often bad history) and much is polemics (usually very abusive polemics). Hitler's powerful mind never underwent in his youth any higher education. In adult life he undoubtedly has read a great deal, besides arguing and making speeches. But his lack of formal intellectual discipline shows itself in a marked incapacity to arrange his material. He jumps from one topic to another, like the open-air speaker that he used to be. He is full of repetitions and digressions. And though he does, of course, make some show of grouping particular subjects in particular chapters, it is broadly true to say of the book that any subject may turn up on almost any page. That renders it confusing and boring to the foreign reader, and explains why so few foreigners have, I think, effectively read it. And yet it really is a very powerful book, not merely because, if you read it in the German, the terse, harsh staccato rhetoric gives you the sense of a very strong personality, but because, while it lacks logical sequence, it by no means lacks logic. Its varied themes do cohere, and are masterfully bound together to form a single network of wide-reaching yet consistent argumentation.

Another hindrance to the foreign reader is that without a knowledge that in most cases he will not possess he can hardly appreciate the interest of the autobiographical part. And yet that is a very important part. Hitler himself says expressly that the key to his whole mental development lies in his pre-War experiences at Vienna; and it is clear that, at any rate on the emotional side, his guiding hates were derived from that—hatred of the Habsburgs, of the Czechs, of the Jews, of the Socialists, and of parliamentary institutions. It was from observing the Viennese Socialists, he also tells us, that he learned the methods of terrorisation and gangsterism which he himself adopted and perfected, first for national and later for international purposes. Here are two passages which form an interesting account of that technique. The first runs :—

" The mentality of the people at large is not sensitive to anything hesitant and weak. Like a woman whose inner sensibilities are not so much swayed by reason as by a vague emotional longing after the strength that is her complement and who would therefore rather bow to a strong man than lord it over a weak man, so the masses would sooner be bossed than supplicated, and feel more reassured by a doctrine that brooks no rival than by one that offers them a liberal choice. With the latter they scarcely know how to deal; and tend

therefore to feel let down. Of the barefaced intimidation practised on their minds, or the violent outrage committed upon their human liberty, they are no more conscious than they are of the whole doctrine's fallacies. They see only the ruthless force and brutality of its determined utterances, to which in the end they always succumb."

There you see a view of human nature like that expressed in three well-known lines of Browning:

> " Oh, the crowd must have emphatic warrant!
> Right arm's rod-sweep, tongue's imperial fiat!
> Never dares the man put off the prophet."

Hitler does not put off the prophet. He has based his practice on that principle, and his book exemplifies it at every turn. And yet such is its extraordinary candour in this and in many other matters that even while doing so it admits what it is doing.

Here is my second passage:—

"The Social Democrats would pick out the adversary whom they thought most formidable [this is an account of the Social Democrats in Vienna and their technique for dealing with political enemies] and on a given signal discharge against him a regular drumfire of lies and slanders. They went on with it, until the nerves of the other side broke down and to get some peace they sacrificed the victim. Only they never got their peace, the fools! The same tactics were repeated over and over again until fear of the mad dogs exercised through suggestion the effect of paralysis."

Well, you could scarcely get a better description of how Hitler himself has dealt with his opponents—first in internal German politics, and then in the international field with such men as Schuschnigg and Beneš. He tells us quite frankly in the book how, observing what the Socialists did, he resolved to copy them and was confident he could better their example.

But let us return to our main track. To follow Hitler's argument in all its branches would be a task far beyond our scale and scope to-night. What I propose to attempt here is to give the briefest outline that I can contrive of his general *Weltanschauung*, and then in more detail show how he applies it in the field of politics and particularly in that of foreign policy.

He starts with a theory, largely false but fanatically believed in, of race. Mankind consists of many and varied races, but the law of higher life and progress, whether spiritual, artistic, economic, is due to one of them only—variously called Aryan or Nordic. This race has acted and re-enacted, countless times over in history, a particular drama. Members of it having, in virtue of their native superiority, overrun large non-Aryan regions and

subdued the non-Aryan inhabitants to their purposes, have built up on the basis of the non-Aryans' brute labour a great edifice of civilisation. These edifices have in turn decayed and collapsed. Why? Hitler's answer is: through miscegenation. The conquering ruling minority has intermarried with its subjects, and being much fewer than they has had its blood swamped by theirs. Only by keeping its blood pure could it have preserved and extended the civilisation, which sprang from its hereditary racial qualities and from them alone. The business therefore of a modern Nordic nation whose blood is that of the supreme race, is to keep that blood pure, and at the same time to maximise its pure offspring in every possible way and to quarter it out over the face of the earth as strongly as possible. Its spread and its dominance are desirable, not only in its own interests, but in those of the rest of mankind, who can hope to derive progress and civilisation from no other source.

Now when you ask what modern nations find themselves in this exalted position of duty and privilege, the answer first and foremost is: the Germans. Germany is the Nordic Great Power. The only other great European nation with any comparable claim is the British. Our past success in quartering out a largely Nordic stock over vast areas of the world outside Europe always evokes Hitler's sincere respect; as you remember it did in his last speech to the German Parliament. But no such even partial equality is conceded to any of Germany's chief neighbours. The French were always a people of mongrels, and are now on the way to becoming a "mulatto empire." As for the Slavs, of whatever kind, they belong to a totally inferior order of humanity and have, as against Germans, no moral rights. If a German ruler conquers Slav land and dispossesses its Slavs in order to settle Germans on it, he is doing not merely a patriotic but a highly moral act; since it is the interest of humanity as a whole that the habitat of the higher race should be extended. A logical but rather unexpected corollary of the same theory is that it is wrong to Germanise subject Slavs. Hitler inveighs against the policies of Habsburg rulers like Joseph II who tried to make the Czechs speak German. For him it is the race that is vital, not the language, and a German-speaking Slav is a danger to race purity. It is one of the few glaring inconsistencies in his book that while inveighing against the Habsburgs on that score he also blames bitterly the Badeni language decrees and other concessions to the Slav languages made under Francis Joseph. But that indeed, like much else of his intense hatred of

the Habsburgs, seems to be mere blind prejudice inherited from his youthful activity as a follower of pan-Germanism in pre-War Vienna.

The general picture, then, is of one strong creative race and a varied lot of weak non-creative races, who are as wax for the strong race to mould. But there is yet another race to be accounted for, whose faults are not negative but positive, a sort of Satan among the nations. It is active, aggressive, it has no *Lebensraum* of its own, but preys parasitically on that of others, and even permeates the Nordic paradise itself, poisoning, polluting, paralysing. That race is the Jews. The difference between them and races like the Slavs is that while the latter may be quite useful in the German habitat, if they are kept down in a servile capacity, the Jews cannot be tolerated in any capacity. The only way to deal with them is to get rid of them altogether.

Now these doctrines may sound crude; as indeed they are. But they were exceedingly well-suited for German consumption after the War. To begin with, it is and has long been an almost universal habit among Germans to regard themselves as a race naturally gifted above all other races, a sort of top and crown of mankind. No other great people, I think, has quite an equivalent habit. French, British, Americans, each commonly believe that their particular nation has the greatest record in the world, and are ready to strain history to prove it. But you do not find them feeling that their race is a separate species of humanity, superior to any other. The Germans do. There are some fairly obvious reasons for it, I think. For French, British and Americans the political unit, the nation, is what unites. But the Germans before Bismarck never had been a nation in the political sense, and even Bismarck brought only about three-quarters of them under a common flag. Hence they thought of themselves not as a nation but as a people, a *Volk*, and so, if you like, a race, scattered about Europe under many flags, and everywhere far superior to the people among whom they lived. Note, too, that their sense of superiority was not unplausible. Everywhere in Central and Eastern Europe the German populations can be seen by the naked eye to be hard-working, thrifty, honest, progressive, with clean persons, clean houses, decent sanitation and well-attended schools. By contrast the Slavs (the Czechs alone excepted) have much lower standards, and appear in the mass as being backward, thriftless, shifty, dirty, verminous, insanitary and illiterate. " Where Germanism ends," a German once said to me, " the louse and the bug begin."

The reasons for this difference are not really race, of course, but may be found much more in history, tradition, religion, economics and other things. But the difference is there, and race pride was not a surprising result.

That is why the Eastern post-War settlements rankled so bitterly in Germany. Even Liberal Germans thought that the freedom of Poles or Czechs was too dearly purchased, if it entailed putting German minorities under them. They felt rather as Americans would if a foreign conqueror were to put the Southern States under negro rule. Even in 1927, when Germany was perhaps more peaceful and more republican than at any other time, and when there happened to be some small controversies with Poland, I could not, on a visit, find anyone who would discuss the Poles on any other hypothesis than that they were in effect sub-human. When, therefore, Hitler proclaimed the Germans a ruling race, and denounced the post-War Treaties as an infamous violation of the rights of the ruling race, and insisted not only on abrogating them but on aiming to bring all Germans under the German flag and on immensely extending the German habitat, it gave his readers and hearers the same sort of satisfaction that one might imagine a bow feels when its string has been drawn abnormally taut and it is suddenly released to spring away in the other direction.

Let us next examine more specially this question of the German people's habitat, for in it is the key to Hitler's foreign policy. The main discussions about it are in the fourth chapter of the first part and the thirteenth and fourteenth chapters of the second part of his book, but it keeps cropping up all over the book and always in terms that are clear, consistent, fundamental. Every people, says Hitler, if it is to live healthily must have a sufficient area to live in. Further, since as we have seen it is the duty of the Nordic race rapidly to increase its numbers, Germany, as the home of the great Nordic people, must have a large amount of extra space for future expansion. Now, how is she situated in these respects? The answer is that she has nothing like enough land for the present, let alone for the future. With an annual increase given by Hitler as 900,000, she must face famine unless ways and means are found which will forestall the danger of misery and hunger. Four solutions, says Hitler, are possible. (1) Contraceptive limitation of births. That is rejected; being, of course, in complete disagreement with his whole position. (2) " Internal colonisation," a German phrase meaning what we should call a small-holdings movement. This,

he says rightly enough, could never cover any large part of the problem. (3) Acquisition of new territory beyond the existing frontiers, enabling more Germans to live by the land. (4) Increase of manufactures for export enabling more Germans to live on the existing territory by foreign trade. The real choice is between (3) and (4). The rulers of pre-War Germany from 1870 onwards chose (4), that is, industrialisation for export. They ought, says Hitler, to have chosen (3)—more peasant production in a greatly enlarged national territory.

Why does Hitler reject the export solution? For three reasons. First, because it involves urbanising and proletarianising the people. Himself a poor country boy driven to Vienna to earn his living, he hates the process. Secondly, because it puts German life at the mercy of vicissitudes in foreign countries which it cannot control. Thirdly, a too compact country is vulnerable in war. A country like Russia or the United States with its population well spread out over a vast area derives defensive strength from its very vastness. A certain size is necessary for the seat of a World Power. At present Germany is not one. But she must become one or perish. What size, then? Well, look at Soviet Russia, says Hitler, look at the British Empire or the United States, China or even the French Empire. Beside any of these Germany's existing territory seems in another class. She must expand. But how? Overseas colonies will not do for this purpose, since none could be obtained suitable for settling millions of white peasants. On the other hand, east of Germany's present living space, in the vast plain of Central and Eastern Europe, immense fertile areas exist as yet thinly populated by inferior peoples. Able to be reached by land, to be conquered and held by the army, and to form with existing Germany a single continuous realm, those areas provide the only and the perfect solution. But how can they be obtained? How, answers Hitler, originally were the two Ostmarks obtained, East Prussia and Austria? How indeed, if you look back far enough, were most of the present German territories obtained? By the German sword followed up by the German plough. Hitler does not flinch from the frank avowal that his policy must be one of annexation by force and that the main victim to be despoiled is Russia. He answers objectors on the first point by saying that all frontiers and all titles to territory were established by force originally, and on the second by pointing to Russia's Bolshevik disorganisation as a providential opportunity for Germany. But the bedrock policy is clear.

Germany can only save herself by a vast eastern annexation. She can only achieve the annexation by a European war, and for that war she must start arming herself at top speed at once. Not only limitation of arms but every confining shackle of the Versailles system Germany must in due course ruthlessly strike away. The actual order of the steps taken since 1933—rearmament, remilitarisation of the Rhineland, absorption of Austria, subjugation of Czechoslovakia, and next the prospective subjection of Poland and Roumania—has conformed to a perfectly logical sequence. As to the stage at which Hitler would have to fight his decisive war, it is clear that he hoped, as results proved rightly, that rearmament, remilitarisation of the Rhineland and Austria could be achieved without fighting. The Czechoslovak stage he was bound to assume could not. He was ready to launch the supreme war last September. And to-day it may even be that he feels sorry because, yielding to others, he did not do so.

I am aware that some English experts do not attach all that importance to the idea of *Lebensraum* in Hitler's thinking, but unless he has changed since *Mein Kampf*, of which there is less than no evidence, I think they are clearly wrong. For in the book it is the cardinal concept in foreign policy. It comes out at all sorts of points. It founds, for instance, the whole of the long, vehement and in some ways very acute criticisms, which he passes on Germany's pre-War foreign policies. The real task, he says, for her pre-War statesmen was to provide new *Lebensraum* for Germans; and what they ought to have done was to take advantage of England's long hostility to Russia to ally themselves with her in an anti-Russian war, and get the necessary annexations as the reward of victory. What they did instead was to mess about with colonies, exports and a navy, thereby antagonising England; and to prop up the rotten bulk of Austria-Hungary, which, lying between them and Eastern Europe, actually shut them off from what should have been their goal. In the same way he denounces post-War reversions, like Rapallo, to the old tradition of Prusso-Russian friendship. But it is not merely his thoughts on foreign policy, but his thoughts on home policy also, that are rigidly hitched to this waggon. He is, at heart, as I have said, a countryman. His hatred for the misery and degradation which he saw in working-class Vienna, is blistering. He regards factories and great cities as man-eaters, farms and craft-trades as man-makers. Beyond the industries that are needed to provide war materials, he does not want any more

than will create autarkic reciprocity between town and country, each deriving all that it needs from the other and consuming the whole of the other's output. His conception of the future Great Germany is essentially a rural one; and if he were to swerve from his scheme of annexation, he would have not only to eat almost every word that he has written about foreign policy, but to deny all his domestic ideals regarding the basis of what he considers a desirable life for the human race. Over and over again it recurs. Let me just give you some examples: "Frontiers to States are made by men and men can alter them." "The *right* to acquire land and soil can become a *duty*, if without an extension of soil a great people appears doomed to destruction." Or let me read you the conclusion of the matter as expressed on one of the last pages of the book: "The rightness of that foreign policy can only be recognised in a bare century's time, if by then 250 million Germans are living on this continent—and living, not squeezed together as factory coolies for the rest of the world, but as peasants and workers who, through what they produce, reciprocally assure a livelihood to each other." You see the points there. You see first of all the immense figure—250 million Germans in a century. And you see he wants them to be well spread out. Eighty million Germans are at present living on an area that is certainly not more than two-thirds, perhaps not more than half, what it should be in his view. You have got to double the territory and then treble the population. It means an empire something like five or six times the present area of Germany. That, of course, means absorbing not only the Ukraine as it was ceded under the Treaty of Brestlitovsk, but a very much larger area. Mind you, geographically those areas do exist. The Euro-Asiatic land mass is far the most enormous thing in the world, and it is thinly populated; the Germans could spread eastward right over it. Secondly, there is that vivid phrase about factory coolies. There you see the Hitler view (and I venture to say every born countryman's view) of the idea of making a white country the workshop of the world: the *factory coolies* of the rest of the world!

Now those, I think, are key sentences in *Mein Kampf*. Far more so than sayings more often quoted in our newspapers, like that about France as the eternal enemy. As a matter of fact, Hitler himself says about France that he will only be obliged to fight her in order to clear his rear, because he feels sure that she will not stand by and let him seize his prey without interfering.

Ought, then, France—and ought Great Britain—to stand by

and give him what has been called a free hand in the east? We know that some influential people, especially in the City of London, have been advocating that in recent years. And indeed to a considerable extent the idea underlay the jettisoning of Czechoslovakia last autumn. But it surely will not pass the test of thought. The new German empire would be so strongly placed, so populous, so rich in every resource and so self-sufficing, so powerful in every way, that no other nation could stand against it. I have heard naïve people object that Great Britain at least could save her Empire by her Navy. They forget that navies to-day are things of steel, quickly built and quickly outbuilt, and that an impregnable continental block which in man-power, steel-power, coal-power, oil-power, stood to this island as a giant to a pigmy, would not be likely to allow the island very much longer to rule the seas, or indeed to rule anything else. No, when we come to see what is the goal of Hitler's Germany we cannot take refuge in the idea that it does not concern us.

It is a crazy book, *Mein Kampf*, and yet, as I have said, an extremely powerful one. Behind its crudities there is a blend of intense idealism and crabbed argument, a combination that often rather reminds us, though Hitler would abhor the comparison, of St. Paul. In an age of moral relaxation and hedonistic self-seeking Hitler stood out unabashed as the apostle of effort, duty, self-sacrifice, the idealistic subordination of individual interests to those of the community; and he won his power on that appeal. Never did anybody live more emphatically by the belief that spirit dominates matter, that where there is a will there is a way.

Now let me read you just one other passage. Hitler has been saying here that Germany must be armed, and has met with the objection: "How can we rearm? We have no arms; we are surrounded by armed neighbours who do not want us to have any, and have forbidden us to have any; how can we move to do anything?" Hitler says:

"The question of recovering German power is not, 'How can we manufacture arms?' but 'How can we produce the spirit which makes a people able to carry arms?' If that spirit rules a people, the will finds thousands of ways, any one of which will get the arms for them. Give a coward ten pistols, and when he is attacked he will not be able to fire one shot. Those pistols are of less use to him than a mere blackthorn would be to a brave man."

Well, I do not like Hitler, frankly, and I think he is a world danger. But he is, if ever a man was, *der mutige Mann*.

Summary of Discussion.

DR. G. P. GOOCH (in the Chair) said that it was the first time that a book had been chosen as the subject of an address at the Institute. For this there were many good reasons. *Mein Kampf* stood in a class by itself. Firstly, it was the best best-seller in the world. The sales had already passed the five million mark; Mr. Wells' *Outline of History* was running between the two and three million mark.

Secondly, *Mein Kampf* might be said to have "made history." Politically it was the most influential book which had appeared in any part of the world within the present century, and would probably rank in generations to come with those great explosive works such as *The Communist Manifesto* of Karl Marx, perhaps the most influential political book of the nineteenth century, and Burke's *Reflections on the French Revolution*, of which George III had said in memorable words that every gentleman ought to read it.

Thirdly, *Mein Kampf* was a political autobiography and apologia, and as such only one of a very large family, including Clarendon, Bismarck, von Bülow, Lord Grey and Mr. Lloyd George, not to mention many others; but whereas most of these books were written at the end of a man's life, as a chronicle and a guide for those who should come after him, Hitler's autobiography had been written not after he had finished his work, but just as he was beginning it. Therefore, although the autobiographical part was very interesting, and indeed indispensable to an understanding of one of the most complex figures on the modern stage, more interesting even still was the programme. Already a great deal of that programme had been carried out. Certainly this book, which was such an extraordinary medley of wisdom and folly, phantasy and statesmanship, could not be ignored, and it was a very good thing that there was now on sale an English translation for those who knew no German.

QUESTION: Where, among the races other than Aryans, had Hitler placed the Italians? Had he spoken of Germany needing allies, and had an Axis ever been contemplated in *Mein Kampf*?

MR. ENSOR said that in *Mein Kampf* Hitler had said that Germany must never again make the mistake she had made in 1914 in getting all the nations against her. She must divide Europe, and some of the peoples must be on her side. In considering those who could be on her side, he had decided upon England and Italy; and since gaining power he had wooed England and won Italy.

QUESTION: How far did the people of Germany really believe in *Mein Kampf*?

MR. ENSOR replied that the extent to which Hitler, at any given moment, was carrying the nation with him was always difficult to

estimate, but, broadly speaking, he had swept the country, of that there could be no doubt.

MR. C. H. LUKE asked whether the lecturer would not agree that the philosophy expressed in *Mein Kampf* was no more than the coping-stone of German agitation over the centuries through her philosophers and teachers.

MR. ENSOR said that he had explained that before Hitler had come to power the people of Germany had considered themselves as belonging to a superior race. The reasons for this could be found quite a long way back in their history. Fichte had been partly responsible for it, but it had become very marked since about the middle of the last century, because in the early part of the last century Germany had achieved a very remarkable simultaneity of excellences. There had been the great German universities—scholarship and history practically refounded, philosophy developed beyond anything attempted in any other country, progress, too, in the natural sciences. At the same time the great German musicians had made music appear almost a German monopoly, and simultaneously had come Goethe and Schiller. In the same period Germany had come to the top in war, defeating Napoleon at Leipzig and Waterloo. All these things occurring simultaneously constituted rather a remarkable achievement.

QUESTION: Did not the lecturer think that the desperate solution of Eastern Europe as laid down in the Versailles Treaty had facilitated Hitler's plans to take over the Succession States piecemeal?

MR. ENSOR said that he did not consider the solutions for Eastern Europe contained in the Versailles Treaty as desperate. Broadly speaking, he thought that they had been just solutions. Certain things had been omitted. It would have been a good thing to set up some sort of economic system between the Succession States. Broadly speaking, however, he thought it right that the Poles, the Czechs and the Roumanians should be free.

QUESTION: Had any mention of naval power been made in *Mein Kampf*, or did Hitler consider that power on land would be sufficient? Had he mentioned possible conflict with any naval Power?

MR. ENSOR replied that Hitler's general argument was that, if land supremacy were secured, then all these things would be added unto it. But in the meantime it was necessary to avoid the mistake made by earlier German statesmen of trying to do the whole thing at once. Pre-War German statesmen had made the great mistake of antagonising Great Britain before they had solved the French and Russian problem.

QUESTION: The lecturer had stated that Hitler had thought that

free advertisement in the world press, while the spokesman of the oth(remained silent, or was content with a neat phrase about "declama tion" or "defence, not defiance," the only possible result was that th undefended thesis should seem to go by default. All the more satis factory was it to see, at long last, Lord Halifax's refutation of th absurd myth that Britain went to war with Germany in 1914 to rui her trade (and this refutation was an admirable example of *suaviter i modo*), and again *The Times'* challenge to that other myth that German was not beaten in the field but only surrendered on terms which w then failed to observe.

A similar myth was the old charge of encirclement, between 1908 an 1914, and once again to-day. This had been often denied in the Hous of Commons, but it was necessary that it should be not merely denied but *refuted*, on the basis of the historical facts, by an official spokesman and this would be perfectly possible, without undue verbosity or displa of academic learning. Explode the pre-war *Einkreisung* myth, anc you were in a fair way to exploding the new version (and incidentally the very dangerous legend that Poland and the Ukraine were thinl populated and therefore suited for alien colonisation, whereas ir reality both are very thickly populated). It seemed to him vita that both our statesmen and our historians should take this matter up and see that the British case was presented, in *German*, on the wireless to the German public, in urbane, conciliatory, but absolutely firm anc concrete form, with chapter and verse for every assertion.

MR. J. A. HUTTON said that the character of Herr Hitler was showr very clearly in *Mein Kampf*. Immediately one saw the contrast between him and his partner in the Axis. Mussolini was the oppor tunist, pure and simple, whose policy changed from day to day, and whc took whatever was offered. Hitler had declared his policy in advance and it had been there for all to see, though many had been unti recently extremely blind. The basis of that policy was Germany's living room; she must expand. If that statement were accepted Germany was at the moment the victim of a policy of encirclement tc prevent her from carrying out this necessary expansion. Right through the book he inveighed against encirclement and stressed thc fact that Germany must never again fight on two fronts. The major war must come, but not until Germany was sure of victory. Great Britain was to remain neutral till the minor Powers were destroyed and Germany was powerful enough to dictate to this little island. But by her guarantees to Poland and Roumania Great Britain had suddenly stopped Hitler from marching farther east without having to fight on the west at the same time. The result had been a sudden outburst of anti-British propaganda entirely contrary to the policy outlined in *Mein Kampf*. The speaker foresaw immediate danger to Europe not in the east but in the west, possibly through Spain and Gibraltar. It was not so long since Poland had been one of the wolves round Czecho-slovakia. Poland had a desire to become a colonial Power; this could

not be achieved as a result of a war with Germany, but could be done by dividing up the British Empire with Germany. So, were hostilities to break out in the west without the east being affected, it might be possible for Germany to maintain neutrality on her eastern front and to seek, first, her living space in the west.

MR. C. H. LUKE said that Herr Hitler had been very fortunate in the people with whom he had been dealing. He had been surprised at the lecturer's strong statement with regard to German character and ability. Certainly Germany was a great nation, but was any nation really great who could be led by the type of statements made in *Mein Kampf*? He could not see that the world was going to sink under the thunderbolt of a man who spoke as Hitler did in *Mein Kampf*. It should be realised that such plausible statements as that Poland should have peace for twenty-five years if Danzig were allowed to become part of the Reich had a much deeper meaning than at first appeared. There was a quotation in *The Times* of that morning (May 4th, 1939) from the *Osservatore Romano* in which the writer said that the command of Danzig and the mouth of the Vistula was one of the main routes to the hegemony of Europe. If there was talk about whether Danzig was worth a war, it would be desirable to remember that if Danzig went back to the Reich, Hitler would soon be in a position to fortify it and to throttle the nations of Eastern Europe from Poland down to the Black Sea. There was more in the matter than Hitler's command of language and his power over his people. No man would have been able to dominate the United States or the British Empire as Hitler had dominated Germany, and it should be remembered that throughout the ages Germany had never been anything but a nation endeavouring to terrorise somebody. Yet, in spite of this, for hundreds of years she had existed as a number of small States. If Great Britain and America and the other democratic nations were to stand up to Germany and to call Hitler's bluff, then the Reich would soon slip back into the number of small countries into which she had been divided in the past.

MR. G. SOLOVEYTCHIK said that the lecturer had remarked that no nation could maintain a fleet which had not got command of iron and steel. According to *The Daily Telegraph*, Great Britain was at present importing iron and steel from Australia. If with her present industrial apparatus Great Britain needed to import iron and steel, what would be her position if Germany had command not only of the sources on the Continent but also command of the seas? This should be remembered, especially in view of the lecturer's remark that a fleet was not only rapidly built, but rapidly outbuilt.

Concerning Hitler's policy towards Russia, of course *Mein Kampf* did state his desire for the Ukraine and certain parts of Russia, but it should be remembered that up to the signing of the Franco-Soviet Pact Hitler had made friendly overtures to Russia. In an interview with Mr. Ward Price in Berlin in February 1934 he had said that the

idea that Germany would take Russian territory was ridiculous. Later, when reviewing his achievements in a speech in the Reichstag, he had emphasised as one of his successes the friendly relations existing between Germany and Russia, and expressed the hope that in spite of ideological differences they would continue to be so. It had not been until July 1934, with the signing of the Franco-Soviet Pact, that he had become so bitterly anti-Russian and presented himself as an anti-Communist crusader. This had certainly served a purpose, particularly with regard to his relations with certain circles in Great Britain, but if the situation were to continue as at present and the negotiations between the latter and the Soviet Union did not result in any definite agreement, it might be that Hitler and Stalin would again be exchanging compliments. It was by no means beyond the realm of possibility that the resignation of Litvinov, which had been described throughout the world press as a great mystery, might be a first move in this direction.

MR. WILSON HARRIS said that great stress had been laid upon the enormous circulation and effect of *Mein Kampf*. It did not, however, necessarily follow that because a book had a vast circulation that it had a vast influence. In Germany every newly married couple had to have a copy of *Mein Kampf*, every member of the Party and every civil servant also was expected to possess a copy; but there was no law requiring it to be read, and it would not be surprising to learn that it had not been read by many of the people who had it in their possession. How, in fact, had Hitler established his ascendancy over the German people and how was it being maintained to-day? He had first persuaded Hindenburg to make him Chancellor. Then one of his entourage had staged the firing of the Reichstag, which had very nearly caused him to win his first election, so nearly that with the Nationalists he had established a majority in the Reichstag. He had used this to excommunicate the Communist Party and thereby secure a majority. During this time he had used his private army to intimidate the population. He had then proceeded to institute a régime of concentration camps. Herr Himmler had begun his great and successful work. He had secured possession of the Press and the radio and had circulated lies and suppressed the truth. Spies had been established in every block of flats and in every factory, letters had been opened and telephone communications listened to; was it astonishing that in these circumstances Herr Hitler had succeeded in dominating the German people?

MR. FRANK HARDIE said that he wished to supplement the point made by Professor Seton-Watson about the importance of refuting the arguments of Herr Hitler by a plain unvarnished statement of the facts over the wireless and in German; he wanted to suggest that there were in Great Britain a great number of distinguished German refugees whose services could be most usefully employed in this connection and who would most willingly give those services.

LIEUT.-COLONEL C. WALEY-COHEN said that it would be very interesting to hear how much of Hitler's foreign policy as contained in *Mein Kampf* was his own and how much had come from his entourage. His ideas concerning a Mittel-Europa were very like those which had had their birth between 1901 and 1913 in Bohemia, which had eventually been absorbed into Czechoslovakia. He had heard the view that a great deal of the detail of Hitler's foreign policy had come from his entourage, and from descendants and successors of those with similar ideas before the War.

MR. ENSOR said that Professor Seton-Watson had contributed an admirable supplement to his own address.

It had been suggested that the refusal of Great Britain to allow Germany to proceed eastwards unchecked might change Hitler's orientation for the time being. This might be so, as he was a very elastic tactician. He had a perfectly clear goal from which he would never swerve, but he would be prepared to approach it from the best possible angle and if he felt the menace in his rear, Great Britain as well as France, to be too great, he might think it a good policy to join with Mussolini and try to isolate the two Western Powers by buying off the Eastern Powers for the time being. It was most probable that he was trying to do that at the present moment. Whether M. Litvinov's resignation indicated a sensational success in this direction was not known, but it was a natural interpretation.

Concerning his statements about German pre-eminence in certain fields, he had not wished to suggest that the Germans were necessarily the greatest people in the world, but that between 1790 and 1830 they had had a great simultaneous flowering in many directions: poets, philosophers, historians, scientists, scholars and musicians. No other nation had ever produced quite so many eminent men and men of genius in so many different fields within so short a space of time.

It was true that Danzig was one of the key points of Europe, and if ever there were such a thing as a people's "living space," then Danzig belonged to Poland. The Poles were the people of the Vistula.

He did not think that much importance need be attached to the fact that Great Britain was importing iron and steel from Australia. A great deal of iron and steel had always been imported by the big iron and steel countries. Before the War Great Britain had tended largely to import German steel to build her ships. This had been more ominous, but there was no reason why she should not now buy some from Australia. A curious thing was that a great deal of the steel with which Germany had carried out her rearmament had been sold to her by England and France; and she was still receiving quite a lot from them.

It might be true that in 1934 Hitler had said that he did not want Russian territory. Later than that he had said that he did not want Czech territory. On the other hand, a Russo-German *rapprochement*

was quite possible. After Rapallo there had been a large number of Russian Army officers who had been in close contact with their German opposite numbers; and there had been a good deal of talk about making some sort of bargain over the Ukraine. Very few Russian officers thought that they could stand up to Germany. The earthen pot and the iron pot had often clashed, and always the earthen pot had been broken. This might be to the detriment of Great Britain.

The influence of *Mein Kampf* had certainly been very small outside Germany, but in Germany there was no doubt that its contents were well known and had been swallowed whole by the younger and more active elements in the country. Some months ago he had spoken with a very intelligent German refugee who had left the country only in November. He had said that the educated classes and the great landowners were now bitterly sorry that they had ever allowed the Nazi régime to be established, but the proletariat as a body were for the Government. Those who before had been Communists and Socialists were now Nazis, as were all the youth of the country; and until some disaster changed their outlook they would continue to be so. Of course the régime had been maintained by force. It was the only way in which such a régime could be maintained. Very much the same type of thing had occurred during the régime of Napoleon III. The same type of thing was taking place in Italy.

How many of Hitler's ideas were his own and how many had come from his entourage was an interesting topic for speculation. But the important thing was that he had made those ideas his own. Fundamentally, in that sense, he was sincere. He had a creed which he was prepared to carry through to the end.

AIR POWER [1]

H. E. WIMPERIS, C.B., C.B.E.

AIRCRAFT are much in mind in these days because of the amazing growth in their speed, in their climbing capacity, in their range and in their carrying power. Air power, thus grown in strength, is a powerful supplement to other and older forms of military and naval force and in considering the air arm you will therefore understand that I shall find it necessary now and again to refer to sea power in various parts of the world and the relationship of air power to it.

To begin with I want to present a picture to your minds which may be novel: not because it is particularly original, but because most people do not think in that way. We look on aircraft as flying practically anywhere: north to south, east to west, up to almost indefinite heights, a three-dimensional movement at will. Is that correct? At the Geological Museum at South Kensington there is a huge globe of the earth, perhaps eight feet in diameter; call it eight, because that means that one foot represents a thousand miles. This huge globe is rotating on an axis which is inclined just as the earth's axis is inclined. If you take your stand so that the equator rises above eye level and look at the Pacific Ocean as it comes by, almost everything you see is water. This gives one an impression that nothing else I have ever seen, even crossing the Pacific, gives of the enormous size of that ocean, and the amount of water there is in the world. If we represent the highest mountain and the deepest ocean on the same scale (one foot as a thousand miles), the highest mountain would be one-sixteenth part of an inch high, and the deepest ocean one-sixteenth part of an inch deep; and the highest height ever flown by an aeroplane would be one-eighth of an inch above the surface of that globe. Those are very small amounts. Again, if you contract the whole globe so that you can hold it in your hand, say an eight-inch globe, then the height of the highest-flying aeroplane is represented by no more than the thickness of a piece of paper. In other words, the whole field of flying that we think of as so large and three-dimensional is really confined

[1] Address given at Chatham House on May 23rd, 1939; Marshal of the R.A.F. the Viscount Trenchard, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., D.S.O., in the Chair.

within a thin shell which to the scale of an eight-inch globe is represented by the thickness of a piece of paper, and so is all the flying that can ever be done. So long as an aeroplane wants air to breathe in its engine and air to sustain the load on its wings, so long must human flying be confined within this very thin shell.

But in the thickness of that shell the aeroplane can do a great deal. It can be used as a convenient and very rapid means of civil transport. It can also be used as a long-range gun, and it is its capacity for this use that has made air power. People are inclined to think that the liability of this island to bombardment from other shores is solely the result of the coming of aircraft. This is not true. In the Great War " Big Bertha " shelled Paris from over seventy miles away, firing shells weighing between 200 and 300 pounds from a naval fifteen-inch gun, fitted with a long liner, at twice the ordinary muzzle velocity. The shell travelled enormous distances. But these could now be increased easily, so that whether aircraft existed or not, cities in this country as near to the coast as is London could be bombarded from a continental base. That is sometimes forgotten. And although the aeroplane, regarded as a gun, may not compare in efficiency with ordinary artillery within the range of "Big Berthas"—100 miles or so—nevertheless when you come to ranges very much bigger than that, the aeroplane has the capacity of being able to deliver its charge at distances which artillery can never approach. It is true that that is not the only use to which aircraft can be put as part of air power. They can also be used for reconnaissance, photography, troop-carrying, and many other purposes, but it is the bombing aeroplane and its counter-measure, the interceptor fighter, that are chiefly important in the consideration of air power.

I have spoken of the enormous size of the Pacific, and if we consider the possibility of air power being added to the existing naval power in that Ocean, we find some rather interesting points to consider. Consider, for instance, the number of countries around that huge ocean. I cannot do better here than quote from a broadcast address by Sir Frederick Whyte. He spoke of the immense variety of the scene :

" From the perishing cold of Dutch Harbour where America is building a great air base, down through the pleasant warm air of Hawaii, which Captain Cook originally called the Sandwich Islands, and the more tropical richness of Fiji, and through the thousand Coral Islands of the Southern Pacific, down to the cold of the South Pole itself. And

across it, in every direction, from the Panama Canal to Auckland and Sydney, from Vancouver to Yokohama, from Batavia and Somabaya to Brisbane, from Vladivostok to San Francisco, from Singapore to Shanghai and Kobe, from Seattle to Manila, is stretched a vast network of shipping lines, under all flags, Norwegian and Dutch, Swedish and Chinese, but mostly American, Japanese and British, carrying the trade of half the world and asking only peace in which to carry it." [1]

That is a graphic description of this great area; Hawaii in the centre is a great fortress, an air base. The Japanese air base nearest to Australia is Pelew Island, about 1200 miles from Darwin. But there are many others at somewhat greater distances, and from them attacks on the continent of Australia would be possible with the growing range of aircraft, though, as may be seen from the map, the situation is affected a great deal by the chain of so many British, French and Dutch islands which could act as scouting bases and advance bases for our own aircraft. When I say our own, I mean those provided by the Home Government and by the Commonwealth of Australia, which is now making a very special effort. There will be a base at Darwin, an important base is talked of in the Fiji Islands, as well as others.

What is the position of the United States in this strategic area? They have a very important air and naval base at Hawaii, and they have the Island of Guam, the biggest of the Japanese mandated Ladrone Islands. This island was captured by the cruiser *Charleston* in the American-Spanish War of 1898, and has remained American ever since. But if we regard Hawaii as associated in any way with the defence of the Philippine Islands, the distance to be covered is very great. If Manila is to be associated in defence with Hawaii, something needs to be done about the defence of Guam, distant about 1500 miles from the Philippines. There came before the House of Representatives in the United States in January last a proposal for providing five million dollars for the improvement of Guam, for harbour dredging, for providing hangars for aeroplanes, shops and barracks. It happens that Congress threw that proposal out, but I am told that it will, in part at any rate, come forward again as a civil measure, for harbour improvement, and that Congress may view the proposal rather more favourably from the civil angle than from the military. Perhaps the military angle was thought unduly provocative.

The Philippines, it is true, are due for independence in 1945

[1] *The Listener*, January 19th, 1939.

at the hands of the United States; but if the United States should merely abandon the Philippines, how much independence will result? That is the uncertain point, and it has no doubt occupied the thought of the Filipinos themselves, so I shall be a little surprised if when 1945 comes independence has in point of fact been given. I think it likely that by then, unless the world becomes a much more sensible place than it shows promise of being, Guam will be, if not so strong as Hawaii, nevertheless a very strong point, and that it will strengthen the position of Manila. The following quotation from Mr. Hector Bywater [1] may perhaps prove prophetic.

"Hawaii itself, Midway Island, Wake Island, Guam and Manila have already become the stepping-stones by which the United States may one day strike, in full panoply, across the Pacific Ocean to enforce the Pax Americana, or alternatively to deal firmly with an Asiatic aggressor."

We are naturally interested because all this concerns the position of Singapore. Singapore is now one of the powerful fortresses of the world, powerful not merely from a naval and military point of view, but mighty in air power.

Consider now the probable growth of air power in the Pacific. Before I close my remarks I shall endeavour to forecast the probable improvements in the performance of aircraft which lie immediately ahead, but at the moment let us just assume them, and consider what would be the effect of increased air power in this particular area. The lay-out of fortifications and fortresses is difficult to plan in the Pacific, because distances are so enormous that naval fleets can hardly operate. We cannot imagine the United States being willing to send her navy across the Pacific, with no repairing base, no docks or harbours of refuge, nothing but an unprepared Guam, and you cannot imagine that Great Britain would send a fleet just to operate at large in the Pacific. The distances in that ocean are too great. But with the coming of long range aircraft the situation would change very much. For one thing, although the Pacific is of this enormous size, there are numbers of tiny islands, many of them coral-formed. An atoll is wonderful from the aircraft point of view because the insect likes to make them in a ring, which may be five miles across, and five miles of calm water is an ideal landing-ground for flying-boats. It is almost as if they had been designed with this object in view. When air power thus becomes effective in that area it will make the

[1] *Austral-Asiatic Bulletin*, March 1938.

position of any ships in any docks very difficult. Not that aircraft bombs are likely to do any important damage to the docks themselves; but they can do much damage to ships lying in them and to the personnel working upon them. And they can attack where they will and with immense speed.

The position of Hong Kong is rather uncomfortable from the point of view of aircraft, but of course it was built up in earlier days. It is Singapore that is the great fortress of to-day. As Admiral Sir Barry Domville[1] recently said, " No hostile forces could advance to threaten India, Australia or New Zealand whilst leaving a fleet in being at Singapore on the flank of their line of communications." So the sole threat to Australia at present, assuming a fleet in being at Singapore (and according to the last issue of the *Round Table*, it is the intention to have four or five capital ships maintained there in case of war), would be sporadic raids.

Before leaving the Pacific I should mention that according to a writer in the *National Review*,[2] " Miles," as many as 2000 aeroplanes are located at Vladivostok, which, of course, in so far as they are effective, is a very great addition to the aggregate air power of the Pacific. It is a little difficult to assess Russian air power, but in a book just written by " Max Werner," translated from the German,[3] and representing apparently the Soviet point of view, the claim is made for enormous air strength in Russia, perhaps 10,000 aeroplanes and 15,000 tanks. If that estimate is right 2000 aeroplanes might easily be at Vladivostok.

The Atlantic is merely a landlocked lake compared with the Pacific. You have only to look again at the globe in the Geological Museum to see how small it is in comparison to the Pacific. The Atlantic has, too, the odd property that it is much easier to cross one way than the other. The trade wind blows strongly and it is far easier to fly to Europe than to America. That is convenient strategically from the point of view of the United States. But the Atlantic situation impresses me mostly in the following way: the distance across from east to west is only about 2500 miles, namely abont a third of the distance flown in a single flight by the Vickers-Wellesley machines (from Egypt to Australia), and as the flying range of aircraft gets greater and

[1] *Fortnightly Review*, April 1938. [2] September 1938.

[3] *The Military Strength of the Powers*. By Max Werner. 1939. (London: Gollancz. 8vo. 376 pp. 7*s*. 6*d*.)

greater the United States will increasingly become liable to be raided by aircraft from Europe. In due course this danger must, and no doubt will, be guarded against, but it so happens that the obvious places for listening and scouting posts to guard the United States would be Newfoundland, Nova Scotia and Bermuda, which happen all to be British possessions; a very interesting situation and one in which I am sure we should co-operate fully. The position in the Atlantic is simple compared with the Pacific because the distances are so short and there are so few islands in it.

If the Atlantic is tiny what is one to say about the Mediterranean? This is about 1900 miles long, and I spoke just now of the flight of the Vickers-Wellesley machines from Egypt to Australia of 7162 miles, nearly four times the effective length of the Mediterranean. Such a machine could have flown from one end to the other and back, and again out and back. It is true that apart from its crew it carried nothing but some tons of fuel; but assume that half the petrol were removed, so that it could carry a couple of tons of armaments, bombs or other gear from one end of the Mediterranean to the other and put the bomb load where it liked; then if there were no effective anti-aircraft defence the Mediterranean Sea would be entirely dominated from the air. In point of fact, of course, there is a very strong defence, and the measure of air power in the Mediterranean to my mind is merely the measure of the relative strength of aircraft and anti-aircraft, much more than in the two oceans of which I have spoken so far. One often hears about Malta being a place where ships could not lie easily because they would be a prey to aircraft from elsewhere. But I think Malta would give a very good account of itself and a great many of the aircraft would never see their home base again. At the same time, of course, if one were just choosing places in the Mediterranean, one would probably make a somewhat different choice from the one we did make in years long since passed. Another thing one should mention when speaking of air power in the Mediterranean is the time factor, which is really almost ludicrous. A modern machine could easily fly from end to end in eight hours, which means that from a medial position it could be anywhere in four hours and in the absence of anti-aircraft it could do what it liked when it got there.

I now come to what may be called the Home Front. That is the position of Great Britain in relation to the rest of Europe. I believe that two theories are held abroad. One is the belief in

the sudden blow; the other is a belief that the sudden blow would fail and lead to very unpleasant consequences thereafter. I do not know which of those opinions is the stronger, but both are held. A writer named Possony, in a book just translated from the German on *To-morrow's War*,[1] tries to make an estimate of how many aircraft, tanks, guns and whatnot would be necessary for a year's war of the total kind, on a front of 1000 kilometres. One of the most striking figures he arrived at is that for a war of that kind, to meet with the success which its advocates believe in, would require no less than 200,000 aircraft for each Power engaged, not all at once, because according to him they would be used up every three months; and as that figure is about twenty times as big as that of any Power in the world at present, you see the immense scale of things. Mr. Possony's conclusion is that the sudden rush is impracticable, because the amount of material required is not available, and so far as aircraft are concerned there is no hope, in his view, of being able to provide the pilots from the populations concerned. In other words, to put his conclusions briefly, that kind of war is quite impossible to carry on and what would ensue would be a long war of exhaustion.

I have surveyed thus briefly the great Oceans, the Mediterranean Sea and the Home Front. When I was in Australia advising that Government on the inauguration of its research investigations, I made bold to urge, in one of the many addresses which I am afraid I gave in that country, that Australia should become a munitioning centre for the Far East, and should not build aeroplanes, guns, machine guns, anti-aircraft guns merely for her own needs, but should provide also the needs of Singapore, Ceylon, India, Hong Kong and the scattered British possessions around that part of the world; and I was greatly encouraged when a member of the Australian Cabinet made a speech the following day endorsing what I had said. When I got home I urged it upon some of my friends in powerful positions, and I was delighted to see as a result of the recent Air Mission to Australia (I quote *The Times*[2]) that the Home Government and the Australian Government had joined together to create centres of aircraft manufacture in Melbourne and Sydney, and that a start was to be made on behalf of both Governments on no less than ten million pounds' worth of aircraft. This will enormously relieve the Home

[1] *To-morrow's War*. By Stephen Possony. 1938. (London: Hodge. 255 pp. 8*s*. 6*d*.)

[2] May 11th, 1939.

situation, particularly if the supply by the Mediterranean path proves slow or uncertain.

What are aircraft going to do in the future? Will they be able to cover still greater distances? What will limit them? The fastest speed yet attained, by a machine designed and built in Germany by Professor Messerschmitt, is reported to have flown at 469 miles an hour. The greatest height attained is 56,000 feet by Lt.-Col. Pezzi of the Italian Air Force. The greatest range is the one I mentioned, 7162 miles by the Royal Air Force. Now how far will these increase? Speed does not much affect our immediate problem, but it is interesting to realise that we are not a very long way from the limit. There is a limit, because when aircraft proceed above a certain speed they come near the velocity of sound, in the neighbourhood of which the resistance to motion goes up with a great leap which no aero engine in sight could pretend to deal with; I expect that the balance will come at about 600 miles an hour.

Speed is limited first of all by the resistance of the air. Height is limited by the asphyxiation of the engine. The engine breathes air just as the pilot does. We have found out how to provide the pilot's needs by putting him either in a sealed cabin or a sealed diver's suit and feeding him on oxygen. In that way all limits are removed and he could go to the moon so far as breathing is concerned; but the engine, which has mightier lungs than any pilot, has as yet no means of being supplied other than by having air pumped in by a series of compressors, which weigh so much that by the time one has added more than a certain number one has diminished the height instead of increasing it. Range does not depend on human limitations, but upon improved structure, the invention or discovery of new materials, and of new alloys. An American observer has calculated that a range of 12,500 miles, that is exactly half-way round the globe, should be possible, so that if that ideal were attained—and I stress the word "ideal"—it would enable every place on the earth to bomb every other if it wanted to do so!

The speeds of civil aircraft are commonly between 200 and 300 miles an hour and I have spoken of the record speed attained by a military machine of 469 miles an hour. It seems to me that we are getting a definite divergence of type, the military machine with a speed of 400 to 600 miles an hour and the civil one with a speed of 200 to 300. This is, I suggest, important, because in the discussions that took place after the War on the possible limitation

of air power there was always the fear that if one merely limited military aircraft the unlimited civil aircraft might take their place. I suggest that that could not now happen, because the civil aircraft which could only " dawdle along " at 200 or 300 miles an hour would be speedily shot down, and could not therefore be an effective force in warfare.

I come now to another aspect of air power: is that power going to increase indefinitely? Granted that the performance of particular machines will increase steadily; granted that their number can be increased so giving an aggregate increase of striking power; is that aggregate increase, when one takes into account the increasing power of anti-aircraft defence, really effective? I suggest that the historian of the future may find that, having regard to the defensive position, air power reached its zenith about the year 1938, and after that it steadily declined in relative power—that is, its power in relation to the defence. A great deal has been done in recent years—far, far more, naturally, than the public knows—to strengthen the defence.

I remember that Colonel Lawrence of Arabia said that he regarded the conquest of the air as the greatest task before mankind to-day. It would hardly be fair, since he did not and could not have foreseen to-day's conditions, to take his words as meaning that the great task is the conquest *of* the air lest the air should conquer us. That the mere achievement of flight by itself is not sufficient. The right use to be made of the power of flight has yet to be laid bare, and it is that conquest which is the task before us. We are getting nearer to it, much nearer to it than we were a few years ago, and I look forward to the time, not so far hence, when we shall be able to say that the discovery of the power of flight, instead of being the curse to humanity which I am sure many people must regard it as being to-day, will be the means of giving mankind that quick, easy, peaceful intercourse which means so much to civilisation. When that has been attained we shall feel that there has been added yet another jewel to the crown of human endeavour, but splendid as it would be to regard that as already won, we must wait a few more years before the scientific ingenuity of men can allow us to say: not only was the power of flight discovered within little more than a generation, but there has since been discovered the right use of it and its proper control.

Summary of Discussion.

A MEMBER asked how India would stand in a scheme of air defence or air attack.

Mr. E. C. Bowyer said that the Indian Ocean was very nearly a British ocean, and many people regarded this fortunate fact as implying that it was a sphere where air power might operate to our advantage. Should war come, it would be necessary to face the fact that the Mediterranean might be closed and that a considerable proportion of British shipping would have to be diverted round South Africa; surely in that case the existence of air power under British control in the Indian Ocean would be vital in order to assure the protection of shipping coming from Australia and the East?

In speaking of the Home Front the lecturer had not mentioned productive capacity. He had mentioned some astronomical figures given by Mr. Possony but, within a narrower sphere, the relative productive capacities of the different countries engaged in any future war would be most important. Would the lecturer give his opinion upon this matter?

Commander W. B. C. Ross said that the lecturer had spoken of the control and right use of air power, saying that scientific progress and technical efficiency might teach mankind the right use of it. He must differ in this opinion. The control and right use of aviation was a moral and political, and not a scientific or technical question. Had we not turned our backs on Geneva, had we not, for instance, turned down the 1924 Protocol, but gone ahead and made the Society of Nations a real thing with force behind it, by now nationally-owned military aviation would have been abolished, certainly in Europe, and any fighting forces which did take the air would have been under the control of an international authority. This was all there potentially, buried in the pigeon-holes of Geneva.

A Member asked what would be the most vulnerable points and those most likely to be attacked in any big European War; would it be railway termini, ports or shipping or other points?

Secondly, what would be the psychological results of bombardment from the air? Had recent experience justified any tentative conclusions as to the effect of prolonged bombing upon populations? What would be the importance of this moral factor in the next great war should it come at a time when the anti-aircraft devices had not completely outstripped and brought under control the potentialities of attack?

Mr. W. V. Emanuel asked whether an air attack on a fairly compact oilfield such as those in Iran, Iraq or Roumania could be sufficiently powerful to put them out of action for a considerable time. This was not such a fantastic idea, with a totalitarian air force stationed at the Dodecanese Islands within striking range of all three of those potential oil supplies of the British Empire.

Mr. Hughes said that he had been very interested in the lec-

turer's remarks regarding Australia, as he knew how concerned shipowners and merchants were about the defence of Australia. The work which the lecturer had done in Australia had been of very great value and was bearing fruit to-day. The question of the production of aircraft in Australia was of very great importance.

Another aspect of Empire air power, not only from the military but from the civil point of view, was that it was hoped that this year or next year the British would be flying the Atlantic and also be crossing Canada in two or three days by air. This would put them in very close touch with the Pacific. As the lecturer had said, from the point of view of the air the Pacific presented the most difficult problem, and from the civil point of view was very important.

The capacity of aircraft to move *en masse* in great numbers in one direction and to arrive there very accurately must increase the powers of demolition by aircraft. He had read an account of an imaginary attack on an island which had shown how it would be quite possible for an air fleet to arrive unknown, flying at 15,000 feet, and bomb the island with very great precision and then depart without being seen. The unexpected attack was one of the great dangers of air power in the future.

MR. M. H. L. POLAK said that the lecturer had mentioned certain limiting factors upon the future development of aircraft, which would normally mean that the defensive would increasingly overtake the offensive power of the air. But defence fundamentally depended upon foreknowledge of an intended raid, or on seeing or hearing the aeroplanes. The first could be overcome by secrecy, the second by night flying. Could the lecturer say to what extent it would be possible to silence aeroplanes? Because clearly if they could be effectively silenced the surprise attack which could be fully effective would still be possible.

A MEMBER said that the lecturer had stated that the civil aircraft of the future would not be likely to be converted into military aircraft, because it would have a speed of only about 200 or 300 miles an hour, compared with a speed of 400 to 600 miles an hour, the speed of military aircraft. Surely he had been comparing the speed of bombers with fighters or interceptors? Could a heavy bomber ever do more than 200 or 300 miles an hour?

VISCOUNT TRENCHARD (in the Chair) said that when speaking of the range of aircraft, the lecturer had not stated that this was dependent upon the invention or discovery of a new type of fuel. What was the present progress in this matter? Also, it had been pointed out that the present range of an aeroplane was 469 miles an hour. It had been over 400 miles an hour when he had left the Air Force ten years ago, so that progress was not quite so rapid as some people thought.

The lecturer had stated that the power of defence had gained over the power of offence. He considered that offence had gained over defence in every way which could be measured. One example was that of time. It was the same for the pilot of an aeroplane as for a soldier on the ground or a ship at sea. In the air, distance was measured by time instead of miles. Where in the past it had taken a pilot eight hours to reach his objective, the same distance could now be flown in two hours, which made an enormous difference both in time and to the morale of the pilot who had to spend proportionately less time, for instance, flying over enemy territory. Another large gain for the offensive was the use of the parachute. In the last War those who were hit had nearly always crashed. Now they could jump out and come down, so that although they would be interned in enemy country they would not be killed. This also made a great difference to the morale of the pilots. Fog had not yet been conquered. Searchlights were of no use in the day. The anti-aircraft barrage could not see through the fog. Again, it was known that anti-aircraft guns had improved enormously, but what was not known was whether they had improved enough to hit the aircraft which had also improved enormously in speed and climbing ability. He thought that a dangerous situation was growing up with this belief that the power of defence was greater than the power of offence. He considered the contrary to be the case.

MR. H. E. WIMPERIS, in reply, said that he did not think that there was a great deal to choose between the present productive capacities of the great Powers, nor did he think that this capacity would be the limiting factor. The difficulty would be the question of providing fuel and pilots, particularly having regard to the replacement which would be necessary. These considerations would, he suggested, limit the number of aircraft long before productive capacity was exhausted.

It had been stated that the right use and control of aircraft was a moral and not a scientific question. He agreed that science alone would not be sufficient to do what was necessary in this matter, but moral indignation divorced from the scientific means of giving effect to it would be just as inefficacious.

With regard to the most vulnerable points to air attack, the cities of the new world were much better built from this point of view than those of the old. What would be most vulnerable would depend on the power of defence. If there were no defence at all, the first things to be attacked would be the docks, the food supplies and the railway termini, but, as these points would be the most heavily defended, their choice might not be so certain. The vulnerability of objectives depended entirely upon the power of the defence.

He was sure that an attack on an oilfield as such would be completely ineffective, but the derricks and pumps could certainly be put out of action for some time, although no permanent harm would be done.

He was glad that the importance of Australia had been stressed y Mr. Hughes. The Australian Government were taking a great eal of responsibility in the Far East. When speaking of the accuracy f flight navigation, Mr. Hughes had omitted to mention that a great eal of the success in this direction was due to the work of his own rm.

There were two chief causes of noise in aircraft, the engine and the air-screw. The engine could be silenced without a serious loss of power, but the air-screw could not, because no one yet knew how to do it.

It had been asked whether the heavy bomber could ever go faster than 200 or 300 miles an hour. The designers of bombers were always trying to give them speed in the hope that the interceptor fighters in the opposing countrv would not be able to catch them. This could not be achieved, of course, for aircraft of what may be called the same vintage. With machines of different years anything might happen, but every effort was made to construct the bombers so that they would be faster than, say, the interceptor fighters of the year before; they would not go slowly because they dared not.

Many new types of fuel had been discovered, but so far they were all forms of petrol, and nothing better than petrol had been discovered as fuel for aeroplanes so far.

The Chairman had said that he did not think much of the rate of speed increase. It was thirty-six years since the first flying had been done, and this was at thirty miles an hour. The speed was now 469 miles an hour, so that it had been going up between ten and fifteen miles an hour every year.

Whether defence was going to overtake attack in regard to air power might be a matter of opinion. But he considered that there was no reason why the defence against aircraft should prove any less successful than had been the defence against the submarine.

THE LABOUR PROBLEM IN THE EAST[1]

HAROLD BUTLER, C.B.

I SUPPOSE in the minds of many people Asia is still the continent of inertia and fatalism, and yet in recent years when people were not so preoccupied with political events in Europe a good deal was said and heard about Eastern competition. Indeed, Eastern competition appeared a very real and dangerous thing to many people engaged in industry in Great Britain, in other countries of Europe, and in the United States. The mere fact that there should be such a thing as Eastern competition is an indication of a profound change in the general balance of world economy, and the first point which I want to make is that the fact of Eastern competition is only the material expression of the spiritual revolution which is transforming Asia, beginning at Turkey and going right through to Japan. The East is no longer indolent, no longer resigned, no longer stagnant. It has been fired by the doctrines of nationalism, and its nationalism is not merely political, it is also economic.

In spite of what is happening nearer home, I am inclined to think that in the future the twenty years succeeding the War will be regarded as more significant for what is taking place in Asia than for what is taking place in Europe. Europe is going through one of its periodical paroxysms, but Asia is waking up to an entirely new kind of life. The Asiatic revolution which has begun is likely to be as fundamental and as far-reaching in its consequences as the Russian revolution, the effects of which we have not really begun to appreciate, but which are bound to be tremendous in the future. The effects of the Asiatic revolution will not become completely visible for some time, certainly not in my lifetime, but that something new is stirring there cannot possibly be doubted by anyone who has read of what has occurred during these last twenty years, and still less by anyone who has seen it and felt it.

I am going to deal in this paper only with the economic aspects of that revolution, and I would like to recall in a very few words

[1] Address given at Chatham House on February 7th, 1939; Sir Arthur Salter, K.C.B., M.P., in the Chair.

some of the outstanding things that have happened since 1919. In the first place, Japan has become a first-class industrial Power. That fact is attested by every statistical measurement that one can apply, and Japan is reckoned as one of the eight chief industrial States which have permanent seats on the Governing Body of the International Labour Office. At the present time there are probably between thirteen and fourteen million people in Japan who gain their livelihood from industry, trade, and transport. India also has a place among those eight States, but is, of course, far less industrialised than Japan. Ninety per cent. of the population of India is still entirely agricultural, and yet in spite of that fact it is calculated that about 26 million people in India gain their living from industry, trade, and transport. As to the increase of industrial activity in India I will quote two figures; the first is that between 1920 and 1931 the industrial production of India increased by 50 per cent.; the second is that whereas before the War India imported on an average 2,600 million yards of cotton cloth, in 1937 she imported only 591 million for a population which had increased during that time by some 80 millions. China was just beginning to embark upon an industrial career when the present war interrupted her progress. Perhaps that progress may have had something to do with the outbreak of the war. China had not yet become an industrial country of the first importance, but possessed many of the attributes which would readily enable her to rival Japan or India in the comparatively near future, provided that certain other conditions existed. Then if you turn to the smaller countries, Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan, and this is perhaps more significant still, you find a national programme of industrial development in full swing. Industrial development is not on a very large scale, but it has become an expression of the nationalist feeling which has been somehow almost spontaneously developed in those countries as in every other country in Asia.

There is one other factor which I think one should not lose sight of, and that is the increasing establishment of large-scale industrial plants by European and American enterprise. If you go to Java you find motor-cars being produced by General Motors; you find tyres being produced by Goodrich. If you go to Malaya or India, you find Bata producing shoes, and one could multiply those examples. But the point is that those factories, manned entirely by Eastern labour, are producing motor-cars and tyres and shoes which are comparable at any rate to what are produced in American or European factories

and which are certainly quite suitable to the needs of the Eastern market.

It is true, therefore, to say that considerable industrial development is going forward in Asia. At the same time it would be a great mistake to exaggerate its present extent or importance. It is somewhat striking to discover that the whole of Asia has about the same share in world trade as Great Britain; that whereas Great Britain has about 14·5 per cent. of world trade, Japan has 3·7 per cent. and India 2·7 per cent. That may seem, from the point of view of the menace of Eastern competition, a reassuring figure, but it seems to me that at the same time it is something of a warning. When one thinks that 1,000 million people in Asia command about the same amount of international trade as the 45 million people in these islands, one begins to wonder whether that represents an economic distribution which can become permanent, or indeed which is likely to last very long. It means, of course, that a very low standard of living exists in a greater or lesser degree throughout the whole of the East, and one cannot help thinking that that great contrast in the distribution of wealth as between nations has something to do with the existence, in the three principal countries of Asia, of strong political parties which have come into existence since the War with advanced social and economic programmes. In Japan you have the Social Mass Party, which would almost certainly be very much stronger at this present moment if no war had intervened; in China you have the Kuomintang, and in India the Congress Party; and all those three parties are turning their attention quite as much, if not more, to the social and economic aspects of their programmes as to the purely political aspect.

I will give one or two other figures to reinforce that particular point. Professor Findlay Shirras, who was the first head of the Bombay Labour Office, has made a calculation as to the national income per head in a certain number of countries. He reckons the national income per head in Great Britain as about 1,010 rupees, in France 545 rupees, in Germany 519 rupees, in Italy 319 rupees, in Japan 186 rupees, and in India 63 rupees, a difference of between 63 and 1,010 in the figures for India and Great Britain. It is quite evident that in those circumstances wages in the East are lower, and to complain that wages are unduly low in international competition is really beside the point. What one realises when one has visited those countries is that the low wages are not so much the fault of industry as of agriculture, which is still the primary industry of every Asiatic country.

In order to show what I mean by that, I will give a few figures as regards India, which is a characteristic Asiatic country. It is the largest of all Asiatic countries in point of population, but I do not think that in most respects the fundamental conditions in India are different from the conditions which exist in other Asiatic countries. Now, India has about 700,000 villages, and more than 90 per cent. of its population lives in those villages. They seek to gain their living by agriculture, for the most part of a very primitive character. It has been reckoned by people in India who are in a position to make calculations, that it would be possible to increase the agricultural production by 25 per cent., without any expenditure of capital, by the introduction of the rotation of crops, banking of fields, and the use of green manure; that it would be possible to increase that production another 25 per cent. by better seeding, by consolidating holdings, and so on. There are various obstacles to the achievement of that increase of production, some of them religious, some of them political, but a greater obstacle, possibly, than either of these is ignorance. Against the fact that agricultural production is very low you have the fact that the population is very high, and is growing with extraordinary rapidity. During the last ten years the population of India increased by about 40 million. It is expected that in 1941, when the new census is taken, the population of the country will be nearly if not more than 400 million people. At the present time a fair-sized town is born every day in India, 26,941 births every day, and the ordinary checks on population either no longer operate or operate to a very much lesser extent than in the past. Internal war has ceased. Famine on a large scale has been prevented by Government organisation. Disease, though still rampant, is far smaller in proportion than it was ten or twenty or thirty years ago. The natural result of this rapidly increasing population is, of course, that unless agricultural production, the production of food, is increased with equal rapidity the standard of living must necessarily tend to go down. Many observers think that that is what is actually happening; but whether that be true or not, one thing is perfectly certain: that the pressure from the country into the towns is increasing rapidly.

During the time that I was in India there was a great boom in the cotton trade. Since Japan was engaged in war, she was no longer exporting to the same extent. Consequently there was a great opportunity for the Indian mills to gain a larger share of the Indian market. In order to do that they doubled their

shifts in the cotton mills in practically every textile town, which meant that several hundred thousand people were taken on. That vast engagement of new labour took place without causing a ripple on the surface of Indian economic life. You go to a town like Jamshedpur, the seat of the great Tata Iron and Steel works, and although it is a long way from any big centre of population, hundreds of people are turned away at the gates every day. In other words, there is a surplus of labour in India, and even if industry were to double its present size, I have not the least doubt that it would be possible to obtain the necessary number of workpeople without any difficulty whatever.

What does that mean from the wages point of view? It means that wages are inevitably extremely low because, as soon as the permanent labour settled in the industrial towns begins to improve its standard a little bit, there is this pressure coming in from outside of people who are prepared to take almost any wage in order to get a livelihood. Under such circumstances it is obvious that no kind of minimum-wage legislation, or anything of that kind, can possibly be effective. I met various people in India who said that the solution lies in keeping up wage standards by Government legislating for and enforcing minimum wages. But I am perfectly certain that any such attempt would be bound to fail. One knows the difficulty experienced in Great Britain, where far better machinery exists for enforcement than could possibly be created in India, and where the pressure from unemployed labour is very much less. So that I think one may say that there is no possibility whatever of adjusting wages in the competitive race by any kind of artificial method.

I should now like to turn from wages to what they represent in terms of living. It is calculated in Bombay, which has better statistical information than any other province in India, that something like 44 rupees a month, that is to say about 70 shillings, represents a living wage for a man and his family. As a matter of fact only skilled workers in Bombay attain anything like that figure. The Whitley Commission, which produced a very remarkable and admirable report [1] seven years ago, give particulars of other wages which they found in other towns in India. In the jute mills in Calcutta they found that the wage varied from about 17 to 38 rupees, that in the cotton-ginning factories it was as low as 13 rupees, that the coal-miners got from 10 to 15 rupees, and that an unskilled man in the industrial cities got about the same,

[1] *Report of the Royal Commission on Labour in India* [Whitley Report]. Cmd. 3883, 1931.

10 to 15 rupees. Those seem extremely low wages, terribly low wages, but they must be compared not with wages in Great Britain, but with what a man can earn on the land in India, where 90 per cent. of the people live; and therefore it is somewhat startling to find that in one province which I visited a village school-teacher of the third class, who is naturally a person of some importance, rather above the social standing of the average villager, gets an official salary of from 5 to 10 rupees a month. Of course he does not live entirely on that; he gets gifts in kind from the village, but the standard of life in the countryside is undoubtedly very much lower than it is in the cities, with the result that a man who has got a permanent job in a factory considers himself thoroughly well off, even at wages which appear to us by comparison extraordinarily low.

What is true of India is equally true of China and of Japan. In Japan the bulk of the cotton operatives are recruited from the villages. The standard of agricultural life in Japan is extremely low, and has tended to get lower since raw silk, which was one of the principal agricultural products, lost a great part of its value owing to the competition of artificial silk. Hence, instead of the standard of life in the Japanese countryside going up, it has been going down, and that means that instead of being obliged to pay more to workpeople, the Japanese cotton manufacturers find themselves able to obtain the same labour at considerably lower cost. In Japan accordingly, as in India, exactly the same conditions operate: a very low standard of agricultural living, a tremendous growth of population, increased pressure on the towns, with the resulting pressure on wages.

Therefore to hope that by any kind of bargaining, or social legislation, or anything of that kind, the cheap labour of the East can be artificially raised is completely idle. That does not mean that a good deal has not been done in India and Japan to improve conditions of labour. But it does mean that there is no artificial means of raising wage scales to a level which could in any degree be comparable with the wage scales in Western Europe or in the United States. But when you have said that you have got to ask yourself another question. Does the labour of the Indian or the Japanese operatives economically earn the wages which they get? And that is quite a different question, because there you come to the question of how far Eastern labour is efficient. Its efficiency is subject to two tremendous handicaps which can hardly be exaggerated. As regards the mechanical equipment of textile factories it is probable that many if not most

of the modern factories in India and in Japan are on the average at least as efficient as the comparable factories in Great Britain, France, or the United States. The same is true of Tata's, which is one of the most efficient steel plants in the world. But when it comes to the human element you find a very different state of things, and the two great handicaps, as it seems to me, which make Eastern labour, with the exception of Japan (and I will come to that later), very much less efficient and remunerative than Western labour are health and education.

I will deal with the question of health first. If you go outside the manufacturing world in the East to the plantation, which is an older form of industry, you find precisely the same handicap in regard to health. When the Dutch began to grow coffee and tea and tobacco, and subsequently rubber and palm oil and other things, in Sumatra, they imported their labour by thousands from Java. The health conditions were extremely bad, but no worse than exist in most parts of the East. They found during the 'nineties that they were losing 74 per 1000 of their workers each year by death, besides a very high rate of disease. Whereupon the Dutch planters, from a purely business standpoint, began to organise a health service, and spent a tremendous amount of money on it. They had a central laboratory at Medan, a hospital in every plantation with a doctor and nurses, a pharmacy, and so on; the whole service was very thoroughly organised at great expense to the planters, but they calculated that, from the point of view of efficiency, it was so enormously remunerative that the additional profits were at least twice as great as the amount spent. At the present time the death-rate, instead of being 74 per 1000 per annum, is 8 per 1000 per annum.

Malaya has had exactly the same experience. The plantations in Malaya have spent very large sums of money on hospitals, medical services, and above all on drainage. I went over a plantation near Kualur Lumpur, not a very large one, where they had just spent £30,000 on drainage. That has had a great effect in wiping out malaria, not only among the Indian and Chinese labourers on the plantation, but also among the white workers—in other words, the managerial staff. The manager of that particular plantation told me that whereas in the old days they had nine managers and assistant managers on the plantation, of whom at any given moment three were sick and three on leave, they now had only four, and there was practically no sickness.

What is true of a plantation is equally true of a factory; yet

you can find a lot of people in India who tell you that the low productivity of the Indian workman is mainly due to the climate. But when you read the official health reports and find that there are 100 million cases of malaria in India every year, that the average duration of life in India is about 26 years, as against 58 in Great Britain, you realise what a tremendous handicap to efficient production ill-health must be. That is a factor to which far too little attention is paid, for there is not the least doubt that where radical health measures have been introduced in India by employers—and this has been done in a good many cases —the results from the point of view of efficiency are comparable to the results obtained by the planters in Malaya and Sumatra.

When employers in Great Britain complain of the unfair competition of the East, that is a point which I think ought to be remembered. In Great Britain they take a lot of things for granted which are given them out of the rates or out of taxation—drainage, health services, public health, social insurance, and so on. None of those things exist in the East, and yet they are fundamental to any kind of industrial efficiency.

The second handicap, which is even graver, is the lack of education. The Whitley report used these words:

> "In India nearly the whole mass of industrial labour is illiterate, a state of affairs unknown in any other country of industrial importance. It is impossible to over-estimate the consequences of this disability. Modern machine industry depends in a peculiar degree on education, and the attempt to build it up with an illiterate body of workers must be difficult and perilous." [1]

It was that fact which led the Commissioner for Overseas Trade who went to India in 1919 to form the conclusion that the advance of Indian industry was not achieved by means of low wages but in spite of low wages.[2] You can find a great deal of confirmation of that view. After visiting a great many places in India I went to see a certain factory in Bombay, and I noticed as soon as I went in that it looked different from any factory I had seen in India. I was taken over by a young man who had just come out from Lancashire; he had spent only a year there, and did not know India at all well, and I asked him, "What is the production in this factory as compared to what you were accustomed to in Lancashire?" He replied, "85 per cent."

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 27.

[2] *Report on the Conditions and Prospects of British Trade in India*, 1918–19, by Thomas Ainscough, O.B.E., His Majesty's Senior Trade Commissioner in India and Ceylon. Cmd. 442, 1919, p. 113.

I remarked, "But that is very much higher than anything I have found anywhere else in India." And he said, "Well, we have got splendid workpeople. We could not have better. We have got production up to 85 per cent., and we will probably get it to 90 per cent. before very long." But he could not explain how it was done, so afterwards I went to see the manager, and I said, "Why is it you are getting this high production, and why is it your factory looks different from the others?" And he said, "Well, if you want to know, the main reason is that I do not take anybody in this factory who has not reached Standard Six in education." I said, "But of course you have to pay more." He said, "Yes, of course I do, but that money is repaid ten times over." And that is the real secret, I think, of why none of the Eastern countries can compete with Japan. I talked to various Indian manufacturers, and they said that, in spite of all the handicaps, they were, by dint of organisation and very modern machinery coupled with low wages, now just able to hold their own with Lancashire. "But," they said, "we cannot meet Japan." I said, "Why not?", and they said, "Because the Japanese is educated. He understands something about the machine. He is not afraid of it. He keeps it properly. He oils it at the right time. He does not think it a sort of strange monster. And that is why we cannot compete with Japan, because we have not got the compensating advantage of low wages as against high wages which we have *vis-à-vis* Great Britain. Japanese wages are low too, and when you add education to that, then you get a very formidable kind of competition."

If you go to other places you find exactly the same thing. You go to Malaya, which, unlike India, is a wonderfully rich country with a very small population, only 4 million people in a country about the size of England, turning out about half the rubber and half the tin of the world. There the Government has been able to do something quite beyond the capacity of the Government of India. It has abolished disease to a very large extent and it has introduced what is practically universal education. The result is that when the Singapore base came to be built it was possible to recruit locally nearly all the skilled labour required. Boys, mostly Chinese, who had been through the schools and who had subsequently been trained in the technical schools of the colony were able to undertake work that is done by skilled artisans in Europe. One finds the same emphasis on education in the plantations in Sumatra. A great many of the planters have organised schools of their own on the estates,

because they realise that they get better production from educated boys than from uneducated boys.

That is one of the most fundamental differences between the East and the West, and it is one of the reasons why Eastern competition is at present much less formidable than it might otherwise be. But even when you have said that, it is still true that quite uneducated people in Java or in India or in China can work modern machinery to considerable effect, not with anything like the same degree of efficiency as the Western Europeans or the Americans, but still they can get a pretty good output at a very low wages cost. One may be quite sure that industry which has now begun to take root in the East will expand very considerably in the future. Of course as the physical condition and the mental condition, the health and intelligence of Eastern countries improve, their capacity for production will naturally improve likewise. From that point of view they will become more formidable in competition than they are at present. On the other hand, there will be no doubt a tendency, which has already shown itself in Japan, towards demanding a higher rate of wages as people become better educated, more ambitious, better able to understand the possibilities of a better kind of life, and that, no doubt, will be a compensation on the other side.

But, when all is said and done, the fundamental problem still remains, the problem of the agricultural population. Of this Japan is the standard example, where you have got over 90 per cent. of the population literate as against 9 per cent. in India, with a large number of newspaper readers taking an intelligent interest in politics and economics. Yet the standard of living, I should imagine, is certainly not going up, and may possibly have gone down, owing to the fact that the products of agriculture no longer command the same market as they did twenty or thirty years ago.

Another point must also, however, be borne in mind. There is no doubt that as industry spreads the old fatalism tends to disappear. The contentment, if that is the right word to use, or indifference to their economic state begins to be shaken as soon as people begin to get into the community life of an industrial town. One reads from time to time of strikes in India, in Malaya, or elsewhere, but what one does not realise until one sees it, is the passion with which those strikes are conducted. They are not political strikes, they are economic strikes. They are strikes for a higher standard of living. I saw several, and, so far as my very slight experience went, it certainly agreed with the Whitley

Commission when they remarked that "although workers may have been influenced by persons with nationalist, communist, or commercial ends to serve, we believe that there has rarely been a strike of any importance which has not been due entirely or largely to economic reasons." That is undoubtedly a new and a very serious problem all through the East, and to meet it a good deal has been done in the way of social legislation. Japan has done a good deal. India has done a good deal, and so far as the factories go, that is to say establishments employing more than twenty persons, I did not think that the factories in India compared at all badly with factories in Europe. In fact I could find some in Europe that are a good deal worse than many that I saw in India. But when you have said that, you have not really done a very great deal to meet the social problem.

Trade unions are being started in most of the Eastern countries, which meet with all the difficulties that one might expect. One has to remember that the irresponsible agitator is much more formidable with an uneducated population than he is with an educated population. For that reason it is far more necessary to pay a great deal of attention to industrial relations in the East than it is in a Western country, if it is desired to keep them peaceful and to avoid stoppages of work. That amount of attention is not always given, but I did find one city in India, one of the largest textile cities in the country, where they had had no strikes for fifteen years owing to a system of collective bargaining; that was Ahmedabad. I admit that system would probably not have come into existence but for a great deal of pressure on the employers from Mr. Gandhi and, as it is his home town, his influence is extremely powerful. But the interesting point is that once the system had been established it worked, and all the employers told me that they would not now go back on the system for anything. It had been worth any amount of money to them by maintaining industrial peace during all that time, when a great deal of trouble had been going on in other parts of India.

On the general question of competition between East and West there is one further point that I should like to make. It has to be realised that Eastern industry, and particularly Japanese industry, is creating new markets. It is not only taking trade away from Europe and America; it is creating trade that did not exist before, by selling things so cheaply that the native peoples can buy them, whereas before they could not buy those things at all. That is happening not only in Asia but also in Africa. I read a report from a medical officer in one of our East African

colonies who said that the introduction of cheap Japanese rubber shoes, at prices far lower than anybody had ever offered them before, had done more to stamp out hook-worm than all the efforts of the medical services. That is an interesting illustration of the kind of thing that is happening in many parts of the East. In Java during the slump, for instance, the national income of the colony fell to deplorably low levels. There was no market for the tea and the coffee and the tobacco, and so on. The income of the Government and of the population was reduced, I think I am right in saying, by about two-thirds, which meant that the Javanese were no longer able to buy textiles in England or Holland, where they had bought them before. It was either a question of their buying them from Japan or not buying them at all, and the Dutch Government decided that it was better to allow them to maintain their standard of living as far as they could by buying the cheaper Japanese article, than to try artificially to maintain the market for Dutch or British goods. Of course, that meant that Dutch and British goods disappeared, at any rate for the time being, though as times got better again they did recover part of the market which had been lost. It is important to remember that there are millions of people in Asia who are living on such a low standard that the products of Western industry are entirely beyond their reach. This large new market has begun to be exploited to some extent by the cheaper products of Eastern industry.

When one looks at the East as a whole one cannot help feeling that this rising tide of nationalism is not a thing that is going to disappear. It is going to stay, and with it has come the demand, as it has in Japan, as it has in India, as it will in China, for protection of the native industries against Western competition. The question therefore arises, whether one is going to meet that challenge by fighting it out or by working it out. Unless some latitude is given to Eastern industry, the safety-valve will be shut down and some kind of an explosion will very likely result. The other alternative, of course, is a painful one; there is no disguising that fact. It means, and it has already meant in Lancashire, a tremendous loss of long-established markets, and a great dislocation of established industry in Europe. But one has to ask oneself whether one is going to take the long view or the short view, whether, even if one takes the short view, one is going to be able to make any resistance to this kind of industrial development effective. And that is the note of query on which I should like to bring this address to a close. I do not think anybody

can make any very confident prophecy about the future. All one can do is to realise that a great new factor has come into existence, a factor which is not a transitory factor but a permanent factor, and a factor that one probably cannot combat successfully by any kind of economic warfare. And if that is so, well, the other alternative is to seek some kind of economic peace by negotiation.

Summary of Discussion

MR. G. E. HUBBARD said that in considering the effect of the industrialisation of Eastern countries upon the West, the lecturer had laid stress upon the different levels of wages and had shown to be a fallacy the belief so often held in the West that competitive power was always in ratio to wage levels. It was useless to consider this factor alone when comparing the competitive value of an Eastern country with that of a Western country in regard to the manufacture of a particular article. The only way to do this was to discover the actual cost of producing one unit of that article and the cost of the wage element in such production. Even in this case, in producing that one single unit of a single article, one country might be using much more advanced machinery than the other. Even if valid comparisons could be effected, it was very often difficult for the manufacturer in the West to know whether he desired a rise in wages in the East from the point of view of competition, because he had to consider that in certain cases such a rise would be accompanied by increased efficiency. It conceivably might be better from the competitor's point of view, if wages in Japan were to rise and wages in India to fall, since Japanese labour was both efficient and cheap, Indian labour cheap and relatively inefficient. The Indian worker's efficiency might enormously increase with better conditions resulting from better wages.

Mr. Hubbard agreed that there was little possibility of a substantial increase of wages in Japan in the near future, because of the extremely close link between industrial wages and the earnings of agriculture. There was as yet no proletarian class of any size in Japan, and labour fluctuated easily backwards and forwards between the factory and the field. This might change, owing to the switch-over to heavy industries, but for the present the remuneration which a farmer received affected very closely the amount he or his family were prepared to receive in a factory; any change in the position must, of necessity, be slow.

Industrialisation in Eastern countries depended almost as much upon the power to obtain capital as the power to obtain cheap labour, and surely the greatest handicap to the development of industrialisation in most of the Eastern countries was lack of capital. It would be many years before it could be forthcoming from the countries themselves, particularly in the case of India. The European countries, if they did not waste all their capital on armaments within the next

few years, were capable of providing a very large part of the capital needed. It would become a problem for the West as to whether she should, or should not, finance on a large scale the further industrialisation of the East.

If the prospects were very gloomy from the point of view of Eastern competition, in that Great Britain certainly could see herself losing her share in the world market in a number of staple manufactures (her cotton goods had already gone far in that direction), might not she be able to keep her place in industrial competition by always keeping a step ahead of her cheap-labour competitor as regards the class and type of goods to be manufactured? At present, particularly as regards new and difficult ranges of manufacture which required a large degree of skill, she was definitely ahead of any Oriental country, and the possibilities in this direction seemed very great; but it was difficult to know whether she would always be able to find new products of industry required by herself and the rest of the world in sufficient ratio to keep her that one step ahead of her Oriental competitor.

A MEMBER said that while the impact of Eastern industrialisation upon Europe had been discussed, no mention had been made of this impact upon an important part of the British Commonwealth, namely Australia. A young and growing country such as Australia did suffer, in her attempt to find a place in the sun, from competition from such countries as India and Japan. This competition might seem as nothing compared with the loss of the cotton trade for the United Kingdom, but presented a considerable problem when viewed from the angle of a small country. With regard to wool, when Australia had placed certain prohibitive tariffs upon Japanese goods she had met such an economic war that she had had to revise her policy, finding that Japan was a large buyer of wool and that this could be used as a weapon against her. Concerning sugar, the low wage level in certain countries made it possible for them to market their produce at a price which made the production of Australian sugar uneconomic. When countries such as Cuba were able to produce on these lines the competition became very difficult to surmount. Did the lecturer not think that in the future the impact of the Eastern countries upon, for instance, South Africa and Australia might be greater than the effect upon Europe?

MR. R. T. BARRETT said that as one who had been an employer of labour in a small way in the British Colony of Hong Kong, he would like to support the statements of the lecturer about the changed outlook of Oriental labour. He had been an editor in charge of fifty printers. Their efficiency was about 60 per cent. of that of British workers. The linotype operators were very good, and could set almost any handwriting when used to it. As regards the wage level, they probably received better value than Europeans, because in England it was a very highly paid profession governed by guild rules. These applied

in the East, but not to the same extent. The idea that the Orienta could only do the same job, in the same way, with no variation whatsoever, was not true to-day. He had found them both conscientious and possessed of initiative. He remembered once being told by a foreman, just as the newspaper was going to press, that a fire had broken out in the town. This meant an hour's extra work getting and printing the report. Printers worked very long hours. The linotype men started at two o'clock in the afternoon and stayed until between two or four o'clock in the morning, when the work finished. Yet they were anxious to start at ten o'clock in the morning on overtime rates. Printers who worked all night often had another job in the day-time. They had seemed tireless, healthy, and contented. This was partly because the town was not malarial, and they were more or less free of malaria—the curse of the East. A distressing factor had been the extent to which the more highly paid men were in the hands of money-lenders. He had tried to get a lawyer to compound the debts, but this had been impossible. Everyone had guaranteed everyone else, and everything was in such confusion that the attempt to reduce payments to a settled amount had to be abandoned. Probably the borrowers cheated the money-lender as much as he cheated them in the end. While in the East Western machinery was being used, the human factor behind it was utterly different, and this was bound to have a tremendous influence in the future development of industry in Asia.

In conclusion, the speaker asked how far industrial development in Japan was influenced by the careful exploitation of women in the factories?

MISS NESTI SANDERS asked whether there was not a political reason for the loss of British markets in the East. Particularly in India, after the passing of the India Bill, there had been penalising taxation against British textiles. Also, was it not a fact that Great Britain had lost a great deal of her trade during the Great War because she had needed to use her merchant ships to bring to England the necessary raw materials and food instead of using them for trade, and the Japanese had at that time captured the trade in India, which they had never given up? She had heard that Japan had recently captured the trade from Egypt, the Sudan, and the whole of East Africa through their very cheap goods and also because of the lack of tariffs in that part of the world.

MR. RONALD WALKER said that he was a woollen textile manufacturer and he wondered whether Japan was subsidising her exports, or whether their cheapness arose wholly from efficiency added to low wages. As a manufacturer he could not understand anyone discounting the value of low wages as an element in cheap production. In woollen manufacture the cost of wages was approximately 33⅓ per cent. of the cost of the cloth, and if this were reduced the cost of the article could

be reduced. There was some variation in efficiency according to the standard of wages, but in textile manufacture wages had increased in his lifetime by 25 per cent., while the rise in efficiency could hardly be said to be more than 20 per cent. over the same period.

Concerning the question of subsidies, not long ago the Italian grain merchants had sent out a circular to the Austrian flour merchants stating that they were prepared to deliver free grain plus three lira per quintal, and they had been able to make a profit out of this procedure. In this case the Government had had complete control and had interviewed the grain merchants to find out the subsidy required. Changes in world prices subsequently brought about a state of affairs in which grain could be bought at less than the subsidy granted. Hence the absurd possibility of sending grain and money for nothing and making a profit.

Throughout the last fifteen years, owing to this sort of thing, trades had been seen to rise and evaporate without any regard to economic or business laws. Europe had been the principal sinner in this respect, but it would be interesting to know whether Japan was subsidising her exports, because sometimes when the Japanese were able to deliver an article at a lower price than the cost of the raw material to the British manufacturer, it seemed that even low wages could hardly account for this phenomenon.

A Member asked what was the value of the International Labour Office to Eastern countries. Had the conventions already ratified been fairly adequately carried out in actual practice? In what direction were other conventions likely to be ratified and carried out?

A Member said that concerning rubber shoes in East Africa, she had heard that since the Ottawa Agreements the natives in Kenya had not been able to buy the cheap rubber shoes which they had worn in the past.

A Member asked what was the position to-day of the legitimate trade-union activities, as opposed to those of irresponsible political agitators, in a country such as India, for instance?

Mr. Butler said that the answer as to whether capital would be forthcoming in sufficient quantities to finance the continued industrialisation of the East was to some extent political. For instance, had China remained undisturbed, capital development would probably have been very considerable. The Chinese workman was extremely hard-working and efficient if educated properly. If conditions were sufficiently peaceful for China to be considered a safe field for investment, there would be a good chance of capital going there. The same thing was true of India, although in this case there was another factor, namely, that the Indians at present did not care to invest their money in industrial enterprises, but preferred to keep it locked up in a box.

This was a very conservative and no doubt misguided view, which might change, and if it did, a great deal of Indian capital might be forthcoming for investment in Indian industry. He sometimes wondered if a factory like Tata's, which had been constructed entirely, or very largely, with Indian capital, and the example of other such factories in India, might not create a national pride in industrial development which would change the present state of things and bring into use the capital at present locked away. But this would, as had been stated, take a very long time, so that the pace of Eastern industrialisation would probably be automatically slowed down. This being so, probably for some time to come the older industrial countries would be able to keep going not by producing the same kind of things, but by turning out rather better-class articles.

He had never been to Australia, but the position of that country was undoubtedly difficult. He did not see how she could produce sugar, for instance, economically in competition, not with Cuba, which, after all, was a country with a high wage level, based on the American standard and much above the Asiatic, but with Java. In Java there was an acute state of over-population added to a low standard of living. One fortunate aspect for Australia was that she could sell wool in Japan, a type of product for which there was no market in most other parts of Asia because they were too hot, but, as had been stated, this market only existed as long as Australia took cheap Japanese exports in return.

It had been very interesting to hear an account from personal knowledge of conditions in Hong Kong. Concerning the exploitation of Japanese women in the factories, the question was a difficult one. Was it true or not that the average Japanese girl was better clothed, better housed, and better fed in the dormitories run by the factories than she would be in her own home? If this were true—and people who had made a study of the subject had said that it was on the whole—then it was difficult to speak of exploitation. In Islamic and Hindu countries women were not going into industry to any extent, in India practically not at all at present, but in China women were employed, and also in Singapore, where the wages, though not very high, were much higher than in India.

Concerning the effect of political factors on the economic situation, it was, of course, true that the great impetus to Japanese trade had come during the War, when the Western countries had been otherwise engaged. It was also true that in India the tariff movement had a very strong nationalist flavour. The cultivation of national industries was one of the forms taken by nationalism everywhere. It should be remembered, however, that it was not only India who benefited by the Indian tariffs. A large number of British firms running factories in India were protected against Lancashire, and they did not by any means object to the Indian tariffs. Egypt had a considerable tariff on cotton goods, and had made a strenuous effort to keep out Japanese goods, so far with little success, the reason being that the Egyptian

cotton industry was in a very rudimentary stage and could not yet compete with Japan on anything like equal terms.

Concerning the question of subsidies to Japanese exports, both Government officials and industrialists in that country asserted that this was not the case, but it was certainly true that the textile industry was very highly integrated, and worked more or less as a unit. There was a pool into which every manufacturer paid a certain percentage, which was used for reducing prices where there was a question of capturing a market, though the price of the same article elsewhere might be twice as high. This was run, however, by the industry itself rather than by the Government; but it was very difficult to ascertain these things. Even in Europe actual methods of subsidy were becoming difficult to discover in some cases.

He had been astonished to find the influence that the I.L.O. had had in the East. As a general proposition he would say that it had had more influence in the East than in any other part of the world. Wherever he went he had found that the Office was very well known, not merely by Government officials, although he had been quite embarrassed at times to find the latter in country places in Malaya and India solemnly reading through the green reports of the I.L.O. and trying to apply the conclusions to local conditions, but also by the people themselves. In India, and particularly French India, there was a very strong belief among the people that but for the I.L.O. their conditions would never have been improved to the extent which they had been. Proof of this could be found again and again in the Whitley Commission's Report. The existence of international standards, even though too high for Indian conditions, had nevertheless enabled the Government in India to do something which otherwise it would not have been able to do. When the Indian legislation had been put through, there had been hardly any public opinion in its favour, and it had met considerable opposition from the manufacturers.

It was, of course, very difficult to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate trade-union activities in the East. In Malaya there had never been any trade unions, and during the depression the wages in the tin mines had been drastically reduced, owing to the fall in the price of tin. Then prices had recovered, but the wages had remained where they were, so that in 1936 a strike had been organised by the Chinese which had held up the majority of tin mines in the colony. This had concentrated attention on the question of collective bargaining, and, when he had been there, there had been a movement to encourage combination among the workers. In India there were some fairly solid unions, but many of them were sporadic mushroom growths which staged a strike and then disappeared the week after.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

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EUROPEAN POLITICS

1*. GERMANY'S NEXT AIMS. By Oswald Dutch. 1939. (London: Edward Arnold. 8vo. 296 pp. 10s. 6d.)

MR. DUTCH, who has to his credit one of the best books on the passing of independent Austria, has now attempted a larger canvas. The result is necessarily more discursive and inconclusive. The author is wisely cautious about definite prediction, though he makes some judgments which are at first sight surprising, *e.g.*, that an attack on Switzerland is more probable than one on Denmark, and that France may be offered French Switzerland as compensation for Alsace-Lorraine. Nor does Mr. Dutch give us any very clear guide to the policy to be pursued. Nobody has shown more convincingly how the present situation has grown out of the complete breakdown of the Central European economic system—the result, at any rate in part, of the Peace Settlement of 1919. Yet at one point he appears to be hoping for a British Government composed of Messrs. Winston Churchill, Duff Cooper and Eden, who would—he assumes—pursue the policy of an "economic stranglehold on Germany." In short, both in his diagnosis of the situation and in his search for a way out, Mr. Dutch reflects pretty accurately the bewilderments and inconsistencies of current public opinion.

Where, however, Mr. Dutch has the advantage of public opinion is in his wide knowledge of conditions throughout Central Europe and the Balkans, and his understanding of the implications of every move in the game. Writing at a time when Germany was playing the Ukrainian card for all it was worth, he foresaw an early threat of collision with the Soviet Union. In fact, however, pronouncements on both sides have been milder since the beginning of the year, and the abandonment of the Carpatho-Ukraine to Hungary suggests the improbability of any increase in tension on the German–Soviet front in the immediate future. The book was also written before the final disappearance of Czechoslovakia from the map, though this event is more or less discounted in advance. Mr. Dutch is undoubtedly right in thinking that the majority of the Sudetens, however much they may have relished incorporation in the Reich, did not want separation from the rest of Bohemia. It may some day transpire that the final impulse for the subjugation of Bohemia came from this quarter.

Mr. Dutch covers an immense amount of ground, and the speed at which the book must have been written excuses a few slips. His account of Naumann's once-famous work *Mittel-Europa* is a pure travesty. Poland did not join the Little Entente on its foundation,

simply because it was (as its terms show) an alliance against Hungary, from whom Poland had nothing to fear; nor did the "common council" of the Little Entente come into existence till many years after 1921. The statement that the Upper Silesia plebiscite "was conducted in a very questionable manner under Korfanty" is misleading. The *rapprochement* between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria was effective long before the treaty of 1937. More serious, Mr. Dutch's account of the first Czechoslovak crisis of May 1938 is highly speculative. There is little doubt now that the Germans did not mean business on that occasion; and the premature jubilation over a supposed German diplomatic defeat was one of the reasons which induced Herr Hitler to decide immediately afterwards to settle accounts with Czechoslovakia once for all.

E. H. CARR.

2*. FALLEN BASTIONS: The Central European Tragedy. By G. E. R. Gedye. 1939. (London: Gollancz. 8vo. 519 pp. 16*s*.)
3*. UN PACTE AVEC HITLER: le drame autrichien 1936–1938. By Martin Fuchs. 1938. (Paris: Plon. 8vo. 358 pp. 24 *frs*.)
4*. A PACT WITH HITLER: The Death of Austria. By Martin Fuchs. Translated by Charles Hope Lumley. 1939. (London: Gollancz. 8vo. 352 pp. 12*s*. 6*d*.)

FUTURE historians will not be able to complain of a shortage of material on Central European events. The censorship and distortion of the official and semi-official press is more than compensated by the readiness of publishers to take in book form the experiences and feelings of actors or witnesses. Here are two more very interesting and in some respects important books, whose subject-matter rarely coincides.

Mr. Gedye has an unquestionable claim to rank among the half-dozen best publicists on Central European affairs. He has long experience, wide connections, a fluent pen; above all, he possesses the gifts of complete sincerity and unflinching courage. A thorn in the side of those with whom he disagrees (who comprise the vast majority of those in authority to-day) he is a perpetual source of strength and encouragement to his friends and a boon to the general public.

His *Fallen Bastions* (of liberty and of Western Europe against tyranny and Germany) are Austria and Czechoslovakia, and his book consists (with certain qualifications) of a personal narrative of what the author saw and learned during the last years of those two States. It is not an exact history, for many events are sketched in only very lightly or omitted altogether; but it gives in much detail those happenings which seemed to Mr. Gedye the most important. The part of the book devoted to Austria is much the larger, and also much the better. There is little in it which is not first hand, or which was not learned by the author from sources which were first hand, or very nearly so (*e.g.* the story of the Berchtesgaden interview, which agrees with that given by other writers). The narrative of the occupation of Austria (including the provinces) and of the subsequent weeks is altogether admirable, and terribly vivid. Mr. Gedye also does a great service in not beginning his narrative at that point, nor even with the Schuschnigg–Hitler duel, but in going back to 1934. His two significant chapter headings, "Dollfuss Chooses Suicide" and "Dollfuss Destroys Austria," may recall certain cardinal features in the Austrian tragedy which are too easily forgotten to-day. It is well that he goes back, more briefly, further yet, and mentions the figure of Monsignor Seipel, whose policy was the direct forerunner of that of Dollfuss.

At the same time, even here Mr. Gedye's passions are obviously engaged, and his horror at the Nazi excesses makes him almost ignore the force of the German national movement which Nazi fanaticism overlaid, but without which Nazism in Austria could not have existed. There is a certain lack of balance, which becomes far more apparent in the chapters on Czechoslovakia. Here again there is valuable material, where the author is writing from personal experience, but this is mingled with and distorted by opinion, to such a degree as seriously to impair the value of this part of the book. The chapter on "Holding the Bastion," in particular, is a purely hypothetical account of the way in which the war would have been won if Europe had not been betrayed by "Gauleiter Chamberlain"—a joke which, incidentally, is much better when made only once; and it contains some really astonishing misstatements, *e.g.* that the Russo-Czech alliance "braced and held together the Little Entente" (p. 386). This is nonsense. It may have had other advantages, but it quite obviously strained and weakened the Little Entente. It is a pity that blemishes of this kind may perhaps have the effect of making some people pay less attention than they should to the great part of what Mr. Gedye writes.

The book by Martin Fuchs, a former official of the Austrian Foreign Office, is much quieter in tone. It tells the story of Austria from the "agreement" of 1936 to the invasion of 1938. It is exceedingly well informed, especially on those points on which Mr. Gedye touches most lightly: the diplomatic history, international intrigues, and in particular, the position of Italy. Here there is much inside information. It is a pity that the author somewhat shakes his own credit by describing in exactly the same manner certain scenes and conversations regarding which he can certainly not have been directly informed. The internal position in Austria, and in particular the relations of the Government with the working-class movement, is treated very lightly. Nevertheless, as a footnote to history, the book is valuable.

C. A. MACARTNEY.

5*. THREE MEN TRIED . . . AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN, STRESEMANN, BRIAND AND THEIR FIGHT FOR A NEW EUROPE. By E. Stern-Rubarth. With an introduction by Vernon Bartlett. 1939. (London: Duckworth. 8vo. 307 pp. *12s. 6d.*)

THIS personal memoir of one who was both a friend, and for some years a collaborator, of Dr. Stresemann sheds yet more light from several angles upon the efforts of the elected statesmen of Germany to achieve a place of honour for their country in the immediate post-War comity of Europe. The three central figures are Dr. Stresemann, M. Briand and Mr. (later Sir) Austen Chamberlain. In the opening chapters the author rapidly sketches his life and times and proceeds to outline the struggles which culminated in Locarno. Not the least interesting feature of this work, which is the first that Dr. Stern-Rubarth has written in English, is the background of personal vignettes which he makes for the political events in which his subjects figured. Lord D'Abernon, Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, Baron von Maltzan, Dr. Luther, Dr. Curtius, Herr Hitler, and Count Apponyi stand out among them. The colonial question, the Ruhr episode and the birth and consummation of Locarno, the versatility and foibles of Briand, the entry of Germany into the League of Nations, then Briand again—the final words of his peroration "arrière les canons," add several

more. The memorable scene at Locarno, the hopes and fears of the participators, the emotion and dignity which surrounded the procession of events make strange reading to-day. The conception of a nation held by the Foreign Minister of the German Republic was incomprehensible to the Liberal Party and inconceivable heresy to the Nationalists. Nationality was not the final goal of human endeavour. " Experiments in policy," he said, " based on nothing but violence are excluded from our programme. Economics must be international without interfering with national culture and self-assertion." Later chapters are devoted to M. Briand and Sir Austen Chamberlain, the Kellogg Pact, the idea of a United States of Europe and a European Zollverein.

Those who endeavoured to raise the emotion latent in international politics to the level where executive capacity shapes lofty ideas into democratic or even dynastic reality were overtaken by the scourge of the *Bacillus dictatorialis*. In the petty fragment of human history which is open to inspection the growing application of force to the settlement of human disagreement follows moderately well-defined lines. Personal resort to fisticuffs, family feuds, tribal disturbances, feudal consolidation, wars of dynastic ambition, the reduction of newly discovered and alien civilisations, struggles for economic domination and among all loosely woven the thin red line of religious strife lead up to the encounter of ideals in 1914. After that the hopes of devout men were raised high : the vision of international co-operation had been widely seen. But now it often seems that the next great and then almost universal struggle may be the tempering of the more rabid sentiments of nationalism : some interpret this as the eradication of the vices of nationalism. The unstable political equilibrium in every nation is dependent at present upon the presence of both vice and virtue, but an excess of viciousness begets a struggle to restore a more equitable balance. There is no evidence to indicate the effects of an excess of virtue. To keep the balance by methods other than war was the summit of these three men's ambition.

H. J. COOPER.

6*. THE WAR AGAINST THE WEST. By Aurel Kolnai. 1938. (London : Gollancz. 8vo. 711 pp. Bibliography. 18*s*.)

THIS is a striking book, towering above the ordinary ruck of works appearing on Nazi Germany as the oak does above the hedgerow. To review it in a few paragraphs is impossible. The publishers may be pardoned for saying that it is the most important work they have ever issued. Mr. Wickham Steed has written a worthy Preface.

M. Kolnai has given us a painstaking analysis of the theory and the practice of the National Socialist Movement, taking us far back to the sources. In these seven hundred pages there is much close argument, and an enormous fund of information. Naturally the theory out-runs even here the practice—*Es wird immer heisser gekocht als gegessen !* But the samples of practice we have had in five years are thorough-going enough.

Every nation, like every individual, is a problem, both for itself and for its neighbours. This is, and has been, particularly true of the German people, and for a number of reasons. Large parts of the German world were only half assimilated to the pattern of Latin Christianity that lies at the back of our civilisation. Further, the ascendancy of Prussia and the Prussian spirit disturbed the course

of things, and has spelled little but sorrow for the Germans. The crash of the Hohenzollern hopes in 1918 left the nation prostrate—Spengler's pessimism; and the spectacle of the nations around them, whom they had been brought up to look down on, attaining independence and unity while they were denied it, prepared the way for the coming of a saviour.

Kolnai makes it quite clear how far the Nazi view of the world is from being something new. Parts of it go back very far indeed—to Luther and Herder at least. The essential things in it can be found in Fichte, and the line of tradition leads straight to Rosenberg through Houston Stewart Chamberlain. At bottom a mysticism, it plays with things like electricity, which are dynamic but indefinable. A denial of all that is rational, it lays claim to that intuition which is infallible, and to an imperative that is absolute. Germany could lead Europe, but prefers to drive it. Hence the title—the War against the West. It has a double meaning, which makes it all the more significant.

The author makes it clear that there is a spiritual grandeur and a relevancy in much the Nazis are after; but they are ruined by the "utter utterness" of every move. Put simply the fallacy lies here: something is good, therefore the more you have of it the better. Hitler may well have hoped to make the German nation into a glorious fellowship (*Gemeinschaft*); but what has come out is a complicated mechanism, made up of endless "parts." Not a glad communion of free spirits, but a vast assemblage of "co-ordinated" units. We were warned against this very long ago by Plato's illustration about "painting the eye purple."

Such captions as "The God that is Ourselves," "Irrational Science," "Breeding the Nation," "The Master Race," are suggestive of the author's line. Notable is his fixing on the "existential philosophy" of the Heidelberg professor Heidegger, as one of the significant keys to the whole enigma. It spells the negation of human personality, the apotheosis of "forces" as determining the fate of mankind, the reducing of men to the level of cockroaches. "As for man, his days are as grass: for the wind passeth over him, and he is gone!"

His brief conclusion brings a serious charge against European civilisation, of being in part to blame for what has happened east of the Rhine; not the Peace treaties or anything of that kind, but the slovenliness of democracy. After all, nothing happens without cause, and we must face the fact that there is live sympathy with much that Mussolini and Hitler have done, outside the dictator States altogether.

W. J. ROSE.

7*. PEACE WITH GANGSTERS? By George Glasgow. 1939. (London: Cape. 8vo. 288 pp. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

So large a proportion of the accepted authorities on international affairs have ranged themselves among the critics of recent British policy that we cannot but welcome a work by an author of the acknowledged competence of Mr. Glasgow, which supports and defends it. If his book is read side by side with those of, for example, Mr. Gedye and Mr. Reed, it may serve a valuable purpose in restoring the balance, and neutralising some undue exuberances of expression. Whether it will, or should, carry the verdict is another matter.

The question posed by the title seems one which would be intro-

duced in Latin by the interrogative "num"—expecting the answer "No." That, however, is not Mr. Glasgow's answer. His principal argument is based on the inconclusive and devastating effects of a large-scale war under modern conditions. Everyone will allow considerable force to such an argument, though we may think that the current *clichés*, "war settles nothing" and "another war will be the end of civilisation," have been much too thoughtlessly accepted as axiomatic. Moreover, though the general fear of modern armaments may hitherto have proved, up to a point, a safeguard of peace, a peace governed by fear alone can hardly be regarded as either stable or desirable. It is difficult, therefore, to share Mr. Glasgow's hope that we are now entering upon a phase of what he calls "shadow" war, in which, apparently, one side can always be trusted to climb down, like the coon in the American fable. If it were true, we should not share his evident enthusiasm. But in fact it seems that practically every nation is still prepared to resist by force certain not improbable demands, and in any case the game of "shadow warfare," played with real weapons, is apt to become the grim reality on any miscalculation or disagreement as to which side is the Colonel and which the coon. The manœuvres of power diplomacy seem historically more likely to lead to war than peace, and the continuous tension which the game creates is increasingly felt to be more intolerable than war itself, and quite as incapable of promoting a lasting settlement.

The "gangsters" who arouse the author's disapproval are exclusively the German members of the gang; Signor Mussolini is treated with a sympathetic approval which is hardly consistent. Mr. Glasgow regrets the rejection of the Hoare–Laval proposals, and regards Sir Samuel Hoare as "one of the best Foreign Secretaries we have had since the War." In matters of fact, as opposed to opinion, the book contains some questionable half-truths, in which only selected points are disclosed, and one or two statements which are seriously misleading. Thus, in a context dealing with promises of territorial transfer, it is said that "in 1925 Italy was again offered the south of Abyssinia in return for Great Britain receiving the waters of Lake Tsana." Though a much later page gives a more correct account of the proposal in question, this statement, in relation to the argument it is used to support, can only be condemned as completely inaccurate. Mr. Glasgow also adds the weight of his authority to the German legend that the war in the African colonies was a violation of the Congo Act of 1885—a mare's nest of which the slightest investigation disposes. These instances may suggest that, in spite of the author's unquestionable sincerity, the cautious reader should verify and supplement the facts before he adopts his conclusions.

G. M. GATHORNE-HARDY.

8*. MUNICH AND THE DICTATORS: A SEQUEL TO "BRITAIN AND THE DICTATORS." By R. W. Seton-Watson. 1939. (London: Methuen. 8vo. xii + 188 pp. 5s.)

9*. WHERE THERE IS NO PEACE. By Hamilton Fish Armstrong. 1939. (London: Macmillan. 8vo. 236 pp. 6s.)

10. WHY WE ARE LOSING THE PEACE. By Vigilantes. 1939. (London: Gollancz. 8vo. 192 pp. 3s. 6d.)

THE first two books in this list deal with the crisis of last September. They are both written in a spirit of bitter hostility to the Prime Minister, and both repeat the criticisms that were heard last autumn,

before the country generally had recovered its normal balance. Professor Seton-Watson's book is still heavily charged with the emotions of the crisis. In February 1938 Professor Seton-Watson wrote about " the present eclipse of Russia owing to the insane purges in the army and in industry." In February 1939 any such notions are attributed to " gross and deliberate misrepresentation in high quarters in the West." In the East, however, Japan has acted with perfect confidence on the theory of the eclipse of Russia. Professor Seton-Watson describes how the French Right Press and the French Foreign Minister desired and endeavoured to conceal the fact that the British Government had given France an absolute pledge of support; and he prefaces this account with the words " incredible as it may seem." Professor Seton-Watson does not conceal that France, after using Czechoslovakia as an instrument of French policy, failed in the end to keep her reiterated promise of support. He seems to be aware of the reasons for this failure, the disordered state of French finances, the decay of the air force, the acute divisions of opinion, the fear not merely of war but of the consequences that even a successful war might have on the internal political structure of France. But he fails to face the necessary implications of these facts.

A rose across the River Huai, says the Chinese proverb, becomes a bramble. Professor Seton-Watson should read Mr. Armstrong's book in order to see the sort of shape his own criticisms take when they cross the Atlantic. Mr. Armstrong's methods, like some kinds of medicine, may be meant for our good, but taste rather nasty. Portions of the book are useful, but generally it is as wide of the mark as the other.

The third book on our list covers a wider field, but descends to a much lower level. The Government, according to Vigilantes offered a free hand to the Japanese in North China in exchange for their promising to respect British interests in Central China; the Government tried but did not succeed in inducing the Chinese to submit to Japanese aggression; the Government were bent from the beginning of the Disarmament Conference on wrecking it in order to get on with their preparations for a world war. Of the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1905 Mr. Zilliacus says, " In the 1905 revised version Great Britain also enlisted the services of the Japanese for helping to put down by armed force any rebellious nationalist movements in India." Any who are interested in psychology will find much more to the same effect.

J. T. PRATT.

11. NEW TYRANNIES FOR OLD. By Lord Snell, Wickham Steed, Major-General A. C. Temperley, Geneviève Tabouis, R. H. S. Crossman, Rt. Hon. Herbert Morrison, M.P. 1939. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 176 pp. 5s.)

New Tyrannies is a collection of monographs of which the contributors are Lord Snell, Mr. Wickham Steed, Major-General A. C. Temperley, Madame Geneviève Tabouis, Mr. R. H. S. Crossman and the Right Honourable Herbert Morrison. Well-known people of considerable distinction in their respective spheres, they have set down plainly, and sometimes forcibly, their views upon European politics. Not the least merit of this work is the compelling of the reader to refresh his geographical and historical memory in order to put himself into a proper perspective. He is then able to set about

forming a personal opinion of the events which change almost daily before his eyes and which have their roots in many and varied ideologies.

H. J. COOPER.

WAR, 1914–1918

12*. HISTOIRE DIPLOMATIQUE DE LA FRANCE PENDANT LA GRANDE GUERRE. 2 vols. By Albert Pingaud. 1938. (Paris: Editions "Alsatia." 8vo. 317, 387 pp.)

THIS excellent book gives more than its title suggests, for a history of French diplomacy during the War is inevitably a history of the activities of the Entente Powers. Even to-day, a quarter of a century after the events here described, we know comparatively little of the official transactions of the Foreign Offices, for the great British, French, German, and Austrian publications cease at the outbreak of hostilities. Only Russia has so far revealed the doings of her rulers during the long struggle. M. Pingaud is acquainted with all the published material, official and unofficial, and he supplements it from the archives of the Quai d'Orsay, of which he was at one time Director. For instance, Klobukowski reports on his talks with King Albert, Jules Cambon describes his visit to King George and Queen Mary on his roundabout journey home from Berlin, and Count Hoyos explains the Austrian ultimatum in the pregnant sentence: "We had to show some sign of life".

While experts will seek out the novelties, none of them of a startling character, the general reader will enjoy the vigour and clarity of the narrative. The sub-title of these volumes—a third is in preparation—is *Les Alliances et les Interventions*. Both sides "touted" for support, as warring countries always do, and it is not a very edifying story. What price shall be offered or accepted? The main theme is the wooing of Italy and the Balkan States, who inevitably turned the desperate need of the belligerents to their own account. M. Pingaud is never content merely to record. As a professional diplomatist he feels himself entitled to pronounce on the skill of the performers, and he is not easy to satisfy. Neither Sazonoff nor Grey receives high marks. The former is charged with restless and often misdirected activity, the latter with a *penchant* for half-measures and lack of initiative. The picture of Grey in these pages closely resembles that painted in the *War Memoirs* of Mr. Lloyd George. The most elaborate portrait in the gallery is that of Delcassé, whose great qualities and failings are equally recognised. The Balkan statesmen come off no better. Bratiano played his hand with considerable skill: "Il se montrait de fer pour proclamer le principe de l'intervention, mais il se montrait de glace dès qu'il s'agissait d'en fixer l'échéance." The greed of Roumania horrified the Allies, and Bulgaria likewise held out for the highest offer. King Ferdinand, we are told, cannot be acquitted of duplicity, but he was very unskilfully handled. Russia in particular felt the indignity of going on bended knee to the little Balkan States so keenly that her offers often came too late. Italy also demanded a high price for her assistance, but it was promptly paid. France, declares M. Pingaud, realised the value of time more clearly than her allies.

The second volume embraces the intervention of Portugal, Greece, and the United States. The concluding chapter, which is of exceptional interest, pays eloquent tribute to the French statesmen and diplomatists who bore the burden and heat of the day. We are not

surprised to see the largest bouquet presented to Paul Cambon, to whom all the important telegrams were forwarded daily by the Quai d'Orsay in the hope that his long experience and cool judgment might suggest a course of action not only in his own limited field, but for the policy of the Allies as a whole.

G. P. GOOCH.

THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES

13*. DAS DIKTAT VON VERSAILLES: Entstehung-Inhalt-Zerfall. Eine *Darstellung in Dokumenten.* Hrsg F. Berber. Mit einem Vorwort von Joachim von Ribbentrop. (Veröffentlichung des Deutschen Instituts für Aussenpolitische Forschung.) 1939. *Essener Verlagsanstalt.* 2 vols. xlvi + 1672 pp.

THE latest addition of importance to the already bulky accumulation of German books, brochures, and other publications devoted to the exposition and criticism of the Treaty of Versailles, its origin, contents, and consequences, is a work comprising nearly 600 official and semi-official documents and utterances. Commissioned by the German Research Institute for International Affairs, Dr. Berber has edited and chronologically arranged the material, and Herr von Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister, has contributed a vigorous *envoi.*

A work of this character and length—it must run to at least three-quarters of a million words—must primarily serve the purpose of convenient and authentic reference, and, so viewed, it is sure to be welcomed by political students who are concerned to know and appraise the case against the Peace Conference of Versailles and its handiwork as seen from German standpoints. Beginning with the correspondence (dating from October 3rd, 1918) between the Berlin Government and President Wilson relative to Germany's conditional surrender, there follow in succession the documents relating to the armistice terms, which are held to have gone far beyond the first accepted peace conditions, an account of the frustrated French attempt to press Germany back to the Rhine, Mr. Lloyd George's plea for moderation in the statesmanlike but unfortunately abortive Memorandum addressed to the Conference on March 23rd, 1919, and the terms of that comparative innovation in international relationships, a treaty of momentous importance not negotiated but imposed by force, each section being accompanied by relevant documents, showing German reactions at the time and in later years.

Of special interest is the correspondence between the German Government and the Allied Powers concerning all the territorial provisions of the treaty, since it not only adds greatly to existing data, but carries the story down to the absorption of Austria in the Third Reich and the solution of the Sudeten problem in September last, including in the latter case a full record of the negotiations between Mr. Chamberlain and Herr Hitler.

Though the work is avowedly published as an indictment of Germany's self-constituted judges and their verdict, it nevertheless contains a mass of facts of an uncontroversial kind. Incidentally we may learn how many German prisoners lived to enjoy freedom in their own or other countries. According to the records given, some 900,000 Germans were captured during the Great War, the largest total being of those in France and Belgium, 424,000; England following with 328,000, Russia with 168,000, America 50,000, Roumania, 13,000, and

other countries together 11,000. The rates of mortality of these unfortunates are shown to have varied greatly; the highest was that in Roumania, viz., 24 per cent., Russia following with 9·4, France with 6, England with 3, and America with 2 per cent. How many deaths were due to wounds is not told, but while France shows over 43,000 prisoners unaccounted for, and Russia 51,000, no debits of the kind are set against England or America. Inevitably the *Diktat von Versailles* will attract greater attention in Germany than elsewhere, and deservedly so, but it is also indispensable to students of war policy who are concerned to know both sides of controversies which after twenty years show no sign of abatement. W. H. DAWSON.

PRE-WAR HISTORY

14*. FROM SEDAN TO STRESA. By Victor L. Albjerg and Marguerite Hall Albjerg. 1938. (London: Macmillan & Co. 8vo. 1187 pp. 18s.)

15*. L'ÉPOQUE CONTEMPORAINE. II. LA PAIX ARMÉE ET LA GRANDE GUERRE (1871–1919). By Pierre Renouvin, Edmond Préclin, and Georges Hardy. 1938. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 8vo. xxviii + 684 pp. 75 *frs.*)

From Sedan to Stresa is a book remarkable for the range of its information and the thoroughness with which it has been compiled. It will prove useful both as a reference work and as a book to be read straight through for its total and cumulative impression. Written by Americans (though presumably with fairly recent European connections and certainly with a good knowledge of Europe), it has the impartiality which distance and a certain degree of aloofness are apt to secure. But this has also its disadvantages. It is very difficult clearly to define how the impression arises, but the reader feels that Europe as seen by the eyes of the authors is something different from what it is for the average European. It strikes him somewhat like the accounts given even by highly intelligent American tourists who have travelled across Europe with the subconscious standards of a very different and much larger continent. The various countries, which are whole worlds to their inhabitants, seem to be reduced, in the American mind, to the size and character of Wisconsin or, if they are large, of Texas. Even in the headings of the chapters there is a certain systematising flatness, due presumably to the absence of deeper emotional contacts with any of the various countries concerned: Chapter I, "Germany—Vigorous and Virile"; Chapter II, "Austria-Hungary in Decadence"; Chapter III, "France in Convalescence"; Chapter IV, "The Latin Trio: Italy, Spain and Portugal"; Chapter V, "Great Britain: Confident and Complacent." A health inspector on his round!

L'Époque Contemporaine is a very different type of book. It is a striking piece of work of a rare character. Its survey of world affairs, international or taken by continents and countries, is of an almost unequalled brevity and precision. But to each chapter there is added, in tiny print, a bibliographical note: the literature and sources of each subject are reviewed in a most interesting critical analysis, and the reader, besides being told what there is on each subject, learns about the even more impressive gaps that remain to be filled, and which, in fact, call for someone to undertake the work. The work is

thus a guide for students to books and materials, and, at the same time, discreetly suggests themes and subjects which may be profitably taken up by them. L. B. NAMIER.

16. THE GREAT POWERS AND THE BALKANS, 1875–78. By Mihailo D. Stojanović, Ph.D. 1939. (Cambridge University Press. 8vo. x + 296 pp. *12s. 6d.*)

17. THE DIPLOMACY OF THE BALKAN WARS 1912–13: Harvard Historical Studies. Vol. XLII. By Ernst Christian Helmreich. 1938. (Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press and London: Oxford University Press. 8vo. xiv + 523 pp. *21s.*)

ALTHOUGH these two books deal with the old and ever-new Balkan roblem from the viewpoint of past history—1875–78 and 1912–13—oth are indispensable for the proper understanding of the issues at take to-day and of what is called the new British foreign policy, which as, in fact, remained fundamentally the same in the Eastern Mediterranean area.

The first author—a Yugoslavian scholar who has made very able se of all documents from the British, Austrian, and Serbian archives s well as of relevant British literature—analyses in detail the relations etween the Balkans and the Great Powers, the competition between ussia and Austria, and the Turkish wars up to the Congress of Berlin, hich substituted Austrian for Russian supremacy in the Balkans, the ormer being challenged again in 1914 by Russia and the World War. British Cyprus and Greece ("a weapon in the hands of England") ppear on the scene, as well as a French Syria and Tunis, Italian spirations to Tunis or Tripoli or Albania (the latter offered by Bisarck), the Austrian drive towards Salonica, and the dual alliance etween Austria and Germany, the pivot around which revolved—and revolving to-day—the whole system of European policy.

While at the Congress of Berlin the Great Powers settled the astern question among themselves irrespective of the wishes and nterests of the Balkan peoples, which were not even represented at he Congress, a generation later—this is the dramatic report of the arvard Professor who investigated all the archives concerned—the alkan States succeeded in taking their fate into their own hands, y forming, first, the Serbian-Bulgarian-Greek-Montenegrin alliance without Roumania) against Turkey, and, secondly, the Serbian-oumanian-Greek alliance against Bulgaria, and by securing, through wo Balkan wars, the London Conference and the Bucharest treaty, The Balkans for the Balkan States," where the Triple Entente gained hat the Triple Alliance lost. "The Balkans were officially at peace, ut within a year the Powers were to be at war among themselves bout the Balkans." ERNST JACKH.

8. GERMANY AND ENGLAND. By Raymond J. Sontag. 1938. (London: D. Appleton-Century Co. 8vo. xvii + 362 pp. *12s. 6d.*)

THIS study of half a century of Anglo-German relations ends with 894. Yet its relevance to the present situation is considerable, since is not primarily another diplomatic history distilled from despatches, ut rather an attempt to trace the more permanent sources of Anglo-erman misunderstanding by analysis of the social and economic

tructure, the public opinion, and the political life of the two nations, ind, above all, by a study of the evolution of two irreconcilable views on the ends and claims and limitations of the nation-State. The nodesty of the preface and the deletion of the apparatus of scholarship save for a valuably selective bibliography) cannot conceal the underlying research, though in lightness and variety of approach the book ias some affinities with Dr. Wingfield-Stratford's Victorian trilogy. The result will not comfort those who hope that settlement of this or hat dispute will bring Anglo-German understanding, nor those who hink that Nazi aims and outlook are not in their essence representative of the normal development of the real Germany. The diplomatic iistorian may profit most from the fresh handling of Caprivi's transitional Chancellorship and may be less happy over the treatment of Bismarck in the 'seventies. L. G. Robinson.

9*. Europe in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (1789–1938). Fifth Edition. By A. J. Grant and H. W. V. Temperley. 1939. (London: Longmans, Green. 8vo. xxiii + 700 pp. Maps. 15*s*.)

This standard history has now been brought up to 1938 by the iddition of new chapters, including one on "Hitler's Drive to the East —Czechoslovakia"; while Part IV, dealing with the last pre-War period, has, we are told, been carefully revised in the light of recent nformation, and Part V (the War and its aftermath) is largely new. The new chapters contain much interesting material; but it is to be ioped that the method of piecemeal addition will not be continued in he next issue. The whole section dealing with the world since the Peace Conference has now reached a stage when it calls for complete ecasting, to include the filling up of gaps, the reduction of repetition, ind the correction of numerous small errors. C. A. Macartney.

0*. The Zollverein. By W. O. Henderson. [*Cambridge Studies in Economic History*]. 1939. (Cambridge University Press. Demy 8vo. xi + 375 pp. 18*s*.)

The evolution of the German Customs Union during the first half of the nineteenth century is one of the most important chapters in he economic history of Europe, but hitherto it has not been studied n Great Britain, at least with the care that its importance justifies.

The latest volume in Cambridge Studies in Economic History is in impressive attempt to repair that omission. It is extremely well locumented, perhaps too much so for ease of reading, and it is immensely detailed. No single transaction bearing on the negotiations preliminary to the various phases of the Customs Union is omitted. It might have helped appreciation, however, if a summary chapter iad been included, interpreting on broad lines the various developments as contributory to the formation of the modern German State, economic as well as social and political. Without such an interpretation it is difficult to fit together the various pieces into a pattern which ias some coherence. It is even difficult to estimate the size of the pieces, and one has the feeling that much of the earlier history could iave been drastically reduced in description, or even omitted in favour of a more extensive examination of the immensely powerful Prussia which overcame Austria in 1866 and won the Franco-Prussian War n 1870. Such an investigation might have helped us now to understand the obsessions and ruthlessness of the contemporary version of

the Bismarck Reich. It would almost certainly have explained how essential to the economic welfare of Great Britain was a less autocratic and more liberal régime in Germany.

This criticism is of small importance, however, beside the careful description of the achievement in political and economic co-operation represented by the Customs Union itself. After the Napoleonic Wars, Germany was in a state of disintegration worse even than during the Middle Ages. It seemed an absolute impossibility to establish any kind of order in a country divided into over three hundred states, where even the larger states, such as Prussia and Bavaria, had outlying sections left as islands in the midst of other states with no geographical connection with the parent state. Fifty years later a single powerful economic system could be traced in three great German states, namely Prussia, Bavaria, and Saxony, where a unified policy had taken the place of the early confusion, and in this period of fifty years there was carried out probably the most remarkable achievement of modern history.

Whether the balance of culture in Europe and the civilisation of the world were really advanced by such a work of consolidation is a matter on which one is beginning to have increasing doubts. Against the economic prosperity of the Customs Union one could balance the great cultural achievements of the eighteenth century. Bismarck, in the verdict of history, must appear a bad substitute for a world figure like Goethe, and still less can Hitler be regarded as a good substitute for Bismarck. The descriptive ability and the careful arrangement of fact, characteristic of the author, only serve to bring into prominence the short-sighted commercialism inspiring almost everyone who negotiated the various tariff agreements; and an ominous development was the increasing power of the German industrialist, as, even in those early years, the industrialist was capable of swaying political policy in the direction of his own interests. At many points it is an unlovely and exasperating story of small interests cancelling out other small interests, with the shadow of Prussia becoming greater and greater, and the influence of states with a longer historical and cultural tradition disappearing more and more completely.

It is illuminating to compare the study of the last fifty years of German industrial and economic progress made by Professor W. F. Bruck with the detailed description of the first seventy years of the nineteenth century carried out by W. O. Henderson. The one explains and interprets the other. The strong historical movement which brought the Customs Union to fruition was also responsible for the emergence of the Third Reich and the new dictatorship of Europe.

HUGH QUIGLEY.

21. AMBASSADOR TO BISMARCK: Lord Odo Russell, First Baron Ampthill. By Winifred Taffs. 1938. (London: Muller. 8vo. 410 pp. 15s.)

WHILE bringing no great surprises, since the diplomatic history of pre-War Anglo-German relationships is now adequately understood, Dr. Taffs' scholarly and eminently readable study of Lord Odo Russell's Berlin years is valuable on several counts. The series of Lord Odo's confidential reports to Lord Granville at the Foreign Office, here published for the first time, are models of their kind, penetrating, well balanced judgments which sift the wheat from the chaff and are rarely belied by subsequent happenings. The figure which emerges most

clearly is, as would be expected, Bismarck himself. The terrifying violence and rancour of his personal feelings for those who worked with him are dispassionately viewed at close range. His failures in the *Kulturkampf* and in the persecution of the socialists are set off against his superlative skill in foreign policy, where he is never caught napping, and never wastes powder and shot on a worthless quarry. Beside him the readily tearful old Emperor appears as a pigmy. The glimpses of German social and political conditions afforded in these reports and in Dr. Taffs' lucid accompanying chapters are a useful corrective to the rose-coloured vision of the Bismarckian age conjured up by German historians of the orthodox school. I. M. MASSEY.

THE LEAGUE AND ITS WORKING

22*. L'ARTICLE 16 DU PACTE DE LA SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS. By Walter Schiffer. 1939. (Paris: Librairie Marchal et Billard; Geneva Research Centre. 69 pp.)

THIS little study is issued under the auspices of the Geneva Research Centre, and is a reprint of an article which appeared last year in the *Revue Internationale Française du Droit des Gens*. It deals, as a subtitle shows, with the interpretation of the Article "in the light of its birth"—"a la lumière de sa genèse"; the author does not express any view of his own as to what is the true construction of the Article, but confines himself to a well-documented and careful survey of the different opinions expressed in 1919 and a little later by persons of authority, most of whom were connected with the drafting of the Article. The book is thus in a double sense concerned with past history—we had almost written "dead" history; for the Article itself in its present form is not likely to play a live part in international affairs, and the views of draftsmen on the interpretation of a text of which more than one draft was prepared are not authoritative, not to mention that in the present case they are widely divergent. The question of the true construction of a text is to be determined by a consideration of the language used; it is only when that language is obscure that a reference to earlier drafts or negotiations is permissible, and even so it is, at any rate according to Anglo-Saxon doctrine, not allowable to use what has passed between A and B as evidence against C.

Readers would have been helped to follow more easily the views expressed had the book contained the text of the Article, and an index also would have added to its value as a work of reference.

J. F. W.

23*. LA COLLABORATION DANS L'APPLICATION DES SANCTIONS prévues à l'Article 16 du Pacte de la Société des Nations. By Raphaël A. Levitch. 1938. (Paris: Pedone. 8vo. 203 pp.)

THE object of Mr. Levitch's study is to consider how in practice Article 16 of the Covenant of the League can be implemented, how the different independent and sovereign members of the League can be brought to collaborate in carrying out the sanctions contemplated in the Covenant. Such collaboration is required, first, to establish the fact that aggression has taken place and that the Covenant has been broken; secondly, to determine that measures shall be taken against the member in order to restrain him and bring him back into the fold as well as the measures to be taken; and thirdly, for mutual support in carrying out the agreed measures.

As the various members must apply the measures agreed upon individually within the limits of their sovereignty, there must be co-ordination between them. Therefore, a committee of co-ordination is provided, consisting of one representative of each State member of the League. This large body of fifty-four members being too cumbersome to work with, it is called upon to appoint a committee of eighteen of their number, called a committee of initiative, which again works through various sub-committees. The task of the committee of eighteen is: (1) to elaborate proposals which contain measures of coercion for each State voluntarily to adopt; (2) to control the measures taken; (3) to try to induce non-members of the League to join with the members in common action.

The author goes carefully into the various difficulties which the carrying into practice of these propositions brings with it, the main difficulty being that none of the members is bound until such member voluntarily accepts the proposed measure. Once the measures are agreed, the committee is bound to see them carried out and to watch the results of the application of the sanctions.

Similar difficulties stand in the way of mutual support between the members when once sanctions have been agreed upon and are being carried out, such mutual support consisting of: (1) minimising the losses which the States are suffering in carrying out sanctions and which affect some of them more heavily than others; (2) resisting any actions taken by the aggressor against one or more of the States which apply sanctions; and (3) allowing troops to cross the territory of a co-operating member.

In practice there is little or no guidance on the means by which mutual support should be given, and the subject is full of pitfalls. After discussing these problems from a general point of view, the author considers in detail in a second chapter the manner and effect of the mutual support given by the members of the League during the Italo-Abyssinian war, when the greatest difficulty in the application of mutual support by economic sanctions was the overwhelming sacrifices demanded of Yugoslavia, Greece, and Roumania in comparison with other nations and the existence of the most-favoured-nation clause in the commercial treaties with Italy.

Mr. Levitch is very conscientious and methodical in carrying out the task which he has set himself. From his careful treatment of the difficulties in rendering collaboration between independent sovereign States effective, it is not surprising to find how very limited was the result of the elaborate system formulated upon the sole occasion that it was put into practice. W. R. BISSCHOP.

24*. L'INFLUENCE BRITANNIQUE DANS LA SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS. By Jean-Félix Charvet. 1938. (Paris: Rodstein. 8vo. 191 pp.)

THERE is much of value in this book on Great Britain's influence on the League, not least because it is written from the particular angle from which a Frenchman sees the League. M. Charvet is right when he fixes on the conflict between British and French views as a main cause of the League's failure. To France the League meant security against war. It was to be a rigid organisation of States with rigorous mutual obligations. An unwinking eye was fixed on Germany. Britain saw the League as a straightforward co-operative association, powerfully assisted by the reduction of armaments and honest reliance on public opinion and something like a world conscience. Here was a

conflict between a policy of the watchful policeman and the thoughtful "good neighbour." Up to 1929 the League rose from success to success; as a result of the work of Great Britain more than of France. M. Charvet's account of this co-operative era is inadequate. A great deal is said of the failures of Great Britain and others to implement "collective security," before it became quite the acid test of later years. But had France supported Great Britain's policy of "co-operation" in this period as vehemently as she did "collective security," who can tell what influence it would have had on the courses of action adopted by other States after 1929? M. Charvet's analysis of later years rings true, as far as it goes. But there is over-simplification of a situation which was far more complicated than would appear. Vacillation of the protagonists; constant changes of opinion, but never by the important States at the same time. At the last hour Great Britain comes up to scratch—only to find France a non-starter. Why? It is not made clear. And the absence of the United States, and the abysmal effect of the world economic crisis on the League are among events which are left too much in the background. Yet they can explain much. M. FANSHAWE.

25*. SOURCES OF INFORMATION: a handbook on the publications of the League of Nations. By A. C. de Breyscha-Vauthier. Preface by James T. Shotwell. 1939. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 118 pp. 5s.)

THIS first edition in English contains additions which will prove particularly useful to small libraries with a limited file of League documents apart from the Official Journal and Assembly records, as full references are given to documents reproduced in those publications. The French edition was reviewed in the January–February, 1938, issue of *International Affairs*. The book has been published in German (1934), Czech (1936), Russian (abridged edition, 1937), French (1937), and English (1939). L. V. D.

26*. THE LEAGUE FROM YEAR TO YEAR (1938). Prepared by the Information Section, League of Nations. Geneva: League of Nations. London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 214 pp. 1s.

THE volume continues the record of the work of the League dealing with legal and constitutional questions (including information on the progress of discussions regarding the application of the Covenant and the question of Swiss neutrality); political questions; Permanent Court of International Justice; mandates; intellectual co-operation; economic and financial work; Communications and Transit Organisation; Health Organisation; European Conference on Rural Life; opium; social questions; international assistance to refugees; technical collaboration with China.

27*. TREATY REVISION AND THE LEAGUE. A new peace outlook. Speeches given by Victor Cornea, B.Litt., Rumanian Delegate, World Youth Congress. Preface by G. Raymond Gauntlett, Chairman, Youth Groups, League of Nations Union. 1938. (London: Lamley & Co. 8vo. 32 pp. 6*d*.)

Opposes territorial revision uncorrelated with economic co-operation.

THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION

28*. LE CONTRÔLE DE L'APPLICATION DES CONVENTIONS INTERNATIONALES DU TRAVAIL. Par Jean Zarras. [Institut du Droit Comparé de l'Université de Paris, Série des Monographies de Droit Public, VII.] 1937. (Paris: Sirey. 8vo. 386 pp. 70 *frs.*)

THE machinery for supervising the application of the provisions of international labour conventions established by the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation is unique in character, and the absence of any adequate study of it has hitherto been a serious lacuna in the literature of international law. The gap has now been filled by Dr. Zarras' able and thorough book. Dr. Zarras wrote his book in the library of the International Labour Office, and the fact that this made it possible for him to have access to a number of documents which have never been published makes his work of special value.

The Constitution of the International Labour Organisation requires each Member of the Organisation to submit each year, in a form prescribed by the Governing Body, an annual report upon the steps which it has taken to give effect to the provisions of each convention which it has ratified. Since 1927 these reports have been considered each year by a committee of experts (upon which the traditions of the common law are represented by Dr. A. D. McNair, who has acted in recent years as *rapporteur*) and by a committee of the International Labour Conference in which employers' and workers' representatives take part in the discussions upon the same footing as Government representatives. Dr. Zarras gives a detailed account of the working of these committees and of the results which they have achieved. He points out that mutual supervision through the annual reports system has become the characteristic method of supervision of the Organisation, and has tended to supplant the formal procedures of representations by industrial organisations, and complaints by States or delegates to the International Labour Conference, provided for by the Constitution of the Organisation. In recent years, however, the procedure of representation has for the first time begun to acquire practical importance, and it is therefore a matter for congratulation that Dr. Zarras has described and discussed it in detail.

A feature of Dr. Zarras' book which the present reviewer has found of special interest is his treatment of a number of legal questions of considerable topical importance, such as the position in relation to the supervision of the application of conventions of States which are Members of the International Labour Organisation without being Members of the League of Nations, of States which have withdrawn from the Organisation, and of Federal States. The International Labour Organisation now includes an important group of States which are Members of the Organisation without being Members of the League. Brazil, Hungary, Persia and the United States are at present in this position, Japan is still formally so, though she has notified her withdrawal; and Chile and Venezuela, which have given notice of withdrawal from the League but have officially notified their intentions of retaining membership of the Organisation, are prospectively so. Dr. Zarras' conclusion as to their position, which appears to be indisputable, is that these States are all in exactly the same position, as regards the supervision of the application of conventions, as the Members of the Organisation which are Members of the League. There is a complete reciprocity of

rights and obligations as between all the Members of the Organisation, and the fact that the Secretary-General of the League of Nations has certain formal functions in connection with one of the procedures of supervision over the application of ratified conventions does not qualify the obligations of these States. These functions are entrusted to the Secretary-General of the League by the Constitution of the Organisation, and the reservation made by the United States when accepting membership of the Organisation that it does not thereby undertake any obligations under the Covenant is consequently inapplicable.

Unhappily the position of States which have withdrawn from the Organisation as well as from the League has also become of practical importance in view of the withdrawal of Germany and Nicaragua and the notice of withdrawal of Italy. It must now be regarded as well established that withdrawal from the Organisation does not terminate obligations under conventions ratified prior to withdrawal. Germany has acted on this view, and Nicaragua has expressly accepted it. There is still some discussion, however, as to whether the obligations which survive withdrawal include those relating to supervision over the application of conventions which derive, not from the terms of the conventions themselves, but from the provisions of the Constitution in accordance with which the conventions were ratified. Dr. Zarras advances strong arguments in support of the view that the obligations under the Constitution of the Organisation survive. He also makes the interesting and important observation that the provision of the Constitution of the Organisation permitting Federal States to treat draft conventions as recommendations in certain circumstances only applies prior to ratification, and that a Federal State which has taken the responsibility of ratifying a convention is subject to the procedures of international supervision in the same manner as other Members.

Dr. Zarras covers so much ground that in the nature of things few are likely to agree with all his views on controversial points, but his book is a valuable addition to the legal literature relating to the International Labour Organisation. C. W. JENKS.

29*. SOWING JUSTICE or The Romance of the International Labour Office. By Stephen Lawford Childs. 1939. (London: Nicholson and Watson. 8vo. 147 pp.)

A popular account of its inception, constitution and achievements.

GENERAL

30*. CRISIS FOR CHRISTIANITY. By William Teeling. 1939. (London: John Gifford, Ltd. 8vo. 320 pp. 10s. 6*d*.)

THE "Crisis for Christianity" with which this book deals is the struggle between the Roman Catholic Church and the Nazi Government. Mr. Teeling is doubtless right in attaching supreme importance to the issue of this struggle. And his book will be read with interest by all students of contemporary history, secular as well as religious. For the fight has more than religious significance: on its outcome may depend the acceptance or rejection by the new Germany of the main values of our traditional civilisation.

The author is to be congratulated on the courage and the industry with which he tackles his difficult subject. Himself a Roman Catholic, he is not afraid in his criticisms of the policy of the Church in Germany to say much that may be attacked by his less courageous co-religionists

as *piis auribus offensum*. He spares neither the Vatican nor the leaders of the German hierarchy, the members of which, with one or two exceptions, he does not consider equal to the gigantic responsibilities which have been thrust on them by the rise of the Nazi form of paganism. Cardinal Faulhaber's reputation abroad as the living embodiment of the Catholic resistance to Hitlerism would hardly seem to be justified: German Jesuits have told Mr. Teeling that " he may sound very well in the pulpit, but round the conference table he is ready to give way at nearly every point." In Rome, too, there has been much uncertainty and vacillation. The Concordat has been broken in nearly all its vital articles, but still no definite lead has come to the Catholics. Pius XI contented himself with protests, not all of them in Mr. Teeling's view opportune, and with a general condemnation of the Nazi " religion " of blood and soil in the Encyclical *Mit brennender Sorge*. As a result of this faulty leadership, the Nazis have already beaten the Church on a number of points: witness the " plebiscites " of parents in Catholic Bavaria in favour of State schools, and the increasing exodus of youth from the Church. Cardinal Innitzer's craven surrender after the *Anschluss* (surely Mr. Teeling's attempt to justify it is painfully weak) may be explained by the general feeling of confusion and helplessness which then obtained in Catholic circles.

Various explanations of this moral *débâcle* were offered to Mr. Teeling by representative Germans, lay and clerical, Nazi and Catholic, whom he interviewed. It is one of the book's chief merits that the author sets forth impartially the opinions expressed to him by all sides. From them we gleam some very valuable information. Obviously in pre-Hitler Germany the Church was suffering from that typically Germanic weakness, over-organisation. Its imposing guilds, trades unions, youth movements were all constructed on a national rather than a diocesan basis. Consequently they were an easy target for the Nazis, and, more important still, when they were finally smashed there was no local leadership to replace them. The bishops had been eclipsed by the enormous nation-wide organisations; so too had been the family, for the children were so well cared for in the Catholic youth movements that parents had ceased to think of their own responsibilities in the matter. Mr. Teeling sees some hope in the prospect of a return to the older diocesan organisations and in the restoration of the family as the centre of the religious life of the young. But how far is this feasible in face of the inexorable monopoly of youth, which is perhaps the most evil feature of the whole Hitler régime?

The atmosphere in which Mr. Teeling has conducted his valuable investigations was singularly confused, and it is hardly unfair to suggest that some of this confusion has percolated into his own work. He is liberal in his criticisms of all the Catholic leaders, but one looks in vain for any suggestion of a clear-cut policy which they might have followed. Indeed, the author at times adds to the confusion by expressing conflicting opinions on the same subject in different chapters of the book. At one time he seems to believe that an accommodation between the Catholic Church and the Nazis is not only possible, but desirable, at another he stresses and illustrates the régime's fixed policy of destroying the foundations of Christianity in Germany. But perhaps such uncertainty is inevitable while the battle is still raging. At the moment the outlook for the German Roman Catholics is bleak. They are not being persecuted openly, their churches are still full, but their strength is being sapped at the base; they are fighting an unheroic rearguard

action, and they lack leaders of the heroic quality of a Pastor Niemöller to encourage them. But perhaps their uninspiring prudence may justify itself in the long run. Despite all individual defections, their numerical strength has been greatly increased by the recent forcible annexations, and they now form over 40 per cent. of the population of the greater Reich. Hitler and his lieutenants may therefore hesitate about waging war *à outrance* against such a formidable body. And, on the other side, the intransigeant Pius XI has been replaced by a more supple successor, well trained in diplomatic methods and with a profound knowledge of Germany. I personally do not believe that any long-term accommodation is possible, but attempts to reach one may well be made in the near future.

The book bears marks of hasty writing, and a number of German words are badly misspelt. They may be laid to the charge of printer and reader, but can one make the same excuse for " ultramontaine " which occurs at least ten times? Nevertheless it is to be hoped that such formal defects will blind nobody to the value of the work and to the courage and honesty of the author. C. S.

31*. The World Mission of the Church. Findings and Recommendations of the International Missionary Council, Tambaram, Madras, India, Dec. 12–29, 1938. 1939. (London: Int. Missionary Council. 8vo. 208 pp. 1*s.* 6*d.*)

32. Through Tragedy to Triumph. By Basil Mathews. 1939. (London: Edinburgh House Press. 8vo. 100 pp. 2*s.*)

" Madras, 1938 " (for short) was a conference of Protestant Christians from sixty-nine countries or territories, held at Tambaram, Madras, in December 1938. This Report shows that they did not fashionably camouflage their belief. They maintained that " for Christian faith there is a mystery at the horizon of life; but at its heart there is the living God, disclosed as Holy Love in Jesus Christ." There was newness at Madras. New intention to act in face of world chaotic problems, the status of women, literacy, agriculture, health; and to engender vitality, no demoded nationalism but free interdependence. Those without defined creed will gain by reading this Report and *Through Tragedy to Triumph*, Basil Mathews' apt commentary on it.

A. H. Ward.

33*. Personal Aggressiveness and War. By E. F. M. Durbin and John Bowlby. 1939. (London: Kegan Paul. 8vo. 154 pp. 5*s.*)

What is the real cause of war and of people's willingness to fight? The authors draw upon psycho-analysis, comparative psychology, and anthropology to show that the primary causes of fighting—possessiveness, strangeness, and frustration—are substantially the same in adults, children, and the higher animals. Fighting is therefore a fundamentally natural form of human behaviour.

War is simply one species of fighting, a transformed aggressiveness of individuals. " The simplest and most general causes of war are only to be found in the causes of fighting." The cure for war must therefore consist in the right treatment of these simple causes. For example, frustration must be countered by freer educational methods and fighting in general be restrained by superior force.

This book deserves to be widely read because of its subject and the thoroughly scientific way in which this is handled. But it suffers a

little from its limited or mainly psychological and subjective standpoint. Moreover, the authors share the tendency of much modern psychology to recognise only the lowest springs of human behaviour even when, as in the case of war, the behaviour is as crude and irrational as anything can be. Thus the peculiar sensitiveness of people to the propaganda of war is attributed to an underlying willingness to kill. But war is much more than simple fighting. It appeals to every human tendency —the highest as well as the most brutal—and its irrationality consists in the inverted way in which these tendencies are directed and ordered, and not in the fact that some are present and others not. If so, a peaceful substitute for war must be added to the cures which the authors suggest.

A. K. WHITE.

34*. MAN OR LEVIATHAN? A TWENTIETH-CENTURY ENQUIRY INTO WAR AND PEACE. By Edward Mousley. 1939. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 470 pp. 15*s*.)

THE main argument of this book is indicated by its title. What the world is suffering from to-day is not Power, but Power directed by a wrong motive. 'Power acknowledged and indeed organized by man as a means to a beneficial end' is one thing: power in the form of 'violence, naked, untamed, undirected to such end' is another. Thus 'the true alternatives' are 'not peace or war, but law or war.'

The first part of the book, in which this argument is presented, is more effective than the remainder, which leads up to a proposal for a Two Hundred Years' Peace Plan, based upon the British Commonwealth and 'the other great democracies'. The book is marred by its discursiveness. It could have been made far more persuasive in much less than half the space. Some of the incidental criticisms, however, are as shrewd as they are forcible, notably those on the Continental School of international lawyers, on the movement for disarmament, and on the working of the League of Nations.

A. Z.

35*. A COMMONWEALTH OF EUROPEAN STATES. By W. R. Bisschop. 1939. (London: P. S. King. 8vo. 31 pp. 1*s*.)

A paper read before the Grotius Society on February 8th, 1939. The author argues for a closer union between European States by the promotion of a federal system to secure peaceful intercourse and the peaceful solution of difficulties.

36. LAUGHING DIPLOMAT. By Daniele Varè. 1938. (London: John Murray. 8vo. xiii + 455 pp. 16*s*.)

ONE wishes that more space could be devoted to a review of this book than can here be found for it, in the first place because it shows what a very human business the transaction of international affairs really is. Their study too often forgets, or ignores, this all-important fact, with the minor result that both writers and readers are apt to mistake stodginess for wisdom, and the major consequence that premises and conclusions are apt to be unreal. Very few writers, it is true, could be trusted to use laughter as the instrument of humanism in the deft and instructive way which Signor Varè uses it. One would be hard put to it to name another three—which is a further reason why *Laughing Diplomat* should find a place in *International Affairs* and in the Library of Chatham House. It is an extremely useful contribution to the philosophy of international politics, in which, surely, the sunshine of human affairs is at least as important as their murkiness and shadows. Moreover it supplies a variety of valuable footnotes to several of the

problems which engage our attention at the present time. The fact that it fulfils these purposes with a lightness of touch and a humour that are irresistibly amusing makes it all the more worth while to the serious reader. For they, by a process of reaction, keep the critical faculty alert, and of course there are faults—as for instance the statement on p. 184 that in Chinese (much of the book is about China) the expression " public opinion " can only be rendered as " the stupid people." " Very apt," says Signor Varè, " not only in China." But the statement is quite incorrect. E. M. GULL.

37. THE NATIONAL MIND—ENGLISH, FRENCH, GERMAN. By Michael Demiashkevich. 1938. (New York: American Book Co. 8vo. xii + 508 pp. $3.50.)

HOLDING " that national characteristics are stable and that they can be discovered," Professor Demiashkevich analyses the national minds of the three leading peoples of modern civilisation. The author is a student of Comparative Education, and his book is meant to serve as prolegomena for a " study of the education of leaders in Western Europe." For the purpose of this " liaison subject " of research, the author regards the nations as " ethnic-psychological groups " whose cohesion is founded upon certain common " basic mental traits " rather than upon racial, natural, and historical circumstances. With great knowledge and acute perception he pieces together a mosaic of careful generalisations, backed up by quotations from the widest range of literary sources. The book is both witty and instructive, except for passages where—as for instance when it comes to explaining the policy of the British Government in connection with the Spanish civil war by making it an illustration of " anti-intellectualism " as an English characteristic—successful analysis gives way to doubtful interpretation. E. A. A.

38*. LES TECHNIQUES AU SERVICE DE LA PENSÉE. By E. de Nalèche and others. 1939. (Paris: Félix Alcan. Sm. 8vo. 265 pp. 18 *frs.*)

THIS volume consists of four lectures delivered last year at the *École Libre des Sciences Politiques* on the chief instruments of modern mass-persuasion and entertainment considered in relation to our present and future " culture." M. Gemon discusses the Press, M. Philippe de Rothschild the Cinema, and M. Mortier the Wireless. All these discussions well repay study, not merely as useful analyses of the present condition of these instruments and industries, but as contributions to the important task of thinking clearly about their impact on our intellectual and moral standards. The final lecture of M. de Tarde, which deals with this general problem, is a brilliant—and on the whole optimistic—piece of synthesis. TERENCE H. O'BRIEN.

39*. WAR, PEACE AND CHANGE. By John Foster Dulles. 1939. (London: Macmillan. 8vo. xvi + 170 pp. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

The American edition of this book was reviewed in the last issue of the Journal, p. 397. Mr. Lionel Curtis has contributed a foreword to the English edition.

40*. NEW DATA FOR V. I. LENIN'S " IMPERIALISM, THE HIGHEST STAGE OF CAPITALISM." Edited by E. Varga and L. Mendelsohn. 1939. (London: Lawrence and Wishart. 8vo. 322 pp. 6*s.*)

THE two most celebrated criticisms of imperialism in the English language are those of J. A. Hobson, first published in 1902, and of

Lenin, the English translation of which appeared after the War. Hobson's analysis was largely in terms of excessive savings in highly developed capitalist countries, leading to a vigorous competition in the development of backward countries and the exploitation of their inhabitants, with consequent risks of war. Acknowledging his indebtedness to Hobson, Lenin fitted the idea of the necessity for the export of capital to undeveloped countries into a more rigorous theory of capitalism in general, which, as he believed, inevitably tended in the direction of more widespread monopolistic control. "Surplus capital," he said, "will never be utilised for the purpose of raising the standard of living of the masses in a given country, for this would mean a decline in profits for the capitalists; it will be used for the purpose of increasing those profits by exporting capital abroad to the backward countries."

There is naturally much in this analysis which can be made the object of legitimate criticism, but there was also much more truth in it than has sometimes been admitted by those who rejoiced in the discovery that the causes of war were numerous and complex. Some of the grounds, for example, upon which the retention of colonies has recently been justified can quite reasonably be regarded by the disciples of Lenin as a confirmation of his thesis. Nevertheless the history of post-War imperialism presents a number of important phenomena which, at least at first sight, are difficult to fit into the theory of either Hobson or Lenin. However it be defined, imperialism, it would generally be agreed, is an outstanding characteristic, even if it is not the main driving force, of the policies of Germany, of Italy, and of Japan. But it is extremely difficult to believe that there is in any of these countries any pressure for the export of capital on the part of monopolists who fear that investment at home will lower the rate of profit for them, or, if there is any such pressure, that it is to any significant degree responsible for those aspects of German, Italian, and Japanese policy which to many in the world outside appear to threaten war. Indeed, in the long run one reason for doubting the stability of the imperialist edifices which they are endeavouring to build up is precisely their poverty in capital resources. And to some extent an examination of the interests in other countries which show themselves most sympathetic to the new imperialisms suggests that there may be a good deal more in Kautsky's idea of "ultra-imperialism" or "super-imperialism" than Lenin's scornful references would allow. The kind of "peace" which the triumph of such imperialism would ensure is not, indeed, at all attractive, for it would be achieved at the cost of many of the values which genuinely civilised people regard as all-important; but however the tendency be assessed, it appears to require some modification of Lenin's theory.

Mr. Hobson published a new edition of his *Imperialism* last year, but it threw no light whatever upon this important problem. The announcement of a new edition of Lenin's book, with extensive "new data" printed on alternate pages, bringing the statistical foundations of his theory up to date, therefore aroused hopes that the problem would be squarely faced. Unfortunately these hopes are disappointed. The new imperialisms are not neglected, as indeed they scarcely could be. "German fascism," the editors declare, "is the principal instigator of the impending world war," though a few pages later it is affirmed that "Anglo-American antagonisms are being transformed into the central antagonism of modern imperialism," a view which even those who are most free from sentimental illusions about the essential

harmony of British and American interests may find it difficult to swallow. But an interpretation of German fascism and of the similar movements in Italy and Japan in terms of the Leninian theory is not seriously attempted. "Through the medium of their fascist agents," it is said, "the magnates of finance capital in Germany, who are dreaming of *revanche*, are feverishly preparing for war," but while it may well be true that important financial interests in Germany have supported the Nazi régime in the expectation that they would find in it the protection which they desired, these expectations by now must have led to disappointment, and the German drive towards imperialist expansion to-day seems to call for explanation along other lines.

There is much else in this volume which deserves comment and criticism, but the point which has been raised seems at the present time to have the most urgent importance. It is by no means a matter of merely academic interest to interpret correctly the bases of post-War imperialism, for the question is also tied up in the closest possible way with the policy of the Soviet Government, and with the policies which other governments are likely or ought to adopt in the light of Soviet intentions. During the Great War Lenin could maintain in effect that it was merely a sordid imperialist squabble, in which revolutionaries should take no part, except to profit from the process of disintegration which was likely to offer an opportunity for overthrowing the existing régime on one or other side, and preferably on both. This attitude was no doubt grim, but not illogical or unintelligent. Should there, however, be another World War, the line appropriate for disciples of Lenin would, one gathers, be different, and it is a matter for regret that an edition of Lenin's *Imperialism*, published in the critical year of 1939, should throw so little light upon this question. ALLAN G. B. FISHER.

41*. THE GOVERNMENTS OF EUROPE. By William Bennett Munro. 3rd Edition. 1938. (New York and London: Macmillan. 8vo. ix + 856 pp. 18*s*.)

THIS is a new edition of a book, first published in 1925, describing the political institutions of the principal European Powers. New sections have been added in this edition dealing with the institutional aspects of the changes which have since taken place in Germany, Italy, and Soviet Russia; the other chapters have been brought up to date, and a supplementary chapter has been included on the Government of Japan. The book is primarily designed as a text-book for the use of American students. Its author seems to be mainly concerned to enumerate the facts rather than to analyse their significance; and though the facts which he enumerates are usually accurate in themselves, his selection and arrangement of them are not always such as to give a true or significant picture of each political system as a whole

D. A. ROUTH.

42*. ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY. By Samuel Van Valkenberg. 1939. (New York: Prentice Hall Inc. 8vo. pp. 401. $3.50.)

HERE a convinced democratic internationalist, inspired by Isaiah Bowman's *New World*, attempts to study "Geopolitik" in such a way as to redeem that subject from its degradation in Germany into a weapon of propagandists for aggression, and one deeply appreciates the author's attempts to be fair to German grievances.

France is used as a type-study for a political-geographical evalu-

ation of a State and there is a great deal of value and interest in the 60 pages devoted to this, notably in the review of the population problem illustrated by very telling birth-rate maps. A phrase on p. 47 may mislead a student into thinking that France acquired its chief iron-ore bearing territory from Germany after the War of 1914–18, whereas the fact is that the department of Meurthe et Moselle had already long been one of the world's chief sources of iron before 1914, in fact ever since the application of the Gilchrist–Thomas process in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.

After this type-study comes an over-rapid review of physical, economic, and human elements in the States of the world. The author tries to support an analogy between the individual and the State, and ascribes to the latter phases of youth, concentrating on internal development, adolescence which is dynamic and aggressive, maturity and senility. This is one of those theories that are rather snares to us and lead too often to faulty generalisation and trimming to suit our views. The sources of effective social-motive-power need more consideration.

The author rightly sees we need great courage and initiative if we are to avoid war, and he would like Inter-tropical Africa and the Western Pacific to become a free trade area under joint control as a result of a scheme to be worked out after the non-aggressive nations have guaranteed an armed peace for twenty-five years. He is not blind to the difficulties involved. H. J. FLEURE.

43*. THE STATESMAN'S YEAR-BOOK: Statistical and Historical Annual of the States of the World for the year 1939. Edited by M. Epstein. 76th annual issue. 1939. (London: Macmillan. 8vo. xxxviii + 1567 pp. 20s.)

In this issue of the Year-Book the territorial changes in Central Europe during the past year are recorded and brought up to date to the end of March 1939. The new situation is illustrated by a map. For the rest the volume maintains its great value as a source of detailed and easily ascertainable information in all the countries of the world.

44*. ANNUAL REGISTER: A Review of Public Events at Home and Abroad for the year 1938. Edited by M. Epstein. New Series. 1939. (London: Longmans Green. 8vo. xii + 498 pp. 30s.)

The first part of the volume (314 pp.) is devoted to a review of political affairs in Great Britain during 1938 followed by sections on the Dominions, India and the Colonies, the League of Nations and *résumés* of events in foreign countries. Part II consists of a chronological summary of events and sections on Literature, Science and Art, Finance and Commerce, Law, and Public Documents, comprising the texts of the Anglo-Italian Agreement of April 16th, 1938, the Munich Settlement of September 29th, 1938, and the treaty between the Balkan Entente and Bulgaria of July 31st, 1938.

45. THE SHORTEST WAY WITH THE JEWS. By Peter Harlow. 1939. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 256 pp. 6s.)

The Socratic method is very elegantly exploited by Mr. Harlow, under whose careful questioning the idea that the Jews are a distinct race disintegrates, and nothing remains but the religious community. (Precisely the contrary view is that held by Herr Hitler.) A similar approach is used for the Jewish problem. The solution which quite naturally emerges is that the best thing to do with the Jews is nothing at all: leave them alone, and they will be absorbed: persecute them, and they will form a defensive community which will challenge further persecution, and so *ad infinitum*. Mr. Harlow's book is simple, unpretentious, and very able. W. H. JOHNSTON.

46*. CONSTITUTIONS OF ALL COUNTRIES. VOL. I. THE BRITISH EMPIRE. Compiled by the Foreign Office. *1938. (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office.* 8vo. vii + 678 pp. *10s. 6d.)*

Contains the texts of the Constitutions of Northern Ireland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Ireland, Newfoundland, India, Burma, Southern Rhodesia, Aden, Bahamas, Barbados, Basutoland, Bechuanaland, Bermuda, British Guiana, British Honduras, Ceylon, Cyprus, Falkland Islands, Fiji, Gambia, Gibraltar, Gold Coast, Hong Kong, Jamaica, Kenya, Leeward Islands, Malaya, Malta, Mauritius, Nigeria, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Palestine, St. Helena, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somaliland, Swaziland. Tanganyika Territory, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, West Africa, Western Pacific: Gilbert and Ellice Islands, Windward Islands, Zanzibar, New Hebrides.

47*. LA VIE POLITIQUE ET CONSTITUTIONELLE DES PEUPLES. Annuaire Interparlementaire. Directors: Leopold Boissier and B. Mirkine-Guetzévitch. Editor: André Pierre. 1939. (Paris: Sirey. 8vo. pp. 239. 50 *frs.*)

Yearbook of the Union Interparlementaire. Contains information on the constitutions of all States, the names and brief biographies of the principal ministers, and notes on important legislation in 1938.

48*. LEADERSHIP IN DEMOCRACY. By the Right Hon. Lord Lloyd of Dolobran. 1939. (Oxford University Press. 8vo. 21 pp. 2*s.*)

Number VII in the series of Walker Trust Lectures on Leadership delivered before the University of St. Andrews on November 14th, 1938.

49*. PACIFISM AS A PRINCIPLE AND PACIFISM AS A DOGMA. By A. D. Lindsay, Master of Balliol College, Oxford. 1939. (London: Student Christian Movement Press. Sm. 8vo. 47 pp. 6*d.*)

The Burge Memorial Lecture for the year.

ECONOMICS

50*. CONTROL OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE. By Heinrich Heuser. 1939. (London: Routledge. 8vo. 282 pp. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

IT is unlikely that the world has seen the last attempt to control the flow of trade by the modern machinery of quotas and exchange control, and any unfortunate government servant upon whom was laid the responsibility for working out an efficient administrative framework for new experiments in this field would diminish the risks of avoidable error if he were first to study Dr. Heuser's book. In Dr. Heuser's view, the purely technical problems of quantitative control, the distribution of licences among individual importers, the proper treatment of seasonal and secular changes in demand, and so on, have already been solved with varying degrees of success, but while the prospective controller of import licences may, by familiarising himself with Dr. Heuser's story, diminish the risks that he may make the same technical mistakes as his predecessors in other countries have already made, he must not expect any soothing assurances that the work he is doing is rational or worth while. "The new methods of regulating foreign trade," it is stated, "do not deserve the support of those who have the well-being of the community intelligently at heart." They are not even always successful in achieving the limited immediate objectives in view when control is first imposed, and in certain circumstances offer attractive opportunities for profit to importers which no doubt are partly responsible for the complacence

with which control systems are preserved. In the nature of things statistical verification of a theory of quantitative import control cannot be entirely conclusive. Dr. Heuser is well aware of this, but at the same time he has performed a useful service in attempting to elaborate such a theory, while his careful account of the causes and methods of foreign trade control is particularly valuable to the numerous students of foreign trade policy, who, knowing that quotas and exchange control have entirely changed the framework of facts within which their study has to be carried on, have nevertheless despaired of getting any satisfactory basis of classification for the bewildering and constantly changing mass of factual detail.

ALLAN G. B. FISHER.

51*. ECONOMIC ADAPTATION TO A CHANGING WORLD MARKET. By Carl Major Wright. 1939. (Copenhagen: Ejnar Munksgaard. 8vo. 305 pp. Sewed 8*s*. 6*d*., bound 10*s*. 6*d*.)

THE most urgent task confronting twentieth-century economists is the elaboration of a realistic dynamic theory setting out clearly the nature of the process of adjustment which is constantly being imposed upon us by changes in the technique of production and changes in consumers' demand. Mr. Wright has made a valuable contribution to this important subject. While not falling into the error, which is still too common, of supposing that dynamic theory and trade-cycle theory are the same thing, he also endeavours to link his analysis as closely as possible with trade-cycle theory, showing how cyclical fluctuations facilitate or hinder the adjustments which are his main concern. Faced with fluctuations in world markets, a small country has apparently a choice between three policies: intervention in the world market, isolation from it, or adaptation to it. Even when several small countries collaborate, the experience of the Oslo Convention has shown that the opportunities for intervention are small, isolation even when it is practicable imposes severe economic loss, and the only sensible course is to make the quickest possible adaptation to new conditions. And though the argument proceeds primarily from the standpoint of small countries, no significant changes are required to adapt it to the conditions of larger economies as well.

The most important task of government is "to guide and help the forces rendered superfluous from an economic point of view in their present employment in the transfer to new industries more profitable for themselves and the community," and Mr. Wright offers some useful assistance in the important task of identifying the commodities to which it will be preferable to shift production. In this connection there have been recent important advances, of which Mr. Wright gives a useful summary, in the study of the measurement of price elasticity and income elasticity of demand. He also discusses the elasticity of supply of the factors of production, and in particular of capital, and the conditions which determine labour and capital mobility. It is in the latter connection that the discussion of the trade cycle has most direct relevance.

There is still much to be added before the analysis of Mr. Wright's problem is complete. Other investigators are, however, much in his debt for the advances which he has made, and English investigators in particular will value the references to literature, some of which is not readily accessible to them. Some recent economic literature has displayed analytic acuteness and subtlety, but the reader has been

left in some doubt whether its authors have been much interested in the real world. Mr. Wright, on the contrary, keeps his feet firmly planted on the earth, and economic theorists who are at the same time concerned with practical policy will do well to make themselves familiar both with his conclusions and with the path whereby he reaches them. ALLAN G. B. FISHER.

LAW

52*. BIBLIOGRAPHIE DU DROIT DES GENS ET DES RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES. By Karl Strupp. 1938. (Leyden: Sijthoff. 8vo. xvii + 521 pp. fl. 12.)

PROFESSOR STRUPP'S bibliography of international law and relations is a welcome innovation. It will be found useful not only by the librarian, but also by the student. The first part of the volume is devoted to reviews of more important works in the last five years. Part II is arranged according to countries. It gives a detailed account of the contributions to the literature of international law in various States. From this point of view alone it supplies valuable and otherwise not obtainable information.

It is very much to be hoped that the results of the first volume will give the learned editor all the encouragement necessary for continuing the publication of this book of reference. Professor Strupp's encyclopedic knowledge of the subject and his indefatigable industry are a sufficient guarantee of the completeness and of the scholarly nature of the undertaking. This first volume is clearly an experimental one. The editor has refrained from interfering drastically with the individual contributions, and this fact accounts largely for the somewhat confusing diversity of treatment. In a work of this nature uniformity is of the essence of success. For this reason it ought to be a matter for consideration whether the existing Parts I and II ought not to be amalgamated under one classification according to topics. Within such an arrangement provision could be made for drawing attention to more important works and, possibly, to grouping contributions from one country under their respective headings. In any case, Professor Strupp, who has earned the gratitude of international lawyers for this first volume, may be assured that they will eagerly look forward to the appearance of its successor. H. L.

53. SYSTEM DER PAKTE: die politischen Verträge der Nachkriegszeit. By Walter Wache. 1938. (Berlin: Volk und Reich Verlag. 8vo. 425 pp. RM. 16.)

THE author has taken as the basis for his work the "political" post-War treaties, beginning with the Treaty of Versailles, but has preceded them by the enumeration of eighty-three previous treaties, beginning with a treaty of February 8th, 1914, between Russia and Turkey respecting certain Armenian territories of Turkey. He examines, before endeavouring to construct a "system of the pacts," what "political" treaties mean. He is quite right when he declares, and he is justified in his assumption by historical fact, that not the *content*, but the *effectiveness*, *i.e.*, the working of a treaty, determines its political or non-political value. He cites, as examples, treaties of commerce and so-called "cultural" treaties. I accept his premise when he says that a treaty, which at its signature must in general be classified as political, may lose its importance from this point of view, while a treaty, which at its inception had no political importance, may

at and from a given moment become of the highest political importance. It should be added that it is that fact which is responsible for the attempt, so often made in international law, to find a clear and practically useful definition of juridical and non-juridical or political differences so very difficult. Examining, further, the *form* of treaties I would like to direct the reader's attention especially to the importance, from the political aspect, of what the author says (p. 15) about the time-limit and about the representatives of the Governments concerned.

After this introduction, Mr. Wache deals (pp. 19–35) with the secret treaties between 1914 and 1919 in an especially interesting chapter which aims at elucidating their historico-political content. Very interesting sketches here and there illustrate the text (a method adopted by me and recommended twenty years ago to facilitate and clarify, by its visuality, the terms of a complicated text or treaty). The author then deals (in the order given) with the treaties of the Near East, covering the years 1919 to the Treaty of Lausanne, of Central Europe to Locarno, and of Locarno, the Ententes, the pact system of Soviet Russia, the Near East after Lausanne, America, and Central Europe after Locarno.

The next part of the book contains a register of treaties concluded, first in alphabetical order, beginning with the treaties concluded by Abyssinia between 1919 and 1925; and secondly, and more important, a classified plan of treaties, in chronological order, concluded between February 1914 and February 1937, comprising no less than 940 treaties. For every treaty (pp. 183–425) is given the date of signature, the names of the parties thereto, a brief indication of the content, the date of ratification, the term of operation, the names of the plenipotentiaries, the place of signature, a source where the text can be found (here it must be noted that such well-known collections as that of Fleischmann and of Le Fur, to which my "Documents" ought to be added, are not mentioned, in favour of sources which the general reader cannot easily find), and final remarks. Though the book contains some remarks and interpretations, historical as well as juridical and political, which I cannot accept, it is of a high standard and of great importance for the knowledge of modern politics and international law.

KARL STRUPP.

54*. THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AT THE HAGUE. Issued by the Registry of the Court. 1939. (The Hague. sm. 8vo. 137 pp. illus. n.p.)

This attractive booklet has been undertaken with the object of affording the general public an opportunity of learning something about the work of the Permanent Court. It contains brief statements on the origin, composition and organisation of the Court, its jurisdiction and procedure, followed by an invaluable list of cases submitted to the Court, in the order of their registration and giving in each case the series and number of the relevant publication, and short summaries of the Court's judgments and opinions, also in chronological order, the latter forming the bulk of the booklet. At the end is a bibliography and an index which makes it a reference work of permanent value.

55*. ANALYSE DU PROBLÈME DE LA NEUTRALITÉ AU COURS DE L'ÉVOLUTION DU DROIT DES GENS. By Dr. W. P. J. Van Royen. 1938. (La Haye: Martinus Nijhoff. 8vo. 122 pp. 2.80 *Gld.*)

THIS is a stimulating and lucid analysis of the problem of neutrality, and it deals with both theory and practice. The conflicting views on

the subject which have been expressed by distinguished jurists all over the world are set out, and the chaotic conditions which have arisen by reason of the failure of nations to fulfil their obligations under the Covenant of the League of Nations are explained. The author realises that to-day, as between States Members of the League, neutrality in any form is only possible in so far as nations fall short of their obligations under the Covenant and that there will be no neutrality once the civilised world has been organised internationally. He suggests that meanwhile there is an urgent need for the elaboration of rules in respect of (*a*) traditional neutrality, (*b*) a new form of neutrality which he calls "non-participation," (*c*) participation in collective measures by the League, and (*d*) non-intervention in case of civil war.

The author does not in this book deal with the view, for which there is much to be said, that the renunciation of war, under the Pact of Paris, is incompatible with traditional neutrality or with neutrality in any form that involves the recognition of duties towards a nation violating the Pact.

International law and order hardly presents a more urgent problem than that of neutrality, and students will find that this book is a real contribution towards an appreciation of the problem. C. G. DEHN.

POPULATION AND SETTLEMENT

56*. WHITE SETTLERS IN THE TROPICS. By A. Grenfell Price (American Geographical Society, Special Publication No. 23.) 1939. (New York: American Geographical Society. 8vo. xiii + 311 pp. 18s.)

"THIS book could not possibly have made its appearance at a more opportune time than the present. . . . To-day more than ever before understanding and clear thought are needed concerning areas suitable for receiving refugees from Europe." This is a quotation from the Foreword contributed by Mr. H. Stuart Hotchkiss. The topical value of the work is clear from this point of view.

Certain tropical areas have been omitted from consideration, as being totally unfit for White occupation. These are the tropical deserts and humid equatorial lowlands. It is possibly for this reason that the historical record contains no reference to the abortive attempt of the Dutch to colonise the island of Great Nicobar in the nineteenth century. An obvious omission, however, is absence of examination of the reasons for failure of the Scotch settlement at Nuwara Eliya in Ceylon in the 'seventies.

The story of White settlements in Southern and Central America and the West Indies indicates that in those areas where native population is dense, the White element is inevitably absorbed, as it is also where the introduction of slave labour has resulted in the preponderance of the negro. On the other hand, in Costa Rica, in Puerto Rico, and in Cuba, White settlement has been successful, and the descendants of the settlers are by far the largest element of the population. Evidently the deleterious influence of climate is less serious than the fatal effect of exploitation of an inferior race.

The history of British failures in the West Indies makes melancholy reading. Three centuries ago the population of St. Kitts was 100 per cent. and of Barbados 84 per cent. White. Incredible maltreatment of White labour by the employer, and the introduction of more pliant slave labour effected catastrophic change, and to-day the White

inhabitants of St. Kitts number but 5 per cent., of Barbados but 8 per cent. of the total population.

The Costa Rican case is examined in detail. The progress there evident is attributed to the "homogeneous population of Whites or near-Whites, who are improving their civilisation and increasing rapidly on tropical plateaus blessed with a fertile soil and moderate climate." A negro invasion has, however, begun, fostered by the owners of the banana plantations on the Atlantic coast, and fears are entertained that the lamentable experiences of Barbados and St. Kitts may be repeated.

The outstanding instance of apparently successful White settlement in a tropical area in modern times is that of North-eastern Queensland. In that locality there is a White population of 185,000, engaged chiefly in the cultivation of sugar, an occupation which demands severe and prolonged physical exertion. Professor Price points out that the death-rate is actually less than that in non-tropical Australia, the birth-rate considerably higher, and the physical and intellectual energy of the White settler remarkable. The existence of the settlement has only been rendered possible by manipulation of the tariff, which permits the payment of very high wages to those engaged in the sugar industry. This is the price paid by Australia as a whole for the success of a relatively small section of its population. The tropical area is now being subjected to increasing penetration of settlers of Italian stock. The author states that these immigrants compete successfully with the British Australian, as they work harder and for longer hours, and evade trade union regulations. The experience gained in North-eastern Queensland should be of great value in the investigation of areas of possible settlement for refugees in other tropical countries.

The conclusions reached by Professor Price, though inconclusive, are important. He holds that the majority of White groups can inhabit the moderate tropics and reproduce for many generations, that they can engage in hard manual labour, which is, indeed, essential to health in tropical areas, but that where an inferior population is numerous, the White settler is liable to be absorbed, as people who work harder and accept lower standards tend to replace groups who demand easier conditions of life. The book, in fact, provides no definite answer, nor does it aim at providing such an answer, to the question whether White settlement in the tropics can prove a permanent success. JOHN HOPE SIMPSON.

57*. GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR STUDIES ON THE NUTRITION OF POPULATIONS. By Dr. E. J. Bigwood for the Health Organisation of the League of Nations. (III Health, 1939, III 1.) 1939. (Geneva: League of Nations; London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 281 pp. 6s.)

Part I deals with Dietary Surveys; Part II with Inquiries into the State of Nutrition.

COLONIAL PROBLEMS

58*. EMPIRE OR DEMOCRACY? By Leonard Barnes. 1939. (London: Gollancz. 8vo. 330 pp. 7s. 6d.)

As a student of colonial affairs and an advocate of the cause of the native subject races Mr. Leonard Barnes enjoys the respect of a wide

circle. To those, however, of his readers who look to him for constructive and statesmanlike guidance in the solution of the colonial problem his latest book will have come as a disappointment. He explains in a foreword that by " imperialism " he means " the forcible subjecting to British rule of India, Ceylon, tropical Africa, the West Indies, and the rest of the so-called dependencies and mandated territories," and that by " the Empire " he means " the territories under the British flag which are so subjected." In the term " Empire " he does not include Canada, Australia, New Zealand, or South Africa, which, he says, " stand to Britain in much the same relation as other small countries, such as Denmark, Holland, or Portugal, with whom we happen to be on friendly diplomatic terms." Not a very happy definition of the relationship between the four great Dominions and the mother country. Surely the Crown still counts for something?

The wisdom of including India in a survey of the colonial problem is questionable. In the advance towards autonomy, India is not far behind the Dominions, and many stages ahead of the rest of the Empire. She stands in a category by herself, and any attempt to prescribe a common policy for India and the non-self-governing colonies and dependencies is bound to be fraught with difficulties. In his first 236 pages Mr. Barnes deals with the German colonial claims, the value of colonies, the method of their acquisition and government, and the general issues involved in the possession of a colonial empire. At long last, to use his own words, he comes to the consideration of future colonial policy. His conclusion is that there are only four possible policies :—

(1) The cession of colonies to Germany.
(2) The refusal to cede colonies to Germany, and the backing of this refusal by armed force if necessary.
(3) International control of colonial areas.
(4) Independence for colonial areas.

Mr. Barnes pronounces emphatically against the cession of colonies to Germany. On the other hand, he argues that German claims " can only be constructively resisted if Britain, as an imperial Power, is prepared to renounce her own exclusive control over colonial territories." The surrender of British control might be effected either by substituting some scheme of international control or by adopting the principle of colonial emancipation. Internationalisation, Mr. Barnes thinks, would be dangerous, as being merely a guise for " inter-imperialism, or the merger of the chief empire-minded Powers for the joint co-ordinated exploitation of colonies."

Mr. Barnes finds nothing left, then, but " the principle of colonial emancipation," and he devotes the last 30 pages of his book to investigating the steps by which the principle can be applied. As the first step he recommends " independence for India," to be " quickly followed by independence for Burma, Ceylon, and, after the introduction of adult suffrage, the West Indies. A self-governing African federation would be gradually built up on a similar model." He admits that for various reasons the African colonies must wait longer for independence than the rest of the Empire. Illiteracy is one obstacle, although he does not apparently so regard it in the case of India, where only 156 males and 29 females per thousand of the respective sexes are able to read and write any language.

One is left wondering how the " emancipation " of India would help at all in the solution either of African colonial problems or of

the difficulties prevailing in the administration of our West Indian dependencies. C. H. RODWELL.

59*. L'EUROPE ET LA QUESTION COLONIALE. By Gilbert Maroger. 1938. (Paris: Sirey. 8vo. 461 pp.)
60. REDISTRIBUER LES COLONIES? By J. de Lagotellerie. 1938. (Paris: Fustier. Sm. 8vo. 192 pp. 18*frs.*)
61*. FRANCE AND THE COLONIAL PROBLEM. By Governor-General Olivier. 1938. (Paris: *Centre d'Informations Documentaires*, No. 32. Sm. 8vo. 38 pp. 1*s.*)
62*. DIE RECHTSENTWICKLUNG IN DEUTSCH-OSTAFRIKA UNTER BRITISCHEM MANDAT. By Theodor Gunzert. (*Schriften der Akademie für Deutsches Recht*, Nr. 3.) 1938. (Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt. 8vo. 135 pp. Rm. 4.)
63. DAS VOLKSBUCH UNSERER KOLONIEN. By Paul H. Kunze. 1938. (Leipzig: Dollheimer. 1a. 8vo. 208 pp.)
64. ENTSCHEIDUNGSJAHRE IN DEUTSCH-SÜDWESTAFRIKA. By H. Blumhagen. (*Koloniale Fragen in Dritten Reich.*) 1939. (Berlin: Reimer. 8vo. 110 pp. RM. 3.50.)

M. MAROGER'S study of the colonial question breaks new ground in a detailed analysis of the bases of the demands both of Germany and Poland. "The demand for colonies" is generally assumed to be a unitary attitude, based on the same expectations and put forward for the same reasons wherever it is raised. In pointing out that every national grievance does not necessarily lead to a demand for satisfaction, M. Maroger raises a point of great sociological importance. What are the circumstances which cause the demand to be put forward? What are the social forces which support it? These questions were examined in the course of a tour through Central and Eastern Europe.

In Germany M. Maroger distinguishes between the widespread indignation felt immediately after the War at the terms of the Versailles Treaty and the very limited interest shown in the colonies for their own sake. The declaration that Germany would in principle not be debarred from the exercise of a mandate satisfied the Colonial Society when it was founded in 1926. Dr. Schacht's currency thesis, now the official basis of Germany's claims, at first received little official support. Under the Nazi régime colonial claims were utilised as a slogan—*une affirmation communale*—like the anti-Bolshevik crusade. As the difficulties of the autarky policy increased Dr. Schacht's thesis gained in popularity, receiving its principal support from commercial interests in Hamburg. It has the advantage that those circles which look on colonial expansion as an end in itself can support their point of view by linking it in different ways with a much wider range of interests. Methods of propaganda are described; they consist not so much in demanding an early solution of the problem as in preparing a responsive public opinion by constant references to the lost colonies.

Polish claims, though now dating ten years back, naturally have had fewer reverberations. They are much vaguer in their formulation. The acquisition of empire is presented as an integral part of national development, and meets with a much wider response than it has in Germany. In Poland the possibilities of colonial territory as an outlet for emigration, particularly Jewish emigration, take a prominent place in public opinion; while its value as a source of raw materials has been increasingly stressed as the fall in Polish exports, due largely to the Ottawa agreements, has made purchase difficult. The claim also dis-

tracts attention from problems nearer home, such as agrarian reform and the future of Danzig. A share of the former German colonies corresponding to the proportion of former German territory included in Poland is sometimes demanded. There is no question of pressing the claim in the near future, but it is certain to be raised if at any time redistribution comes to be seriously discussed.

M. Lagotellerie puts forward economic arguments now familiar, and urges that the colonial question be considered as part of a wider whole. He appears to be unfamiliar with recent material on population trends. M. Olivier adduces the colonial achievements of France as an argument against the surrender of any territory in her possession.

The three German books illustrate M. Maroger's account of German propaganda methods. Herr Gunzert's is an exhaustive account of the legislation of Tanganyika, containing little comment; the statement that the policy of economic development through native peasant production broke down in the depression of 1931 will not be generally accepted. The *Volksbuch* is a slight volume, attractively illustrated, which aims at capturing the popular imagination. The actual raw-material production of the mandated areas is not exaggerated, but it is argued, as usual, that this has been deliberately restricted in the interests of neighbouring territories and could be enormously increased. Herr Blumhagen ascribes the suppression of Nazi activities in South-West Africa to unprovoked hatred of Germans, stimulated by the Jewish press of the Union—a suggestion which must draw a rueful smile from any reader who has followed the growth of anti-Semitism there. He quotes the comparatively slower rate of increase of European population under the Mandate as a proof that the Union has neglected the potentialities of the territory. The "principle" that South-West Africa should be a white man's country involves in his view the restriction of cattle-owning by natives and their development as wage-labourers, which will be in their own best interests. L. P. Mair.

65. The Key to National Unity. By Captain C. E. Cookson, C.M.G. 1938. (London: John Lane, the Bodley Head. 8vo. viii + 86 pp. 3*s.* 6*d.*)

Essays on British colonial policies mainly in Africa, with suggestions for reform. Also contains articles on general political questions.

GREAT BRITAIN

66*. Political and Strategic Interests of the United Kingdom: An Outline. By a study group of members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1939. (London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press. Demy 8vo. xvi + 304 pp. 7*s.* 6*d.* To members of the Institute 6*s.* 6*d.*)

This Study Group publication is most timely and valuable. Originally prepared as the United Kingdom contribution to the second unofficial Conference on British Commonwealth Relations held at Sydney in September 1938, the content of the study has been brought up to date and modified in the light of events of March 1939. As now published it forms an indispensable background for the understanding of the problems confronting Great Britain in the formulation of her foreign policy. In spite of the emphasis laid these days on ideological and moral factors in determining the actions of governments,

it still remains true that in the last resort it is a country's vital interests which guide its policy. When the British electorate is being flooded with " inside information " from so many self-appointed interpreters of the latest moves in the diplomatic game, it is comforting to turn to the less flamboyant but more balanced content of this publication. There is not space to detail or analyse its subject-matter here, but it provides a clear, impartial, and restrained account of the world-wide interests and problems confronting Great Britain. Only through such knowledge can the citizens of a democracy qualify themselves to pass judgment on foreign policy and acquire that steadiness and balance so necessary in these days of " war on nerves."

One criticism only. It is unfortunate that no maps are included. Everyone is not sure of the location of Hanaidi, Lusaka, or Dumeirah, and not everyone is ready to use an atlas to find out. Yet maps are essential for the understanding of strategic interests. Perhaps this omission can be made good in subsequent editions, for subsequent editions there certainly will be.

K. C. BOSWELL.

67*. PERFIDIOUS ALBION—ENTENTE CORDIALE. By Geneviève Tabouis. Translated by J. A. D. Dempsey. 1939. (London: Thornton, Butterworth. 8vo. 310 pp. 12s. 6*d*.)

THIS brilliant and learned authoress attributes British perfidy to British materialism. Even the Shakespeareans knew nothing of " the things of the soul." The Cromwellians were animated by " insatiable greed." Since then, any success upon the part of one of our neighbours has been " a personal affront " to us. We seek our own interests " by an unswerving rule."

Fortunately, upon the other side of the Channel exists a race of idealists. " The Frenchman will spend life and treasure with an open hand for an ideal, but not for gain." But in spite of this, or perhaps because of this, antithesis of characters, our authoress has to conclude her survey of Anglo-French history from 1066 up to July 1938 by the reflection that " a complete Entente between the two peoples never has existed."

It is our fault. In crises our perfidy stands revealed to French eyes. In August 1914 " this sacrosanct regard for British interests, these hesitations and denials, seemed to French onlookers the very essence of ' perfidy.' " And besides, we are impossibly proud. " England is unwilling to enter into any engagements with other Powers, for this would mean allowing other nations to be judges of British interests. That is forbidden by national pride." A proud, perfidious, profiteering race.

Even after the War of 1914-18 we soon reverted to our old habits. As early as 1920, France was " convinced at last of England's perfidy." In 1921 Great Britain again appeared " to be playing a game by turns perfidious and cynical, always hostile to French interests."

What is to be done about it? As a strong supporter of a true Entente Cordiale I have only one remedy to suggest. Let us drop analyses of each other's conduct. Let us be partners in action, not partisans in acrimony. Or, if we must differ still, let us do so in the spirit of Augustus Cæsar addressing Cinna in the tragedy of Corneille:

> " Commençons un combat qui montre par l'issue
> Qui l'aura mieux de nous ou donnée ou reçue."

GEORGE PEEL.

68. THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION. By H. R. G. Greaves. 1938. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 296 pp. 7s. 6*d*.)

IN this book Mr. Greaves attempts a difficult task. He tries to give an account in a short space not merely of the more obvious political institutions in Great Britain, such as Parliament, the Monarchy, the Courts, the Cabinet, and the central Civil Service, but also of important and often-neglected institutions of undoubted constitutional significance such as the political parties, the armed forces, the local authorities, the public-utility corporations, the Church, the press and the educational system. But he does not stop at this. He goes behind institutions and tries to discover what are the fundamental forces which determine their growth and operation.

It may be said at once that Mr. Greaves has accomplished this difficult task with great success. His book is most interesting. It is based on deep and wide research, but it is nowhere overburdened with quotations and references. It is clear and incisive. Not everyone will think it impartial, for Mr. Greaves does not sit on the fence. He states boldly his thesis that the key to the efficient working of the British constitution is to be found in the strength of the upper middle class, which holds the chief positions in the machinery of government and controls the press, finance, and industry. Those who have economic power have also the political power (pp. 281–2). Those who do not accept this class-theory will think that Mr. Greaves is biased. If he is, the bias is obvious, and it does the book no harm.

There are a few corrections which one would like to suggest. It is stated (p. 16) that the Covenant of the League of Nations is part of the law of Great Britain by virtue of the Treaty of Peace Act. A careful perusal of that Act suggests that this goes too far. All that the Act seems to do is (to put it shortly) to empower the King to carry the Treaty into effect by order-in-council and otherwise in so far as he thinks fit. The shifting of responsibility from the Home to the Dominion Government for the appointment of a Dominion Governor-General was not carried out by the Statute of Westminster (p. 79), but by a resolution of the Imperial Conference of 1930. The Unemployment Assistance Board was not set up to administer the unemployment insurance fund (p. 180), but the quite separate fund, the unemployment assistance fund, which provides for those who do not qualify for insurance benefit. It should be made clear on p. 181, therefore, that the Unemployment Insurance Statutory Committee set up by the same Act of 1934 is concerned only with the insurance provisions of the Act, and does not touch assistance. Is it accurate to say that Switzerland has a fairly even division between its French-speaking and German-speaking inhabitants? (p. 277). Most of the books of reference give the proportions of 70 per cent. German-speaking to 20 per cent. French-speaking.

The generalisations about bishops on pp. 234–6 are severe, but perhaps one should remember that, as Professor G. N. Clark says in *The Later Stuarts*, " the ordinary Englishman has never shown more than a temperate enthusiasm for bishops." It would have been worth while to explain the difference between the Secretary at War and the Secretary for War (pp. 191–2), and to give the reference for the statement on p. 268 that sedition has been interpreted to mean " the incitement of one class of His Majesty's subjects against another." Occasionally, too, one is disappointed by a lapse into general criticism

of such vagueness that it becomes of no real value, as, for example, when it is said of the B.B.C. that " there is need for more adequate supervision by the representatives of the public " (p. 264).

K. C. WHEARE.

69. THE BRITISH CABINET SYSTEM, 1830–1938. By Arthur Berriedale Keith. 1938. (London: Stevens and Sons. 8vo. xi + 648 pp. 15s.)

PROFESSOR KEITH has given us much more than a mere text-book. This study is a critical analysis of the British system of government, which takes advantage of recent publications providing material on the reign of George V. He is especially troubled, as are so many others who are genuinely concerned with the preservation of the basic features of the constitution, by Mr. Chamberlain's dictator-like tendency to present Commons, People, and King with the *fait accompli*. He lays particular emphasis on the repudiation without reference to the people of as fundamental a principle of policy as the League of Nations Covenant on which election was secured in 1935, such a repudiation playing havoc with democratic essentials.

It is a pity that Professor Keith does not give us more enlightenment on the King's duty when faced by the Cabinet's demand to use the prerogative for controlling the House of Lords. He appears to accept the thesis of Lord Esher that the Sovereign has the right to make a dissolution the preliminary condition, and yet to envisage his being constitutionally bound to use the prerogative immediately after a socialist electoral victory, in order to pass an emergency powers act necessary to the maintenance of ordered government when faced by financial sabotage. But we have here a valuable companion volume to Dr. Jennings's *Cabinet Government*. H. R. G. GREAVES.

70*. JOURNALS AND LETTERS OF REGINALD, VISCOUNT ESHER. Edited by Oliver, Viscount Esher. Vol. IV, 1916–30. 1938. (London: Ivor Nicholson and Watson. 8vo. ix + 315 pp. 25s.)

THE last volume of Lord Esher's letters contains a certain amount of new material, particularly about the War years, though most of the facts are already known through other sources. The story of these years leaves a bitter taste in the mouth: quarrels of generals and politicians, quarrels of generals among themselves, *e.g.*, " There were such crowds of people at the Crillon yesterday. All Paris in the tea-room. L.G. came down there and walked about among the people. The soldiers were gathered in groups, representing different 'hates.' Robertson's lot. Henry Wilson's lot. D. H.'s lot. It was comic." Meanwhile (the date was November 1917) the common men of the Allied nations were dying in thousands in the trenches because their commanders did not know how to win a war, or their statesmen how to end it. Lord Esher was too sensitive a man not to feel distaste and disgust at these exhibitions of moral and intellectual confusion, though he lived in too narrow and unimaginative a circle to realise their full significance. After the War he judged the peace settlement with a certain clear-sighted cynicism, but he was beginning to lose his grasp of the questions at issue. The volume ends with a quiet record of old age, and these concluding pages form the most pleasing and the most dignified chapter in the four volumes. E. L. WOODWARD.

71*. A Servant of the Empire. By Clara Boyle (Mrs. Harry Boyle). 1938. (London: Methuen. 8vo. xxvi + 337 pp. *12s. 6d.*)

This book provides a delightful blend of autobiography and hero-worship. The former ingredient is a group of thumb-nail sketches by Harry Boyle himself; the latter is the work of the " Polish girl " whom he married somewhat late in life, but who confesses to having been in love with him since she was four years old. To the outside world Boyle was not so much a hero as a character of distinction and paradox. Handsome in bearing and courtly in manners, he would dress like a tramp and live like a spartan. For honours and preferment, though they must often have been within his reach, he had no use; generous to a degree, he was constantly in money troubles. A fastidious scholar and a splendid linguist, his gifts were always at the disposal of others, and he himself was content to do the work of a trained diplomat on the salary of a junior clerk.

Of Egypt, where he spent twenty-four of his best years, Boyle had such knowledge as few men possess, and his pictures of the country under the Cromer régime are of historical value. Of Germany, where he was unwillingly transferred from Cairo, he soon acquired an uncanny perception, which only deepened his anxieties about the future; " I am convinced," he wrote to his mother as far back as 1908, " that the next two generations will be a tough time for us; if we are to work out our salvation as a nation, it must be after some bitter straits, both social and political." There are other touches of prophetic wisdom in the book; *e.g.*, in his pessimism about the League of Nations and about the settlement in Palestine. But perhaps the most interesting page is his account of Disraeli's purchase of the Suez Canal shares; " its real author," he says, " never enjoyed the slightest credit from anyone," being Raphael Borg, an Italian Maltese who was Vice-Consul at Cairo at the time. Meston.

72*. L'Angleterre et la Securité Collective. By Jean Schwœbel. 1938. (Paris: Sirey. 8vo. 434 pp. 60 *frs.*)

A survey of the extent to which Great Britain has participated in collective security, with an analysis of her motives. Contains sections on her traditional policy, the influence of British conceptions on the form of the Covenant, and on Britain's attitude to collective security as manifested in her post-War foreign policy.

73. Britain and Europe, 1815–1936. By Robert M. Rayner. 1938. (London: Longmans, Green & Co. 8vo. xi, 505–605, 166–407 pp. 5*s.*)

[Chapters reprinted from the author's *Concise History of Modern Europe* and his *Concise History of Britain.*]

Mr. Rayner's story of Britain's post-Napoleonic period is clear and rather colourless, as is the nature of good school-books. The learner is helped by useful " potted " notes. W. J.

EUROPE

74*. Briand: Sa Vie—Son Œuvre. Avec son journal et de nombreux documents inédits. I. Révolté circonspect 1862–1904. 1938. II. Le faiseur de calme, 1904–1914. By Georges Suarez. 1939. (Paris: Plon. 8vo. xi + 468 pp.; iii + 515 pp. 40 *frs.* each)

Briand was Minister of Foreign Affairs for more years than any other Frenchman, and will probably remain the most famous of the

Foreign Ministers of the Third Republic. The present volumes, however, extend only to the year 1914, and deal mainly with domestic questions. About the very early years there is apparently not much known; in any case, few persons' boyhoods are of much interest to the public or to later generations. Briand was a successful *avocat* at St. Nazaire and at Nantes until a divorce case in which he was implicated caused a suspension in his legal activity. He went up to Paris, and was given work on Socialist journals, especially *La Lanterne*, of which he ultimately became editor. He was an active member of socialist and labour organisations and believed in bringing socialism into the State and society not by revolution, nor by legislation through the *bourgeois* parliament, but by the general strike, which he incessantly, at any rate in theory, advocated.

The first volume is a valuable commentary on French domestic politics, municipal and central, between 1885 and 1904, particularly of politics outside the circle of the old conservative-republican party which was in office down to the end of the Dreyfus crisis and the ministry of Waldeck-Rousseau. It is helpful to an understanding of the Boulanger Affair, Dreyfus Affair, and French socialism. There are long and graphic pen-portraits of Guesde, Jaurès, Millerand, and much criticism about these personalities. There are some splendid scenes—a night-scene in a secret society, the coming and going in an editorial office, soldiers riding down rioters.

Briand was much more methodical than the public gave him credit for being. When he died he left a large collection of papers, in good order. There are numerous letters to him; but the biographer does not reproduce many letters from him. One sometimes wonders how a French politician lives, particularly if he is frequently out of office or loses his seat in parliament or retires from active life. Briand towards the end of his life drew up a financial statement of his career. For years he made a steady, though not large, income by journalism, and all this time he was making "economies." He liked food and company, but was very moderate in his tastes. He spent little on clothes and almost nothing on travelling. He lodged *en pension* in his younger days in a family, and later in a small apartment. In his first ten years in Paris he saved about 50,000 francs, say £2000—not a great deal, but then he was only thirty years old. He was not grasping or calculating, but he valued his independence; and his economies made him independent.

The evolution of the advocate of the general strike, and even of resistance of conscript soldiers to their officers, into a pillar of domestic order, of external security and international concert, is a deeply interesting study.

In the second volume Jaurès goes out of socialism, forming first the circles of *ministrables* and soon the ministry itself in the Sarrien Cabinet. Briand's first outstanding success was as *rapporteur* for the Law of Separation which was the work of the Prime Minister Combes. Always a conciliator, Briand softened some of the asperities of the Law of Separation and piloted it successfully through the Chamber of Deputies. After this his rise was rapid to the Cabinet, and in 1909 he was Premier.

A number of notes exchanged between prominent politicians are reproduced, and even a considerable number of conversations. Some of the speeches might perhaps have been compressed, but they are useful as source-material and not always easily accessible in

English. There are elaborate pen-portraits of Clemenceau, Poincaré and others, excellently done and extremely informing. The working day of a French minister is given in detail and the chief laws and policies of the French Government in this period are fully treated.

The character and ability of Briand are fully disclosed in the course of this biography. He appears in all his curious contrasts—a rather puzzling figure—pleasure-loving and public-spirited, ironical and sincere, lazy and industrious, conciliatory and independent. He emerges as a very lovable man, with obvious faults. His consuming interest in foreign affairs, his mission of international peace, came to him comparatively late in life; the zenith of this activity must be the theme of the third volume yet to appear. Briand, however, always stood for peace, from his earliest socialist days.

A word of praise must be given to the excellent and revealing photographs which illustrate the biography. R. B. Mowat.

75. Son of the People. By Maurice Thorez. Translated by Douglas Garman. 1938. (London: Lawrence and Wishart. 8vo. xxvii + 237 pp. 5s.)

This book, according to the introduction by Harry Pollitt, is the life-story of the Secretary of the Communist Party in France. It is true that the first two chapters do give an autobiography, rather remotely told, of what must be an engagingly sincere character; but the rest of the book is a description of the events leading to the formation of the Front Populaire and the victory of May 1936, and an exposition of the Communist programme.

M. Thorez, who is now thirty-eight, comes of mining stock, and long before he was twelve, when he first went to work in a pit, his grandfather, an ardent trades unionist, had made him aware of the Labour movement. He grew to manhood during the War as a refugee, still with his grandfather, working on the land in the department of the Creuse. He was helped by the village schoolmaster, and his political education was developed by contact with militant socialists in that relatively progressive department. Mobilised in March 1918, he worked behind the lines until the Armistice, when he went back to his home in the north and worked as a railwayman and as a miner. He joined the Communist Party in 1919, and practised several trades until 1923, when he became a Party official and a professional revolutionary. The practical work of organisation and agitation absorbed all his time and energy, and it was not until 1929, in the studious tranquillity of prison, that he was able to concentrate on the intellectual analysis of and meditation on the doctrine of Marx and Engels.

M. Thorez describes how the Communists, hitherto spurned by the Socialists, at last, in 1934, achieved the unity of the Left which was to win such a resounding victory in the General Election of May 1936. He develops the familiar thesis against Capitalism and Fascism, and goes on to show that part, at least, of the Communist Party programme, *e.g.* social insurance, and old-age pensions, is not, in principle, revolutionary. He makes the point that the Communist Party in France is not opposed to all private ownership, for it is pledged " to respect private property which is the fruit of work and thrift." " Ownership of the basic means of production is the only kind of ownership which needs to be socialised . . ."; but M. Thorez says that that dictum does not apply to the small farmer, the small shopkeeper or the small industrialist. Full of admiration for the U.S.S.R., he maintains that French com-

munism is essentially democratic, and, in matters of religion, tolerant. Indeed, all through the book he lays the strongest stress on the national character of the French communists, claiming that they are the worthy descendants not only of the Jacobins of 1792, but of the great humanists of the Renascence and of the scholars and artists throughout history who have made French culture. He refutes the suggestion that he and his friends are paid agents of Moscow, and says rather that they are "carrying on the great tradition of Francis I and Richelieu."

E. D. GANNON.

76*. THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY OF GERMANY FROM 1933 TO THE INCORPORATION OF AUSTRIA IN MARCH 1938. By C. W. Guillebaud. (London: Macmillan. 8vo. xiv + 303 pp. 10s. 6d.)

IN this scholarly book Mr. Guillebaud has set out to describe and analyse the events which have so completely transformed the economic life of Germany since the National Socialist Government came into power. After a brief but highly competent sketch of the relevant parts of German economic history during the preceding fifteen years, he deals in detail with the first Four Years' Plan (for the conquest of unemployment), the second Four Years' Plan (for the increase of national security and economic independence), and the significance of National Socialism for the consumer and worker; while in two concluding chapters he summarises the main features of the present German economic system and discusses the problems with which Germany is now faced.

Throughout he has based himself on officially published statistics—which he, in my opinion rightly, holds to be innocent of *suggestiones falsi*, though sometimes guilty of *suppressiones veri*—and his account of those aspects of Germany's economic situation which lend themselves to statistical treatment can be taken as thoroughly fair and reliable. It will provide a much-needed answer to those who, because they dislike the political and racial views of National Socialism, try to belittle the remarkable achievements which stand to its credit in the economic field. It is only proper to add that at times he is in my view over-generous: even purely economic affairs have their darker side in present-day Germany, and though Mr. Guillebaud mentions these, he has as a rule little to say about them usually for the excellent reason that they cannot be handled with any pretence at scientific objectivity.

The book may prove difficult at times for non-economists; the discussion of banking and financial matters, in particular, is often extremely compressed. Moreover I wish the author had been a little more systematic in citing his authorities. So far as the actual statistics he offers are concerned, there is nothing to complain about—and it is to be hoped that the numerous references to the half-yearly reports of the Reichskreditgesellschaft (one of the large Berlin banks) will induce many of his readers to have their names put on the mailing list for the English translations of these admirable economic surveys. But much of what he says in the text of his discussion contains matter which one would have liked to follow up, and with respect to which a more liberal citation of authorities would have been helpful. Finally a glossary of the technical terms used, along with the German terms of which they are translations, might have assisted those readers who are not well-versed in the details of German economic organisation.

L. M. FRASER.

77*. ONE MAN AGAINST EUROPE. By Konrad Heiden. 1938. (*Penguin Special.*) (London: Penguin Books Ltd. 8vo. 279 pp. 6*d.*)

78. MY YEARS IN GERMANY. By Martha Dodd. 1939. (London: Gollancz. 8vo. 319 pp. 10*s.* 6*d.*)

79. REACHING FOR THE STARS. By Nora Waln. 1939. (London: Cresset Press. 8vo. 326 pp. 8*s.* 6*d.*)

THE only bad thing about this first-rate Penguin Special is its title, which suggests the awe with which German refugees tend to regard their enemy. The book itself, however, does full justice to the forces inside Germany and in the Western democracies which have helped to place Hitler in his present position. At the same time it gives a penetrating analysis of the flexibility, the intuitiveness, the coherent ideological background which make this lonely and incalculable figure one to conjure with. Herr Heiden's extraordinary knowledge of the rise and structure of the Nazi movement and the personalities of its leaders is condensed into the present work with a mastery which enables the reader to follow the guiding lines with ease through chapters packed with detailed information. It is a book for the serious student as well as for the general reader.

Martha Dodd's brilliant gallery of portraits of Nazi personages and their womenkind, the diplomatic corps and the journalistic world of Berlin from 1933 to 1937 is also of more than ephemeral interest. Her "close-ups" of the Nazi Big Three are of such vivid immediacy as to make the reader mentally recoil a pace. What she tells is based either on direct observation or on information from the first-hand sources with which she was surrounded. Her downright narrative will upset the elderly and reactionary and delight all other readers by its shrewdness and verve.

Reaching for the Stars is a scrap-book of impressions collected by a kindly Quaker lady during a four years' residence in Nazi Germany. Anecdotes of sufferings and cruelties connected with the régime are sandwiched between idylls of peasant life, amateur investigations into ancient German customs and panegyrics of the German character and genius. Over the resultant incoherence the distressed lady shakes a puzzled head and reiterates her youthful conviction that the Germans are the kindliest and most intelligent people on earth. I. M. MASSEY.

80*. DIE NIEDERWERFUNG DER RÄTEHERRSHAFT IN BAYERN 1919. [Vierter Band von *Darstellungen aus den Nachkriegskämpfen deutscher Truppen und Freikorps.* Kriegsgeschichtliche Forschungsanstalt des Heeres. hrsg. 1939. (Berlin: Mittler. 8vo. xv + 222 pp. Map. Kart., Rm. 4.50; Gbd., Rm. 5.60.)

THE Fourth Volume of the *Darstellungen aus den Nachkriegskämpfen deutscher Truppen und Freikorps* deals with the efforts of the Extreme Left to establish Soviets in Munich and elsewhere in Bavaria. It describes briefly the assassination of Kurt Eisner and the overthrow of the legitimate Socialist Government by a comparatively small body of Red Extremists joined by undesirable elements who seized the opportunity to impose themselves on a defenceless population. The efforts of the Socialist Government of Hoffmann to regain its position became more and more feeble, and it was at last reluctantly decided to

accept the assistance of North German and Württemberg forces to put down the Soviets.

The organisation of "Freikorps" and the fighting which ensued, sometimes spasmodically, at others more constantly, is dealt with in detail, and some useful notes on street-fighting and the general methods to be adopted for waging civil war are added. It is also interesting to note the care taken by the Central Government in Berlin not to do violence to Bavarian feelings by too openly parading Prussian aid in putting down the local rising. H. F. P. PERCIVAL.

81. FUENFZIG JAHRE DEUTSCHLAND. By Sven Hedin. 1938. (Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus. 8vo. 256 pp. Rm. 5; Gbd., Rm. 6.)

FEW foreign admirers have remained such loyal and uncritical friends of the Germans throughout the last fifty years as Mr. Sven Hedin. In this book the famous Swedish traveller and geographer writes of his associations with Germany from the time when he came to Berlin as a student—and found that town to be "the capital of Europe" and its centre, "Unter den Linden," "the most beautiful street in the world" —until the present day. Mr. Hedin is nothing if not grateful, for he remembers every favour and every compliment received from the crowned heads, the generals, the statesmen, scientists and the general public of Imperial Germany before and during the Great War, and particularly from the Nationalist and National-Socialist leaders of post-war Germany. His *bête noire* is Russia, and he glorifies Germany's historic rôle as the guardian and bulwark of Western civilisation against the floods and storms from the East. E. A. A.

82*. SCHOOL FOR BARBARIANS: Education under the Nazis. Introduction by Thomas Mann. By Erika Mann. 1939. (London: Lindsay Drummond. 8vo. 162 pp. 5*s*.)

MISS MANN has made a wide and valuable collection of quotations from edicts and speeches dealing with education, which brings home with unanswerable force how in the Third Reich education is being reduced to a mere national-socialising machine. For example, Miss Mann quotes Herr Flieder: "Present and future instructors in History are aware of the fact that its aims are not so much scientific as essentially practical," and later, "The crown of all teaching of history consists only of following the Führer."

The wealth of evidence of the above kind speaks for itself, and though we must sympathise with Miss Mann's horror of what is being meted out to the youth of a Germany she loves, one cannot but feel that she weakens rather than strengthens her case by the bitterness of her style and the omission of a single redeeming feature in the whole system.

E. S.

83*. HERMANN GOERING: THE MAN AND HIS WORK. By Erich Gritzbach. 1939. (London: Hurst and Blackett. 8vo. 230 pp. 8*s*. 6*d*.)

The tone and terminology of Herr Gritzbach's authorised biography of Field-Marshal Goering are strongly reminiscent of a whole crop of books appearing after 1871 and dealing with people like Moltke, Roon and Bismarck. These were the old Kaiser's "paladins," as Field-Marshal Goering is Herr Hitler's "paladin" and all alike they are brave, loyal, simple and fearless. There is, however, one important

difference. The 1871 vintage used to be described as for the use of the "riper school-youth," anglicè for the Upper Fifth and higher forms. Herr Gritzbach's book is meant for grown-ups.

Apart from its rather uncritical hero-worship, the book does tell us quite a lot about Field-Marshal Goering—"wie er sich räuspert und wie er spuckt"—facts which are of an anecdotic if not of a historic significance. It is interesting to find him in the early days of the Nazi régime working extremely hard on very little food and a good deal of drink: existing, in fact, on his nerves, a way of life resembling that which brought another typical German, Stresemann, to an untimely death. W. H. JOHNSTON.

84. GERMANY RAMPANT. By Ernest Hambloch. 1939. (London: Duckworth. 8vo. 297 pp. 10s. 6d. net.)

THE author of this lively work has spent much of his life in the British Consular Service. And though he does not appear to have lived in Germany, he has had time to read widely in German literature, past and present-day. His book sets out to show how the Nazi movement has its roots in the history of German thought and life, and to deduce from an investigation of the latter the aims and significance of the former. With his conclusion—that "the present peace is merely a truce between wars, and attempts to conciliate Germany by concessions are hopeless"—I find it difficult to disagree. But the historical part of the book is full of wild generalisations. And when I find that Mr. Hambloch is often painfully wrong about writers with whose works I have myself some acquaintance I become highly distrustful of his sweeping assertions about matters outside my own beat.

L. M. FRASER.

85*. DIE WAHREN HERREN DEUTSCHLANDS. By Hans Behrend. 1939. (Paris: Editions Prométhée. Sm. 8vo. 184 pp. 10 *frs.*)

Herr Behrend's tacit syllogism runs: capitalism is the root of all evil: Hitler is evil: therefore Hitler's roots are capitalistic. Whether or not he agrees with the premises, the reader will find a good deal of material on the advantages enjoyed by big business under the Third Reich, though nothing about the many cramping regulations from which it also suffers. The style shows that Dr. Goebbels has no monopoly for invective in the German language. W. H. JOHNSTON.

86. LE RACISME ALLEMAND. Essai de mise au point. Carnets de l'Actualité. By Edmond Vermeil. 1939. (Paris: Fernand Sorlot. Sm. 8vo. 62 pp. 7.50 *frs.*)

This little pamphlet is primarily a summary of the more obvious objects of Hitler's foreign policy as stated in *Mein Kampf*. It recapitulates the series of broken promises and worthless declarations of peaceful intentions, and concludes that Germany aims at the absolute overlordship of Europe. The last words are: "Nothing is lost if France remains united to the great Anglo-Saxon democracies. Nothing is lost if the democracies are determined to defend, against Germany, their traditional liberty and independence." A useful answer to the activities of the "Fifth column" in France. A. J. P. TAYLOR.

87*. LA CONCEPTION NATIONAL-SOCIALISTE DU DROIT DES GENS. By Jacques Fournier. 1939. (Paris: Editions A. Pedone. 8vo. 252 pp. 60 *frs.*)

A straightforward and not unsuccessful attempt to expound the National-Socialist conception of international law and its relation to Nazi ideology. The author would perhaps have been wise to warn his readers that, in view of the "dynamic" quality of that ideology, some aspects

of his account would rapidly become out of date. There is a comprehensive bibliography at the end. D. A. R.

88. Les Doctrines Juridiques Contemporaines en Italie. By R. Battino. 1939. (Paris: Editions A. Pedone. 8vo. 192 pp. 50 *frs.*)

This is not, as its title might suggest, an account of the juridical theories of Fascism—these are dismissed in a couple of pages—but a brief and somewhat unappetising summary of the legal, political and philosophical theories of various Italian thinkers since the Risorgimento. D. A. R.

89*. Eye-witness in Czechoslovakia. By Alexander Henderson. 1939. (London: George G. Harrap. 8vo. 336 pp. 10*s.* 6*d.*)

90*. Lost Liberty? By Joan and Jonathan Griffin. 1939. (London: Chatto and Windus. 8vo. 289 pp. 8*s.* 6*d.*)

Mr. Henderson has provided a full and thorough study of the problems of pre-Munich Czechoslovakia and the processes by which it has been destroyed. One of his central incidents is, of course, the Runciman Mission, the real purpose of which, he writes, "may be set down as follows: (1) at all costs to prevent the Czechs going to war with Germany; (2) to do this by inducing the Czechs to yield to German demands, since there was no means of making the Germans give way; (3) if possible to save the territorial integrity of Czechoslovakia by persuading the Sudeten Germans that it was in their interest to accept a settlement within the Republic." Mr. Henderson, incidentally points out that, contrary to a statement in the House of Commons, Prague never asked for Lord Runciman. Mr. Henderson knows well how to choose the most eloquent indications of the character of the Czechs, how they marched through the streets of Prague on the night of September 21st, 1938, shouting Palacký's words, "We were here before Austria, and we shall be after it." Nor does he neglect the puzzling "Schwejkism"—as M. Beuve-Méry has called it—of the Czechs, which made them tell funny stories so soon after Munich—for example—"The Government has received a new ultimatum—from the Eskimos. They demand immediate annexation of the Prague Ice Stadium."

Whereas Mr. Henderson implies that Hitler was so certain that Great Britain would not fight that his plans for marching into Czechoslovakia in whatever circumstances on October 1st had long before been completed, Mr. and Mrs. Griffin are convinced that Hitler was bluffing and could have been restrained by a determined British attitude. Their narrative includes an extremely interesting account of how the Czech crowds broke into the Prague broadcasting station on September 21st because the people wished to broadcast to the world that it would rather die than yield. If *Lost Liberty?* expresses bitter indignation against the Munich Agreement, it is difficult not to sympathise with the authors when one contemplates the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, to which the Agreement inevitably led. It is melancholy indeed to consider how the Gestapo treats the Czechs to-day and how large groups of workmen from the Czech interior have been forcibly transferred into the Reich. It seems strange by comparison to look back at the grievances of the "tortured" Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia before Munich.

Elizabeth Wiskemann.

91. CZECHOSLOVAKIA WITHIN. By Bertram de Colonna. 1938. (London: Thornton Butterworth. 8vo. vi + 105 pp. 5s.)
92. THE CZECHS AND THEIR MINORITIES. By Diplomaticus. 1938. (London: Thornton Butterworth. 8vo. 88 pp. 5s.)

IT would be unfair to criticise as mistaken any book on Czechoslovakia which appeared in the first half of 1938. The mistakes made, however, in these two books have a particular significance. Representing faithfully the Nazi point of view they appeared at a critical stage in the German–Czech crisis of 1938. It is interesting, therefore, to recall what arguments preceded the acceptance by a section of the British public of the Munich Agreement.

" The most important point to remember is that the Czechoslovak State owes its existence to the unique international situation as it was in 1919," writes " Diplomaticus," having already implied that the Czech nationalist movement was three and a half years old and was not supported by the majority of Czechs. " There are no signs anywhere of an anti-Czech attitude on the part of the Germans " (p. 16), he continues, but " Is then a general European war to be used as an instrument for the realisation of Czech national ambitions? " (p. 59). " Germany," says Diplomaticus, in the identical words of the Führer, " is in no way interested in the Czechs themselves. . . . No one intends to deprive the Czechs of their national self-determination."

Much the same could be said of M. de Colonna. For him Czechoslovakia is " not an economic entity . . . (Its) chief port is Hamburg. . . . All he (Henlein) asks are fair and just conditions for the German speaking minority." M. de Colonna's solution—this book must have been written a day or two later than the other which only spoke of autonomy—was that Czechs, Sudetens, Slovaks should " form a State each." The Nazis in fact achieved rather more than this.

It remains only to quote M. de Colonna's own words, " It is never too late to right a wrong, and the fleeting opportunity that is afforded at the present moment should be grasped with resolution and whole-hearted decision." SHIELA GRANT DUFF.

93*. TRAINING IN DEMOCRACY. The New Schools of Czechoslovakia. By Francis H. Stuerm. Introduction by Mr. W. Carson Ryan Jr. 1938. (New York: Inor Publishing Co. 8vo. xiii + 256 pp. $2.50.)

Describes the educational system under the Czechoslovak Republic.

94*. HENLEIN, HITLER ET LE DRAME TCHÉCOSLOVAQUE. La question allemande des Sudètes. By Antoine Karlgren. Translated from the Swedish by Jacques de Coussange. 1939. (Paris: Librairie Bloud & Gay. 8vo. 255 pp.)

The author concludes that the main Sudeten grievances had no justification in fact. He discusses German policy and traces the course of events from the *Anschluss* to the Munich settlement. British policy is severely criticised.

95*. KONRAD HENLEIN'S REDE IN KARLSBAD. Auf der Tagung der Sudetendeutschen Partei vom 24 April 1938. MEMORANDUM der Sudetendeutschen Partei vom 7 Juni 1938. Schriften des Deutschen Instituts für Aussenpolitische Forschung. Heft 4. 1938. (Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt. 8vo. 67 pp. *Rm.* 7.60.)

96*. DIE ILLEGALE PARTEI. By Otto Bauer. 1939. (Paris: Éditions " La Lutte Socialiste." 8vo. 208 pp. 20 *frs.*)

IN these posthumously published essays Otto Bauer gives expres-

sion to his ardent faith in the coming victory of Socialism, and indicates by what means it might be attained. Of greater interest to the general reader, and of more lasting value, is his narrative of the history of the post-War Socialist movement in the European countries. Though his illustration from Austrian events is not quite apt, he makes a good point in asserting that Fascism and National Socialism create rather than crush Communist counter-revolutionary movements and, while it is doubtful if a Socialist Republic would be established in Germany after another war (p. 156), it is more than likely that war would be the signal for the rise of the masses and the end of Fascism. But the end of it all would be something far more chaotic than the Socialist's ideal.

E. QUINN.

97*. CHRONOLOGY OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC EVENTS IN THE DANUBIAN BASIN, 1918–36. Danubian studies no. 1.

Autriche (in French). 178 pp.
Hungary. 86 pp.
Tchéchoslovaque (in French). 101 pp.
Bulgaria. 120 pp.
Yugoslavie (in French). 53 pp.
Roumania.

All 8vo. 1938. (Paris: International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation. London: Allen and Unwin.)

98*. AFFAIRES DANUBIENNES: Revue de l'Europe Centrale et du Sud-Est. No. 1, July 1938; No. 2, December 1938; and thereafter quarterly. (Bucarest: Centre des Hautes Études Internationales, Institut Social Roumain. About 100 pp. an issue. Annual subscription: 1938 (2 nos.), 12 *Fr. frs.* or 50 *lei*; 1939 (4 nos.), 40 *Fr. frs.* or 160 *lei*.)

THE Centre des Hautes Études Internationales was founded towards the end of 1936 and has already useful work to its credit. The periodical now issued by the Centre is most welcome, and the Centre is to be congratulated on the authoritative contributions which have appeared in it.

Each issue contains a series of articles on questions of current political and economic interest, a chronology of events in the Danubian and Balkan areas, a bibliography and a particularly valuable collection of documents—texts of treaties and agreements, official communiqués, declarations, decrees, etc.

99*. MUSSOLINI IN THE MAKING. By Gaudeus Megaro. 1938. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 347 pp. 10*s*. 6*d*.)

MR. GAUDEUS MEGARO has constructed a fairly complete record of Mussolini's life up to the Great War. He has got hold of the rare files of some of Mussolini's early journalistic productions (*La Lima*, a Ligurian weekly on which he worked in 1908, *L'Avvenire del Lavoratore*, which he edited in Trent—on Austrian territory—in 1909, *La Lotta di Classe*, which he edited in 1910 in his native Romagna). From these considerable excerpts have already been published, especially in the first two volumes of the life of Mussolini by Ivon de Begnac, now on sale in Italy. But Begnac, like Signora Sarfatti and other orthodox or formerly orthodox Fascist biographers, had to make out a case for Mussolini having through all his Socialistic activities steadily aspired or at least groped towards a patriotic or nationalist sort of revolution. Mr. Megaro has no such prejudice. While scrupulously fair to Mussolini (whom he absolves of various alleged misdemeanours,

giving him credit for disinterestedness and sincerity in his Socialist days), he believes that he worked round from Socialism to anti-Socialism in the sheer pursuit of ambition and possibly of vengeance for slights. He therefore exposes in its nakedness the extreme contradiction between all that Mussolini said and did before 1915 and all that he said and did afterwards.

Within the Italian Socialist party Mussolini stood for something not far from terrorist anarchism. He approved and applauded the assassination of kings and ministers and the blowing up of theatres. He attacked those "sentimentalists" who would have interceded to save the victims, or condoled with their relatives. He was for forcing Socialists to a total and open breach with any religious faith or practice. He was a refugee from military service, until he judged best to perform his service in order to be able to return unmolested to Italy from Switzerland, after his passport had been found to have a forged date. Perhaps Mr. Megaro has done his best work in bringing out Mussolini's actions and words about military service. Mussolini became eligible for conscript service in March 1904. He had left for Switzerland two months before, and was registered in Italy on April 28th as an absentee. When he applied at Geneva for a residence permit, in March, the police found that he had a passport valid until 1903 with the date clumsily altered to 1905. In a letter written just after his consequent arrest, quoted by Gaudeus, he mentions that he is an absentee and that he would be in jail if the Swiss had sent him back to Italy: some friends had managed to get him liberated at Bellinzona, on the Swiss side of the frontier. Begnac, in his very vague account of this affair, alleges that Mussolini, by registering at the Italian consulate at Bellinzona, put himself right with the Italian military authorities. But Mussolini only returned to Italy in December 1904 after an amnesty to deserters had been proclaimed for the birth of Prince Humbert. He then did his service.

Meanwhile in 1910 Mussolini publicly rejoices over the number of absentees from conscription. In the same year he mocks, "An Italian army has never been victorious . . . War? With an army that cannot win? Has Italy then the warlike traditions of France and Germany?" Against all this stands the alleged letter of Mussolini to Captain Simonetti in 1905, with patriotic phrases. Mr. Megaro points out that there is no uniform text of the letter and no means of authenticating it. Should it be authentic, then Mussolini was, for some reason or other, professing to this Captain sentiments in crass contradiction to those he publicly professed before and afterwards.

Mr. Megaro could be confuted only by a denial of the authenticity of his documentation, which has not, it seems, been anywhere challenged. C. J. S. S.

100*. FASCISM—WHO BENEFITS? By Max Ascoli and Arthur Feiler. 1939. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 341 pp. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

THE authors of this remarkable parallel essay on the great totalitarianisms want above all to warn off facile and self-satisfied critics of the Italian and German régimes. Since Mussolini's squads first marched into Rome, those who "knew better" have waited for the unskilled amateur politician to find that he must lean upon experience and tradition, or else find the State collapsing around him. These self-satisfied critics felt sure that after a little flag waving the March on Rome would issue in an ordinary Conservative Government: that simi-

larly Hitler would have to take his line from the *Army* and *the Junkers*: that Italy in Abyssinia would find (as others had found) too much summer rain, and would therefore call off the imperial ambition: that Germany would not want to get embroiled with the Papacy and so would leave Austria: that Germany and Italy could never, after all their past history, join together or get over their differences over Austria. The authors of *Fascism—Who Benefits?* and specially Max Ascoli, in his brilliant enquiry into the Italian totalitarianism, sweep these complacencies aside. When Mussolini finds that his sort of pugilistic politics in Italy are incompatible with all that is presumed to be stable, it is the presumed stability, and not the pugilistic politics, which goes by the board. Very likely Mussolini was really as unskilled as the critics supposed, and failed to foresee a climax in which rule by fists and clubs would directly clash with the continued functioning of elections and parliaments. Only when the parliamentarians Matteotti and Amendola risked and lost their lives in resisting violence did Mussolini see that liberal institutions, if allowed to exist, would bring him down. He proceeded to abolish the institutions.

Similarly in 1935 when his Abyssinian policy proved incompatible with the system of international relations he did not drop the policy but smashed (as far as in him lay) the system. Thenceforth he proceeds, unable, maybe, to foresee or determine whither he goes, but untrammelled by any tradition. To try and foresee Mussolini's external policy from the supposed traditions of Italian history is thus waste of time, and likely to lead to dangerous disappointments.

Arthur Feiler contributes a careful and detailed analysis of German National Socialist rule: his 150 pages are a small encyclopedia of the policies and the makeshifts of the German régime in these five years. These are more complex and crowded and closer to us than the Italian affairs of almost two decades. Mr. Feiler lets us perceive through his descriptions of the corporative organisation of agriculture and of the relations between totalitarianised employers and still more totalitarianised labour a process of power accumulated always for the sake of more power and thus (as in Italy) in the last resort never any certainty about the purposes for which power is wanted. C. J. S. S.

101*. I Helped to Build an Army. By José Martín Blázquez. Introduction by F. Borkenau. 1939. (London: Secker and Warburg. 8vo. 361 pp. 15*s*.)

One of the few officers who remained loyal to the Republic, Major Martín Blázquez played a leading part at the Ministry of War in Madrid in converting its militia into an army. His narrative, unpretentious but intensely interesting, reaches to March 1938, when, completely disillusioned, he left for France not to return. It is a contribution of the first importance to the appreciation both of a herculean task and of the human factors that stultified it at every turn. The Anarchists demanded a revolutionary army, the Communists a totalitarian army, and the centre Socialists and Liberals an orthodox non-political fighting machine. All were tried in turn, and failed in turn. Mr. Borkenau stresses, in a long and valuable introduction, the failure of the political parties to realise until it was too late that the rising was more than another *pronunciamiento*. This has its bearing on the old thesis, revived by Major Martín, of the constant superiority of the Spanish people to their rulers. The men who guided Republican destinies were all thrown up out of the people, and out of the shortcomings of

the Spaniard as *homo politicus*, more than from any other single cause, the war was lost. WILLIAM C. ATKINSON.

102*. FRANCO IN BARCELONA. 1939. (London: United Editorial, Ltd. 27 pp. 3*d*.)

This pamphlet, written by a British resident in Barcelona, deals with the period January 19 to March 1939.

103*. MARSHAL PILSUDSKI. By W. F. Reddaway. 1939. (London: George Routledge & Sons, Ltd. 8vo. xiv + 321 pp. 15*s*.)

THE first thirty-one years of Pilsudski's adult life were spent in conspiratorial work to free his country from foreign domination. At the end of 1918 he had achieved that aim, and the last sixteen years were devoted to guiding the destinies of the State which he, by his own genius and strength, had created.

Can there be any doubt which of these two periods was richest in events, in triumphs and disasters, dangers and romance? Yet this book disposes of the first period in one-third of its content, filling two-thirds with an account of his efforts to keep his country on the right path against the machinations of a host of lesser men, moved by either ignorance or malevolence.

The difficulty, of course, is that there are practically no documents of the early period. Conspirators must keep their meetings, decisions and plans secret. Consequently the would-be historian has to rely on the recollections of the actors, and after a lapse of time, through the magnitude of the subsequent happenings, recollections get clouded, connections are forgotten and accounts become coloured by partisanship.

One feels, however, that much of interest in the early period is omitted from this book—for instance the early history of the Z.W.C., and the romantic episode of the first and only course of instruction for future officers of the Polish irregulars, which ended just in time to appoint them as officers in the Legions at the outbreak of war.

It is sometimes difficult to follow the author's meaning—for instance in the account of Pilsudski's pamphlet on Narutowicz it is hard to discern to which of those two men each successive "he" or "him" refers. Events are often named, *e.g.* page 142, "The Suwalki Pact," without letting us know what the pact was. Again, men are often mentioned by their office, or even more vaguely, when their name would be helpful.

In a country where the spelling of proper names is generally considered difficult, the only error is in the name of the Commander of the Russian invaders of 1920, where Tutachevski should be Tukhachevski.

E. CLAYTON.

104. THE NEW SWEDEN. (Discussion Books No. 18.) By Bjarne Braatoy. 1939. (London: Nelson. 8vo. 172 pp. 2*s*.)

IN eight balanced chapters Mr. Braatoy explains Sweden's "New Deal" of "equalisation"; this does not consist of measures of social reform in a traditional sense, but rather of measures of social rationalisation. The author tells us how the Social Democratic Party, co-operating first with the Liberals and then with the Farmers, always following the rules of the democratic conception of public life, has been

working for the "dominating ideal of Swedish Society: equality in living conditions."

From the international point of view, the sections of special interest are those on the Swedish mining and armaments industries (pp. 76 and 88 *sqq.*), the Swedish press (p. 144) and propaganda methods in general. The book is too optimistic, as Mr. Braatoy must realise. Sometimes he feigns to believe that matters are very simple: as when he pretends that "any real quarrel between the generations" is being eliminated from Swedish politics through the—admittedly well-organised—political youth movement. S. E.

105*. IL FRONTE SUD. By Rodolfo Graziani. 1938. (Milan: Mondadori. 8vo. 354 pp. *Lire* 40.)

Two previously published accounts of the Italo-Abyssinian War, written respectively by Marshals De Bono and Badoglio, contained little information about the Italian army on the Southern or Somaliland Front. The official history of the campaign may now be considered as completed by the vivid narrative of the operations in the south written by Marshal Graziani himself.

As Il Duce says in an appreciative preface, the Southern Front was no less important than the Northern Front as a contribution to the conquest.

We learn that Graziani's rôle was to be a defensive one, and that his orders were to contain the largest possible number of enemy troops in Somaliland. The threat to Addis Ababa and the railway from this quarter most effectively cut the Ethiopian forces in two.

General Graziani (as he was when he took over command) had already made a distinguished name for himself in desert warfare, and would undoubtedly have added to his reputation in Somaliland even more than he did had the contest been more equal. As it was he won by far the most keenly contested "battles" against the elements, flooded rivers and vast stretches of waterless desert.

The defeat of the two columns of Ethiopian troops that opposed him could only be described as successful armed advances. An arms embargo enforced by England and France against Abyssinia prevented the Ethiopians from buying modern military equipment, and was only lifted when it was too late for their troops to be trained in its use. In addition to scouting, the Italian Air Force planes were able to bomb concentrations of the enemy, act as covering artillery in attack and complete the rout of retreating enemy forces under conditions that could seldom be as favourable in any other war, for they were practically unopposed.

The conversion of Mogadiscio, which had no deep-water harbour, into a huge base camp, and the supply of a highly mechanised army in appalling country, the defeat of the troops of Ras Desta at Neghelli on the Ganale Doria River and later the rout of Ras Nasibu's army at Dagamedo, and the advance into Daghabur and Harar and finally to the railway at Dire Dowa, 600 miles from the base, without any serious reverse could only have been accomplished by outstanding skill in military organisation.

The author may be congratulated on a handsome book, well documented and with ample maps and a collection of photographs of high artistic merit. R. S. CHEESMAN.

106*. GOLIATH: THE MARCH ON ROME. By G. A. Borgese. 1938. (London: Gollancz. 8vo. 495 pp. 16s.)

THIS is a vivid, mordant and penetrating account of post-War Italy with the figure of Mussolini in the foreground. The author, who was Professor of Aesthetics in the University of Milan and at one time also Foreign Editor of what was then a great newspaper, the *Corriere della Sera*, left Italy at an early stage of the Fascist régime, and, though he has clearly followed developments very closely from his present post at Chicago, the most valuable part of his book is the account of the immediate post-War situation and of the beginnings of Fascism. The significance of the Fiume episode in this connexion is often overlooked. The black shirt, the Fascist salute, the Fascist yell, the balcony speech to the assenting crowd and the corporative system itself, according to the author, originated during the brief D'Annunzio régime in Fiume. His pages are also filled with a number of incisive pen-portraits: the subjects, or victims, include D'Annunzio, Pope Pius XI (the author sheds new light on the policy of the Lateran Treaty), Orlando, Sonnino, and Benedetto Croce. Much information is also given about the Duce, especially as to his earlier years and the time when the *Popolo d'Italia* (founded with French money) was the humbler contemporary of the *Corriere della Sera*. A. Z.

107*. BIBLIOGRAPHIE BALKANIQUE, 1938. Huitième Volume. Rédigée par Léon Savadjian. 1939. (Paris: Société Générale d'Imprimerie et d'Édition. 8vo. 176 pp. 100 *frs*.)

The present volume of this Bibliography which has now become an established institution, includes titles of books with brief annotations of their content and of articles in periodicals published in the year 1938 dealing with Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Roumania, Turkey, and Yugoslavia which have appeared in French, German, Italian, and English.

A special chapter is devoted to Danubian problems and provides the first international bibliography of the *Anschluss* and of the Munich Settlement.

The present volume is prefaced by a comprehensive chronology of political and diplomatic events in Central Europe and the Balkans during the year.

THE MEDITERRANEAN AND NEAR EAST

108. GIBRALTAR UNDER MOOR, SPANIARD AND BRITON. By Major-General E. R. Kenyon. 3rd edition, revised. 1939. (London: Methuen. 8vo. xviii + 136 pp. illus. 8*s*. 6*d*.)

109*. GIBRALTAR AND THE MEDITERRANEAN. By G. T. Garratt. 1939. (London: Jonathan Cape. 8vo. 351 pp. 10*s*. 6*d*.)

GENERAL KENYON'S account of Gibraltar originally appeared in 1911, reprinted from *The Royal Engineers' Journal*. The present edition has been revised and enlarged by Lieut.-Colonel Sanson, R.A.O.C., a former President of the Gibraltar Society. Despite its title, the Moorish and Spanish parts of the history are very brief, and the greater part is devoted to the British period—now only seven years short of the Spanish. The treatment is as much geographical as historical; it deals very fully with material relics of former posses-

sors, of the construction of roads, building of new batteries or barracks, at various periods. It savours, indeed, a good deal of the guide-book, and as such is very good of its sort.

Mr. Garratt, on the other hand, takes a very much wider view, and relates the history of Gibraltar from without, rather than within. The various sieges, in his account, were but incidents in wider campaigns; though Gibraltar has been a British possession since 1704, its retrocession to Spain has often been considered, and discussed. The reasons for the fact that the negotiations have never borne fruit, Mr. Garratt assigns largely to a sentimental tradition, arising from national pride in the stubborn defence of the fortress throughout more than one siege. But the instinct to preserve "one of the brightest jewels of the British crown," if unthinking, was strategically sound, as Fox pointed out in the debates of 1782. British influence in the Mediterranean—always exerted in favour of freedom of passage and against restriction—depended upon the continued possession of a base there.

Mr. Garratt considers, with good reason, that the strong feeling of resentment at a foreign occupation which has existed in Spain for two centuries, and still exists, has been insufficiently recognised in Great Britain; and he regrets that the opportunity of ending that resentment, without prejudice to their country's strategic needs, by exchanging Gibraltar for Ceuta, facing it across the Straits, was not taken when the exchange could have been carried through with goodwill on both sides. He is not very hopeful of the future of British influence in the Mediterranean, but as that attitude seems to derive from a reading of British policy, and recent events, in that region which, to say the least of it, seems not untinged with political prejudice, it may not carry so much conviction as the historical part of his book. H. G. T.

110*. L'ÉGYPTE INDÉPENDANTE. (Collection du Monde Islamique, Tome I, Travaux des Groupes d'Études, Publ. No. 73.) Par le Centre d'Études de Politique Étrangère, Le Groupe d'Études de l'Islam. 1938. (Paris: Paul Hartmann, for the Centre d'Études. 8vo. 456 pp. map. 25 *frs.*)

111*. THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN EGYPT. By A. E. Crouchley. 1938. (London: Longmans, Green. 8vo. viii + 286 pp. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

L'Égypte Indépendante adopts an effective plan in its survey of contemporary Egypt. Instead of attempting to cover the whole ground, its authors have concentrated on three essential factors which have brought Egypt to its present position and on which (so far as internal forces are concerned) its future will mainly depend. Each of these factors is analysed in a study of some length, and other problems are more briefly dealt with in a socio-historical introduction. The first discusses the situation of the foreign communities in Egypt before and since the abolition of the Capitulations, the second describes the economic structure of the country, and the third is a briefer but brilliant essay on the creative rôle of the Arabic Press.

All these topics are handled in the traditional French spirit of sympathy with the aims and ideals of the Egyptians, but with an objectivity which is less often seen in French works. The writers have striven to do justice to the British administration (except for one

ungenerous and, as Sir Ronald Storrs has recently demonstrated afresh, unjust reference to Sir Eldon Gorst), and they indicate, but without over-emphasis, the dangers and weaknesses which beset the future development of the country. Particularly instructive in this respect is the chapter on the evolution of *la jeunesse*. There is some implied criticism of British policy in the matter of the Capitulations, natural enough in view of the fact that three-fifths of the foreign capital invested in Egypt is French. The view is expressed that it is the foreign communities who have been left to pay the price of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, although their action in using the Mixed Courts as a weapon against the Egyptian Government is unsparingly condemned. The detailed account of the Montreux Conference may perhaps conceal a mild apologia for the hesitations of the French Government in conceding the demands of the Egyptian delegation, and there is a sting in the observation that " other Powers " have shown no delay in taking advantage of the concessions so painfully acquired by French insistence. The essay on the economic structure is a masterpiece of compressed detail, with an abundance of useful statistics, although one or two minor errors have crept in. The third essay stands in a class by itself; no comparable study has ever been made of the complex and neglected problem of the Egyptian Press. This alone would give distinction to any book on Egypt, and the volume as a whole is exceedingly good value at its modest price.

Mr. Crouchley's book is the first general survey of its kind, and therefore welcome for its own sake, besides usefully supplementing the economic study in the former volume. Although it bears obvious signs of its genesis as a series of lectures to a not very advanced class of students, as, for instance, in its frequent repetitions, this is not wholly a disadvantage. The exposition is clear and seldom lends itself to controversy. For the earlier period, between 1800 and 1880, what may be called the traditional views are accepted, with little fresh criticism. But for the period since 1880 the available statistical materials are skilfully utilised, and the effect of the War of 1914–18 in setting Egyptian public finance on its feet is particularly well brought out. There is an interesting final chapter on the possibilities of future development, in the course of which Mr. Crouchley breaks a lance with those who (like the writer of the French survey) hold that Egypt is over-populated, and a convenient appendix of statistical summaries.

H. A. R. Gibb.

112*. L'Histoire secrète du Traité Franco-Syrien. Par M. Homet. Préface du General E. Brémond. 1938. (Paris: J. Peyronnet. 295 pp. 18 *frs.*)

The traditional interests of France in the Levant and the part which that country has played in domestic and international politics in that region have been made the subject of some criticism. Though the premises are sometimes not perfectly sound, the technique of the argument founded upon them follows, as one would expect, logically. Some conclusions are finally drawn, others only presented in skeleton, but there are examples in each case of exposition multiplying the original errors.

After a preface by General E. Brémond, the author has divided his book into nine parts, to which he has added as annexures the texts of

the Franco-Syrian and Franco-Lebanese treaties. A historical sketcl is followed by an examination of the Syrian-Lebanese disagreements the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of 1923 and the entry of Iraq into the League oi Nations in 1929 had important repercussive effects in Damascus These events showed an independent State emerging from the ancient orbit of Turkey, and Syrians felt that their former prominence in both Mohammedan and international spheres was in danger of permanent eclipse.

The French administration of the Syrian mandate is castigated for failing to reserve for French uses the petrol reserves in Syria, and it is abruptly said that the inhabitants are not amenable to a form of government showing tolerance, and require to be held in complete mastery. Any power seriously inclining to that view is clearly unsuited to mandatory sovereignty: to bring political appeasement and economic enlightenment to a number of tribes steeped in feudal habits and tradition is a task of some magnitude, but if the past may in any way be a mirror of the future, it will not be beyond the genius of French statesmanship to make a sound beginning.

For the rest there are rather more than a hundred and fifty pages devoted to French reactions to the Franco-Syrian treaty, the manœuvres and negotiations with which it was surrounded, a study of Syria and Lebanon after the treaties and some notes upon Alexandretta and the Druse question. The book is brought to a close by a review of the international position occupied by Mohammedans and of the repercussions following upon recent events in Palestine and upon the Syro-Palestinian frontier. H. J. COOPER.

113*. MEDITERRANEAN CRISIS. By Harry J. Greenwall. 1939. (London: Ivor Nicholson and Watson. 8vo. x + 259 pp. 5s.)

MR. GREENWALL is a simple-minded journalist who would like to be hard-boiled but who doesn't succeed in being so. He has tried to write a serious book, but he cannot forget that he was once a star reporter moving in that fantastic world of newspaper make-believe, where everything is several times larger than life and history is a collection of anecdotes written up for sensation and "human interest." "One summer's day in 1917 a slightly built man might have been seen limping up the carriage drive of a fine house in the Castellana, Madrid." No, not Bulldog Drummond, but Count Romanones, "the greatest landowner in the country and the Grey Eminence of His Most Catholic Majesty King Alfonso XIII of Spain." And so on. Mr. Greenwall seems to have been present at every important event in Europe in the last twenty years, and to have met and conversed with most of its leading statesmen. His manner in recounting these experiences is modest but assured. He always knows what *really* happened, like the good reporter he is, and he diagnoses each problem with the confidence of a "wise guy." And yet at the end one has the same sensation of indigestion combined with hunger as is produced by a reading of some of the more popular daily newspapers. Perhaps it is that Mr. Greenwall was always too close to his subject, and too busy telling the world about it, to have leisure to reflect upon the questions he discusses. His job is to entertain rather than to inform, and it is a little unfair of any publisher to expect him to do both. His entertainment value can best be judged by quotation. "The Straits of Messina look like they

were lit by fireflies. . . . Pock-marked Levantine harlots edge up to you in the night. . . . The coffee is good." GEORGE MARTELLI.

114*. THE TURKEY OF ATATÜRK: Social Progress in the Turkish Reformation. By Professor D. E. Webster. 1939. (Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science. 8vo. xv + 337 pp. $2.50.)

THIS book was undertaken under the facilities of a fellowship of the Academy, and gives a description of the work accomplished in Turkey after the World War. The author deserves well of the Republic.

" To most of her Near Eastern neighbours, Turkey has become," he says rightly, " a utopia to envy and an example to emulate."

There is ample information, derived chiefly from contemporary Turkish sources, on education, press, agriculture, public health, hygiene, industry; there are maps, plenty of them, statistics, population pyramids, more statistics and two appendices. The description of an establishment of a school (p. 266) is reminiscent of a patriarchal rule.

It is doubtful whether the racial theories propounded with a wealth of references will find universal approval; the Greeks will have a word for it when they learn they are of Türkî stock.

The book is no doubt intended for the American public. English ears cannot appreciate yet: " reformerism, returkification, revolutionism, ideological credo, defeatist psyche," etc., etc.

But this does not detract from the author's massive thoroughness. The extensive bibliography might have been more generous to English sources; could not Sorel's work have been mentioned?

Lastly, the judge on p. 144 looks very charming; she is almost worth a professional acquaintance, say for a technical motoring offence. NESTOR.

115*. THE TRAGEDY OF MESOPOTAMIA. By Sir George Buchanan, K.C.I.E. 1938. (London: Blackwood. 8vo. ix + 287 pp. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

SIR GEORGE BUCHANAN was sent out to Mesopotamia during the War as an expert on port development, and *The Tragedy of Mesopotamia* is largely an account of his work in the Port of Basra at that time, giving a point of view of the Mesopotamia campaign which hitherto has not been described.

This book is of some value, in that it draws attention to a vital aspect of this and all other campaigns and preparations for campaigns—the drawback of control of a campaign being in the hands of such a system as the Government of India, " designed for the institution of economy," and the consequent fatal delays in obtaining the necessary supplies and transport. The soldier's business is to wield or prepare a weapon with a view to success in battle, and the beauties of budgetary balance are not his concern. In times of crisis, therefore, the financial aspect must not be allowed to delay for one moment provision of whatever is required.

One cannot help wishing that Sir George's great knowledge had led him to continue his book for yet another chapter, and to offer suggestions to Iraq as to what steps she should now take. Whether we like it or not, Iraq has passed under the rule of an Arab Government, and although we may pride ourselves that the people of Iraq would have been happier under British Government, that is merely an academic speculation, and if we are as interested in the

happiness of these people as we are apt to think, surely constructive criticism is more likely to help them than the purely destructive criticism which forms the theme of this book. L. D. GRAND.

116*. L'ODIERNO SCOMPIGLIO DELLA PALESTINA. By Romolo Tritonj. 1939. (Estratta dal Bollettino della Reale Società Geografica Italiana, Maggio 1939, 353–371 pp. n.p.)

The author recommends suspension of Jewish immigration and the appointment of a Moslem Governor, with an elected Council, effective power to be vested in the ex-Allied Powers and the United States of America with a special commission appointed to safeguard the Holy Places.

U.S.S.R.

117*. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION. By Samuel N. Harper. 1938. (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc. 8vo. xviii + 204 pp. $1.75.)

THIS work, by Professor Harper of the University of Chicago, forms part of a series of text-books on the governments of modern Europe. Government in the Soviet system must be understood in the broadest Marxian sense. It concludes not only the normal governmental functions of law-making and public administration, but also a new world of extraneous socialised activity ranging from the theatre and trade to the labour and co-operative unions. It is a curious fact that in the welter of discussion concerning the merits and defects of communism, little or no attention is paid to the working machinery of the Soviet system. This book is a good general introduction to the subject. It is not a work for the specialist, but it should be useful to many. It would, I think, be vastly improved by a stronger dose of critical analysis and some flavour of personal reminiscence of Russia, her officials and institutions, with which Professor Harper has been familiar for more than thirty years. The material collected here clearly shows that the time is yet far from ripe for a book on Soviet Russia comparable to the standard works on the French or British systems of government. This is so for several reasons. In the first place, it is extremely difficult under present conditions in Russia to find out exactly how any department of State actually functions. More important is the fact that Soviet institutions are still far from static. The revolutionary process begun in 1917 is still actively at work, as the revolution proceeds stage by stage on its march from capitalism to communism. Soviet laws are comparatively short-lived. Enacted for the most part with a revolutionary object, they are re-drafted as soon as it is achieved. The machinery of Soviet law-making and of public administration, as well as of the Party and the Soviets, is being constantly modified. Not only is the system in a state of flux, but theory and practice are often sharply at variance. This is perhaps best demonstrated by the arbitrary abandonment of "mass-controls" in the Party, the Soviets, and industry, when high placed officials wanted to be their own masters. The recent purges revealed hundreds of cases of such "non-democratic practices."

The Soviet system has undoubtedly conferred widespread social benefits and political rights on the Russian people, but at the present stage of development it can be commended neither for honesty nor for efficiency. The Soviet leaders admit many of these defects, but regard them as the "inevitable children's diseases of a new structure." So does Professor Harper. The violence of the "shootings, arrests, demotions and dismissals of 1937–38" does not shock Professor

Harper, though his treatment of this question shocked the present reviewer. He laconically contends that purges, and even blood purges, will continue to be a part of the Soviet system, particularly of the technique of leadership, evidently forgetting how incompatible all this is with the "withering away of the State" towards which Bolshevism is officially steering. The persistent regimentation of the Soviet intellectuals is casually set aside on the plea that "revolutions cannot be carried out in the spirit of a debate." When he goes on to say that "politicising does not mean an extension of control by a bureaucratic authority over all activity. It means the relating of all activity to the programme of the revolution . . .," he seems to have hypnotised himself into accepting a Soviet distinction without a difference. Too often, in fact, it is difficult to know whether Professor Harper is expressing his own opinion, or merely paraphrasing the official viewpoint of the Soviet Government. It is important to have leading issues well and if possible decisively thrashed out, rather than left in mid-air, as they often are here. For example, Professor Harper seems to be unable to decide whether Russia is or is not a totalitarian State, and is entirely non-committal on the moot point as to whether any member of the Union of Soviet Republics could, practically speaking, establish its own independence. In an account of a system where the Soviets play such a preponderating rôle, it is unfortunate that little or nothing is said regarding their origin and development in pre-revolutionary Russia. The ultimate question suggested by this book is unequivocally answered by Professor Harper: in spite of its limitations on personal freedom, the Soviet system secures more real opportunities for larger numbers of people than Western parliamentary systems.

VIOLET CONOLLY.

118*. LA NATIONALISATION DES BANQUES EN RUSSIE ET SES EFFETS À L'ÉTRANGER. By André Sollogoub. 1939. (Paris: Sirey. 8vo. v + 261 pp. 40 *frs.*)

DR. SOLLOGOUB'S book is a well-documented account of the legal difficulties which arose in connection with the liquidation of foreign branches of Russian banks when the parent companies were nationalised by the Soviet Government. After giving a brief historical account of the dissolution of the old Tsarist banking system, together with the texts of the nationalisation decrees, the author proceeds to analyse the interpretations placed by the courts of a number of countries on the status and liabilities of the foreign branches of these banks. The position of branches in France receives, as is understandable, the most detailed treatment, and four chapters are devoted to the technique of liquidation. Of particular interest to English readers, however, is the chapter describing the findings of the Court of Appeal judges and the House of Lords in the cases of the Russian Commercial and Industrial Bank *v.* Comptoir d'Escompte de Mulhouse and Banque Internationale de Commerce de Petrograd *v.* Goukassoff, and how these findings came to be modified by the introduction of new company legislation in 1939. There is an interesting appendix describing the effect of the nationalisation decrees on the branches of foreign banks in Russia.

L. E. HUBBARD.

119. LES PRÉCURSEURS DE LÉNINE. By Maurice Paleologue. 1938. (Paris: Plon. 8vo. 247 pp. 18 *frs.*)

Traces the revolutionary tendencies in Russia from Peter the Great to Lenin.

120*. AGAINST AGGRESSION. Speeches by Maxim Litvinov. 1939. (London: Lawrence and Wishart. 8vo. 208 pp. Cloth, 5*s.*; unbound, 2*s.*)

To a collection of thirteen speeches from the period 1934–38 by *M. Litvinov there have been added the Covenant of the League of* Nations and the text of some sixteen treaties, conventions, and protocols concerning non-aggression between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and other countries.

The success of the Soviet Union's efforts to prevent foreign attack is due, it is alleged, to the fact that the U.S.S.R. has at its disposal "both reliable punitive institutions and a well-equipped Red Army, as well as a consistently conducted policy of peace in the sphere of foreign relations." Implicit in this quotation are three facts—that enemies are omnipresent and a secret police and counter-espionage service are vital; that the Red Army has a considerable measure of mobility; and that Russia has no intention of irrupting into a neighbour's territory. It may be that this latter is true, since a self-contained economy has no need of invasion to increase its territory; but it requires no more effort than a glance at the map to show that the maintenance of a modern force upon the borders of Western Russia might well overtax the capacity of its administrative services. Thus, when many nations are working frantically to ensure what they consider to be adequate security, the U.S.S.R. seem to consider treaties to be an adequate frontier defence. It may have been an unconscious but certainly a candid revelation that the compilers upon the first page should say that "answers which are designed to consolidate peace achieve their full value and demonstrative force only when made rapidly without excessive reflection, without mental reservations and unconditionally."

H. J. COOPER.

121. THE FATAL YEARS. Fresh Revelations on a Chapter of Underground History. By Colonel B. V. Nikitine. Translated from the Russian by D. Hastie Smith. With a Preface by Sir Alfred Knox, K.C.B., M.P. 1938. (London: William Hodge. 8vo. xiv + 312 pp. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

Now that the first years of the Russian Revolution seem sufficiently distant for the ideologists to foist upon the reading public all kinds of doctored descriptions and twisted and distorted "official histories" of those fateful years, it is refreshing to read a straightforward narrative of those historic events from the pen of one who himself played an active part in them.

Every first-hand contribution to the knowledge of the events in Russia which at the time were, and still are, so sadly misunderstood by many is to be welcomed. As head of the Counter-Espionage Bureau in Petrograd, Colonel Nikitine saw in 1917 the inside of the Russian tragedy and the helplessness of Kerensky and his Government to stave off the coming catastrophe.

The facts which the author adduces to prove that Lenin and his comrades relied on German financial aid to bring about Russia's defeat in the War seem convincing; I remember that it was generally believed in Russia at the time of the July Rising in 1917.

Here and there the account is a little too sketchy, and one would wish for some more coherence and detail, but the story on the whole bears the imprint of truth. I can recommend this book to all students of the Russian Revolution.

W. J. OUDENDYK.

122. THE RABBIT KING OF RUSSIA. By R. O. G. Urch. 1939. (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode. 8vo. xi + 275 pp. 7s. 6d.)

FROM his headquarters at Riga, Mr. Urch, the author of this book, has been reporting on Russia and the Baltic States since 1922. This means that he has had to depend mainly on the Soviet Press for his information, and must have amassed a mountain of clippings in his time. *The Rabbit King of Russia* is a fantastic pseudo-chronicle of post-revolutionary life in Russia, hoisted on a formidable scaffold of footnotes, cross-references, illusive identifications and other trappings of reality. I must confess that this kind of fictitious make-believe always bores me, so I am perhaps an unfortunate reviewer for *The Rabbit King*. I would gladly dispense with a little of the weird and wonderful with which the tale is crammed for a breath of the real Russia—some description of her towns and countryside and the eternal characteristics of her people. Of such things there isn't a word from start to finish, though the story moves from one end of Russia to the other. From this point of view it is very obviously made in Riga. There is something definitely *vieux jeu* about the whole conception of this book, both in form and expression. It is surely no longer necessary to add a translation of every commonplace Russian term for the reader's benefit nor to insist *ad absurdum* on the incredible happenings of the early days of the Soviet régime. VIOLET CONOLLY.

123. MEMOIRS OF A SOVIET DIPLOMAT. By Alexandre Barmine. 1938. (London: Lovat Dickson. 8vo. xvi + 360 pp. Illus. 15s.)

EVERY story of personal adventure has something to commend it. Some are hard to read because of their form, others hard to believe because of improbabilities. The memoirs of Alexandre Barmine make an excellent story, and many facets of his varied career are made to stand in relief. One has to remember that until he grew to manhood he was unacquainted with those who are comprehended by the term the *civilised peoples*. For by no stretch of the imagination could the life of the peasant and humble functionary in Russia either immeditely preceding the Revolution or after it be called civilised.

The book is divided into three parts: the first explains how he evaded a trap to kidnap him while *en poste* in Athens; the second deals with his childhood and student life, the civil war and Polish campaign and his work in Bokhara; the third, most comprehensive, shows the life in Teheran, Stamboul, Athens, Rome, Berlin, Brussels and Moscow, and explains the struggle against Trotskyism, with its attendant bitterness of party strife and consequent centralisation of administration tending to throttle almost every activity.

It is not perhaps wise to base a critique of a system upon the observations of one who was ultimately a victim of it, but it is permissible to allow that, until the unaccountable purges of 1936, the life of the U.S.S.R., in so far as the author saw it, was faithfully portrayed.

H. J. COOPER.

124*. A CRITIQUE OF RUSSIAN STATISTICS. By Colin Clark. 1939. (London: Macmillan. 8vo. 76 pp. 6s.)

THE principal object of this investigation is to discover, if possible, the real income per head of the population of the U.S.S.R. Unfortunately the author relied almost exclusively on second-hand information, taking his figures from publications such as the bulletins issued by the Department of Russian, Birmingham University, the U.S.S.R. Hand-

book, a useful but unofficial work published in England, and various other foreign reviews and periodicals. The investigation tends to show that the standard of living of the Russian people has not made any impressive advance since the socialist reconstruction of the nation's economy; but the attempt to relate the purchasing power of the rouble to capitalist currencies is unconvincing. L. E. HUBBARD.

125. J. M. SWERDLOW. DER GROSSE KAMPFGEFÄHRTE LENINS UND STALINS. By Z. Selikson-Bobrowskaja. 1939. (Paris: Editions Prométhée. 8vo. 80 pp. 2 *frs.*)

Sverdlov, "first President of the Soviet Union," died in 1919, and the present biography is of purely academic importance, except for the fact that it is also orthodox anti-Trotsky propaganda, and as such has a political significance. W. J.

126*. UKRAINE AND ITS PEOPLE. By Hugh P. Vowles. 1939. (London: W. R. Chambers, Ltd. 8vo. 219 pp. Map. 5*s.*)

127*. L'UKRAINE: son histoire, ses richesse. By Charles Steber. 1939. (Paris: Bureau d'Editions. Sm. 8vo. 81 pp. 2.50 *frs.*)

MR. VOWLES has written a refreshing book on the history of the Ukrainians—no one, of course, really knows where they came from, how many of them there are, or what they really want, but Mr. Vowles has read fairly widely. His tendency is towards the left—his description of the socialisation of agriculture in the Ukraine is very euphemistic, according to the best authorities.

M. Steber's book should satisfy the most lurid taste for tales of Tsarist brutality, capitalist intrigue, etc. He also supplies a certain amount of information about agriculture and industrial development in the Ukraine, derived from Soviet sources: no account—even euphemistic—should of course be expected of the miscalculations of the Bolsheviks, while the work of German engineers and the German Republic of the lower Volga is ignored: if the book were of less ephemeral character, it would require an index. G. MICKLETHWAIT.

INDIA

128*. SOME ASPECTS OF INDIAN EDUCATION PAST AND PRESENT. By Sir Philip Hartog. (University of London Institute of Education Studies and Reports, No. VII.) 1939. (O.U.P. for the Institute of Education 8vo. xv + 109 pp. 3*s.* 6*d.*)

THIS valuable piece of research should be read alongside Mr. Gandhi's Address and the subsequent correspondence[1] in which Sir Philip Hartog challenged the statement that "India to-day is more illiterate than it was fifty or a hundred years ago . . . because the British administration . . . instead of taking hold of things as they were, began to root them out." Sir Philip Hartog has examined with great care and also with great impartiality the evidence adduced by Mr. Gandhi in support of his allegations; especially the reports of Adam (with reference to Bengal) and of Leitner (with reference to the Punjab) which have been accepted at their face value for far too long. He has, it may be hoped, finally laid to rest the legend of the

[1] See *Journal of the Institute*, November 1931, pp. 727–8; and January 1932, pp. 151–2.

100,000 schools in Bengal, and also Leitner's assertion that the position in the Punjab gravely deteriorated subsequent to the annexation.

The discussion would have been more interesting, and perhaps more valuable, had Mr. Gandhi been content with deploring the slow progress of literacy, and with the possible proposition that British administrators would have done better had they built on the foundations of indigenous schools. Had he done so, he would have been very largely on common ground with the Hartog Committee, who were very far from regarding the educational position with complacency and who did more than perhaps any other body to draw attention to the stagnation and wastage which still persist in the primary schools of India. But the evidence which Sir Philip Hartog brings forward indicates also that the Administration was guilty—if it was guilty—merely of neglecting and not of uprooting the indigenous schools. Even more pertinent to the issue, the evidence goes to show that, even a century ago, the schools were scarcely worth saving. One of the main causes of disappointing results in Bengal to-day is that approximately 800,000 pupils still attend indigenous schools.

In recent years, attempts have been made to build up a system of primary education on the basis of schools maintained by local bodies; but, as Sir Philip Hartog points out, these attempts have been gravely impeded by the abandonment by Government of almost all power of controlling the activities of those bodies. The impressions gained from reading this book are that progress in Indian education has been far greater than is generally admitted; and also that the difficulties confronting that task have been " colossal."

GEORGE ANDERSON.

129*. FOOD PLANNING FOR FOUR HUNDRED MILLIONS. By Radhakamal Mukerjee. 1938. (London: Macmillan. 8vo. xviii + 267 pp. *7s. 6d.*)

IT is a grim thought that the population of India will probably attain the four hundred million mark by 1940, and that the rate of increase is even tending to accelerate. It is estimated that the rate of increase will probably be 13 per cent for the decade 1931–41, as compared with 10·67 per cent. between 1921 and 1931—the highest figure previously recorded. The extreme urgency of the Indian population problem has at last begun to attract the attention it deserves, as is testified by the growing literature on the subject, the inauguration in 1936 of periodic Indian Population Conferences, and the recent establishment of an Indian Institute of Population Research.

Professor Mukerjee has made a notable contribution to the subject in his *Food Planning for Four Hundred Millions*, which contains various novel estimates and indices that throw considerable light on the extent and nature of the problem, and should do much to stimulate thought and a more constructive policy. He examines systematically the relations between agriculture, nutrition, and population in India. In particular he attempts to estimate the extent of the existing food shortage in India, and to establish certain food standards for various regions which have different customary diets. These inquiries enable him to draw more definite conclusions than have hitherto been possible as to the extent and nature of the prevailing malnutrition. He then estimates India's population capacity if her agricultural potentialities were fully developed, and compares her future needs and possible supplies. He concludes that at present forty-eight millions would

obtain no food at all, if the rest received an adequate, but by no means generous, diet. In discussing remedies he suggests that under existing circumstances little relief can be expected from overseas emigration (although he ardently advocates freer international migration) or from the expansion of overseas trade, or large-scale industrialisation, but that India's greatest hope lies in a judicious combination of food and industrial cropping, rather than in the encouragement of subsistence farming, and in rural rather than in urban industrialisation. Above all, it is necessary to restrict numbers, rather than to rely on the diversification of employment. He holds strongly that in the absence of conscious control of population growth, no other remedies can possibly be effective.

Professor Mukerjee's conclusions are fully supported by the statistical and other evidence adduced. He relies mainly on official records and sources, supplemented at times by modifications required to correct obvious and often acknowledged deficiences and inaccuracies. On the whole his use and interpretation of his statistical material are careful and moderate, although he follows the misleading but widely prevalent practice of comparing the figures of occupational distribution at different censuses without sufficient allowance for changes in the methods and bases of enumeration—a practice which tends to exaggerate the increasing dependence upon industrial employment. Also, at times, he interprets as permanent trends variations which are probably due only to temporary fluctuations. For instance, he asserts again and again that the output of wheat is declining. By choosing certain years an apparent decline can be demonstrated, but other years might well be chosen which would support the opposite conclusion. Actually it is difficult to trace any genuine "trend" of wheat production during recent decades. Output fluctuates considerably, as does the output of most Indian crops, but the "normal" level seems to have remained fairly stable. But these are small faults in an eminently careful and reasonable exposition. Professor Mukerjee does not try to demonstrate that British rule has lowered the prevailing standard of life. On the contrary, he estimates that up to the present there has been no actual decline in food supply per head. But he shows that a critical point has now been reached. The difference between the rate of growth of food-supplies and population is narrowing, and, if present tendencies continue, will shortly disappear. Thereafter the latter will tend to exceed the former, and the "Malthusian situation" will prevail. Moreover, the outstanding remedies of the nineteenth century can no longer be applied. There is now little opportunity for the extension of cultivation to areas not at present cropped, or for any large-scale extension of irrigation facilities. These conclusions are supported by most authorities on agricultural conditions in India, and the opinion that the potentialities of irrigation have been largely exhausted might well be even more strongly put. There is, indeed, considerable evidence that the limits of successful irrigation have already been overstepped in certain areas where new Government works have resulted in the exhaustion of subsoil water and the drying up of wells. It is not, of course, argued that there is no room for improvement in agricultural output. Indeed, Professor Mukerjee estimates that better methods and more intensive cultivation might at least double the output per acre. But, even so, if the present rate of population growth continues, after a definite period the pressure of population will reassert itself and output per head must eventually decline.

Professor Mukerjee's most original contribution is his attempt to estimate the dietetic needs of the population, and the food value of existing diets. Here he makes ample allowance for the smaller needs and lower metabolism of an Asiatic, as contrasted with a European population. This makes his conclusions, quoted above, with regard to the present food shortage, all the more startling. It must be admitted that criteria of malnutrition, and of what constitutes an adequate diet for particular peoples, are still doubtful. But even if substantial further allowance were made for the smaller needs and lower metabolism of Asiatics, it is clear that Professor Mukerjee's general conclusions would not be altered, and that the existing prevalence of malnutrition is no less than horrifying. VERA ANSTEY.

130. THE TRUE INDIA: a Plea for Understanding. By C. F. Andrews. 1939. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 251 pp. 3*s*. 6*d*.)

131*. THE RISE AND GROWTH OF THE CONGRESS. By C. F. Andrews and Girija Mookerjee. 1938. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 304 pp. 7*s*. 6*d*.)

132. THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE GROUP: an Indian Study in Conflict. By B. K. Mallik. 1939. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 181 pp. 6*s*.)

WE have here three books throwing light on the relations between India and Great Britain, and written from the standpoint of the Indian Congress. The first two books, as everyone who is acquainted with Mr. Andrews would expect, are very readable, so that even those who do not agree with the views expressed will find it hard to lay either of these books down half read. The first book attempts a refutation of the allegations made by Miss Mayo and other authors against the moral outlook of the adherents of the Hindu religion, and lays emphasis on the injustice done to prominent Indians, for instance the poet Rabindranath Tagore, whose views have been misrepresented. It is not denied that the evils mentioned by Miss Mayo exist, but it is contended that the instances given are not typical and that the forces working in the direction of reform have been overlooked. A consideration of this work would suggest that the weakness of Hinduism consists in its excessive tolerance of all ideas and the general tendency of the Hindu Joint Family System to encourage the increase of population beyond the capacity of the soil of India or any other country reasonably available for immigration.

In *The Rise and Growth of the Congress* a vivid picture is given of the history of the Congress movement, showing in startling fashion how its aims have developed even in the last generation. A movement which once represented only the aspirations of the English-speaking minority, and whose claims were limited to the establishment of a legislature subordinate to the Imperial Parliament has become a mass movement, drawing its strength from the Indian villages and aiming at nothing less than complete severance of the connection with the United Kingdom This change is mainly attributed to the unceasing efforts of the Mahatma and his policy of non-violent revolt. It is a pity that the work hardly mentions the Khilafat controversy which was of such practical importance as a rallying-ground for Hindus and Muslims after the Great War, until in a thoughtless moment the Turkish Government abolished this Khilafat altogether.

The third book, by Mr. Mallik, starts discussing the Hindu-Muslim

differences, and the hostile attitude taken by Muslims towards reform in India. The author seeks in vain to discover the reason why Muslims should take sides against the Hindus who are their neighbours and natural allies and should join with the British, whose philosophy is antagonistic both to Hindu and Muslim ideas in the excessive importance attached to the individual as opposed to the group of which he is a member. Suggestions are made to cure this disharmony. Mr. Mallik's style is somewhat involved and difficult to follow, and this book will not greatly appeal to the general reader. H. S. CHATFIELD.

133*. NATIONALISM AND REFORM IN INDIA. By William Roy Smith. 1938. (New Haven: Yale University Press; Oxford University Press. 8vo. vi + 485 pp. $5.00. 22*s.* 6*d.*)

THE American investigator of the Indian political scene is frequently more thorough and objective in his studies than British contemporaries, for he has the advantage of viewing the complicated problem of Indian nationalism in a spirit of detachment. For the general reader this book gives a fair and balanced presentation of the history of the nationalist movement and of Indian reform in the last fifty years. Except, however, in the chapter outlining the Federal Constitution provided for in the Act of 1935, the author does not pay as much attention as he might have done to the position of "Indian India," where a very important part is being played in Indian development. The question of the religion of ruler and subject is less simple than the author suggests.

The book is well indexed and documented, and can be recommended. "X. Y."

134. INDIA'S NORTH-WEST FRONTIER. By Sir William Barton, K.C.I.E., C.C.I. 1939. (London: John Murray. 8vo. xiii + 308 pp. 10*s.* 6*d.*)

THE problem of India's North-West Frontier may be studied from three points of view: as a local problem in the North-West Frontier Province, as part of the political evolution of India, and as an Imperial problem. It is too often considered solely from the local standpoint. Sir William Barton gives us in the first chapters of his book sufficient data concerning the local conditions, ethnical, geographical and political, to enable us to view the Frontier in its true perspective as "an Imperial problem of the first magnitude" (p. 23). Though this general description of the Afghan borderland, the tribes and tribal areas, and the British border administration cannot be, in a work of this size, more than a sketch, the complexity of the problem becomes at once apparent; and a chapter on Waziristan admirably instances the difficulties to be contended with in pursuing the policy of "peaceful penetration."

After a short survey of the relations between Afghanistan and India, the author turns to the post-War effect of Indian politics on the Frontier, reviews the Imperial strategical aspect and discusses future policy. It is these chapters which should and will command the attention particularly of students of Indian and Imperial affairs.

For a book which has place-names on almost every page the sketch-maps are regrettably quite inadequate. The inclusion of a diagrammatic sketch of the administered districts and political agencies with their respective tribal "content" would simplify reading for those not intimate with the geography of the Frontier. GEOFFRY KEATING.

IRAN

135. Reza Shah. By Mohammed Essad-Bey, with Paul Maerker Branden and Elsa Branden. 1938. (London: Hutchinson. 8vo. 272 pp. 15s.)

Mohammed Essad-Bey describes the life of Reza Shah from his childhood to the year 1935. He relates the early career of Reza Shah in the Cossack Brigade, of which he eventually became Commander-in-Chief, the march on Teheran (February 1921), which was followed by the emergence of Reza Shah as the real ruler of Iran, and finally his assumption of the crown (December 1925).

Reza Shah's policy in creating a national unity where formerly none had existed and his numerous reforms—the emancipation of women, the westernisation of education, the abolition of the capitulations, the building of factories, etc.—are briefly touched upon. One wishes that the author had dealt more fully with these matters. The policy underlying the construction of the railway from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf is, however, discussed in greater detail.

The picture drawn of Reza Shah himself lacks both clarity and consistency. Opinions expressed by the author in one part of the book are contradicted in another. The character and remarkable achievements of Reza Shah are worthy of more skilful treatment than they have received in this work. It is not that Mohammed Essad-Bey does not recognise the ability of Reza Shah, but that he has not produced a well-planned, consistent or scholarly work. The author moreover does not seem to be familiar with the historical background. The transliteration further seems to have been based on caprice rather than on any accepted system. Ann K. S. Lambton.

THE FAR EAST

136. The Far East in World Politics: a study in recent history. By G. F. Hudson. (Second Edition.) 1939. (London: Humphrey Milford. 8vo. vii + 276 pp. Illus. 7s. 6d.)

The original edition, which was reviewed in *International Affairs* for July–August 1937, has been changed principally by the rewriting of the "Conclusion." It is only a short chapter, but alone it is worth the extra seven-and-sixpence. Dealing with Far Eastern developments since 1931, it goes straight to the point of the failure of the League Powers, and of Great Britain and the United States in particular, to curb Japanese aggression. One is thankful to Mr. Hudson for his sane and simple explanation.

"The urge in these two countries [Great Britain and the U.S.A.] towards the application of sanctions was almost entirely an expression of idealism, of attachment to the new international order. . . . It was an emotional enthusiasm without any ground of immediate national interest. . . . But to be effective in great international conflicts idealism requires an alloy of baser metal; devotion to abstract principles must be reinforced by awareness of a direct threat to national security or main economic interests if a country is to endure for long the sacrifices required in a war of attrition."

As a statement of hard fact this is indisputably true; how much breath might have been saved at the time by its frank recognition! The only question is whether Mr. Hudson does not exaggerate the function of "realism" in British motives in dealing with the Chinese situation. He speaks of the prevalence of fear that "a struggle undertaken to vindicate the League Covenant and restore Manchuria to Chinese sovereignty might serve instead to clear the way for a return

of Borodin and Galen to Hankow" (in other words, to establish Chinese Communism to the detriment of British interest), but he makes no allowance, on the other side, for an equally positive factor, namely the influence on British policy of genuine friendship and goodwill towards the Chinese nation. There is a danger, too, that his use, when speaking of the relations of the Western Powers with China and Japan, of somewhat hyperbolic terms such as "semi-colonial domination" may create misconceptions of fact in the mind of the general reader for whom the book is chiefly designed. Apart from this suspicion of "leftist" bias, one can only confirm the verdict of the *New Statesman* reviewer which the publishers quote on the wrapper, that Mr. Hudson's work is "a model of conciseness, lucidity and masterly political analysis."

G. E. HUBBARD.

137*. DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN, 1895–1905. By Payson J. Treat. 1938. (Stanford University Press; Oxford University Press. 8vo. x + 291 pp. 16s.)

IF there were no books on foreign affairs except such as have been written in a spirit of sympathy and understanding, one of the great obstacles to the development of a better world order would have been removed. At a time when Japan stands condemned at the bar of world opinion this study by Professor Treat of what is perhaps the most important period in her relations with the West is of great value. During the ten years from the end of the war with China to the end of the war with Russia Japan, in spite of contempt and neglect, bullying and unfair treatment, won her way from the status of a negligible Asiatic race to the position of a Great Power; and the records, which Professor Treat allows to speak for themselves, show her always gallant, courteous and correct. Japan had many causes of complaint against the United States—the high-handed annexation of Hawaii, the unsavoury administration of the Exclusion Law and its application to Japanese not subject to its regulations, the closed door in the Philippines at the very moment that the open door was being championed in China ("a most unfavourable contrast to the liberal conduct of England in her Asiatic colonies" as Mr. Komura did not fail to point out), ill treatment and boycotts of Japanese in America—but, in spite of all these grievances handled with admirable temper and dignity by the Japanese representatives, the relations between the two countries remained cordial and friendly.

On November 23rd, 1905, Japan established a protectorate over Korea; next day, November 24th, America recognised the Protectorate and withdrew her diplomatic mission; and this, says Professor Treat, was the "apex of the curve of Japanese-American relations." After 1905 the descent into hostility and suspicion was rapid and disastrous.

Though it is only Japan's relations with America that are dealt with in this book, Professor Treat's admirable handling of the subject sheds a welcome light on the whole period. Professor Treat insists that there is no truth in the theory "that Japan adopted a continental policy at some early date and followed it with undeviating tenacity." There was already noticeable in this period that weak spot in the Japanese character which may yet be their ruin: "a tendency to insubordination that makes it possible for those in places of trust to follow the the dictates of their own blind folly and prejudice." But

on the whole the picture of Japan that emerges from these pages is a pleasant one. The "prompt, efficient and modest way" in which she carried out her task in 1900 when she marched to the relief of the Pekin legations was typical of the Japan of those days.

J. T. PRATT.

138*. GOVERNMENT IN REPUBLICAN CHINA. By P. M. A. Linebarger. 1938. (London: McGraw. 200 pp. 8*s*. 6*d*.)

THIS work, which is one of a series of Studies in Political Science published in the United States, represents something new—to British readers at least—in books on China. It is an attempt to describe through the media of the most modern technical terms of Western political science the background and results of a quarter of a century of revolution in one of the most ancient and most extensive of Eastern civilisations.

The method of approach to the study of government in republican China is as unusual as the form of the study itself. The first part of the book is devoted to "Movements," and introduces the reader to Confucianism, Nationalism and Communism as constituent parts of Chinese patriotism. The second part of the book is entitled "Armies," and aims at elucidating the poetic injustice which decreed that a State, wherein the scholar had for centuries been exalted above the soldier, should in turn suffer so long and so much at the hands of the War Lords. Only in the last third of the book is the reader introduced to the history of the Chinese Empire, of the Revolution and of the Reconstruction of the China of to-day.

This form of presentation requires and is entitled to very careful reading, and, so read, it offers great help to the serious student of international affairs, who might otherwise shrink from examining for himself the vast literature which exists on the subject of China, in order to gauge the latter correctly as one of the indispensable factors in world appeasement.

Naturally in such a condensed survey there is little room for the appraisal of individual Chinese, and equally natural is the tribute of admiration paid to the great revolutionary leader Sun Yat-sen by the author as the son of that leader's Counsellor. The appreciation of Yuan Shih-kai, however, does less than justice to a patriot, who fell not least because he was an implacable opponent of Japanese domination, while the questionable rôle played by Sun's Russian Communist allies, and the years of civil warfare which consequently ensued on the emergence of Chiang Kai-shek in 1927, are perhaps treated with the benefit of the same filial doubt.

In view of the importance which the outcome of the present struggle in the Far East bears for the English-speaking peoples, this contribution to a modern understanding of an ancient problem is especially timely; the present-day student will recognise the technique of modern science, while the old China-hand will be reminded of a Chinese philosopher analysing with calm detachment the factors which parade as cause and effect in the march of time. SIDNEY BARTON.

139*. THE RISE OF A PAGAN STATE. By A. Morgan Young. 1939. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 224 pp. 7*s*. 6*d*.)

LORD CURZON somewhere warns us against "the tendency to depreciate that which we do not sympathise with or understand and which we are therefore prone to mistake for a mark of inferiority or

degradation." Mr. Morgan Young has written an interesting book full of much curious information that should help Western readers to realise how widely different from our own are the processes of thought of the Japanese mind, but if he had resisted, just occasionally, the tendency to depreciate, his book would have been both more valuable and more convincing. No country in the world can match the 250 years of profound peace that Japan enjoyed up to the middle of the nineteenth century. But in his remarks about this period Dr. Young does not fail to expatiate on the outlet that the Japanese found for their homicidal proclivities and the method they adopted to alleviate the suppressed blood-lust. The chapter on head-hunting provides an opportunity for some lurid stories and for suggesting a comparison with the savages of Formosa and elsewhere, but the argument that head-hunting began in Japan has little evidence to support it.

Mr. Morgan Young explains that his study is mainly concerned with religious beliefs and observances, and his thesis is that Japan has won her way to the top by means of a religion destitute of moral content. Shintoism and the Emperor cult may be strange growths according to English ideas, but the Imperial Rescript on Education (p. 137) is none the less a noble document and not at all a fit subject for derision. In fact, just as extremism in any form is liable to have a reverse effect to that intended, so will this book incline many people to believe that there is more to be said for the Japanese than they would otherwise have been inclined to allow. J. T. PRATT.

140*. THE DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN. By Kenneth Scott Latourette. 4th edition revised. 1938. (New York and London: Macmillan. 8vo. xi + 272 pp. 10*s*. 6*d*.)

THE fourth edition, extensively revised and brought up to date, of this unpretentious volume should be welcome. It is comprehensive, conveniently arranged, moderate in tone, free from prejudice on the one hand and from sentiment on the other.

The scope of the work, as defined by the author, has been "to give an introductory chapter on the geographic setting, followed by a succinct narrative of the nation's history to the time of Commodore Perry." There follows a more detailed account of Western contacts and the abrupt transformation of Japanese civilisation together with a survey of the problems and the progress of New Japan. Thus, the book does not claim to be much more than a summary, and is historical rather than speculative. It should prove useful both for reference and as an introduction to the study of Japan both old and new.

There is a carefully selected and very well-arranged bibliography, which, in itself, is not the least valuable part of the work.

GRACE JAMES.

141*. LABOUR CONDITIONS IN INDO-CHINA. [*International Labour Office Studies and Reports, Series B., No. 26.*] 1938. (Geneva: International Labour Office; London: P. S. King. 8vo. vii + 331 pp. 7*s*. 6*d*.)

THIS outstanding book, which holds the kernel of many a drama, has all the lucidity of M. Jean Goudal's original French. In it the International Labour Office summarises the results of ten years of research in this "ancient agricultural country," where the French have for generations striven to introduce "modern methods of

industrial organisation." This is the story of the little man at home, from birth to death.

During late pregnancy no woman may be employed, except on light work. After confinement she has a month's rest with pay, and for the first two months whilst nursing a child she may again not be employed except on light work.

In undertakings of more than fifty women the employer may be compelled to maintain a crêche, where the children are cared for whilst the mothers work. Where a woman has children, the free ration of dry rice is increased for them. To protect the worker against beri-beri, the rice is not wholly husked. The daily ration includes meat or fish, and vegetables.

In 1933 a woman was paid 0·18 and a man 0·24 piastre a day on a European industrial undertaking. In the mines of Tonkin a labourer might get nearly a third of a piastre, whilst in skilled trades a man two-thirds and a woman's fourth in the north rose to 1·25 piastres in the Saigon district.

In the country the worker's house is made of mud or wood, covered with thatch, his clothes cotton or silk, simply cut, the utensils few and the furniture rudimentary. Home-made bamboo coats keep off the rain, and hats of latania the sun. Many workers make their tools. Tradition runs through life, the clothes, the tools, the patterns, the customs.

Decrees safeguard the employed worker's health. Thanks to the Pasteur Institute, the malaria mortality rate in Southern Indo-China fell from 5·4 per cent. in 1927 to 2·09 in 1931 and to half of that in the first half of 1932. Amongst plantation workers the death-rate fell from 5·4 per cent. in 1927 to 2·32 in 1930, but the rates apply to persons in the prime of life, of good constitution, and are high. It must console everyone to know that the employer must supply a coffin and bury the worker.

The story of the perennial battle against usury, which tells of loans at the rate of 3 per cent. per day and the wiles of the moneylender, be he Annamite or Indian chetty, fascinating though it be to the reader, must be puzzling to the unlettered native.

A perhaps too-hasty reading shows no trace of the simple Moi, who needs protection from the sophisticated Annamite. The index is scanty. None the less, our thanks are due once more to the I.L.O. for an important work. H. SCOTT TUCKER.

142. MANDSCHUKUO: Führer durch die mandschurische Wirtschaft. By Dr. Kiyoshi Kato. 1937. (Königsberg: Ost Europa Verlag. 8vo. vi + 79 pp.)

THIS handbook on Manchukuo by Dr. Kiyoshi Kato, the Trade Commissioner of that country in Berlin, gives a concise account, with numerous official statistics, of progress in agriculture, industry, finance, and commerce between 1932 and 1936. Among the tables at the end is included the text of the trade agreement concluded in 1936 between Germany and Manchukuo, and Dr. Kato's book is doubtless intended to help in the closer trade relations which the agreement was intended to produce. The foreign trade figures (pp. 38–41) show that the balance of trade was much against Germany, which in 1936 took 8·3 per cent. of Manchukuo's exports and supplied 1·9 per cent. of its imports, in contrast to the United States, which had a favourable balance of trade with Manchukuo. However, this is made up by Germany's trade with

Japan, so that the trade of Germany with the Japan-Manchukuo bloc is in her favour.
F. C. JONES.

143*. CHINA FIGHTS BACK: An American Woman with the Eighth Route Army. By Agnes Smedley. 1938. (London: Gollancz. 8vo. 286 pp. 7s. 6d.)

IT is easier to be enthusiastic about Miss Agnes Smedley's indomitable courage in writing this record as an invalid carried in the wake of the Chinese forces on a stretcher than to be quite convinced that her impressionism is an accurate guide to the course of the operations which she attempts to describe. She has long earned the respect of her critics as well as the affection of her protégés by her sincerity even when it seems to have subordinated fact to emotion. There is no reason to doubt the psychological strength of the organisation which the Eighth Route Army has managed to create in stirring the national consciousness of the people and bracing their sinews to resist invasion. It would be more satisfactory if Miss Smedley could give specific reasons for suggesting that the resistance in military terms means more than a gallant gesture by rightly outraged but ill-equipped guerrilla bands. The value of her personal record lies in its revelation of the spirit of the Chinese whom Japanese might has so carelessly challenged. A remarkable document is the account of a conversation with a wounded Japanese prisoner. If that man's view of the war has any wide support in Japan, the Chinese can indeed declare that resistance, even under the terrible odds accepted, will win. Miss Smedley's quality is good. Whether she is really describing a vital aspect of the war is in question.
R. S.

144. AGRARIAN CHINA: Selected source material from Chinese authors, compiled and translated by the Research Staff of the Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations. With an introduction by R. H. Tawney. 1938. (Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh. London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. xviii + 257 pp. 8s. 6d.)

This book was reviewed in the last issue of *International Affairs* (May–June 1939, p. 453). It should be noted that the publishers of the English edition of the work are, as stated above, Messrs. George Allen and Unwin.

145*. THE NEW SIAM IN THE MAKING: A Survey of the Political Transition in Siam, 1932–1936. By M. Sivaram. 1936. (Bangkok: Stationers Printing Press. 8vo. 168 pp.)

As the author says in his Preface, this little work is not a complete history of the political revolution in Siam, but a news reporter's survey of the main events connected with the transition in Siam from an absolute Monarchy to a constitutional form of government.

The author gives a spirited description of the *coup d'état* of June 24th, 1932, when, during the absence of the King from Bangkok, the People's Party, aided by the military, seized the Throne-Hall, took into custody the chief Princes of the Realm, and later presented the King with a demand for a constitutional Monarchy.

The author writes from the point of view of a supporter of the People's Party, but he is not unduly biased and, as far as his knowledge goes, gives a fair account of the problems awaiting the Siam of to-day.

At the end is a copy of the Constitution of Siam.

R. LE MAY.

THE UNITED STATES

146*. Politique Extérieure des États-Unis des Lois de Neutralité à la Conférence de Lima. By Alfred Max. Preface by M. André Siegfried. (Publication Centre d'Études de Politique Étrangère, Section d'Information, No. 11.) 1939. (Paris: Paul Hartmann, for the Centre d'Études. 8vo. 180 pp. 15 *frs*.)

The French counterpart of Chatham House has an admirable series of brief monographs on various subjects of foreign affairs. The present work has 174 pages and deals particularly with the Lima Conference of 1938, but it has a considerably wider scope than this and comprehends the years 1933–9. M. André Siegfried writes a brief explanatory introduction in his well-known succinct and telling style. There is also a short recapitulation of the historic evolution of the neutrality of the United States.

Scholars will find particularly useful the section on the rivalry between Congress and President; and still more the section on the effect which the Sino-Japanese conflict has had in modifying the attitude of American politicians to neutrality and their conception of what American neutrality should be. Events in Europe come within the view of the author, and also the resignation of Mr. Eden, which M. Max thinks had a detrimental effect on British-American collaboration. Mr. Roosevelt's attitude and actions during the crisis of Czechoslovakia in September 1938 are analysed, but he is not considered to be responsible for the kind of conference *à quatre* which for the time being settled the Czechoslovak question. The conclusion contains interesting comments on American politics in regard to foreign policy.

R. B. Mowat.

147. Our Maginot Line. The Defense of the Americas. By Livingstone Hartley. 1939. (New York: Carrick and Evans. 8vo. 315 pp. $2.75.)

148. Blood is Cheaper than Water. The Prudent American's Guide to Peace and War. By Quincy Howe. 1939. (New York: Simon & Schuster. 8vo. 223 pp. $2.)

These tracts for the times are, in a sense, complementary or, to put it more exactly, Mr. Hartley's tract is an example of a kind of argument that Mr. Howe denounces. Both have in common the handicap of having been written before Mr. Chamberlain abandoned appeasement and turned to building up a front of resistance. Both writers, reacting in different ways to the results of Munich, are more or less agreed in suspecting that the Western Powers cannot or will not effectively resist. They both think, therefore, that the United States must take careful stock of her new position. This position, as Mr. Hartley sees it, is governed by the fact that America cannot rely on the British fleet to secure her Atlantic front-door or on Great Britain and France to hold such keys to that front door as Freetown or to the American back door as the Marquesas. For Mr. Howe, the problem takes another form; in this time of the breaking of nations and empires, if America is going to play an active part (and Mr. Howe is resigned to that), she should at least make sure that if she is going to play the game of power politics, she should play for her own hand and get what there is to be got out of empire-building, and avoid being involved in a war merely to preserve the *status quo*. Both writers

would claim to be realists. Mr. Hartley is an acute student of military problems who believes that a Franco-British defeat would impose on America very serious burdens. The United States could not permit Germany to occupy the Caribbean possessions of France and Great Britain or the Pacific possessions of France for simple reasons of geographical strategy. At the least, that is to say, America would have to snatch some of the fruits of victory away from under the noses of the Axis. Better than this desperate last-minute gamble would be aid to Great Britain and France, not indeed the despatch of a large army, but the use of the navy, the air force and the immense industrial resources of the country to avoid that totalitarian victory which would seriously menace American security. These fears Mr. Howe thinks groundless, but he is so convinced that the mixed regiments of the war party in America will defeat the equally mixed but less well-led regiments of the peace party, that the real question is not what will bring America into war, but what she will get out of it. Mr. Hartley compares Great Britain to Joe Palooka; Mr. Howe is more like Joe Louis than Joe Palooka, and, like the Black Bomber, his punch when it lands is deadly, but, again like the champion, he sometimes misses. In what form, for example, is the £100 million contributed by India each year to the cost of the Royal Navy paid? How is it disguised? But if Mr. Howe's hard-boiledness is overdone, his vivacity of style and his acuteness of eye enable him to score a good many points, not all of them merely debating points. D. W. BROGAN.

149. AMERICA AGAINST AGGRESSORS. A verbatim report of an address entitled, "The Spirit of International Law," delivered by Cordell Hull, U.S.A. Secretary of State, to the Tennessee Bar Association, on Friday, June 3rd, 1938. [*Platform Pamphlets No.* 2.] 1938. (London: Peace Book Co., Ltd. 8vo. 16 pp. 3*d*.)

ERRATA

1. The footnote to the translation of General Faucher's address at Chatham House on "Some Recollections of Czecho-Slovakia" (page 343 in the May–June 1939 issue of *International Affairs*) referred to the fact that General Faucher had spoken "before the annexation of Czecho-Slovakia by Germany in March, 1939."

This should have read: "before the Proclamation by Herr Hitler on March 16th, 1939, announcing that Czecho-Slovakia had ceased to exist and that a Protectorate of the German Reich had been established to be known as the 'Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia' and the signature on March 18th, 1939, of a treaty between Germany and Slovakia providing that the 'political independence of the Slovak State and the integrity of its territory would be protected by Germany.'"

2. In the review of "Some Australians Take Stock," number 64 in the last issue of *International Affairs* (May–June 1939), page 426, line 19, the word "conviction" should read "convictism."

JAPAN IN CHINA[1]

CHRISTOPHER CHANCELLOR

FOUR years ago almost to a day, on June 19th, 1935, I was privileged to speak at Chatham House on exactly the same subject as to-night. Japan was trying then, by threatening the use of force, to procure a re-orientation of Chinese internal politics which might enable her peacefully to attain the strategic and economic objectives which comprised her China policy. There was talk at that time of a British initiative to extend financial assistance to China. I offered an explanation for the bitterness of Japan's reaction to this initiative. I suggested that Japan was mortally afraid of uncontrolled industrial growth in China, and that a fundamental factor in Japanese policy was fear of competition from a modernised industrial China. I said it was possible that Japan might prefer to retard China's economic growth rather than allow her, assisted by the West, to develop along lines which would conflict with Japan's vital interests.

During the months which followed the retreat of the Chinese armies from Shanghai many of us used to wonder what conceivably could be the advantage to anyone, particularly to Japan, of the wholesale destruction by the Japanese army of everything, factories and buildings, which lay in its path. For instance, there was even quite an extensive destruction of agricultural implements in the Nanking region. But this became intelligible on the assumption that Japan's objective in China was a dual one, constructive in the north and destructive in the Yangtse Valley. In North China Japan wanted to develop and control sources of raw materials, coal, iron and particularly cotton. In the Yangtse campaign, which Japan found herself drawn into without any previous plan, the policy was at first purely destructive. The Chinese "scorched-earth" policy of destroying everything before the advancing Japanese army was at least a logical policy. It seemed strange, however, to us to watch the Japanese adding fuel to the Chinese fires which aimed at preventing them from exploiting their victory.

[1] Address given at Chatham House on June 20th, 1939; Lieut.-Col. Sir John Chancellor, G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., D.S.O., in the Chair.

The Japanese army has now overrun a vast part of China; but it does not occupy a defined tract of country with geographical boundaries. As soon as Japan came south of the Great Wall she met this great difficulty: that there were no natural frontiers against which she could establish herself. China is so huge that it is extraordinarily difficult for the Japanese army to insulate the so-called occupied territory from the territory which is still Chinese. For example, I was in Hankow last summer when General Lu Chung-lin left to take up his duties as Chiang Kai-Shek's new governor in the province of Hopei, the province where Pekin and Tientsin are situated. I saw General Lu being given a dramatic send-off on setting out to take up his post right inside territory which the Japanese had "conquered" a year before—and he got through. The Japanese-occupied territory, I think, can be best described as the railways, the roads, the principal strategic and commercial centres and most of the coastal and river ports in China's richest and most accessible provinces. After the fall of Hankow there ceased to be a front in the accepted sense. If you told somebody in China that you were off to the front, he would have to guess a great many times before he found out where you were going.

Broadly speaking, the occupation of Hankow marked the end of the Japanese formal offensive. There was no purpose in plunging on into the heart of China. There was no military objective which would justify further sacrifices of men and material. Having seen both the Chinese and Japanese armies at close quarters, I have little hesitation in saying that the Japanese army could go where it wished in China, even to Chungking, if it chose to make the necessary effort and to obtain the necessary reinforcements from Japan. I believe I am right in saying that nobody outside the Japanese General Staff knows exactly how many troops are in China to-day. Sailings from Japan are kept very secret, and as the units are constantly moved about from place to place in China, it is almost impossible to keep track of them. Personally I am inclined to think that there are less Japanese troops in China than most people believe. The commonly stated figure is about eight hundred thousand troops south of the Great Wall. I think possibly five hundred thousand would be nearer the mark. But however that may be, the Japanese army is spread very thin over a huge area; in places it would be spread disastrously thin if the Chinese were militarily a little more efficient. Without enlarging their forces I doubt whether the Japanese could greatly enlarge the scope of their military opera-

tions; in fact, after watching the trend of events in China since the end of last year, I believe they will have to bring over substantial reinforcements from Japan in order to carry on the work of pacification. But the main disposition of the Japanese army in China seems likely to remain in general as it is to-day. Japan realises that she may not be able to destroy Chiang Kai-Shek (one of her announced war aims); but she hopes that if her army remains in occupation of everything that hitherto has been regarded as of economic value in China, the picture will gradually alter in her favour—that Chinese of the better type will associate themselves with the "puppet" administrations and that the prestige and authority of Chungking will steadily decline. To promote this process, while the army devotes itself to the task of pacification in the occupied areas, the Japanese air arm will continue systematically and indiscriminately to raid Chinese territory, a daily terror from the skies, designed to weaken the resources, communications and morale of the Chinese Government. A few months ago the Chinese in Chungking entertained the pathetically optimistic hope that the Szechuenese clouds would make major air raids impossible. A clear sky is a rarity in Chungking; the Chinese have a saying that "when the sun comes out in Szechuen the dogs bark." But, as we have recently seen, this optimism was delusion.

Now, the Chinese themselves always said that the fall of Hankow would mark a fundamental change in the character of the campaign. Positional warfare would be replaced by guerilla operations conducted against Japan's scattered garrisons and extended communications. The Chinese at last came to realise that they could never defeat Japan in the orthodox military sense. They are too deficient in equipment, capacity for organisation, generalship and knowledge of the science of warfare. All that they now hope to do is to keep themselves together as a political reality in the Western Provinces of China and to harass the Japanese army of occupation over a wide enough area and for a long enough time to prevent it from exploiting its conquests. This, then, is a test of endurance in which all kinds of factors other than military factors are involved.

The Japanese army, enormously extended as it is, ought to be very vulnerable indeed to guerilla tactics. Yet the Chinese guerillas so far have fallen sadly short of expectations. Of course evidence is difficult to collect, as foreigners are mostly confined to the treaty ports and the Japanese permit no one to move about freely in the occupied zones. You cannot rely at all on either

Chinese or Japanese reports, although in justice I think I ought to add that throughout the conflict we have found that on the whole the Chinese reports are nearer the truth than the Japanese reports. As regards the guerillas, one's only accurate information comes from the missionaries, who, with tremendous gallantry, remain at their posts in the interior, and from whom, through devious channels, reports trickle in. It is impossible to give an accurate general picture, because guerilla activities vary so much in different parts of the country. This is not surprising when you consider what is covered by the term guerilla. Guerillas may be anything from regular military units in communication with Chungking by wireless to just plain bandits exploiting the general situation. In some areas the guerillas have shown an unfortunate disposition to let things slide, preferring to live off the villages within their domain, rather than raid Japanese outposts. The efforts to destroy bridges and railway embankments have often been miserably inadequate owing to lack of technical knowledge and supplies of dynamite. One day last summer at the Hungjao aerodrome, just outside Shanghai, which is near my own house, the guerillas staged a raid. The small Japanese post had been withdrawn from the aerodrome about two nights before, and just before sunrise we were woken up by a tremendous noise of machine-gun firing. The guerillas then dashed on to the aerodrome, pulled down the Japanese flag, put up the Kuomintang flag—and bolted. One unlucky old Chinese gentleman walking out early in the fields was killed. I only relate this episode because it is typical of quite a lot of activity which goes under the rather impressive title of guerilla operations. The truth is that China needs a battalion of T. E. Lawrences. I think I should qualify this picture a little by adding that in Chungking there is a very general realisation of the shortcomings of the guerillas. Plans are stated to be under way for bolstering them up by distributing regular Chinese units about the occupied territory, and further attempts are to be made at co-ordination. Recently there has been a resurgence of irregular fighting round Canton, in the Hangchow sector and in North China.

Nevertheless I think it is essential to reserve judgment on this question of the guerillas. One can only say that up to the present the Chinese have not shown themselves capable of conducting a guerilla type of warfare on a scale which can materially affect the military *status quo*. To do this it would be necessary for the Chinese to kill many more Japanese than they do. Here again I tread in the shadows, because no one knows exactly how many

Japanese have been killed. My friend, the Soviet councillor, whom I saw in March in Peking, told me that he had special information to the effect that the Chinese were killing eight hundred and sixty Japanese every day. I do not know how he arrived at this oddly precise figure; but I am quite sure that it was generous to the Chinese. But if we have to discount the guerillas as a military factor, we can nevertheless count them as a very important element in the long-term endurance test. Even if militarily they do not become much more effective than at present, they can make it exceedingly difficult for the Japanese army to settle down and get on with the work of exploiting the occupied territory.

I have sometimes felt, when viewing the unattractive results, that there might be a little less nocturnal chopping off of heads of Chinese puppet policemen and a little more bona-fide shooting at Japanese soldiers. But of course decapitation has a value if carried out on a big enough scale, and Chungking is determined to press forward with this business of "bumping off the puppets." In this enterprise it has been already quite successful. At the time when the so-called Reformed Government was launched by the Japanese in Nanking, I remember an American-registered Chinese newspaper in Shanghai came out with the headline: "A new litter of puppets." At the current rate of puppet mortality further deliveries will become increasingly difficult. This question of "bumping off the puppets" was, of course, the actual *casus belli* in Tientsin. The four Chinese gangsters whom we refused to hand over, were believed by the Japanese to be concerned in the killing in the British Concession of a Mr. Chen who had been working for them.

The Chinese have shown a disposition to take advantage of the comparative safety of the foreign Concessions in conducting their war of assassination. A considerable number of small fry among the puppets were killed in this way in Shanghai last year. Finally, early this year Mr. Chen-lo, Foreign Minister in the Nanking Reformed Government, was shot dead in his house on a road on the outskirts of the International Settlement. Things became very tense in Shanghai. We all felt that the pot was very nearly boiling over, and many of us thought that the Japanese were going to enter the Settlement. A number of urgent telegrams were sent to Chiang Kai-shek by leading Chinese residents entreating him to confine this activity to territory outside the foreign-administered areas. The crisis passed, and, to the general relief, the epidemic of assassinations in Shanghai ceased, at any rate

for the time being. In considering this question it has to be remembered that the handful of foreign troops guarding certain sections of Shanghai constitute a protection for the lives and property of about 3 million Chinese who would otherwise be at the mercy of the Japanese army.

The mere existence of the guerillas, therefore, makes it extremely difficult for the Japanese army to start the constructive side of its operations. This has become especially apparent in North China, where the principal fruits of conquest were to take the form of bulk shipments of cotton to Japan. Last February, with the approach of the cotton-planting season, the Japanese executed a series of drives into Hopei Province. This effort was superficially successful. The Japanese columns occupied their objectives without much difficulty, and the guerilla bands dispersed in front of them. But the Japanese could do no more than garrison the towns, while at night their dominion extended no farther than their sentry-posts. The guerillas compelled the farmers to cultivate food-crops instead of cotton. It will be extraordinarily difficult for the Japanese to obtain real control over the countryside, short of maintaining an enormous army of occupation over a very long period. Particularly cruel reprisals are taken against the villagers in the guerilla areas. But this only adds to the general impoverishment of the country. The Japanese army cannot possibly occupy every village. As soon as they move away from a district the guerillas close in again. The condition of the farmers is absolutely desperate all over China. In North China the situation in the countryside is one of increasing anarchy.

The general picture, then, of Japan in China is one of an army which has tried to occupy more territory than it is able effectively to control, striving to "cash in" on its adventure, exasperated because the material rewards of conquest seem to elude its grasp and followed by a vast horde of camp followers, out for booty, representing all that is least attractive in Japan. So far the Japanese army has not been able to settle down. It feels insecure and rather unsure of itself. In the night Japanese sentries, scattered up and down China, fire off their rifles in the darkness in order to keep up their spirits.

I will give you some sort of picture of this Japanese army in China as I have seen it myself. As regards the campaign in the Yangtse, I can say without any hesitation that it would be almost impossible to exaggerate the cruelty of the Japanese army in its

treatment of the Chinese civilian population. I have no time to describe what happened during the weeks following the occupation of Nanking. I have a great friend, a Japanese of the very finest type, who went to Nanking from Shanghai six weeks after the occupation. He told me that he would never forget as long as he lived the awful spectacle of wholesale murder and pillage that he saw there. He described to me the scene when General Matsui, the Japanese Commander-in-Chief, called together his commanders (including a Prince of the Royal House) on the steps of the Sun Yat-sen Monument at the Purple Mountain. For half an hour he harangued them. He told them that what had happened in Nanking would be a permanent stain on the honour of the Japanese army, and that they should all feel everlasting shame. Nevertheless this process of murder and pillage continued right up the Yangtse Valley.

I have many memories of this period. Once I acted as chauffeur to Father Jacqinot, the Jesuit priest, who is a very well-known figure in China. He asked me to take him to see some French mission property in Sungkiang, a small town about thirty miles south of Shanghai. I drove him along the Hangchow road down which, three or four weeks earlier, the Japanese army had pursued the retreating Chinese. Old men and young boys had been forced to carry burdens far beyond their strength. We passed their bodies on the roadside bayoneted by their conquerors where they had fallen from exhaustion. We passed the graves of Chinese farmers which had been broken open : skeletons were displayed grotesquely at the side of the road. There was an endless vista of blackened ruins of farms and villages. The whole thirty-mile journey through country normally densely populated was like a journey through a desert. Crops lay rotting in the fields as far as the eye could see. Sungkiang itself, once a thriving walled city (incidentally the original headquarters of General Gordon's " ever-victorious army "), was a scene of indescribable desolation. Acres of buildings were laid waste, and the only visible living creatures were bands of dogs gorging themselves on the corpses. On our way back to Shanghai we met the Japanese army—an artillery unit returning from the direction of Hangchow. It made the most extraordinary appearance. Gun-limbers were loaded with loot : clocks, furniture, rolls of silk—everything you can think of. Rickshaws were hitched on behind cavalry horses piled up with trunks and suitcases. Japanese soldiers, with live chickens strapped to their belts, were riding on donkeys, cows, and even water-buffaloes which they had got in from the farms.

We saw foraging-parties sent out all over the countryside to comb the farms and villages for loot. They stripped the farms of everything they had, alive or dead, and then set fire to them. We stopped on our way back to Shanghai, fifteen miles out, at a Catholic mission. It was simply packed with women and girls seeking refuge from the Japanese army. I went back there again with Father Jacqinot about three months later. The mission was then besieged by Chinese peasants trying to get their daughters kept in a place of safety; but there was no more room, and the kindly Fathers had to turn them away. I have given you this personal description because I think it constitutes a more vivid picture than quotations from reports and statistics compiled by other people. What I have described was only a very small example of a state of affairs which existed all the way between Shanghai and Nanking, and beyond. I have looked up a telegram which I sent to *Reuters* about this time, in December 1937. After referring to various reports coming into Shanghai, I wrote: "What is happening in the densely populated delta between Shanghai and Nanking may one day be described as one of the greatest mass migrations in history. No one is able to answer the question: What is happening to the hundreds of thousands, or rather millions, of Chinese who have disappeared from this area. A huge number have been killed. A never-ceasing stream of refugees is fleeing up the Yangtse before the terror of the Japanese army."

I feel that people here have never fully realised the magnitude of the horror of this Yangtse campaign. The death and destruction in six months must have far exceeded the eleven-year ravages in the same area of the Tai Ping rebellion three-quarters of a century before.

In North China the Japanese campaign was conducted less ruthlessly. This may partly be explained, as I suggested earlier, by the fact that in the north there was a constructive policy, whereas in the Yangtse the first objective was to destroy. Also treatment of the civilian population has varied very much in accordance with the resistance put up by the Chinese troops. There has been an extraordinarily primitive element about the Japanese campaign. Japanese officers often talk about "punishing" the Chinese, those wicked Chinese so evilly disposed as to resist the Japanese army, yet so remarkably inferior that "one Japanese soldier is worth at least a thousand Chinese." Of course this punishment, so brutally administered, is for the most part visited upon the utterly defenceless Chinese farmers.

As to the Japanese army in the field, I think it is true to say that in organisation, supplies, transport and staff work generally it is quite an efficient machine. But in just those features where one would have expected it to be pre-eminent there has been a notable deficiency. I refer to the discipline and morale of the troops themselves. All the observers with whom I have spoken agree that, compared with the period of the Russo-Japanese War, there has been a very striking deterioration. This may partly be explained by the fact that there is no longer an officer class in Japan. The old Samurai warrior's code of decency and fair-play is fast disappearing; moreover, compared with our own or with continental armies, the Japanese army is very much under-officered. This is important with an army so widely extended as the Japanese army is in China. A great deal is left to the N.C.Os. As regards morale it has become apparent to all of us that the Japanese soldier dislikes being killed just as much as anyone else; and he seems to stand up indifferently to punishment. When I am informed, as I very frequently am, that Japanese soldiers are as " brave as lions," I cannot help remembering what I saw myself during the famous victory parade in Shanghai in December 1937. When the Japanese troops marched down the Nanking road, a little hand-made bomb, which killed nobody, was thrown at them. Half a battalion broke ranks and bolted for shelter into side-alleys and shop doorways. Several rifles went off at random. It took about twenty minutes before these highly-strung warriors could be reformed and the march continued.

As to the Chinese army, to call it an efficient machine would be a crude travesty of truth. In organisation, staff work, leadership, medical service, knowledge of the science of warfare and skill in the use of its implements there has been a terrible deficiency. One of the German military advisers whom I saw in Hankow in August of last year told me how at the Matang boom, which was supposed to be the strongest point on the Yangtse between Nanking and Shanghai, the best of the Chinese artillery was thrown away. The Chinese gunners were told by their officers that on no account were they to open fire without orders. When the Japanese landed from the river and proceeded to advance, the Chinese gunners tried to telephone for orders to their officers, who were at Kuikiang, several miles in the rear. But the officers were having a good time in the tea-houses of Kuikiang and could not be disturbed. The result was that China's best field-guns were captured without a shot being fired.

Last summer I asked a Chinese soldier, who was at the front

outside Hankow, what he thought of the Japanese soldiers against whom he was fighting. He replied: "Why, they are a lot of cowards." I asked him why he thought so, and he said: "They must be cowards, because whenever they go into battle they have to have their officers with them." Not so the Chinese soldier, who, however, for toughness, endurance and complete lack of nerves is really more than a match for his Japanese antagonist. With miserable leadership, poor equipment, utter inequality in armament, callously sacrificed by the incompetence and indifference of his officers, left like a dog to die of his wounds unless he can drag himself from the battle zone, the Chinese common soldier has been a remarkable and rather inspiring phenomenon. The Japanese have had continuous command of the air and overwhelming preponderance in artillery and tanks. But with the Chinese it is not so much a question of deficiency in armaments as of incompetence in their use. The Japanese once announced at Shanghai (and I think this might have been true) that they had captured a Chinese tank and discovered inside it the driver, his wife, and four small children.

There has been a certain amount of criticism of Japanese strategy and tactics. It is true that by underestimating their opponents the Japanese have made mistakes; notably when General Itagaki's division was isolated at Taierchwang in March 1938. The chief criticism is that the Japanese have consistently tried to gain their objectives with insufficient troops, and that almost every stage of the campaign has been needlessly protracted. The Japanese are bad improvisers. In their campaign in China they have been faced with a gigantic task of improvisation. They never intended to go so far into China. They have had to adapt themselves at various stages to a much more extended campaign than they had originally contemplated. Another point to remember is that, all through the campaign, the Japanese have tried to gain their objectives with the minimum of casualties. The infantry would not move forward until the Chinese had been blasted out of their positions by days and often weeks of intensive artillery and aerial bombardment. This made progress slow. I think it is possible that the Japanese would have been wiser if they had risked heavier losses in order to speed up the campaign. But delay gave the Chinese time to pull themselves together after each successive withdrawal, while every month of prolonged hostilities promoted the growth of chaos in the regions which the Japanese intended to exploit.

As to the actual conduct of the war, we must remember that

our own standards do not apply. Generally speaking, prisoners are taken by neither side. This is an Oriental war fought according to Oriental standards. In my work as a *Reuter* correspondent I have tried, I fear not always successfully, to keep my own emotions from becoming involved. One is sometimes too much inclined to see things through the haze of one's own feelings and to imagine that the Chinese feel in the same way as one feels oneself. But the Chinese are a hard-boiled and unsentimental race. To us the awful plight of the country people, the fate of the wounded soldiers, the daily horror of the air raids on packed, defenceless towns sometimes seems more than we can bear. But this is not so with the Chinese. This is part of their strength, this emotional detachment and indifference to human suffering. It is one of the most important reasons why the continuous, merciless bombing does not break down Chinese morale.

Now I am going to make a digression about Tientsin. The crisis in Tientsin has been blowing up for a long time. I was there myself last March, and I saw the famous " live-wire " which the Japanese had stretched round the British and French Concessions. At that time it had not been put into operation; but on one or two occasions the current had been passed through it to test the circuit. One or two old Chinese men and a few donkeys had been killed as a result of incautiously leaning against it. There was a most unpleasant feeling in Tientsin even at that time. I came away feeling extremely sorry for that very resolute British community, living even then in a sort of concentration camp, subjected to humiliating treatment at the hands of the Japanese army whenever they went outside the narrow confines of the Concession, and watching the trade on which their living depended being relentlessly circumscribed and curtailed. Tientsin is very much an outpost community. In Shanghai, of course, the problems are very similar; but the foreigners are not so much at the mercy of the Japanese army. One reason for this is that the United States has a legal share in Shanghai's International Settlement and takes part in the Administration. Japan is extremely anxious to avoid provoking the United States.

There has been friction, both in Tientsin and Shanghai, between the Japanese army and the foreign authorities over the question of dealing with Chinese suspects of political activities behind the protection of foreign-controlled areas. This is a very difficult question. The Japanese, having decided that it suited them better to wage war without declaring it, nevertheless find it impossible to forgive us for not behaving as if they have. They

feel entitled to take over all the rights of the Chinese Government in connection with the foreign Concessions on the ground that their troops have conquered the surrounding country. But, while the Japanese army claims to be the heir to certain Chinese rights by virtue of its military conquests, it is by no means easy to define exactly what this inheritance is. Also it was one matter to allow certain customs to develop as part of a policy directed towards ultimate rendition of the concessions to an independent Chinese government, and quite another to allow the Japanese army, or its puppet nominees, to start in exactly where the Kuomintang left off. In actual practice, with the full understanding of all reasonable members of the Chinese communities who live in the midst of Japanese-occupied territory, under the protection of the foreign administrations, realities have been faced and common-sense practices have been evolved for dealing with Chinese terrorists. A great deal was done, both in Shanghai and Tientsin, to meet the Japanese view; and, considering the fact that the Japanese insist upon their "puppets" and other disreputable protégés having the full run of the foreign areas, it is tremendously to the credit of the foreign police forces that there has been so little provocation and terrorism in the areas under their jurisdiction.

This question of the four terrorist suspects in Tientsin has rather faded into the background. It is now described as a Japanese "pretext" for raising wider issues. I think "pretext" is not quite the right word. The dispute was genuine enough; but the ice was extremely thin. Japanese resentment against England and against the Tientsin Concessions has steadily been gathering momentum. The blockade of the Concessions has been contemplated for many months. When, as the Japanese military spokesman rather picturesquely put it, the arrow finally left the bowstring, the whole major issue of Japan-in-China *versus* Great Britain-in-China came into the open. In Tientsin this issue centred largely on the currency problem. In North China, where Japan hoped to develop an important source of raw materials for the benefit of her own economy, what I have described as the endurance test assumed the special characteristics of a currency war. The Japanese army made a hasty and rather ill-conceived attempt to introduce a new currency based on the yen to replace the Chinese Government dollar. But as Japan lacked foreign exchange resources to exploit the new currency, and as (thanks in part to British help) the Chinese currency remained freely convertible, nobody wanted the Japanese notes. The Japanese launched themselves upon a currency war to fight which they were

inadequately equipped. They were not strong enough financially to establish this currency on its own merits, and they had not yet obtained sufficient military control over the country to be able to prevent by force the circulation of Chinese notes in the areas theoretically conquered. This currency war has been joined in full force by the Chinese guerillas. The wretched Chinese farmer is in a terrible predicament. If the guerillas find him with Japanese notes, they shoot him. If the Japanese find him with Chinese notes, they shoot him too. In any case, the farmer will not grow more than he requires for his own use unless he can get paid in a currency which he wants. This currency war therefore has tended to strengthen the economic barriers and to curtail the flow of goods between zones where the Japanese military occupation is effective and the vast tracts of country where the guerillas are in command. A floating mass of yen from the unoccupied territory has found its way into the foreign Concessions to be sold on " black " exchange markets at a discount against the Chinese dollar. Also through the foreign Concessions, by devious channels, went a trickle of exports paid for in foreign exchange against Chunking's currency. Thus Japan's blockade of the Concessions is a perfectly logical development. If the Japanese army is to establish its currency in North China, it must close this loophole, and it must take the export trade out of the hands of the British trading interests in Tientsin.

But to understand the hatred shown against the British and the indignities heaped upon them it is necessary to know something of the background. First of all it must be remembered that the foreign areas on Chinese soil were sometimes an obstacle to the Japanese army during military occupations. Chinese troops occasionally developed a taste for clinging to the borders of the foreign areas and bolting inside to be interned when the Japanese pressed them too hard. In this extraordinarily primitive type of warfare, when one really looks forward to bayoneting one's prisoners, this was naturally a constant irritant to the Japanese army. In Japan's resentment against the Concessions, Hong Kong has played a big part. Up to the fall of Canton it was a vital inlet for Chinese arms imports. Hong Kong and Shanghai, the two great ports on the coast of China, tempting spoils eluding Japan's grasp, have played an important rôle in prolonging China's resistance. To the Japanese this must indeed be tantalising. Within or on the edge of territory conquered by the Japanese army there remain these rich enclaves which are a source of profit and a place of refuge for the persons and property

of the Government it is seeking to destroy. The hoarded wealth, the publicity, and the banking and currency structure of the Chinese Government have been sheltered since the outbreak of hostilities in the British colony of Hong Kong, in predominantly British Shanghai and in the Tientsin Concessions. England has been marked down by Japan as Public Enemy Number One. This follows naturally from the fact that British interests and British investments are so much larger than those of any other Power. But from the very early stages we have been deliberately singled out. Increasingly we are becoming the scapegoat for the otherwise unaccountable delay in the appearance of the new order in East Asia. When you consider this background of Japanese resentment against Great Britain-in-China, and when you contemplate this undisciplined, brutalised army, which is fed continuously with violently anti-British propaganda, you can hardly wonder that British subjects in China who are trying to preserve their trading establishments are exposed often to insult and danger. All through the Japanese-occupied territory the gangsters and servile coolies out of whom the puppet governments of the New Order are being fashioned, are instigated against the British. A special anti-British song has been written; and the seedy-looking crowds, periodically herded together for political demonstrations, are made to sing it.

The Anti-Comintern Pact of course plays its part in this process. I have very little doubt that the Japanese are constantly being encouraged to press us as hard as they can; assured by their friends that we shall not retaliate. But actually there has not been as yet very much discrimination in favour of German traders in China. Special facilities have in certain cases been given to Germans in North China; and there have been cases of discrimination which are more irritating than serious such as the supply of electric current to German houses in Hankow and its refusal to British houses in the same district. In practice it is not always easy to distinguish between German and Italian friend and British foe. So a German doctor found to his cost last summer when riding near my own house outside Shanghai. A Japanese soldier attacked him shouting, "You English pig," and nearly poked out one of his eyes with his bayonet.

About a year ago I had the pleasure of accompanying my friend Mr. Peter Fleming, of *The Times*, to Tokio. He is not here to-night, but he has assured me that he will not bring a libel action against me if I tell this story. I had some rather anxious moments with him, especially when he insisted on writing the

word "espionage," as his reason for visiting Japan, on the questionnaire provided by the Japanese police. I got over the difficulty by writing "goodwill mission" as mine. As I have to live in the Far East, whereas he only makes rare excursions there, I insisted that when we got to Tokio we should conduct our interviews separately. Mr. Fleming went to the War Office to see a certain General. As soon as he got there the General began violently attacking "those third Powers" for helping Chiang Kai-shek by supplying arms to Chungking. Mr. Fleming at once replied, "Yes, of course, General, you mean the Germans and the Italians." The General, nettled, said: "No; I mean Great Britain." Whereupon Mr. Fleming said: "But do you realise, General, that Germany and Italy are supplying enormously more arms to China than we are?" The General replied: "Yes, I know that; but that is not the point; the point is the spirit in which these arms are supplied." Mr. Fleming then said: "I now understand what you mean, General. Japan prefers to see a large quantity of arms going to China in the right spirit rather than a few arms going in the wrong spirit." And the General said: "Yes, that is exactly what I mean." So you can see that loyalty to the Axis partnership imposes a considerable strain upon the Japanese military mind. At the same time I had an interview with General Ugaki, who was then Foreign Minister and Deputy Premier. He asked me to speak to him frankly. I talked to him for half an hour about what the Japanese army was doing in China. I told him much of what I had seen; and I suggested that Japan, having embarked upon a gigantic task in China, was not necessarily wise in creating such deep antagonism among neutral Powers. The General listened very patiently: when I had finished he thanked me and said that I had told him many things about the Japanese army in China which were news to him. He then said with great emphasis: "I am afraid these things cannot easily be changed. But I hope you and your English friends will realise that many things are being done in China by the Japanese army without the sanction or approval of the Japanese Government." We all knew that Japan had loosed upon China a machine which was not always under control; but it was interesting to hear this from the lips of so eminent a member of the Japanese Cabinet.

One final word about the general situation in China. I have described it as an endurance test. No one can see how it will end, least of all, I think, the Japanese themselves. I am not

going to attempt to answer the question: can Japan succeed? There are too many imponderables. All that one can say with certainty at the moment is that Japan has not yet succeeded, and that in this endurance test she has gratuitously handicapped herself at the start. It is not a sound policy to destroy, murder and rape on a huge scale in the territory which you intend to conquer and exploit. I have said that the atrocities of the Yangtse campaign were not repeated in the North. Nevertheless, to-day you have Japanese garrisons all over China, ill-treating and terrorising the civilian population. Any Japanese soldier has complete licence to murder, loot and rape at will. This unlimited power of life and death has its effect on discipline and behaviour. In addition to its brutality and indiscipline, a factor handicapping Japan's task of reconstruction is the greed and corruption of her army in China. In the Yangtse, after the orgy of destruction was spent, the Japanese tried to revive economic life by inviting Chinese owners of factories to co-operate in starting them going again. But it soon became perfectly clear that these Chinese would not be allowed any interest at all in the property taken from them by conquest. I think it is possible that, had it not been for the greed and indiscipline of the Japanese army, a certain measure of co-operation in the work of reconstruction might have been obtained from the Chinese moneyed classes. As things are, the Chinese capitalists not unnaturally prefer to hoard their wealth in the foreign Concessions and in Hong Kong.

Summary of Discussion.

SIR JOHN PRATT said that, unlike the lecturer, he had not been in China for fifteen years, but he would like to say something about the Japanese army. The information given concerning the behaviour of its soldiers was amply confirmed by all who had been eye-witnesses in China. Why had the Japanese army sunk to this level? In 1895 during the first Sino-Japanese War, in 1900 at the siege of the Legations in Pekin, when something like eighteen thousand Japanese troops had saved the inhabitants of the Legations from being massacred, in 1905 during the Russo-Japanese War, three occasions when the Japanese Army had fought under the eyes of European observers, they had won golden opinions. They had behaved admirably, especially in Pekin in 1900, when the Japanese army had been a model to the Europeans there at the time. Confirmation of this could be found in a book called *A Staff Officer's Scrapbook*, written by General Sir Ian Hamilton after the Russo-Japanese War, which had covered the Japanese army, both soldiers and officers, with praise. What had been the cause of this extraordinary deterioration? After the Russo-

Japanese War Japan had entered upon the possession of territory on the mainland of Asia, her army had occupied territory inhabited by Chinese, and from this time on she had been engaged in the degrading practice of bullying the native population. The officers of the army, meanwhile, had been engaged in the equally unmilitary task of political intrigue. Between those two things the Japanese army had deteriorated, until now it was covering itself with shame throughout China.

MR. G. E. HUBBARD said that he would dare to venture where the lecturer had feared to tread—into the field of the future. The latter had said that the Sino-Japanese War had developed into a test of endurance. All who were following the situation in the Far East must agree that at the moment the chances of Japan bringing China to her knees by normal military means were very small, so the test of endurance must be of another sort, a test of moral endurance and of economic strength. The former was the more important, and the big question was whether the Chinese could keep going for another eighteen months or two years the type of semi-passive resistance they were putting up and had put up in the so-called occupied areas. The same spirit which sustained the guerilla type of warfare among the Chinese was responsible for preventing the Chinese middle class from throwing in their lot with the Japanese. For the Chinese of this class the likelihood of his being " bumped off " by his compatriots was no doubt a deterrent as well, but from information received from many friends in China, the speaker did think that, apart from the fear of assassination, the majority of the middle class of China were now proving sufficiently patriotic not to ally themselves with the Japanese, although this might be to their individual advantage. It was very difficult to say whether the Chinese morale, the strength of which had surprised all those who had lived in the Far East, would last for another eighteen months or two years, but at least at present it showed no signs of flagging seriously.

Concerning the economic endurance of Japan (leaving aside the eventuality of outside events such as a European War or an armed conflict between Japan and Russia, and supposing the present state almost of deadlock to continue), Japan would be very hard pressed to maintain her half-million troops in China and to keep them supplied. At present she was receiving a very meagre return from the occupied territory. In the first year when she had gone in she had collected a good deal of raw cotton, but much of this (as also of the iron ore) had been lying ready to hand when she had appeared on the scene, and had been carted off wholesale to Japan. Now the stocks had been exhausted, and it was known that the present output of cotton in North China was considerably less than formerly. This was very natural, because a farmer would obviously be averse to growing a crop which was only valuable to him from the point of view of selling, when he had no idea of when or how he would be able to sell it, and he

would naturally prefer to grow something, such as foodstuffs, which he could use himself if everything else "went west." So far as the speaker could judge, Japan had not only as yet received very little out of North China, but was not likely to do so until she could obtain a degree of control over the occupied territory which she seemed unlikely to do as things were. Meanwhile she was getting into a very difficult economic position, because she was having to import vast quantities of raw materials in order to keep her war industries going. This had thrown her balance of trade completely out of gear, and in order to rectify it she had had to draw on her gold reserves, which had diminished by at least half. It was difficult to see what she would do when this was all used up and she still needed foreign currency in order to import raw materials for war purposes.

The only thing which could save her would be if in the meantime her enormous investment in Manchuria began to bear fruit. No less than some two thousand five hundred million yen had been invested in Manchuria in 1931. At the present moment her return on this money was relatively negligible. As it had been sunk mainly in the form of constructive works, such as factories, it was possible that the return would come with a sudden burst, as had happened in the case of the output of military aeroplanes in the British programme of rearmament. But from his information he did not think that the Japanese investment in Manchuria would be likely to fructify fully before about 1941, so that if things went on as they were at present in the Far East, Japan would probably soon find herself in a very difficult position indeed. Probably in about two years' time, or possibly even before then, she would find herself unable to import the raw materials which would be necessary in order to enable her successfully to carry on her war with China and be prepared at the same time for a possible war with Russia.

Concerning China's economic position, it was very difficult to assess it, but she seemed to be less dependent than Japan on her foreign trade balance and on continuous supplies from outside of raw materials. She lived from hand to mouth in a most extraordinary way. She had a comparatively small amount of heavy war equipment, but she depended mainly on rifles, small arms ammunition, bombs and machine guns which she could manufacture herself. As far as could be seen, it would not be difficult for her to keep up her present standard of military equipment and supplies of food for the next two years. This, of course, could only be guesswork, and the drop in the value of the Chinese dollar recently was perhaps rather significant. Should this depreciation continue, China *might* find herself ultimately in the same position as was threatening Japan, unless of course her friends came to her aid more strenuously than they were doing at present. If they had the will, such Powers should be able to supply her with efficient war material on credit. As the lecturer had said, she was obtaining supplies from those very Powers who would normally be her antagonists. Another favourable factor which China did and Japan did not possess was the

great wealth of the Chinese community overseas, in which there was still a very great reservoir of wealth for China. The remittances of money from Chinese in Malaya, the Philippines, America and so forth had been very great indeed, and after two years of war she could still rely a good deal on those resources.

MR. JULIAN PIGGOTT said that, in judging the present Far Eastern situation, we should remember one or two rather important points. Only four or five years ago, before Japan had launched her invasion of China, she had made a very definite offer to Great Britain to consult and discuss the best method of co-operating in the Far East. For reasons which may have been sound at the time, not much attention was paid, and after knocking a great many times at the door of Downing Street, Japan had eventually decided to take matters into her own hands. He ventured to suggest that this was a pity, in view of subsequent happenings.

Concerning current events in Tientsin, we should bear in mind that if one were engaged in a game of poker, one must have something in one's hand. He was not suggesting that we had nothing; we had a fair hand—but whereas we might think we had threes, we might find we only had two pairs and the second pair might possibly not be a pair at all. We had, for example, only two battle fleets, not three, and though our first pair—Great Britain and France—was all right, the other pair—the United States and Russia—might in the end not be a pair at all.

Now, it might be said that British policy in the Far East over the last two years had been to smile amiably at Japan, whilst quietly assisting the Chinese as much as possible. There was a good deal to be said for such a policy—on a short view—on the grounds that the longer the war went on, and the farther the Japanese army penetrated into China, the more difficult would become their economic position. From the point of view of Japan, however, and particularly of the Japanese military commanders in the field, the matter was not likely to be viewed quite in that light. Was it not possibly wise in future for the British Government to follow in the Far East the policy of non-intervention she had done so successfully in Europe?

MRS. ANDERSON said that she had lived in the far West of China for the last twelve years. Concerning the question of China's morale, only half of the Government's interest at present was in the fighting; the other half was in the development of the western provinces. In these they had always known that they had a gold mine, but they were only now exploiting this rich country. There China had tin, coal, iron, silk, sugar, medicines and all manner of things which could be used and developed. There were a great number of experts at work there putting the production of these on a better basis. Each week she received from the Government a news-sheet giving an account of the constructive work going on, and she had confirmation from friends there that these projects were not simply on paper; they were actually

being done. So it was not just a question of China's holding on grimly while she was being smashed to bits. Down on the coast things were being destroyed, but there was compensation in the great piece of creative constructive work going on up-river. As an example, the Government had a plan for getting rid of illiteracy in two years; this involved something like one hundred and ninety million people. She believed this could be done by using the students in the schools and universities. They would be sent into the towns and villages to act as teachers. China was certainly not downhearted. She had seen refugees who had lost everything they had in Mukden and had moved to Nanking to start again; had lost everything there, and had come to Chengtu to start once more. There was no grumbling among them and no defeatist talk. She had asked one of them if he thought China was going to win, and he replied: "If this generation doesn't manage it the next will."

MR. R. T. BARRETT said that he had noticed that the Japanese were beginning to clamour for the rendition of Hong Kong. This was probably the prelude to putting in force against it the measures used in Tientsin. Hong Kong was a much bigger proposition than Tientsin. It was a large British colony with a defensible base and the gateway to South China, at the mouth of the Pearl River. It was the terminus of the Canton-Hankow railway and had a big airport. It was also a tremendous trade centre, and the point where European culture entered China and Chinese culture came out. Great Britain should hold on to it until the very last. If war should come, it must be defended, and every effort must be made to safeguard this important British colony and centre of European culture in the East. If Japan could seize Hong Kong she could close China to the West and pursue her instinctive policy of isolation which she was trying to apply to the Far East.

As an editor in Hong Kong for a long time, he would like to pay tribute to the very fine work done by *Reuters* in that part of the world. When in 1930 the Hong Kong Government had had to cut down their subscription, *Reuters* had risen to the occasion, maintained their news service almost intact, and kept the British point of view well before the East.

MR. CHANCELLOR said, in reply, that the deterioration of the Japanese army in China from the high level which it had maintained in the days of the Boxer rebellion had been a very startling phenomenon. An elderly Chinese gentleman who had been an intermediary at that time had told him that of the foreign armies the American and British troops had been easily the worst behaved, next had come the French and the most impeccable had been the Japanese. He agreed that Japan's projection of her army into China had been responsible for the change; and he considered this to be one of her greatest dangers. She now had a huge army swarming over China, and its return to

Japan could not be visualised within the next ten years at least. In these circumstances its brutalisation and degrading conduct were a very serious factor from the point of view of Japan.

He agreed with everything the second speaker had said. Certainly the Chinese had stood up to their terrible ordeal much better than the foreign resident in China had believed they could do, and there was no sign of their morale breaking at the moment. Air raids were going on daily all over China. Most towns of any size had been bombed, and the destruction was simply appalling, and it would go on day after day, week after week, month after month. Its one purpose was to break down Chinese morale. The towns were not industrial centres nor military objectives, but packed with defenceless unarmed populations. So far these raids had not succeeded. Japan's morale was also very high. He had been in Tokio in March, and the people had seemed, young and old, to be both determined and united. They realised they were up against a very big crisis, and were prepared to make great sacrifices. The standard of living was going down and prices were rising. The country was going through a period of enormous change, both social and economic, and the people were prepared to face great hardships. Many people disagreed with the conduct of the army in China, but they felt they were now in the war and must go through with it. There was no sign whatever of Japanese morale cracking at present. There was no doubt that the economic situation of Japan was getting worse, and that the Japanese were worried about the condition of their foreign exchange. They were cutting down imports, and there was no doubt that they would have to go much further with that process. It was, however, very difficult to assess the exact degree of gravity of the economic situation or how great were the sacrifices that the Japanese people would be prepared to make. Outside factors might change the whole picture; for example, if there was a trade revival in America and she came into the market as a large importer of Japanese goods, this might change the whole situation in the Far East, and enable Japan to acquire the amount of foreign exchange necessary to tide her over her difficulties during the next year or two. So that one could say no more than that the Japanese financial and economic position was unsound and getting weaker.

Referring to Mr. Piggott's points, he said that he knew nothing about the Japanese knocking on the door in Downing Street five years earlier, because he had not been in England at the time.

Secondly, the same speaker had mentioned the game of poker being played by the British in Tientsin, and he had spoken of America and Russia as an uncertain pair of cards. Certainly Russia was an unknown quantity. The Japanese themselves to-day discounted her, and after the affair at Chankuofang last summer they had come to the conclusion that they need not fear her any more, and they had withdrawn a considerable part of their garrison from Manchoukuo. It was these troops who had taken part in the invasion of Canton in October. The Japanese had never feared an attack from Russia,

but a great many of them had wished to attack Russia. Now they realised they had too much on their shoulders in China to be able to risk any further adventure. In the early days of the present war the Japanese garrisons in Manchuria had been against the adventures south of the Great Wall because they had always dreamed of attacking Russia and going to Vladivostock. Now they had given up this idea.

The question of America was quite different. Had it not been for American interests in the Far East, British interests would have suffered a great deal more than they had done, and were it not for America, what had happened in Tientsin would soon happen in Shanghai. There had been a very great change in America during the last eight months. We must not give the impression that we were expecting help from America, and yet we must make it clear that we were ready to stand beside America in any steps she might take in the Far East. This had been the British policy outlined at the Brussels Conference, and it was the only one for us to adopt. The Americans had played an important part in Shanghai and in the crisis at Amoy. Great Britain could follow no policy at present other than the one she was following. Even had we wished to make a deal with the Japanese (and it was now too late for this, although it might have been possible earlier), from the point of view of America it would be fatal. The Far Eastern situation was now definitely linked up with the European situation, and America tended more and more to see Japan as one of the partners in the Axis. The British attitude in the Far East would be judged accordingly, and it would have immediate repercussions on our European position.

After all, Great Britain had really done very little to help China so far. As he had said, Japan chose to wage war without declaring it, and then desired others to behave as if she had. He agreed with Mr. Piggott that the military spokesman in Tientsin had probably gone a good deal farther than the Japanese Government would wish. The Japanese were not feeling at all sure of themselves in China, and although he did not believe in the idea of a conflict between Liberals and extremists in Japan, there were certainly those who wished to go fast and those who wished to go more slowly. He considered that the British Government had been right in dealing cautiously with the Tientsin affair. He had had many unpleasant experiences himself at the hands of the Japanese army. He had had a bayonet pointed at him while his Chinese chauffeur was having his face punched. Many British residents in China had gone through similar experiences; but it was obvious that the British Government must not be stampeded or rushed into a premature conflict with Japan in the Far East. In trying to preserve her interests in the Far East, almost every single one of which was now in territory occupied by the Japanese, Great Britain was inevitably a great irritant to Japan. Nevertheless by bluff, and the resilience and enterprise of the British traders out in China we had managed so far to keep this great industrial and trading structure going.

EUROPE TO-MORROW[1]

COUNT R. N. COUDENHOVE-KALERGI

THE most important thing that has happened in Europe during the past year is the fact that Great Britain has become a European State. The menace of German hegemony convinced British opinion that its fate was linked for life and death with the fate of the Continent, and that if Great Britain did not take the moral lead of Europe, this lead would certainly fall to Germany. That would not only mean a Europe directed against Great Britain, but also the end of European civilisation.

The fact that Great Britain has become a European Power is, therefore, of great importance, because it decides the future of Europe. Briand's efforts in past years for a union of Europe were frustrated by the attitude of Great Britain. Great Britain did not want the Continent to unite without her and, on the other hand, she did not want to link her fate to the fate of the Continent. So the enterprise of Briand failed. Now for the first time Great Britain knows that only if she and France stand together can they counterbalance the 80 million Germans on the Continent. Great Britain cannot, as she did at the time of Napoleon, enter into European politics in a crisis and get out after the crisis is over. She is obliged to stick to Europe because history forces her to do so as the result of a new technical development. The invention of the aeroplane is of the same significance to Great Britain as was the invention of the cannon to Venice. Just as the possibility of Venice being an island ceased with the invention of the cannon, so by the invention of the aeroplane England ceased to be an island from the strategic point of view; and if Venice had understood her destiny after the invention of the cannon, she would have taken the initiative in creating a union of the Italian States and would now be at the head of Italy. She did not understand it. I am glad to see that Great Britain has understood her destiny, and that the policy that she has followed in recent months is a whole-hearted European policy. She decided, together with France, to take the lead in Europe to defend European liberty and to struggle for European liberty

[1] Address given at Chatham House on June 15th, 1939. The Rt. Hon. Alfred Duff Cooper, D.S.O., M.P., in the Chair.

and European peace. She has succeeded and she is going to succeed further.

The great fact that we must face now is that the League of Nations is dead under the attack of the totalitarian States. After the War the League of Nations was established partly with a view to the organisation of the European Continent, which had been split up into thirty-four States. Everyone knew that these thirty-four States in this little European Continent could not remain without any link, that a state of anarchy was quite impossible in Europe, and they hoped that the League of Nations would provide the machinery for the future organisation of the Continent. This hope failed. Now we must face the alternative. Either Europe will revert to anarchy, to permanent wars, and to economic misery, or Europe will find a new means of organisation, a new method of breaking away from anarchy. Technical progress enforces European unity, but it is very doubtful what form this unity will take.

There are two very clear programmes for European union. One is the pan-German programme. It is the programme of Europe under German hegemony. Many Germans hope to unite Europe first by creating a Mittel-Europa, a federation of Germany and the little States of Central and Eastern Europe, a federation in which Germany would play the same part as Prussia played in the German federation of Bismarck. After Germany had organised those 150 millions of Europeans, she would endeavour to force France to join the union, and then she would be strong enough to force England to join this Europe under German hegemony. That is one plan, to be carried out by war or by threat. Another plan is the Soviet plan, under which the European States would become Soviet States and would join the Soviet Union. In the one case it means German hegemony, in the other it means Russian hegemony.

Against these two dangerous European unions we must set up a third ideal, the pan-European ideal. This ideal is a European federation on the basis of equal rights, of national equality, and personal liberty under the moral lead of Great Britain and France. If we look into Europe from inside we see those things that divide the States from each other, antagonisms and hatreds and divisions. But if you look at Europe from outside, with the eyes of a Japanese, a Chinese, an American or a Russian, you will see Europe as a unit. One sees in Europe too much of what divides Europeans and too little of what unites them. If an outsider is going to Europe, he speaks of going to *Europe*. If

Europeans meet in America, they feel as Europeans. But most Europeans who are only living at home ignore this fact; they do not know what a European is. So that one might say that the only people who do not know anything about Europe are the Europeans. And in fact the world moves now under the impulse of technique to huge groups in the whole of the world around Europe.

You see the United States of America, themselves twice as large as Europe, organising the pan-American union that is five times as large as the poor little Continent of Europe. You see the Soviet Union, our neighbour in the East, with an enormous territory, three times as large as the rest of Europe. You see the Far East. It is now in a state of war between Japan and China, but one day this war will end with a system of co-operation between the peoples of the Mongol race, a co-operation that will create a bloc of 600 million Mongols strong enough to set up an army of 30 millions of men, who have the advantage that they do not fear death. That will be the strongest army in the world, and this fact might be realised in one generation. If you see Europe, torn, divided Europe, between those three great blocs, that either exist, or that will exist, its future looks very dark. But everything would change if Europe decided to federate; and I think that the realisation of the fact of this group evolution outside Europe might lead to a federated Europe at the end of the second World War.

We are in the second World War. It began the day that the German troops crossed the Austrian frontier to destroy one of the oldest and most beautiful centres of European civilisation. This war is conducted by different methods, by threats, by propaganda, by armaments, by alliances, but it is none the less war. One day this war will end, and at the end of it we shall see a Europe entirely different from the Europe of pre-war, from the Europe of 1933. We shall see the birth of a new Europe; and as I believe that the war in the Far East will end by a union of the yellow race, it is possible that the second World War will end with the union of the European race. This solution is possible if Great Britain decides to take the leadership of the European union. France has decided to adhere to her policy of European union; nothing has changed in the French programme since the days of Briand. France is waiting until other States are prepared to associate themselves with her great task of uniting Europe. It is indeed her great historic programme. Since the days of Pierre Dubois in the fourteenth century, since Sully,

since the Abbé St. Pierre, until our own day and Briand, the idea of European federation has always been the great objective of French policy, but it can only be achieved if Great Britain takes part in this effort and, jointly with France, undertakes to act as the trustees of the European idea.

The realisation of this fact has become easier than it was, as a result of the great modern renaissance of France. I think that among the many wonders that we have seen in the last year one of the greatest has been the resurrection of France. France seemed to be weak until a few months ago. She had lost a great part of her moral authority, and was considered by many people in Germany and Italy as a small, unimportant nation. Since she restored her finance and re-established her morale France has once again become a world Power. Now the whole nation is united, strong and determined to accomplish its historic mission. With this renewed France Great Britain can lead Europe, can unite it and can save peace.

This moment is of supreme importance, because great historic facts can only be accomplished in dangerous times. If Europe does not seize this moment to unite, the chance may never come again. In the last century Europe twice had a chance to unite. The first time was after the breakdown of Napoleon; the Holy Alliance was then created and proved a failure. The second time was in 1848, when the nations of Europe rose against absolutism. Here the chance was knit up in the ideal of the wonderful genius of Mazzini, but that also failed. I think that the failure was principally due to Napoleon III, who could have become the leader of the movement for Italian liberty, but who preferred to align himself with reaction in Italy. Then in our century we had one great opportunity to unite Europe, after the Great War in 1919. If the European statesmen had wanted to do so, they could have achieved the United States of Europe then; they did not want to do it, and so this great moment was lost.

We are again approaching a moment when history shows the way towards European union. It is a great question whether on that day the statesmen will have enough vision and courage to realise this great aim and to accomplish it. If they do so, European civilisation is saved. If they do not, I fear very much that European civilisation is doomed.

When we speak of uniting Europe we aim at three things. One is the aim of constituting lasting peace in Europe; the second is to create the possibility of European prosperity, and that possibility will not exist until Europe ceases to be divided

into so many little economic States; the third aim is the maintenance of civilisation. We do not want to unite Europe for barbarism. I would prefer a Europe torn and divided into many States rather than a Europe united in the name of barbarism. So we must accomplish not only the union of Europe, but the union of Europe in liberty. That is our great task, and the task can only be accomplished by Great Britain and France.

Now, many of you will say: We admit European federation is necessary, but it is not possible. It is not possible to unite so many States with different languages, different traditions, into a federation. The answer to this question is the fact of Switzerland. Switzerland gives you the proof that European Federation is not only necessary, but that it is possible. Switzerland found an excellent solution of 99 per cent. of all the problems that exist between European States to-day. There you find different languages, different religions, different traditions. You find a number of States which, in the interior, are nearly independent. You find complete co-operation and solidarity; and so it is much better, in thinking of a European union, to accept, so far as possible, the great example of Switzerland in Europe.

Now we are facing the great problem whether or not Europe will emerge from the unbloody war in which we are living without having a bloody war. That is one of the two main problems of present-day European politics. One is the problem of peace, and the other is the problem of liberty. And I say quite frankly that the ideal of liberty is higher than the ideal of peace. All those nations and countries in history who preferred peace to liberty were lost. They lost their liberty and they lost their peace; and all those who put the ideal of liberty above the ideal of peace played decisive parts in history. European liberty can be maintained and peace can be maintained if the powers of liberty are stronger than the powers of barbarism, and there I think that the whole world must be grateful to the great policy of Great Britain, to the policy of the Peace Front, and the policy of armaments and alliances, the policy of defending peace by force. The great decision in Europe will be reached either by arms or by ideas, by a bloody war or by propaganda. The word propaganda is disliked in Great Britain, but in our times it is this struggle of ideas that one calls propaganda. It is a war of ideas, and in this war the democracies ought to be stronger than the tyrants.

In the years of the Great War, the first European war from 1914 to 1918, one thing that decided the war was the Fourteen

Points of President Wilson. The Allies would probably have won the war without those Fourteen Points, but they were spared at least six months of war. I am sure that the German nation would have defended its home behind the Rhine for at least six months more if Wilson had not published his Fourteen Points and, through them, had not given the Germans and the Austrians the idea that he had a constructive plan and that the Allies were aiming at a better future. Germany had no alternative to offer, no counter-proposition for the reconstruction of Europe. So many people thought that this solution was the best course to adopt. That was one of the greatest examples of the importance of propaganda in modern war and modern politics. But the greatest example was the union of Italy by Piedmont. Piedmont, a little Italian State, stood against the great empire of the Habsburgs, against the Empire of the Pope, but it won the struggle because it was allied with the future. It was allied not with States, but with nations. It was allied with all Italians who desired liberty and union, in Venice, in Milan, in Florence, in Naples, and so, by this alliance with the future, Piedmont became stronger than all the rest of the States, became stronger than Austria, stronger than the Pope, and united and conquered Italy. If Great Britain and France follow this example they will have the whole of Europe behind them. It is not a question of the governments following; the nations will follow. The nations will be your allies, and not only the little nations in Europe, but the great part of the German and Italian nations.

I do not think that this fact is understood in Great Britain or else it would not have been possible for Germany to have obtained certain enormous successes by internal propaganda, particularly in regard to the propaganda of encirclement. The greater part of the German nation is disgusted with the internal mess of Nazism. But, in spite of that, they stick to Hitler because he has been clever enough to use this formula of encirclement and to tell the German nation: If you do not stick to me you will be crushed; you will be crushed by Great Britain and France and the other nations; you will have a peace much worse than Versailles; you will have bolshevism. And Great Britain and France, owing to their lack of propaganda, do not give any alternative. The fact that the British Government always declares, We do not encircle you, does not convince anybody. First of all, the Germans are convinced that statesmen have not only the right but the duty to lie, that any statesman who does not lie in the interests of his nation is a traitor; and so any statement

without proof is worthless. I know very many Germans, but I do not know a single German who would argue: I thought we were encircled, but now, since I hear that we are not encircled from British and French statesmen, I am convinced that we are not encircled. One great difference between the British and the German mentalities is that the British do not like maps. The Germans adore maps. They look at maps from their earliest youth, and everybody looking at a map must see that Germany is encircled; and I can only congratulate British policy that it has succeeded in such a complete encirclement, and I hope it will become much more complete, because it is the only hope of saving peace.

I think there is at the base of the statement a misunderstanding. Great Britain, in declaring that it does not encircle Germany, wants to say that this encirclement is not aggressive encirclement, but a defensive encirclement. But it is not explained in this way. In declaring that Great Britain does not encircle Germany, she makes every German look at the map, and he hears the statement of Goebbels that he is encircled and the British statement that he is not encircled, and he comes to the conclusion that German propaganda speaks the truth and British propaganda does not. And so this takes away the moral value of the British statement. I think that the result on the German mentality of this way of putting things will be: Great Britain encircles us; that is a fact, but she is afraid of us, therefore she says she does not encircle us; she encircles us, but with a bad conscience, and that is only a sign of British hypocrisy. That will be the conclusion of the average German. I think the problem ought to be handled in quite a different way. They should be told: You are encircled, you will be encircled much more if you continue your policy, but it is not we who encircle you, but Hitler encircles you; Mr. Hitler encircles you economically by his policy of autarchy, he encircles you morally by his policy of barbarism and he encircles you politically by his policy of aggression; as long as you continue to follow him in this way, you will be encircled more and more; you will be encircled till you are strangled, but any day and at any time you can get out of this encirclement if you cease this policy and begin a policy of co-operation. This way of talking would impress the Germans. This they would understand.

It is the same thing with the other problem of the *Lebensraum*. It is very difficult to translate this word exactly, because it has not one, but several significations. It has a very harmless signi-

fication of living space and a very aggressive signification of *espace vitale*, or a dynamic living space. But in any case it is nothing which one ought to fear. This word has a great significance in policy, and the conception of living space is something very sane, because in fact, on account of the communications of to-day, no State can be indifferent to what its neighbour is doing or what happens among its neighbours. Therefore one ought to say to Germany and Italy: If you state that Bohemia belongs to your *Lebensraum*, just as you say you cannot remain indifferent to what happens in Bohemia, we answer that we cannot remain indifferent to what happens in Germany and Italy. That is the fact. Then one also ought to say to them: You speak of *Lebensraum*. What *Lebensraum* do you want? If they then answer that they want two or three colonies and Central and Eastern Europe between Russia and Germany, they should be told: We offer to you a much larger *Lebensraum*. We offer you the whole of Europe and a great part of Africa if you really only want living space, a space where you can be free in your commerce, in your life; but if you want living space for domination, then you will not have anything; but if we construct a federated Europe, then the whole of Europe will be your living space, and then you will have much more than if you conquer one or two countries.

Of course there are many Germans who will prefer to be masters in a little part of Europe rather than to participate on the basis of equality in the whole of Europe. But I think these Germans are in the minority. In fact, the German situation is that there is a minority for Hitler, there is a minority against him, and there is a great majority that is not for Hitler, but sticks to Hitler because they are afraid that after Hitler something much worse would come. They dislike the system, but they are afraid that after the breakdown of Hitler there will either be bolshevism or a national breakdown, that is to say national humiliation and great unemployment and inflation. And, therefore, they prefer to keep Hitler. And people who put forward the suggestion that after the new war Germany would get a treaty much harder than the Treaty of Versailles, help Hitler very much. Because most Germans would respond to that suggestion: Then we must stick to Hitler, because he defends us against this danger. If you want this majority of the German nation, that is now helping Hitler without being in favour of him, to turn round, then you must give them an alternative programme, a positive programme of European reconstruction.

That is the reason why the European problem is not a problem of the future, but an immediate problem. The only thing that can counterbalance the encirclement campaign in Germany, and the most important step to prevent war, is a clear statement of how you think that the Europe of to-morrow should be built. I think, too, that the British and the French, and all the other nations that are now making tremendous sacrifices for this cause, have a right to know for what aims, for what programme they are suffering and making such sacrifices. But first of all Germany must know the alternative before it. If it does not get this alternative, it will stick to Hitler because it thinks his régime still better than that which would follow him.

The programme of reconstruction must provide clear answers to certain questions. It must convince Germany that she does not risk an inflation such as she had in the year 1923. If she joins Europe some economic instrument must be created to prevent such a catastrophe and help Germany to keep on its economic feet. Another problem is the problem of unemployment. Many Germans say that the day that the manufacture of armaments ceases they will have 10 million unemployed, and that means bolshevism. One must accordingly work out a programme of great public works, European public works, to deal with the period of transition between the industry of armaments and the civil industry, so that this heavy unemployment can be avoided. Finally the programme must be fair to Germany, and must secure for her entire equality in the framework of Europe.

When this programme is drawn up it must be brought into Germany. This is now much easier than it would have been during the Great War, because of the invention of broadcasting. It is very easy to publish such a programme in Germany by broadcast, if among a thousand people only one hears of it, the rest will hear it and it will spread. In fact, the radio is a Trojan Horse in every house.

This diffusion of a programme of reconstruction is also very important for the small States of Europe, because there are many people in those small States, especially in Eastern Europe, who think that the struggle in Europe is a struggle between two great groups of Powers, between the British and French group and the German and Italian group; and they will join the stronger part. That is a mistake. It should be made clear that Great Britain and France are working as trustees of Europe, they are working for Europe, for the liberty of the little States and for individual rights, and that the others are working for tyranny

and war. That must be stated; then you will see how all the little States who are not sure with whom they will go will with you.

There is one great difficulty in all of this, the fact that Gre Britain is not a European Power but a World Power. Gre Britain is a Great Power on all five continents, and some of yo will perhaps answer: We are a World Power, we are inte continental; we cannot join one continent; we cannot jo Europe; we must continue to make our world-wide policy. think the last incident in Tientsin should show the connection a European and world-wide policy. If there were peace i Europe, you could send your whole Navy and whole Air Forc to the Far East. Now you cannot. And the British Navy an the British Air Force will always be tied to Europe as long a there is no permanent peace and co-operation in Europe. So on the contrary, if you want to continue your world-wide polic or your imperial policy, you must try to unite Europe and to ge your back free in the North Sea. Besides that, there should b an effort to set up a world-wide peace organisation, not one tha is based like the League of Nations on an anarchical Europe but a world-wide organisation in which pan-Europe plays decisive part like pan-America, and is based on the co-operatio of those two members of Atlantic civilisation.

I know very well that there are very strong arguments agains pan-Europe; if I wanted I could write the best book agains pan-Europe, because I know all the arguments that can be sai against it. I know it is very difficult, but I know that all grea things in history were difficult and are difficult, and that it ca only be achieved with the two qualities of vision and courage Only if we see the things that are coming can we change history and only if we have the courage to fight for them can we do so The continent is ready to march; if you would make a plebiscite in Europe in any State, even in Germany and Italy, you would find a majority for European federation. France is ready to go ahead. Everything depends on Great Britain. If Great Britain has the European vision and the courage to fight for it, our generation will see the United States of Europe.

Summary of Discussion.

MR. L. S. AMERY said that by far the most important aspect o the lecturer's address was the convincing way in which he had shown that the policy he advocated was not some theoretical project which should be considered some day, but one that had a direct bearing

upon the immediate problem. He was right in saying that the only hope, slender though it might be, of preserving peace in Europe was if the German people could be convinced that there was a third alternative to crushing or being crushed, the two alternatives which Herr Hitler continuously drummed into them, one which would put an end to the fear of "encirclement" and give Germany as ample an economic space as any nation could desire, and, most important of all, which suggested that there was a higher ideal to work for, a higher ideal not at all inconsistent with true German patriotism. As the lecturer had said in reference to the unification of Italy, it had been the wider conception of Italian unity, very new to the people in many cases, who had only until then thought in terms of a Neapolitan or a Venetian patriotism, which had won the day. Unless there were in the forefront, not merely the mechanical structure of an economic system which would afford ample markets and sources of raw materials to the countries concerned, and a framework of peace in which to work, but also a real source of inspiration through an ideal, there could be no success.

Ever since the Great War he had shared the view of the lecturer that at the present stage of the world all progress must be evolutionary, and that the first step to world peace must be to break down the smaller anarchies, and above all to create a Europe. What should be the geographical definition of such a Europe depended upon a number of factors. Any scheme which was to enlist positive emotion must be based first of all on some limitation. The League of Nations had failed because it had been universal and beyond the conception of the ordinary man. Secondly, any scheme must have one or other and more than one of the following elements: economic community of interest, geography, history, race or tradition. The British Commonwealth enjoyed the advantage of historical unity, of a common language to a very large extent, of a system of common ideals, of political liberty and of the reign of law, of a kind of geographical unity consisting in the fact that they were united by the seas so long as these remained open, and a large measure of economic unity. What were the common elements of European unity? Obviously there were the practical geographical considerations and the absurdity of present divisions both from the point of view of trade and of peace and, even more important, that ideal of a common Western European civilisation, built upon Greece, Rome and Palestine—Greek liberty and love of truth, Roman love of justice, the Christian conception of the underlying equality of all human individuals, chivalry, all these things constituted a common civilisation, in danger to-day but yet deep in the hearts of all Europeans, deep in the hearts of the Germans themselves. The question was how outside elements could be brought into that group without weakening it, and this depended a good deal on the constitutional conception of the future Europe. If the federation mentioned by the lecturer were to be anything like the American or Canadian

federations, then the tighter the structure the more difficult it would be to bring in outside elements. On the other hand, if the union contemplated were to be like that of the British Commonwealth, involving no sacrifice of individual sovereignty, a free and elastic system with no constitution beyond the desire to work together and a policy of mutual co-operation in foreign affairs, defence and trade, then it would be more easy to bring in elements from outside without making it difficult for those who had relationships elsewhere to come in. Obviously the nucleus of the future Europe must be the great main bloc of Europe from the Pyrenees to the Eastern frontiers of Poland and Roumania, from Denmark to Cape Matapan. There were border elements. Spain might be drawn, if not by geography, at any rate by language and tradition, into closer association with South America. Scandinavia might find herself drawn by race, standards of living, and outlook, more towards the British Commonwealth of Nations. Russia was not only geographically more a part of Asia than of Europe, but had little part in that tradition of Western Christendom, or in the liberal constitutional conception which would be of the very essence of the future Europe. It would be difficult for Russia to be more than a neighbour. The British position was a peculiar one. It was true that Great Britain must take a leading part in creating a united Europe, because fundamentally she was impartial in reference to the old struggles of Europe. On the other hand, once European unity was created and the fear of aggressive domination by any one part of it eliminated, then the extra-European considerations of her Commonwealth and world relationships would exercise their pull upon her, and her relations with Europe, particularly on the economic side, and perhaps in other directions, could not be as close or intimate as those of the central bloc of European Powers. Her position towards Europe might some day be more analogous to that of Canada towards the pan-American union, a position of absolutely friendly co-operation, though not of complete participation. But these were marginal problems to be dealt with in the future. For the moment it was the obvious task of all to be whole-hearted Europeans in the defence of European liberty against subjugation and barbarisation, and to play their part in holding before Europe the constructive picture of an ideal which would solve its material difficulties, give it a practical programme and make its present conflicts unnecessary.

MR. WICKHAM STEED said that he agreed entirely with the lecturer about "encirclement". The word encirclement had been invented by Prince Bülow in the year 1904. Reference was made to it in Professor Kantorowicz's book: *The Myth of Encirclement and the Spirit of British Policy*, where this German authority said that it had been invented in an era of profound peace for the purpose of stirring up the German people to approve of an essentially aggressive policy. In 1907 the late George Saunders (for many years correspondent of *The*

Times in Berlin), on the eve of his departure for London, had had an interview with Prince Bülow, who had said that surely it must be agreed that during the whole of his term of office he had never done anything that could possibly impede the best Anglo-German relations. Saunders had prudently omitted to mention Bülow's wordy duel with Joseph Chamberlain, but had said that the use of the word encirclement had not been precisely conducive to good relations between England and Germany. Prince Bülow had replied that he would have his tongue cut out rather than say that word again—and, of course, went on saying it. The lecturer was quite right in saying that for the British to tell the Germans that they were not being encircled was to give themselves a certificate of hypocrisy and of imbecility. British statesmen might not care what foreigners thought of them, but in this case it was important that foreigners should think that they meant what they said. One trouble in the world to-day was that foreigners did not believe that British statesmen meant what they said. The Germans should be told not only that they were encircled, but that they would be more encircled and strangled ultimately if they did not change their present policy. Hitler was encircling Germany, and it was no use talking to him as if he were another honest Birmingham merchant. He did not understand that language. If a firm British policy were constantly put forward by statesmen, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary, in Parliament and in the Press, it would be believed as soon as their actions were in accordance with their words.

Propaganda was a word foreign to the British, they did not like it. During the War, feeling that she was misunderstood, Great Britain decided to tell the world what good people the British were, and so a department was set up which printed tons and tons of literature. Some hundredweights of it had finally found a resting-place on the shores of Guatemala! At length, towards the end of January 1918, people realised that some real propaganda was needed, and the elementary fact was then grasped that propaganda was no good without policy. There must be an idea and a policy and conviction that these things would be carried out, because the only thing which convinced people of the reality of propaganda was when events confirmed what propaganda had said in advance. A policy was found, and it formed the basis of propaganda. In a very few months it shook the whole of the enemy front in Europe from end to end. The same could be done again provided Great Britain had a policy with an idea behind it like that expressed by the lecturer. To give Hitler his due, his success had been solely owing to the fact that he had consistently carried out what he had said he would carry out in his book, *Mein Kampf*. Having had one success, he had gone on to another, and he would have others unless some means were found of stopping him before he threw all Europe into the cauldron of war out of which she might emerge somewhat purified and emaciated, but in which she might perish utterly.

Mr. Vandeleur Robinson said that the arguments for federation were unanswerable, partly for economic reasons and because separate States had to spend so much time and energy on defensive preparations, on account of wars, and injustices performed for lack of wars, and partly also because in a Europe of sovereign States the small nations were in an exceedingly difficult position. Czechoslovakia had been extremely uncomfortable when she had formed part of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and she was still more uncomfortable now that she formed part of the Third Reich. The alternative solution of giving each people their own independent State, which was on the whole the solution of the Peace Treaties, fell to pieces as soon as any great Power went out on the war-path. The only way in which the independence of small peoples could be combined with security was through federation.

When the American colonies had freed themselves from the rule of London they had formed themselves into something very like the League of Nations, and the central government had had to deal with the Government of each State, for example when asking for its taxes, and if the local government did not want to pay, it did not, and very soon this confederation had collapsed. Then a federation had been formed in which the spheres of government were divided by subjects. Certain subjects were regarded as the affair of the States, to be run by them, and others were regarded as of federal interest, and in these cases the federal government was the body to which the individual citizen owed allegiance; in these matters he was not a subject of Maryland or Georgia, but of the United States of America. The moral of this example was that it was of no use for Europe to form another League of Nations, with slightly tighter articles in the Covenant, because the trouble was not that the promises of such a body were not strict enough, but that the individual members reserved the right, or had the physical ability, to break those promises whenever they felt like it. Federation must be a real thing, and this raised the point as to which group of countries were to form the federation.

Here those who believed that federation was right and necessary were divided. There were those who believed that Europe was a neat unit, occupying a small part of the world, and therefore suitable for federation, and there were those who believed that federation must be based upon a considerable community of ideas. There was such a community of ideas between a certain number of European nations, such as the Scandinavian countries, Great Britain, France, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, and certain overseas nations, namely the United States, and the members of the British Commonwealth. Secondly, if a federation were formed on the basis of community of ideas, the group of countries he had mentioned would include the most powerful and the richest nations in the world, having nearly all the world's resources within itself, and nobody could attack it. This would be of very great benefit to the world, because it would ensure

peace absolutely, and other nations could join such a federation when they were ready and willing to do so. There should be also a federation for Eastern Europe, for the countries occupying the space from Bohemia to the Black Sea and from Esthonia to Greece. These countries were sorely in need of federation, and the maritime countries could give great help to the East European federation. Then, when the remaining European countries returned to civilisation, they too could come in, and eventually there would be a world federation. For these reasons the scheme proposed by Mr. Streit in his book *Union Now* seemed more immediately practicable than the idea of pan-Europe; but it was to be hoped that the protagonists of the two ideas would come together and work out something, because it would be a tragedy if all those who believed in the federal idea were to fail because of differences over points of detail.

SIR RONALD STORRS referred to the statement made by the lecturer that there was a large proportion of Germans who, if consulted, would be ready to accept the pan-European idea. He had heard that Germany could be divided into the two watersheds of those under forty years of age and those over that age. Of these, those over forty would be the only ones interested in the pan-European thesis, the others having been so indoctrinated with other and pernicious ideas that they must be regarded as opposed to any such ideal. If this were so, then it was only necessary to read *The Times* column of births and deaths to see that the pan-Europeans in Germany were daily more hopelessly outnumbered.

Secondly, the lecturer had postulated that Germany should be offered entire equality within the framework of Europe. In what respect did Germany not possess at present entire equality within the framework of Europe? Many thought she had a good deal more—he did, for one. In what respects could Germany be given more equality than she already possessed?

MR. FRENCH said, in regard to the lecturer's remarks on the effect upon Europe of the present troubles in the Far East, that during a recent visit to Rome a responsible Fascist official had told him that while giving Japan full marks for resisting Communism, they were not anxious to see Japan take the whole of the China trade. This statement had also been confirmed by another Fascist official.

THE RT. HON. ALFRED DUFF COOPER, D.S.O., M.P. (in the Chair), said he felt that events and facts were forcing the world in a certain direction. Never had there been so sudden and astonishing a reversal of British foreign policy as had happened in the last few weeks. Almost equally astonishing had been the fact that this reversal had been agreed to practically without remark and without protest, even by those who had most enthusiastically supported the Government's

previous refusal to do anything of the kind. This all proved that events were more powerful than words or intentions. Events were forcing Europe, it was to be hoped, along the path indicated by the lecturer, and the British Government was being forced by those same events to travel in the right direction.

COUNT COUDENHOVE-KALERGI said that he did not think the fact that Great Britain was concerned with a great part of the extra-European world need be a hindrance to her joining a European federation. For two centuries Austria had controlled the Danube basin as a Habsburg monarchy, and at the same time her rulers were German emperors. With one hand they had ruled the Danube basin and with the other they had ruled Germany. In the same way England could lead the British Commonwealth of Nations with her right hand and Europe with her left. Of course there were many problems which must be worked out not only theoretically but practically. There would be many disappointments, but finally a way would be found. To a certain extent Europe must be considered as the *Lebensraum* of England; she could not be disinterested as to what went on there. There was some analogy in the attitude of Japan to China. For centuries Japan had been able to live peacefully beside China without being connected in any way with the Chinese continent, but when aviation was invented she had seen that either the Chinese continent would unite without her, leaving Japan as an insignificant little island, or Japan must take the lead of the Chinese continent. This had led to the present conflict. Similarly in Europe, either the continent would be united under the German hegemony and England would become an island at her mercy, or, against her wishes, for he knew England had no wish to lead Europe, England would have to lead Europe to prevent Germany from doing so. Through the invention of aviation England would be led forcibly to control the European Continent.

The idea of encirclement had had a terrific effect in Germany during the War, and the average German still believed that the Great War had begun by the encirclement of Germany by King Edward VII. It had therefore been easy for Hitler and Goebbels to begin their new propaganda of encirclement. It was necessary to point out that this was the natural reaction to aggression everywhere. If any member of society behaved towards society as Germany was behaving towards Europe, they would soon be encircled by the police. Therefore Great Britain should not be ashamed, but proud of encircling Germany. It was one of the greatest successes of her history, and if peace were saved it would be due to this policy of encirclement.

British policy, although now very strong, very energetic and very consequential, was incomplete because it was negative, directed only to the prevention of war, and never in history had a merely negative policy been successful. The only things which could change history were positive ideas, and therefore the whole idea of non-aggression

was poor, because, although it might arouse conviction, it could not arouse enthusiasm. It was ridiculous to say that because one did not like propaganda one did not make it. It was like saying that because one did not like war one had no Ministry of War. The fact that others possessed a Ministry of War forced Great Britain to have one too. In the great ideological war now dominating the world Russia had a General Staff for Propaganda, and so had Germany, but France and Britain had no General Staff for it and no army.

With regard to the suggestion that federation should be based upon democracy and not upon geography, all crimes against geography had always been punished by history, and it would be a crime against geography to leave Central and Eastern Europe out of federation. European barbarism had had two consequences in America. One was a desire to help civilisation against this barbarism, the other to keep away from it and from Europe; and this latter element would become stronger, and every attempt to drag America into a European federation would only strengthen it and weaken the goodwill at present existing towards European co-operation. On the other hand, if there were a federation of the great democracies without Germany and without Eastern Europe, then certainly Germany and Eastern Europe would turn towards Russia, and there would be formed against the democratic federation an anti-democratic bloc consisting of Germany, Eastern Europe, Russia and the Far East. This would lead not to peace, but to more struggles. Perhaps in the future a plan of world peace would become possible, but for the moment it would be well if there could be peace in the Atlantic, a pan-Europe under British and French leadership, and a pan-America under the leadership of the United States, and the close co-operation of both through the Anglo-Saxon communities. By this means peace might be attained in the Atlantic, but the Pacific and the Far East were just on the eve of a series of great wars, which was another reason why Europe should be strong.

With regard to the proportion of Germans who would be in favour of pan-Europe, firstly they were not a political nation, and most of them had no fixed views on politics. He did not think the younger generation was entirely pro-Nazi. According to his information, the generation which was pro-Nazi was the one which had grown up under the Weimar Republic and struggled against it. But the one growing up under Nazism was anti-Nazi for the same reason that children were usually against their parents. Of course it was very difficult to judge the views of a country where there was no freely expressed public opinion, but in 1926 he had been in Munich, and had given his book on pan-Europe to the *chef de reception* at a big hotel. On asking what he thought of it, the *chef de reception* had replied that it was a great idea, an even greater idea than anti-Semitism. Up till then he had thought that the greatest idea in the world was anti-Semitism. Many Germans thought that National Socialism was the greatest idea in the

world. If they could be shown that there was something still more colossal—the European idea—then many of them would adopt it. This was why it was so important to show them the alternative to Nazism, because it was always impossible to fight an idea by arguments, an idea could only be fought by a still greater idea, by a bigger ideal. Just as the moon vanished when the sun arose, so many people in Germany would consider the European ideal greater than the national ideal. He knew that the Germans were much affected by the pan-European idea, because he had made a great deal of propaganda in Germany before the Hitler régime, and there had been a great response, and particularly in very nationalistic milieux.

He had said that Germany must be given equality in Europe. If Germany again surrendered and changed her régime, she must know that she would not be treated as she had been at Versailles, where she had not been treated equally or honourably, where she had been not only impoverished but dishonoured. If they felt that another Versailles were possible, they would fight to the end behind Hitler rather than face such a national humiliation. Of course Germany said that she wanted colonies, but she did not really need them. On the contrary, it would be a danger to give them back to her; but she must have economic rights so that she would not need colonies, she must have access to raw materials and to the greater part of the colonial markets in Africa.

What should Great Britain do in the immediate future? The British and French statesmen should have a perfectly defined plan for a European programme as and when the present crisis was over. This policy should be announced and adhered to and, if Germany did not immediately change her policy, probably she would hold out for at least another year, then a start should be made by creating common federal institutions open to all European States, and economic and banking questions, public works, and first of all, military questions should be discussed. This was the difference between an alliance and a federation, the latter needed such federal institutions, and they could immediately be started and controlled. He repeated that pan-Europe must be based on common ideas, because nothing could live without a soul. Europe must have a common soul and a common civilisation to defend, and therefore she must derive her inspiration from Western civilisation, because the whole European problem was a moral problem, and the stronger moral forces must conquer, and he was convinced that in Europe the stronger moral forces lay with Great Britain.

THE FUTURE OF EXPORT TRADE[1]

ROY GLENDAY

THE difference commonly drawn between home trade and export trade is largely an artificial one. Economically speaking, it makes little difference whether Lancashire sells cotton goods in, say, Paris or London. Yet the one transaction will be called export trade and the other home trade. For this reason it appears to me quite impossible to form any judgment of value regarding the long-range future of our export trade unless, first, we make up our minds about what is likely to happen to the long-range future of trade as a whole.

I shall accordingly begin my paper with an examination of the trend of our trade as a whole.

There is a story told of a British business man who inquired of a German colleague whether there was any truth in the report that a Vice-President of the Reichsbank and Assistant Minister of Economics had suffered a mental breakdown. The German business man replied, "Oh, yes; but there is nothing surprising in that. What *has* surprised us is that the Ministry of Economics has noticed it!" While we may laugh at this story and congratulate ourselves that we do not live in a totalitarian economy, it has to be admitted that all is not well with the trade of what are—somewhat ironically, so it may appear to some—referred to as the "free" economy countries. There is certainly nothing very "free" about export trade in the world of to-day; nor, apparently, very sane about the manner in which its affairs are conducted. The countries that would appear to stand in the greatest need of imports of cheap food and manufactured goods seem to be the most clamorous in demanding the imposition of increased tariffs, quota restrictions and exchange clearings with a view to preventing the entry of these very goods from the countries able and willing to export them.

Now, I propose to put the broadest possible interpretation on the title of my paper, "The Future of Export Trade," by endeavouring first of all to trace back this seeming insanity to its originating cause; and, second, having suggested what that cause

[1] Address given at Chatham House on June 8th, 1939; Lieut.-General Sir George Macdonogh, G.B.E., K.C.B., K.C.M.G., in the Chair.

appears to be, to try to indicate what the future trend of our own export trade, in the broad sense, is likely to be.

May I begin by asking: why is it that we regard the present behaviour of the business world as abnormal? My answer would be: simply because it has not behaved in the way past experience and our economic doctors have led us to expect. But suppose the past is no guide to the future, and that accordingly the doctors are wrong in their diagnosis. May not the present behaviour then be entirely normal? Suppose economic systems behave like our human bodies and grow old and less flexible with age. Surely then we should not expect an old system to behave like a young one?

The economist pictures a world of free individuals with ample room to move about and do as they please. He pays little attention to environment in which those movements occur—what we vaguely refer to as the economic system. The business man, on the other hand, thinks of little else. His main preoccupation is no longer how to make the best use of scanty resources in meeting man's apparently unlimited desires, but how best to escape from congestion due to an overcrowding of the market by too many offers of the same kind of goods to a body of consumers whose needs, so far from being infinitely various, are depressingly similar in general character.

Let me try to illustrate the distinction which I am endeavouring to draw between the world of economic theory and the world of business fact.

Were I to ask a number of you the question: What should be the objective of our economic system?, I would expect some such reply as this: To provide every citizen in this country with a reasonably decent standard of life—a house where he can marry and have, say, two or three children, a small motor-car and garage, and perhaps also such labour-saving devices as a vacuum cleaner, refrigerator and the like. He should have enough money for entertainment and luxuries such as tobacco and alcohol; perhaps also a garden, or at least ready access to the countryside. In other words, you would urge that the main objective of our economic system should be to help the poor to attain a similar standard of life to that now enjoyed by the rich. This in fact has, I believe, been the major preoccupation during the past half-century.

Let us now look at an economic system in which this has to take place. Something like half the population of these islands is congregated in some ten large towns, or conurbations as they

are sometimes called. The congestion in towns like London is already so great that any attempt made to raise the standard of accommodation of the poor to that of the rich serves not to give more room but merely to redistribute the overcrowding. Soon we shall all—rich and poor alike—be living like termites in the cell-like rooms of the modern block of flats, with the few sticks of furniture and domestic appliances that will be all that such limited accommodation will allow. Impossible for everyone to have a motor-car; there is neither room for the garage space to accommodate them nor for the roads on which to travel. If we attempt to solve the problem by widening the roads, then we encroach on the housing space. If we pull down houses, and at the same time insist that those displaced must not be mulcted of increased rents nor removed from the neighbourhood, then we find ourselves compelled to build tall blocks of flats on the now more limited building-site area. The reason is that if the cost of the new building is to be defrayed without increased rents, it must be capable of housing a far larger number of families. It will be merely a matter of time before these additional families lead to a re-congestioning of the roads so recently widened.

To attempt to escape from this vicious circle by speeding up the movement of transport leads to a similar *impasse*. It is said that nowadays it takes a motor-bus longer to get from the city to the outskirts of London than the horse-bus it superseded. Just over a hundred years ago the first mechanically propelled vehicle made its appearance on our roads. To prevent what was then regarded as an excessive speed, it had to be preceded by a man carrying a red flag. A century of free development in motor-car production and transport mobility finds us back again to the same restriction. There is a difference, however: a mechanically operated red light has replaced the red flag! Of such are the triumphs of progress!

The inhabitant of London who thirty or forty years ago not only had a garden but was perhaps only two or three miles from rural amenities, now finds himself as much as ten miles, or even more, from direct contact with the open country. It is true that transport facilities are more numerous, but their cost is so high that the poor cannot afford to make frequent use of them. The solution of the problem is to remember that you cannot with comfort provide *both* housing space and roads for more than a limited number of people in a given area of ground. You take away space and amenities from the rich; but overcrowding makes it impossible to give them to the poor.

The problem of raising the standard of living of the poor to that of the rich in an economic system may be likened to that of trying to provide those in the back rows of a football stand with front-seat accommodation. The larger we make the ring of front seats the more distant must all the seats then be from the centre of the field; for you cannot increase the circumference of a circle without also increasing its radius. The result of gradually increasing the radius in an endeavour to accommodate in the front row an ever-increasing population will be to reduce the view of the match enjoyed by its occupants to that enjoyed by, say, the back row of the pit in the previous smaller stand! By analogy with what is being done in many of our overgrown towns to-day, we might so increase the radius of the circle of our football stadium that everyone had to use field-glasses to secure an adequate view of the match. The unthinking might then conclude that the modern spectator, because he was the fortunate possessor of field-glasses, enjoyed a higher standard of living than his predecessor, and, because the new seats were dearer than the old, that he was wealthier also.

So congested have some of our larger towns become, and so difficult communication between centre and outskirts, that their structure is threatening to break down. If recent tendencies are allowed to proceed unchecked much longer these conurbations are likely to break down, leaving a dead central area surrounded by a ring of satellite towns, thus reverting—under a new guise—to the collection of smaller units from which they originally sprang: the curve of progress thus being from the village to the large conurbation, and then back again to the medium-sized satellite town. All these things have happened because we have forgotten that for every type of city pattern there will be a most convenient size.

I wish to suggest to you this evening that the maladies of our export trade are due to the fact that our economic system has outgrown its most convenient size; and, as a consequence, is, as I suggest might happen in the case of some of our large towns, in process of breaking down into smaller units. There is really nothing new in the suggestion that an economic system can outgrow its structure, it was put forward as a cause of economic breakdown over two thousand years ago by Plato in his *Republic*. To-day science generally accepts the view that the necessity of achieving a balance between growth in bulk and growth in area is the determining factor in limiting the shapes and sizes not only

of all forms of plants and animals, but of every other kind of growing structure or pattern as well. Galileo expressed this principle some three hundred years ago by saying that neither can man build a house, nor Nature construct an animal or plant beyond a certain size, while retaining the same proportions and employing the same materials as sufficed in the case of the smaller structure. The thing will fall to pieces of its own accord unless we either change its relative proportions, which will at length become clumsy, monstrous and inefficient, or invent some new and stronger material than was used before, and then rebuild it. In short, for every structure or pattern there will be a most convenient size.

How does the problem of structural breakdown arise in the case of an economic system? Economic systems have been defined as patterns for living together. Such patterns have always been in the nature of a compromise between the natural instincts of human beings, individually, to fend for themselves and retain complete freedom to behave as they please, and the necessity to work in co-operation imposed by numbers in relation to territory. It was this growth in numbers which led relatively early in the development of the present economic system to activity being concentrated increasingly, not so much on catering for the supposedly unlimited desires of the rich individuals, but on the twin objectives of (1) providing rapidly growing populations with the necessities of life and (2) raising the standard of living of the poorer sections of these populations by making available to them the amenities and luxuries already enjoyed by the rich—or providing them with reasonably adequate substitutes. The various inventions in transport assisted in this work by enabling the radius of the area to be covered to be widened progressively, first to include all our own territory within a single pattern, and second to reconstitute and widen that pattern till it stretched to the four quarters of the globe.

It was to the necessity of concentrating on this twofold task that our economic system principally owes its present special type of structure. The method of expanding production generally adopted was to subdivide and specialise the processes of production into a series of ever-lengthening chains. This enabled producers to produce faster and faster, that is, more goods in a working day. This was the only way in which it was possible to increase progressively both consumption *and* production, *i.e.*, by producing goods more cheaply and yet maintain, if not increase, consumers' incomes. But, of course, as we speed up

output we shall in time begin to find that we need to use a smaller and smaller proportion of the population to produce a given commodity. This means that if the economic system is to continue to grow, we must continue to find new articles to produce if work is to be provided for all prospective producers. The practicability of doing this will depend partly on the rate at which new inventions and discoveries are being made and partly on the rate at which the population is growing, and adding to the number of prospective producers. In the seventeenth century most of the labour of this country was employed on the land; by the close of the nineteenth century a majority were in industrial employment; to-day it is "services" which is the expanding avenue.

Judging both by our own experience and that of past economic systems, there arrives a moment in the life-history of every economic system when population growth begins to outstrip the capacity to provide jobs with adequate prospects: the economic system begins to exceed its most convenient size. A number of things are then likely to happen. First, those already accommodated, in an endeavour to maintain their own and their families' prospects, will begin to reduce their numbers, *i.e.*, begin to practise birth control. This will in due time lead to a fall in the demand for necessities. There will be less mouths to feed, fewer bodies to clothe and house. What effect will this have on the economic system? It means that demand for one of the main sections of its output, that of producing necessities for the new additions to the population, will begin first to stop expansion, then to slow down and finally to decline absolutely. The economic system will then be able to continue to survive as an economic "whole" only if all the energies previously devoted to expanding the output of necessities can now be transferred to the work of raising the standard of living of those already born.

Before we examine this possibility, let me say a word about the phrase economic "whole". If a group of persons agree to co-operate in developing an economic system which is to grow by a process of subdivision and specialisation, then if that system is not to break down it is obvious that there must be a tacit understanding that each participating group will stick to the task allocated to it and refrain from duplicating the work of other groups. Those who grow food, for example, must not compete to do the work of those providing, say, industrial manufactures. The successful operation of the whole arrangement depends upon the various sets of activities being kept separate and distinct

and treated as *complementary* contributions to a common pool; for if the food group were allowed also to make their own manufacturing requirements, then the manufacturing group would find its contribution of manufactures to the pool unacceptable in exchange for food. Consumption and production will then begin to work against one another, like the houses and roads in our congested towns.

Naturally in a young system with a growing population, still small relative to the area and resources available for expansion, the effects of departures from this understanding can be quickly eliminated by the natural expansion of the arrangement as a whole. If one food area decides to provide its own manufacturing needs, it can be allowed to break away from the system, and a new, but undeveloped, food area put in its place in the pattern. But suppose the system as a " whole " stops growing, what then? Surely a breakaway can only mean disruption of the system. Instead of working together to expand a common pool, producers will now begin to fight among themselves for increased shares of a limited pool. For suppose the food producers now proceed to make their own manufacturing needs, the industrial countries will now be unable to produce an alternative market for the output of the surplus manufacturing capacity with which they will now find themselves landed. It will be idle for the latter to develop a fresh food-producing area, as, owing to the decline in population, they will not be able to accept food in exchange for manufactures.

If the economic theorists were indeed right, and human needs really infinite, then the way out would be to allow the agricultural areas to take over the manufacture of the simpler types of industrial products and concentrate on the more complex and the introduction of new types of luxuries. But if this is to happen in time to avert breakdown, it will require a quite exceptional acceleration in both the rate of new invention and in the rate at which consumers are accustomed to alter their traditional habits of consumption. After all, inventors and discovery have all along been doing their utmost to develop new needs and luxuries. And it takes on an average some twenty to thirty years to bring a new invention into general use.

In the light of the above considerations, let us turn to the actual behaviour of our own economic system. Our present economic structure may be said to have begun to emerge somewhere towards the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth centuries. Until that time the available evidence

suggests that world population had been growing very slowly indeed, the change measured over a century being often almost imperceptible, though there might of course be severe local fluctuations. From about the middle of the seventeenth century, however, it suddenly began to shoot upwards. Starting from a level estimated at between 450 and 500 millions in 1630, it had by 1930 reached the stupendous figure of well over 2,000 millions —more than a fourfold increase in a period of three hundred years.

The major part of the increase occurred, I think there is no question, in the nineteenth century. During the course of a hundred years our own population increased fourfold, that of Europe threefold, and that of the United States fifteenfold. Nothing like this can ever have occurred on the surface of the globe before. Nor has the world ever before had to face such a colossal economic task as that of providing, in a relatively short space of time, such a vast horde of people with the necessities of life and, in many cases, something better than bare necessities. All current indications suggest that this flood of migrants from the unknown has spent its force and is reaching the end of its flow. Many are now fearful lest that flow may now be succeeded by an ebb of almost equal magnitude.

There is, I think, no justification for terrifying oneself with bogies of this kind. Nor again does it make any material difference to our problem whether the point of the end of the flow is reached this year, or in five years, or even in fifteen years' time. It is enough for us to realise that already the mere slowing down in the rate of flow has faced us with economic problems of the first magnitude.

The economic structures of the principal countries of the world—and also of the central international economic structure from which most of them sprang—have all been elaborated on the assumption that this avalanche of new people was to continue for an indefinite period. Can those structures now be changed and re-adapted to meet conditions of population stagnation, if not decline? It is an extraordinarily difficult problem, especially when you realise that something like one half of the population of the world of to-day is contained in just over 5 per cent. of its land area. Personally I do not believe they can be changed *quickly enough* to prevent disintegration of the system as a whole.

Look at our own international economic structure with its central core—Britain—highly industrialised and densely populated, its outskirts a ring of distant overseas agricultural areas relatively sparsely populated. Can we expect such a system to

endure under the new conditions, or must we expect, as in the case of our large towns, a break-up into a stagnant central area surrounded by an outside ring of satellites?

Already the happenings of the Great War period, the post-War slump, coupled with the slowing down which has already occurred in the rate of growth of population, have encouraged more and more of these traditional agricultural areas to break the unwritten complementary rule of the old international system and embark on their own industrial manufacture. Europe has widened the breach still further by reverting to agriculture. Our own national awareness of these drastic changes has been somewhat dimmed by the circumstances that we still receive the equivalent of something like 40 per cent. of our imports in the form of interest on past investments, shipping and other services. That is to say, it saves us having to provide in payment for our import needs the equivalent of some £350 million of exports. Even so, we are failing to balance our international account, and the deficit has shown signs of increasing year by year. These invisible services have also served to conceal from us the fact that the volume of our exports to-day is not only substantially lower than in 1913, but has been declining in the meantime, each new peak year being below its predecessor. The quantum index given below is only a rough one: both the character of the goods exported and the method of compiling our trade returns have altered substantially since 1913.

VALUE AND VOLUME OF U.K. EXPORT TRADE.

Year	U.K. Exports Value £'000	U.K. Exports Quantum Index
1913	525,254	153·0
1929	729,349	125·6
1937	521,391	100·9

On the other side of the account the stagnation of our population and the reversion to agriculture have meant a slowing down in the rate of growth of our food-import needs.

INDEX NUMBERS OF THE IMPORTS OF TWENTY-EIGHT AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS, WHICH ARE ALSO IMPORTANT BRITISH FARM PRODUCTS. PREPARED BY THE AGRICULTURAL INSTITUTE, OXFORD.

1931–1937
(1927–9 = 100)

Year	Total
1931	117
1932	111

Year	Total
1933	107
1934	104
1935	103
1936	105
1937	103

Can we hope to do more than slow up the rate of breakdown of our present economic structure? Wherever I turn—Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Argentine, Brazil, India, the Far East —the trend of development suggests the same answer. Perhaps some of you may feel more optimistic than I do. In Europe the situation is more confused, and the breakdown more complete, but the basic prospects are the same.

It is this condition of affairs which appears to provide the answer to the question that I posed at the beginning of my paper : Why are all countries increasingly imposing restrictions on the entry of cheap imports into their territories?

The answer is that they no longer behave as *complementary* units of a single international structure. All countries are tending more and more to produce all their own requirements, and they see no reason to admit the goods of another country just because those goods happen to be cheaper than the home products. But you then will ask, surely there is no reason why we should not be able to repeat our earlier economic conquests in fresh directions, say by selling luxuries and developing ways of satisfying some of the untapped human desires which the simple living economists tell us are infinite both in number and variety? I have indicated the direction of my own answer to that suggestion in my parable about the growth of the modern city; some of you may feel disposed to give another and more optimistic one. But it is not going to be easy in a world in which producers are already beginning to resist attempts to make them work faster and demanding more leisure, while the consumers are requiring, not more kinds and varieties of goods, but more time, space and leisure to enjoy those they already have. After all, there are only twenty-four hours in the day.

Last of all comes the question, Can nothing be done for the countless teeming millions of those whose standard of living and level of economic civilisation is still so far below our own?

Here again, though I am sure that much can and will be done to assist, by, for example, the export of capital, plant and skilled personnel, it is necessary to utter a warning regarding the magni-

tude of the possibilities under our *present* economic structure. The enduring stability of that structure, as I have already premised, depends on the maintenance of *complementary* relations. This means that unless we are prepared to engage in salvaging stricken economics as a free-will offering to the work of civilisation, those countries must be in a position to pay for these exports by sending us imports in return. How are they going to provide those imports? Remember this country will have a stagnant, if not declining, population, and for some time to come is likely to be glutted with offers of most raw materials and foods from other overseas countries, not yet adjusted to the new world conditions. Our recent purchase of Roumanian wheat provides an instructive illustration of the difficulty of trading with a country only able to provide in quantity goods we are already able to obtain in abundant quantities from elsewhere.

But there can be no going back; for economic systems are irreversible. Yet it is natural for human nature to be optimistic. As a well-known scientist recently observed, " Human nature has a curious trait of gambling against the law of cause and effect. We always hope that the fate which befell our predecessors will pass us by. Babylon, Egypt, Rome, Spain, all traversed the same track; and to-day we follow in their footsteps, hoping to reach some different goal. Our peculiar quality of superior mentality seems but a suicidal acquisition hastening and intensifying the imminent doom."

Those who find something fanciful in the suggestion that the economic fate of the modern world could ever be similar to that of any of its predecessors may be invited to study the condition of the Roman Empire in the days of its economic decline in Italy, given in the twelfth volume of the *Cambridge Ancient History* just published, where we read :—

"The picture as a whole is one of a more lively and flourishing economic activity, reaching the zenith in the age of the Antonines and finding its reflection in the widespread city prosperity of the times—prosperity for which the *nouveaux riches*, naturally enough, claim most of the credit.

"Decentralisation meant not only that the centre declined in significance, but also that the peripheral regions became more self-dependent, and then economic activity increased. Indeed, the result was, in the last resort, that regions which had relied substantially on primary production and had imported manufactured articles processed by skilled technique, now themselves worked up and finished the raw materials, thus developed special capabilities of their own, until in the end they imported raw materials from abroad to be processed at home."

To those who feel that to stress the parallels between our own present-day world and that of Rome in the days of its decline is to give way to the forces of despair, I would suggest that they should remember that the events which brought disaster to Imperial Rome were the same as those which brought to birth the Christian world that was to succeed it.

So to-day, while there may be many who will desire to mourn over the dead body of our present economic structure, there will be others seeking to pierce the veil to discern the resurrected body that is to provide the structure of the world that is to come.

Summary of Discussion.

MR. BARNARD ELLINGER said that at his age one could only afford to be an optimist. The young dwelt upon the wonders of the past and of the future, while those who were older were more imbued with a sense of the wonders of the present.

A wonder which impressed him was the fact that from the time he left his bed in the morning until he had finished his breakfast there were at least fifty articles which he required which were either imported from abroad or of which the raw materials were imported. He lived in a flat over John Barnes' shop in the Finchley Road, and all those fifty articles could be bought in the shop, although they came from the four corners of the earth and were exchanged in the long run for British exports or services. They were all necessary, and the demand for them was always growing. In his youth such things as grapefruit and the marvellous imported fresh and tinned fruits at present available were unknown. Nasty little oranges with yellow skins appeared just before Christmas and lasted for three or four months. The countries which were as happy to sell these products as the British were to receive them must be content directly or indirectly to accept British exports and services in payment for them. It was quite true that with a declining population Britain's international trade would possibly, but not necessarily, decline in volume. This would be unimportant as long as the international trade per head of population did not decline, but it would probably be necessary to go through a period of getting rid of a certain amount of redundant productive capacity while the population was declining. The impediments which had been placed upon trade during the last few years were, of course, a very serious handicap to the exchange of commodities, but he was not convinced that they need necessarily last. Great Britain would never again export the same quantity of cotton goods as she had exported formerly, because other countries were now manufacturing them. She would never again export the same quantity of coal, because so much oil was used in its place. But he had spent fifty years in the export trade, which was constantly changing, and to-day they were exporting things which had not even existed in the past when he had entered business. There were no motor-cars, no aero-

planes, no wireless, no gramophones, no electrical appliances and no artificial silk, and this list could be greatly extended. In time those newer articles and inventions which the lecturer had mentioned would, subject to two conditions, form the substance of a large part of the export trade necessary to replace that which had been lost. We should in future export more capital goods and more luxury goods instead of simple consumer's goods—richer industrialisation would make our customers. The first condition was that the creditor countries of the world reverted to their former practice of lending long-term and short-term money to the debtor countries. One reason for the great increase of tariffs and quotas was the breakdown of the international credit system. Along with that breakdown had gone a very considerable lessening in the spirit of enterprise of British exporters. The failure to restore that spirit of enterprise as well as the long- and short-term lending was due to the lack of confidence at present existing in the world. He was not impressed by figures showing the difference between British exports to-day and in 1929. The wonder was not that international trade had declined, but that it had not declined more than it had done—all international trade was carried on on credit. If any export merchant were asked to-day whether his customers were as credit-worthy to-day as in 1929, he would have to say that compared with 1929, reduced though his trade was, he was still giving far more credit than was warranted by the credit-worthiness of his customers; and if his customers were guaranteed by the banks of their own nations, and he went and asked his banker for credit based on the guarantee of those banks, he would receive a similar answer. Such shocks had been received in recent years as to the banking stability of foreign banks that possibly to-day with a limited amount of exports, taking into account the credit-worthiness of the customers and the stability of foreign banking systems, merchants were over-trading, and not under-trading. Until this position was reversed it was impossible to look for a revival of export trade on anything like the lines which had existed prior to 1931, and this revival of confidence would only come about when the world felt that it had once again entered upon an era of peace. Possibly in 1913 a few people had foreseen a war with Germany, but the great bulk of the traders of the world had been living in an era of peace, and had not envisaged the world catastrophe which had occurred in 1914. Nor in 1929 had they envisaged the conditions which existed to-day. To-day the world was living and trading in the fear of war. Although with a declining population international trade might decline, if credit and confidence could be once more restored he could not see why international trade per head of population should not be carried on in exactly the same magnitude or in greater magnitude than in the past, given a sense of peace and security.

MAJOR A. STUART MENTETH thanked the lecturer for drawing attention to the causes of moral decay in civilisation at the present moment. He drew attention to the fact that an export trade cannot

be severed from the means of paying for it. The two were linked together. A great many of the present maladies were due to lack of confidence and a moral decline, and a steady growth of fear especially in the financial system of the world. Considering the amazing advance made between 1821 and 1921, might one not look forward to an equally astonishing one by 2021? The first breakdown had undoubtedly started with the Great War, which had brought fear and its other concomitments, a declining population, birth control, increasing luxuries, selfishness, a luxury standard of living, everything which had preceded the fall of the Roman Empire. Why think in terms of a puny European civilisation when Russia and South America, for instance, were there to be developed? It should be realised that if Europe did not wake up, other nations would take its place. Large undeveloped countries like Russia could not be expected to develop along the same lines as the older civilisations unless Christianity really began to mean something again. Fundamental Christianity, which meant enterprise, courage and hope, had built up our civilisation. Great Britain needed to get back to the spiritual and moral forces which had developed her banking system. Hartley Withers had said that the welfare of Great Britain was wrapped up with the welfare of humanity at large, and it would seem as if some unseen Power had been directing the selfish idiosyncrasies of individuals towards some higher objective. The Indian Empire had been developed by railways. Both Africa and China needed railways. If Great Britain could only get back her former spirit of enterprise, there was no reason why she should not develop these areas and provide the people with some of the things they needed and desired.

MR. CHARLES H. LUKE said that the lecturer had not mentioned the distribution of population or the distribution of goods. Probably his remarks on the economic structure of the world had in some ways a façade of truth, but he had not discussed the future of the export trade of the world of to-day. He had himself expected to hear how some of the present difficulties might be overcome. One thing which was completely overlooked in Great Britain was that she had in her Empire room for millions of people, and it was owing to the stupidity of both her politicians and her people that those millions overcrowded in the cities of Britain were not out in the open prairies of the New World, in Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, endeavouring to have a moderate standard of life, if not one up to the standards at present considered somewhat sacrosanct in Great Britain and which would probably decrease in the future so far as the rich were concerned, in order to enable other people to have a better standard of living than they enjoyed at present.

The description of the economic structure of the world which had been given was purely the view of an economist. There was no need for the trade of the world to decrease if the peoples of the world would have the common sense to realise what was necessary to maintain

it. As a previous speaker had said, there was the work of opening up countries like Africa and China and all the undeveloped parts of the world, and it was sheer defeatism to say that the world in general, and Great Britain in particular, were approaching that stage of decay which had preceded the fall of the Roman Empire. The world to-day, of which the British Empire represented a quarter, was capable of giving the peoples of the world a decent export trade and standard of living if those who controlled its destinies, the governing classes, would do the work they had to do in a way in which the conditions of to-day indicated were necessary. To-day the world lived under the fear, after having digested the lecturer's awful picture, of the dictators, but this was only a phase; when the world returned to spending on the distribution of its population and world exportation what it now spent on armaments, then it would prosper once again.

Captain Elliot Warburton said that he was of the same vintage as the lecturer, yet he had all the optimism of the first speaker. He had been a little disappointed that the lecturer had dwelt so much on the background that he had not had much time left for the foreground of export trade. He had hoped for some guidance as to the future, and wondered whether there were not certain compensations for the present difficulties, some which were automatic and some which might be brought into play deliberately. Surely the dispersion of our overpopulated centre of Empire, like the dispersion of cities, should be encouraged? If the overseas Dominions and other countries who had hitherto produced raw materials were now turning over to manufactures, they should be helped to do so, and machinery and population sent out to them so that, instead of providing an excellent target for General Goering, Great Britain should have her strength dispersed all over the world. The doubt had been expressed as to whether these countries would be able to pay for such machinery, but surely at present the British balance of trade with most overseas countries was favourable to them? Many of them wanted to find more things which they could buy from Britain in order to balance the goods which they wished to send to her. He had been surprised that rearmament had not been mentioned. Great Britain was at present buying much from the rest of the world which would never be resold, but which would be delivered *free*, if at all, so that here was certainly a margin. She should not mind other countries turning to manufacturing. Some things they could manufacture better and more cheaply, but there were others in which Great Britain had a natural advantage owing to long experience. She should concentrate on her natural advantages and on evolving new lines for which there would be a market in this world which was going to get more prosperous. Concerning the spirit of enterprise which had existed in the past, and had been rightly praised, it was very difficult to-day for individuals and firms to compete with Governments who played much too large a rôle in world trade to-day; therefore some co-operation was needed for the time being if Great Britain

was to get a fair share of trade. He sometimes thought that the Department of Overseas Trade could show more vision in searching for the best lines for British export trade and in guiding it for the future. The right industries should be selected and the right advertising used. The fact that the populations would move out would be an advantage, and not a disadvantage. The Federation of British Industries was another organisation which could co-operate, also the Incorporated Society of British Advertisers, and there were no doubt other such organisations which could help. Once the present international problems could be solved, the future need not be so black as the lecturer had at first made it appear.

MR. R. STOKES said he thought the lecturer's paper had been the best economic address he had ever heard at the Institute, and had not seemed to him nearly so pessimistic as the last speakers had made out. He had rather seemed to be trying to stimulate thought as to how particular problems could be met, and had given or implied a series of principles which could be applied to the present situation. How far could the tendency of formerly agricultural areas, such as the Argentine, to go in for secondary industries and invisible services such as banking and insurance, in which Great Britain had specialised in the past, be met by an increasing regionalisation of the world? How far, in this case, should Great Britain fall in with this tendency by making the Empire so far as possible an economic unit and by encouraging, in particular, those secondary industries in the Dominions which would draw their raw materials from the colonies and by trade triangulation further develop the demands of the Dominions for the produce of those secondary industries which they had been unable themselves to produce and which Great Britain had been able to produce? In that event how far did it follow that the Balkans and the countries surrounding Germany should be left as the natural field for German expansion?

MR. M. ZVEGINTZOV said that he had considered the lecturer's address to be optimistic because it had outlined the way in which the development of trade would occur in the future, and, in fact, suggested means of taking advantage of it. The decentralisation which he thought inevitable would be an important factor for increasing trade, and not the reverse, because it would create a number of centres of economic activity.

Concerning population, people were too apt to regard the decrease in population in Great Britain as meaning saturation of requirements, but attention should be paid to the degree of under-nourishment in Great Britain, and the consequent potential desirable increase in the consumption of food stuffs. The fact that the increase in population was slowing down surely meant that the solution of the problem would be easier, because to concentrate on the increase of consumption per head must be easier than trying to catch up with two continuously receding goals: increase of mouths to feed and progressive rise in the

standard of living. Primarily, therefore, this was a political and social question. The question of population, together with the desire for self-sufficiency, would explain the diversification which had arisen in a large number of countries which had formerly produced primary products and taken goods in exchange; not only the rapid increase in their population, but also a conscious desire to increase their standard of living was the driving force. South-Eastern and Eastern Europe had a population of some 120 million : this area was supposed by some people to be Germany's sphere of activity. The rise in population was greater even than in Russia and the area was rich in natural resources. Surely the fact that these countries were developing a strong national sense and trying to build up their own economics was a very good thing, because instead of there being eggs in a very few baskets, there would be a larger number of eggs and a larger number of baskets. This was where Germany was making a very bad mistake. She was attempting to keep down these countries to producing fewer types of goods, in order to supply the German market, which was supposed to be complementary, with the result that she was having increasing difficulties, partly through this natural feeling of independence and desire for diversification and partly because she was, in trying to build up a rigid comprehensive system, going against that fundamental trend which the lecturer had rightly stressed, the trend towards decentralisation. In fact, this idea of a German sphere of influence would be found to be wrong and impracticable—and so an excellent illustration of the general principle outlined by the lecturer.

This decentralisation would lead to the increased use of the means of distribution and other services. He warmly supported the speaker who had mentioned the idea of building railways and developing other countries. This was just the type of thing which would increase trade in the world. Four years ago Poland had just been beginning to build roads; now that the roads were built, backward areas were becoming more prosperous, simply because the goods could be exchanged more easily—and that in spite of the tension due to the international situation. There were many services of the invisible export type which the world would need for this increased decentralised trade, and Great Britain knew more about such services than anybody else. Therefore there was no reason to be pessimistic. The modern tendencies in the world were precisely those from which, by the intelligent exploitation of British experience and geographical position, Great Britain could best benefit.

The political factor was the overriding consideration. There was the political question of how to deal with a stationary population and the social aspect of raising the standard of living and overcoming the question of under-nutrition. Then there was the international question of the present fear-psychology. It would not be easy to deal with the second matter, but in the meantime there should be no delay in concentrating upon the first and to solve some at least of the problems which the lecturer had so rightly stressed.

MR. T. B. BARLOW said that his experience had been the bitter one of having to close down two exporting businesses. He felt that Great Britain had passed from an era of free trade which had been the backbone of her export trade, and was entering into one of government barter which was bound to create a difficult situation for both merchants and bankers concerned with the export trade. All were faced with vested interests, because every country had been building up its own manufactures, and this could not easily be broken down. It was also necessary to face competition from a lower standard of living in countries like India, Japan and now Germany, and whereas in the past Great Britain had prospered on the exportation of consumption goods like cotton and coal, now her only hope lay in the exportation of capital goods, and none of the people for whom she would like to build railways appeared to have any capital, so she had not only to build the railways and feed her people in the meantime, but to leave money on loan in the hope that sometimes she would be paid interest.

PROFESSOR F. A. V. HAYEK said that the lecturer had been called pessimistic, but his real pessimism did not refer to any inevitable facts but to the developments of man's own making—developments, indeed, of which the lecturer at the same time seemed to approve. The fact that more and more effort could now be devoted to raising the standard of life, instead of to merely maintaining an increasing population at a given standard, was surely fortunate; and the fact that people were able to take out more and more of their income in the form of leisure rather than in commodities was certainly a matter for congratulation. If the standard of life were to be raised, a larger percentage of the world's efforts would have to be directed towards manufacture, and a smaller part to agriculture. But this meant that more and more countries which had in the past been predominantly agricultural must now turn to manufactures. The lecturer had suggested that by doing so these countries did not obey the rules of the game. But the countries which did nearly all the world's manufacture when 40 per cent. of the world's efforts were devoted to manufacture could not expect to retain that position when 60 per cent. or 75 per cent. of the world's product was wanted in manufactured form.

The real problem was not whether the newer countries were to turn to manufacture, but to what kind of manufactures they were to turn. The natural thing would be for them to make more simple manufactured goods, such as cotton piece-goods, which the European countries had supplied to them during the past hundred years. If, however, they were denied the markets for these simpler goods, the effect could only be that they would have to turn to the more highly manufactured commodities. And in fifty or sixty years the result would be that what were now the new manufacturing countries would be the most advanced countries, whilst the older countries would be in a state of stagnation, because they had insisted on hanging on to the things they

had always produced. If in the future economic progress was to take the form of raising the standard of life, it must mean an increase in productivity per head, which in turn could only mean a gradual reduction of prices. But this, instead of being regarded as a blessing, was treated as a danger, and all contemporary policy aimed at preventing it. If in these conditions the larger product which could be turned out could not be sold, this again was not an inevitable fact, but the outcome of our deliberate policy.

MR. GLENDAY said that at the beginning of the discussion he had felt rather like the man who had been called upon to address the members of a lunatic asylum and during his address one man had been removed from the room for having exclaimed "What rot!!" The attendant had told him afterwards that he might have thought he was wasting his time addressing them, but actually he must be doing them good, as it was the first sensible remark the man in question had made for months!

He was surely only a pessimist if he believed that it was only possible for the world to continue on the basis of its present economic structure. Personally he thought that the world had advanced, although it had periodically discarded what might be called its outer economic skin and started on a new course of life. This point had obviously been missed by some of the earlier speakers, and it was the reason why he had not attempted to provide ways out of the present difficulties of doing export trade. He believed that the present economic structure of the world was undergoing a change, and it would only be a matter of time before the present methods of carrying out export trade were completely discarded, and not only export but every other form of trade.

Monetary policy had been mentioned as a solution. Because he rejected it, he hoped he would not be misunderstood and regarded simply as one who could see no faults in our present system. To show that this was not the case he might remind them that he served an organisation which had been the only one in Great Britain to raise a voice of protest when it had been suggested that a return should be made to the gold standard in 1924. At that time that suggestion had been regarded as almost immoral and his organisation had been held up to public obloquy in the Press and by economists, while to-day everyone seemed to regard printing off unlimited paper money, defaulting on debt obligations and depreciating exchanges as proper and respectable methods of carrying on finance.

Personally he believed it to be more confusing than helpful to try to solve the economic problem by approaching it from the monetary point of view. When anyone spoke of money, he wanted to know what it was going to be used for, and when they spoke of savings and investments, he wanted to know what they were made up of in labour and materials. A well-known economist who had recently studied the unemployment returns in relation to the new munitions

programme had published a calculation which suggested that the whole of the million five hundred thousand registered as unemployed would be absorbed into new employment. He had modified his statements subsequently, but they showed the danger of discussing economic problems in abstract terms of "labour and money". There might be heavy unemployment in, say, the Lancashire cotton industry, but it did not mean it could be relieved because there happened to be work to be done in, say, the Kent coal-fields. Anyone who thought our employment problem could be solved simply by monetary means should study what was at present happening in Germany, where they had found a way of producing the maximum amount of employment; but where also they had found it necessary to impose a very powerful and ruthless form of dictatorship for the purpose. This did not of course mean that he considered that the present monetary system would continue to function as in the past. He could even envisage a negative rate of interest being found necessary in the future; by this he meant the possibility that a man who lent say a thousand pounds would receive say only nine hundred back in ten years' time.

As the last speaker had said, the present difficulties were largely of man's own making, but the position would be perhaps more difficult to deal with than he had seemed to think. There were still many ways of continuing export trade, and some of them had been mentioned, for instance if the overseas countries in the world were going to break away and establish their own industrial systems, they would have to be provided with plant and machinery for the purpose. The same was true of many undeveloped areas in Europe. To show what astonishing results could be achieved by providing countries even with the most elementary forms of transport and communications, he would remind them that in the eighteenth century the price of meat as near London as Horsham had been 1½*d*. a pound, while the price in London had been 8*d*. This enormous gap had been bridged simply by introducing better methods of transport. In the distant places of the world similar spectacular price reductions could be effected, but this could not happen if the same rate of interest were expected or the same method of repaying loans employed as was in use to-day. He mentioned some of these things just to illustrate that to believe that the present economic structure might be destined shortly to disappear was not to be a pessimist; on the contrary, if he had to believe that the United States of the year 1929 represented the apex of the civilisation to which all the world should aim, he would regard the future of the world with profoundest pessimism.

LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR GEORGE MACDONOGH (in the Chair) said that his own feelings were much the same as those of the first speaker in the discussion, and looking back on seventy years of experience he could really say that he was an optimist; but he entirely agreed with the lecturer that there was no hope of going back to the old system which had prevailed before the Great War.

ANGLO-JAPANESE COMPETITION IN THE SHIPPING TRADE

W. L. HICHENS

ANGLO-JAPANESE competition in the shipping trade is a long and a complicated subject, and I cannot possibly do justice to it in the short time at my disposal. I must begin by making certain assumptions. The first assumption I will make is that our trade in the Orient is of vital importance to this country. The second assumption I will make is that our shipping in the Far East, which to a large extent carries this trade, is also of great importance to us, partly from the revenue that it brings in; from statistics prepared by the Chamber of Shipping it would appear that the revenue derived from shipping to and from and within the Far East is about a quarter of the total gross earnings of the shipping of this country. But it is also important, I will assume, because a strong mercantile marine in the Far East is essential to us as an Empire. For my own part, I take these assumptions for granted, and, that being so, I take this also for granted—that if our shipping trade in the Far East is of vital importance to the British Empire, we must take the necessary steps to preserve it in so far as steps require to be taken.

What is the present position in regard to our Oriental shipping trade? As far as the shipping trade between this country and Europe generally and the Far East is concerned, we are holding our own pretty well. We have about 50 per cent. of the total tonnage passing through the Suez Canal to the Orient, and we have much the same percentage—about 50 per cent.—of the tonnage passing to the Far East round the Cape of Good Hope. Now, that is a substantial proportion, and it has not fallen off at all appreciably in recent years. It is true that there was some slight falling off in the tonnage passing through the Suez Canal at the time of the Italo-Abyssinian War but, on the whole, we have maintained our position well. But I do not think we can afford to lie back and think that all is well. We have many formidable rivals—the Germans, the Italians, perhaps the Norwegians, the Japanese and others—and it is not going to be too easy a matter in the future for us to maintain the big percentage which we have to-day. It will take us all our time to

hold our end up, but at any rate for the moment the situation regards our shipping between Europe and the Orient is in a fair satisfactory position. When you come, however, to our s trade within the Orient it is a different story, and there the situation is not nearly so satisfactory. I think it can be be explained by one or two examples of what has happened.

As of course everybody knows, the shipping business on th principal trade routes is controlled by Conferences, that is t say by agreements between the shipping lines on those route in regard to such matters as the freights to be charged the apportionment of the tonnage as between one line and an other, the pooling of receipts and the question of deferred rebate These Conferences are sometimes known to the general publi as shipping rings, and sometimes they are regarded somewha askance as machinery for keeping prices up and exhibiting th vices of a monopoly.

I should like to interpose here that this subject was inquire into by the Imperial Shipping Committee, and we came to the unanimous opinion that the liner trades of the world could not possibly be maintained efficiently without Conferences. They are a necessary part of the proper organisation of liner shipping

The shipping trade in the Far East is accordingly governed by Conferences, as it is in other parts of the world. There are I think, altogether some sixty Conferences in the world; in the Far East there are only about half-a-dozen important Conferences governing the many routes of shipping. I am not going to deal with all of them, but will take one or two examples to show what has happened in regard to British shipping.

The first example that I will take is the Bombay–Japan Conference, that is to say the group of shipping lines that run between Bombay and Japan and vice versa. This Conference was started at the end of 1888. At that time there were only three members of it, the P. & O., which had 66 per cent. of the trade, the Austrian Lloyd, which had 17 per cent. and the Navigazione Generale, which also had 17 per cent. Japan, at that time, had none of the carrying trade. That lasted for some time, but eventually the Japanese came in, and the manner of their entrance is interesting and instructive. Mr. Tata, who was the head of a large iron and steel business in Bombay, thought that the ring was charging too high prices for his shipments. He therefore went over to Japan and offered to support a prominent Japanese line if it would compete for the traffic. As a result the Japanese line did come in, and there was a freight war. Eventually

Mr. Tata made his peace with the Conference, but the Japanese were more persistent. They went on, and eventually had to be admitted to the Conference. That was in 1896, that is to say eight years after the Conference first started. Their share was provided wholly by the P. & O., who conceded 18 per cent. of their 66 per cent. so at the time when the Japanese first came in the P. & O. had 48 per cent. of the trade and the Japanese only 18 per cent. By 1913, however, further inroads had been made on the position of the P. & O.; Japan then had 40 per cent. and the P. & O. only 28 per cent. and the other two lines 32 per cent. between them. Thus in twenty-five years the Japanese share of the trade had risen from nothing to 40 per cent. and the P. & O. share had fallen from 66 per cent. to 28 per cent., which seriously prejudiced British shipping. Then came the War when the British Government requisitioned most of the British tonnage. The result was that whilst they performed a service of the greatest imperial importance the trade of the British shipping lines fell largely into the hands of the Japanese. In 1921 the Conference agreement was revised, with the result that 66 per cent. of the trade was allotted to Japan and 34 per cent. to the P. & O., the other two European lines having dropped out. But even that was not the end of it. The Japanese persisted still further, and in 1929 they secured no less than 80 per cent. of the traffic, only 20 per cent. being left to the P. & O.; and I am afraid that there is more trouble brewing, because at the present time a fourth Japanese line is seeking admission to the Conference, and, backed as it is by the other Japanese members, its claim may prove irresistible. Another unsatisfactory feature about this Conference is that the freight rates are fixed not by discussion between the members of the Conference, with mutual concessions here and there, but by "Renzokai," which is the Japanese Cotton Spinners' Association. They settle with the Japanese members of the Conference what the freight rates are to be and the P. & O. are obliged to accept their decision. It is said that the present rates are unremunerative. Thus from a 66 per cent. share in 1888 the P. & O. have dropped to a 20 per cent. share to-day and the Japanese from nothing at all have risen to 80 per cent. with control of the freight rates.

The next example I will give is the Calcutta–Japan Conference, and the tale there is much the same. The Japanese again have secured the lion's share of the Calcutta–Japan traffic for themselves, and have strengthened themselves in other ways. One of the last Conference settlements was made in 1929 and the

British India Company was able to get a provision inserted to the effect that the constituent members of the Conference would respect the established trades of the other members outside the Conference. The particular object that the British India Company had in mind was that they were engaged in the shipping trade to East Africa, whilst the Japanese had no share in that trade. The Japanese lines agreed to this provision in 1929, but sometime later on they gave notice that they could no longer be bound by it. Eventually a Japanese line, the O. S. K., had to be admitted to the East African Conference. Now, that is a matter of great significance, because it shows how the Japanese are spreading their tentacles wider and wider. Having got to East Africa, there is no doubt whatever that they will in time extend down to the Cape and round the Cape up to West Africa. The shipping problem, therefore, at once becomes a matter which affects the South African Government as well as the other members of the Empire, for the Japanese have begun to invade the South African market.

Now one last example, and I have finished this dreary tale. The trade between Australia and Japan was in the hands of the British Eastern and Australian line from 1872 to 1895 when Japanese competition began. Not to make too long a story of it, the present situation is that the Japanese lines have sixteen modern ships on that route, and they are about to build two more large ships of 11,700 tons and something like twenty knots speed, whereas the British Eastern and Australian Line have only three old ships. Fortunately, for the latter, the Australian Government supported them in their negotiations with the Japanese members of the Conference, with the result that a pooling arrangement was established in respect of 50 per cent. or thereabouts of the freights, and of that pool the British Eastern and Australian Line get 22½ per cent. and the Japanese 77½ per cent. So that, practically speaking, the Japanese have two-thirds of that trade now; and the British Eastern and Australian Line is, I am afraid, there only on sufferance. The rates of freight, it is said, are such that they cannot make a living, and most of the traffic is carried in Japanese ships. This is, of course, inevitable so long as the Japanese ships are more up to date and faster than those of their rivals and new tonnage is essential if the British line is to hold its own.

Summarising the position, one may say that within the last two generations the growth of Japanese shipping has been phenomenal in the Orient, and the decline of British shipping

has been lamentable. At the present time more than two-thirds of the British-Japanese trade in the Orient is carried in Japanese ships, whereas two generations ago Japan had no mercantile marine in the western sense. Meanwhile our share of this trade has dwindled to insignificant proportions. That is a serious situation, and I submit that it is one which requires to be dealt with actively and drastically, if we are to maintain our position at all. But before discussing what we ought to do, I should like to say a word or two as to the causes of this disastrous position of British shipping.

The Imperial Shipping Committee inquired carefully into the causes of this rise and fall which may be summarised. In the first place the Japanese Government have adopted a far-sighted policy of subsidies. They have had no less than three "scrap-and-build" schemes between 1932 and 1936. As a result of those three schemes some five hundred thousand tons of old shipping were scrapped and some three hundred thousand tons of new shipping were built. They built forty-eight new and fast ships infinitely superior to anything they had ever had before, with the result that, at the end of 1936, the Japanese mercantile marine had more ships under five years old in proportion to its tonnage than any other country in the world. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of this up-to-date tonnage. In addition to the scrap-and-build policy provision was made for loans for shipbuilding at low rates of interest. Moreover, operating subsidies amounting to about a million a year were provided. I do not regard that as a very big figure, but it helped to strengthen Japanese shipping. I would like, however, to stress the importance of the new ships that the Japanese have built under these schemes. It has enabled them to compete successfully against the older tonnage of British lines, and has put the latter at a very great disadvantage.

In the second place, the Japanese have had an advantage on account of currency depreciation and the lower standard of living in Japan. It has been very difficult to form even an estimate of what the value of these factors might be, but the Imperial Shipping Committee, after taking what evidence they could, came to the conclusion that this might mean an advantage of something between 10 per cent. and 15 per cent. to Japan in the year 1936. That is a very rough estimate, and it may be rather on the low side. Now, the subsidies that Japan gives and the advantage derived from currency depreciation and a lower standard of living are obviously beyond the control of British

lines, and, I submit, they may reasonably claim that subsidy should be met by subsidy and that they should be enabled to compete on equal terms. This is a necessary corollary to the proposition that British shipping in the Orient must be maintained.

Now we come to another advantage which is claimed for the Japanese. By far the greater part of the Japanese large-scale industry is in the hands of three large family concerns known as the Zaibatzu. (There is a fourth Zaibatzu, but as it only deals with finance it does not come into the present picture.) These large concerns are what are known as vertical organisations. That is to say, they each have their own mines, their steel works, their ship-yards: they have their own shipping lines: they do their own banking and insurance: they are merchants and they are manufacturers. Now, it is claimed that that is a very material advantage to the Zaibatzu in their competition with British firms which are not on that large scale and which are not organised vertically. I do not want to argue as to whether the vertical or the horizontal form of organisation is the best. For my own part I believe that the horizontal form of organisation is best for this country and I am convinced that it would be a mistake for us to attempt to imitate the Japanese large-scale organisations. These great organisations may suit them—I think they do. They are based on a long tradition of some two hundred or more years, but I feel convinced that they would not suit our highly developed individualism, and I cannot believe that they are necessary for effective competition.

Another advantage claimed for Japan is that the Japanese lines are more efficiently run than some of the British lines. Now, in so far as the British ships are older and therefore less efficient, the fault does not lie wholly with the owners. But the criticism goes beyond that and suggests that in some cases there is an inefficiency in the management and organisation of British lines which clearly deserves the fullest investigation. We have too much evidence that the organisation of some of these lines is behind the times to allow the conclusion that there is nothing in the accusation at all.

These, then, are the advantages claimed for Japanese shipping—subsidies, cheap loans, currency depreciation, lower cost of living, powerful industrial and financial organisations, greater efficiency. But there is one other advantage that the Japanese have which is I think by far the most important of all. They have the active and continuous support of a strong Government, backed not only by business opinion, but by public opinion

generally. The development of the Japanese mercantile marine is a great national movement, and commands the support of every section of the community, and that support is expressed, as we have seen, not merely in words, but in deeds. I have mentioned subsidies and cheap loans. I will add that a shipping control law was passed in 1936, the effect of which is to prevent uneconomic competition as between one Japanese line and another: that coastwise shipping is protected; that by government orders wherever possible Japanese goods are carried in Japanese ships and goods purchased by Japan in foreign countries are also carried in Japanese ships. This vigorous policy has been highly successful and the result of it has been that to-day more than two-thirds of the Japanese trade with other countries in the Orient is carried in Japanese ships, whereas two generations ago practically none of it was so carried. That, then, is the position of Japan: she has this highly centralised Government closely watching the shipping of the country, doing everything that can be done to foster it and to see that Japanese shipping is given every conceivable advantage.

What, then, does the British Empire do to look after the shipping of the Empire in the Far East? The Empire is like an orchestra without a conductor, every member doing that which seems good in his own eyes; or rather perhaps the British Empire is like a modern Laocoon strangled by the State rights of its constituent members.

There is no Imperial organisation in existence which is capable of dealing with this particular problem. The nearest approach is the Imperial Conference which meets once every five years. When it met last, in 1937, it reaffirmed that "the maintenance of adequate British shipping is a matter of common concern to the countries of the Commonwealth." That is the quinquennial contribution of the Imperial Conference to this particular problem. As a sentiment it is unimpeachable, but it is neither constructive nor even accurate.

The resolution, for instance, says that British shipping is a matter of common concern, but is it? Take the case of India, for example. There is very little doubt, I think, that Indian public opinion is not in the least interested in the P. & O., or the B.I., or any other British line. It regards them as interlopers, and foreign rivals who frustrate the development of an Indian national marine. And there is something in that. There is no doubt that the P. & O. and the B.I. have to some considerable extent frustrated the ambitions of nationalist India. I do not

say that India could have got on without these companies, but the time has come when Indian interest in Imperial shipping must be enlisted by giving India a share in her own shipping that will satisfy her national aspirations. Then take the Australian line. Is there any "common concern" there? I do not think that the Australian wool-growers regard the British Eastern and Australian Line as a necessary part of Australian national life. I should have said that their primary concern was to get the best price they could for their wool, and that whether it was carried by a British line or a Japanese line was a secondary consideration. I do not say that is true of the statesmen of Australia, but it is true, I think, of the average wool-grower, and the reason is again because this is not an Australian national line in any real sense of the word. They have no pecuniary interest in it, and after all that is one important consideration. Again I think the time has come when it should be made clear to Australia that an Imperial shipping line which is of common concern to Australia as well as to this country implies that Australians should have a financial interest in the success or failure of the line. So that part of the resolution, which refers to British shipping as a matter of common concern, seems to me to fall to the ground under analysis. Then again there is no unity of control in regard to our shipping in the Orient. It is obvious, of course, that the Imperial Conference exercises no kind of control. A multiplicity of departments deals with the problems as they arise. They spend their time writing minutes, making statements and speeches, but nothing happens. Now, I suggest for your consideration that there is only one effective solution of this problem, postulating as I do that the real cause of Japanese success is the vigour with which the Japanese Government support their own people. The solution is that we must have one Imperial body as vigorous as that of Japan endowed with the necessary power to see that a policy is inaugurated, is pursued and is carried out. I can only think of one analogy in the Imperial world, namely the Imperial War Graves Commission. The Imperial War Graves Commission has done a great Imperial work and has set an example which we should do well to follow in other fields. We may learn from it in particular that success can only be achieved if the appropriate instrument is devised and what is more important, if its use is entrusted to a strong and vigorous personality.

Some such imperial body is required, I submit, to restore British shipping in the Orient to vigorous life. I do not want an

Advisory Committee. Advisory Committees are futile bodies. They talk a great deal, they give advice which nobody pays any particular attention to and nothing happens. What is wanted in this case is a body endowed with power to act. The kind of powers that an imperial shipping committee for the Orient ought to have are, I suggest, in the first place the power to adminster subsidies. I have said that I thought subsidies were essential. They should be Imperial subsidies voted by the whole empire, not only by this country because, *ex hypothesi*, the whole empire is interested in the problem. In allocating these subsidies the committee should be authorised to make such conditions as are appropriate and to see that they are carried out. The committee should also have power to see that the subsidised lines in question are efficiently administered. They should also have power to conduct negotiations subject to ratification by the appropriate authorities. For instance, to conduct negotiations to-day with India, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, merely by correspondence is quite hopeless; it is necessary for someone who is familiar with the problems to visit these different countries and to establish personal contacts.

The Imperial Shipping Committee made a very tentative suggestion. They suggested in guarded terms that "it may be necessary to develop some new form of organisation appointed by the governments concerned and specially charged to watch over British shipping in Middle and Far Eastern waters," and they commended the idea for the early consideration of the governments concerned. That is as far as they went. I, as you see, have gone a good deal further, and of course I am speaking for myself and not for them, but at least they recommended that the idea which I have been trying to put before you should be considered by the governments of the empire. I wonder if anything has happened? Has anybody in the Chamber of Shipping, for instance, who should be interested in this problem caused a question to be asked in Parliament to know if anything has been done? I doubt if anything has happened, and there are grave risks that this report will share the fate that attends the work of most advisory bodies.

Meanwhile we are losing an asset which is of vital importance to us. It is time that we acted, because the sands are running out, and if we do not act soon we shall not have any shipping in the Far East to save. It is much easier to save the shipping that you have got than to recover it after you have lost it, and it should not be difficult to make a reasonable agreement with

Japan. Let me give you one interesting example. The Netherlands East Indies were in just the same difficulty as we are. The Japanese Government made a determined attack upon their shipping, which at first was more or less successful There is, however, this fundamental difference between the two cases—namely there is one government in the Netherlands East Indies which is not afraid to act promptly and vigorously. Moreover public opinion and the business community locally supported the Government in their opposition to Japanese encroachments. I need not worry you with the steps they took, but they succeeded. Eventually, after a short and sharp freight war, they came to terms with the Japanese lines concerned on a fifty-fifty basis, which is a reasonable basis for the carrying trade as between two countries. Now, if the Netherlands East Indies can achieve a fair settlement, why should not the British Empire? Nobody would grudge the Japanese a fair share of the trade. They are entitled to it by reason of their enterprise and efficiency. But the British Empire is also entitled to at least a half share of the trade and we have only ourselves to blame if we fail to get it.

Summary of Discussion.

MR. CLEMENT JONES said that he would like the audience to imagine for a few moments that they were shipowners, though the lecturer had drawn a picture which perhaps would not make them care for this position for long. For the sake of an example they owned a ship, a British ship of say 5,000 tons, a cargo liner in the Far East. This ship was twenty years old and, as the average life of a ship was twenty-five years, she had five more years to run. Being shipowners, and having read the report of the Imperial Shipping Committee, and also the speech in the House of Commons by the President of the Board of Trade on March 28th last, they would know the position and where some money could be found. Having got some money, they would go to their shipbuilder and order a new ship, but not the same ship as last time, because, having read the report of the Imperial Shipping Committee, they would see that the Japanese were putting on faster boats, and therefore the British must modernise their ships too with perhaps a speed of an extra knot. Some people might think one knot was not very much, but one knot translated into mileage per year meant 5,500 miles, because, it was estimated in the report, the steaming of a ship at sea was about 230 days in the year, the balance being spent in loading, discharging, and in repairs and surveys. The British shipowner having got his new ship, having obtained assistance from the Government, having obtained a faster ship than the old one, would turn back to the Committee's report and would find that his modern vessel might possibly compete with an old Japanese ship, even

allowing for the lower running cost, the depreciation of currency, and the cargo arrangements under which the Japanese benefited, but not with a modern Japanese vessel. In view of this really terrible position for British shipowners in the Far East, it had been refreshing to hear from the lecturer what the British Empire might do.

MR. R. T. BARRETT said that during the twelve years he had been an editor and journalist in the Far East, from 1926 to 1938, the P. & O. line had completely replaced their fleet with new vessels. Unfortunately these ships were only running at seventeen knots, compared with the twenty knots and more of the Lloyd Triestino (Italian) and the N.D.L. (German). It was unfortunate that the P. & O. did not command the support and the affection which it should do from the British community. The Blue Funnel liners, which were rather old and rather slow, were, however, always full and deservedly popular.

As to coastal and river shipping in China, Great Britain had opened up the Yangtsze and the West Rivers to navigation, and we were now being driven off both of them. On the West River conditions had been unsatisfactory for many years. British ships had to have British officers, but in many cases the officers were no more than dummies, and the ships were run by Chinese pilots and compradores. Conditions were better in the coastal traffic. Discontent in British merchant vessels in the Far East, and on the Far East run, seemed to go deeper than ordinary grumbling, and there was a serious leakage of personnel, many apprentices and certificated officers being ready to do anything rather than remain at sea.

SIR KENNETH LEE said that in the last century and up to the Great War it had probably been convenient for the Empire to have different governments. The Dominions had been far apart, communications poor, and competition not particularly severe. Since the War matters had entirely changed. Communications were different and a situation had arisen which had never been contemplated when the Dominions had become autonomous. The time had come when it was again necessary to consider the possibilities of an Empire Parliament which should meet at quite frequent intervals; and this was made possible by the development of air communications. It might be that such a parliament could start with an empire shipping committee, charged with looking after shipping in the Far East; and it might be found that such an organisation had so much value that it might then develop into something much more important. The lecturer had pointed out that the time had come when such an organisation was vitally necessary if the Empire was not to be driven off the trade routes of the Far East. The position was very serious. It was quite impossible for the shipowners to compete unless they had assistance, and that assistance was not all monetary. The merchants, the people of the Empire must be behind the shipowners. Therefore the suggestion of the lecturer, which had gone far beyond the tentative proposals of the report of the

Imperial Shipping Committee, was of the utmost importance. It was to be hoped that he would himself put forward even more concrete suggestions so as to formulate what was a most important departure in the policy of the British Empire.

MR. BARNARD ELLINGER referred to the statement in the report of the Imperial Shipping Committee that Japan had an advantage over United Kingdom shipowners in 1936 of from 10 to 15 per cent. owing to the depreciation of her currency. Since then the Japanese wholesale price level had risen 50 per cent. The British price level had fallen, and this difference should have more than wiped out the advantage gained for Japan from her depreciated currency. The report said that she had an advantage in the cost of shipbuilding of 10 to 15 per cent. Since then her steel had risen in price 100 per cent., and the price of timber had risen 50 per cent. British steel prices had also risen recently but not to the same extent. It might be said that this position would alter when the present conflict was over, but at present Japan was piling up an enormous national debt. Since the Sino-Japanese conflict started her cost of living had risen by 40 per cent., her wages by only 8 per cent. but they would rise still further, and it was probable that at the end of the war she would find that her prices and cost of living approximated more to the British level than formerly.

Then in an appendix to the report there was a most interesting analysis of the difference in the cost of running a British ship and a Japanese ship of the same tonnage, which showed that the British costs were £310 a month more than the Japanese costs. It was said often that Japanese wages were very much lower, yet according to this report the Japanese were paying 30 per cent. more than the British and for a smaller crew. Practically the whole of the difference between the British and Japanese costs arose from the salaries of the officers and the engineers and their messing charges. Indeed, the salaries of the master and the chief engineer alone came to about a third of the difference in the running costs. He did not wish for a moment to suggest that they were overpaid, but it was important to point out that the difference could not be put down to the payment of wages in the ordinary sense of the word.

With regard to efficiency, he knew nothing of the efficiency of British shipping, but in 1926 Mr. Inouye, the late Finance Minister (who had been assassinated), had given some interesting figures for Japanese shipping—for instance, that a Japanese vessel the same size as a British vessel would carry a crew of 123, whereas the British ship would carry a crew of only 94. Looking at the appendix of the report, he saw that the British boat carried a crew in the proportion of four to three to the Japanese but according to Mr. Inouye in 1926 the crew of a British vessel was in the proportion of four to five of that carried by a Japanese vessel. Thus in thirteen years the proportions had been reversed. Whatever might be the efficiency of British ships,

there had been an extraordinary increase in the comparative efficiency of the Japanese ships and from his knowledge of the Japanese, if any settlement with them were to be arrived at in conference, it would only be arrived at if they were convinced that the British were as efficient at running their ships as they were themselves. Of course if the British were going to fight with subsidies, they had the longer purse, and would probably win in the end, but, after all, a fight with subsidies was exactly the same as a freight war, except that the tax-payers paid for it instead of the shipowners.

As regards the three great families and the vertical organisations in Japan to which the lecturer had referred, there was nothing comparable in England, yet there were very great and powerful vertical firms who did extensive overseas trade. It was very doubtful whether the capital of any one of the three big families equalled that of Lever Bros. But when the Japanese bought goods from Australia, for instance, they insisted that they should be carried in their own ships. They went further: they bought goods f.o.b. and sold c.i.f., and by this means carried their goods between the two countries in their own ships. He had been for very many years an exporter of Manchester cotton goods to India and the Orient, and during the whole of the twentieth century the Bombay shipowners had had an agreement with the Bombay Piece-Goods Association which embraced hundred of members, by which they had fixed the rates of freight and the sailing dates between Lancashire and Bombay, and the Bombay Piece-Goods Association had imposed this contract upon the Manchester shippers, saying that they would only buy the goods in spite of the fact they were sold c.i.f. if shipped in these boats at certain rates agreed by the Bombay shipowners. If the good will of the Indian traders and the Australian traders could be secured, British shipowners might make similiar arrangements with these traders as were made with the Bombay Piece-Goods Association. The difficulty might, no doubt, be to secure this goodwill.

Admiral Drury-Lowe said that he would like to make a plea for extra speed. In the days of the Great War when the convoy system had been adopted to counter the submarine menace, the convoys had been for the slow ships, mostly twelve knots and under, and ships of over 14 knots were usually not included. In the next war there would be the added danger from enemy aircraft when approaching land or from aircraft-carriers on the open seas, and the question of increased speed would be a very important matter. At the moment 60 per cent. of the British shipping over 3,000 tons was under 12 knots. Only 5½ per cent. was over 16 knots. Japan, Italy and the United States were giving subsidies for new ships on a minimum speed qualification and increase subsidy for additional speed. It was very necessary that Britain should have faster ships, especially oil tankers which could then be independent of convoy. These should have a speed of at least 18 or 19 knots.

MR. WARREN SWIRE said that he was a shipowner, and rather proud of the fact, though this might seem strange. His sphere was the China coast, and in his experience the Japanese were not the villains of the piece. They were villains; but for many years he had competed with them, and until 1937, when the Sino-Japanese war had started, had been able to hold his own against them perfectly well. The Japanese were subsidised, and he was not. Since the start of the war, of course, British shipowners had been up against Japanese armed forces, and there was no answer to that. Even so, quite recently the Japanese Government had wanted the Nisshin Kisen Kaisha to re-start their services on the Yangtsze on a proper commercial basis in competition with the British lines, when the N.K.K. had replied that they were not strong enough to tackle us without Government help. Actually at the moment, however, the British were being treated with utter contempt. The Yangtsze River was closed to all foreign shipping, and what was needed was not subsidies to deal with the Japanese, but the action of the British Government to preserve British rights in the Far East.

A serious matter for the ocean shipowners with services to China would be the disappearance of so many English merchant firms, of whom there were only two or three of any size left. British export firms in the Far East were either being squeezed out by the Japanese or were dying of anaemia, and the loss of their support could not but be a very serious matter.

As regards the floating staff in the China coast companies, if those who criticised knew how many hours were spent considering the staff problems, they might be more charitable. There was a great deal to cope with, but the Companies were doing their best.

LORD ESSENDON (in the Chair) said that the lecturer had spoken from the point of view of his position in the Imperial Shipping Committee. In a lesser degree he had had a similar experience, because latterly the Board of Trade had requested the British shipping industry to make a report on the conditions of the industry, and the Chamber of Shipping and Liverpool Steam Shipowners' Association had appointed him as Chairman of a Committee to find the facts; as a result of their report, various things had been done for the shipping industry.

They had been particularly requested to look into the matter of foreign competition, and it was fairly widely known that the position of British shipping as compared with 1914 was fairly stationary. On the other hand, foreign shipping had increased since that period by about 20 million tons, and whilst British shipping was the largest individual unit of all the countries, her proportion of world tonnage had been reduced from 44 per cent. to 27 per cent. They had paid particular attention to Japanese shipping, and had found that it constituted indeed a great menace to British shipping for the future. He had with him a report on the matter which said that particular attention should be paid to Japanese shipping. In so far as it was subsidised and aided by exchange control, it was not peculiar in character; its

danger lay in the fact that it was operated on standards considerably lower than those of Britain and other European countries. Then the Japanese system combined in one organisation the business of shipowning and merchanting, which meant that Japanese trade, both export and import, followed the Japanese flag. Hitherto this competition had been confined to trades based on Japan, but now Japanese sea-going merchant navy vessels of 2000 tons gross and upwards had increased by over 200 per cent. since 1914, and by about 25 per cent. since 1929, and a further substantial increase would be brought about in the near future, as a result of the new rebuilding programme upon which she had embarked. Under subsidies granted up to April 1937 there had been built seventeen large Japanese cargo vessels with a speed of 15 to 18 knots, as compared with the normal economic speed of 12 to 15 knots. It was understood that under recent subsidies cargo vessels with even higher speeds were being built. This excessive building for speed was what was called in the shipping industry a speed ramp. Passenger shipping was a different thing, but for a cargo-boat to have such an excessive speed meant that it had to be subsidised to make it pay. Every knot of increased speed made a tremendous difference to the cost of production; an economic speed for a cargo-boat was anything from 12 to 15 knots, according to the trade in which the vessel was engaged. One speaker had mentioned speed entirely from the defence point of view. Things would be pretty bad when boats had to be built with a view to their being bombed. Boats should not be built for this purpose; it was a chance which had to be taken. Cargo-ships with a speed of 18 and 19 knots were entirely uneconomic, and there was no excuse for building cargo-carrying vessels of that speed. If Japan and one other nation continued this, however, it would be necessary to meet the competition which it represented. This could only be done by subsidies.

The lecturer had spoken of trade between India and Japan, and Australia and Japan, and had said how the merchants and bankers and shipowners worked together. Very often the merchants and the shipowners belonged to the same groups in Japan, and then there were the advantages of the yen and the lower standard of living. He knew of an instance concerning the carriage of rubber going from British Malaya to New York. Until four or five years ago the Japanese had not been interested in that trade, but they had demanded, and finally received, admission to the Conference. Of course, they were supposed to adhere to the Conference rates and conditions. They had overcome this by forming a merchanting company which could buy rubber at slightly higher prices than the other exporters were prepared to pay. They had then shipped it in their own vessels at the Conference rates and had sold it in New York at a lower price. This had caused a dispute between the various shipping lines, and in order to meet that competition the British had reduced their rates by about 50 per cent., and then a fight had arisen, after which they had negotiated as to the proportion of the trade they should have. After six months the Japanese had, by these

methods, had 10 per cent. of the trade, and after twelve months 50 per cent. Then discussions had been started, and the British had mentioned 15 per cent., and the Japanese asked for 26 per cent.; and then the Sino-Japanese War started, and for the time being the whole matter had been shelved, but no doubt the conflict would arise again unless something were done in the meantime. Hitherto most of their competition had been confined to the Pacific, but it was almost certain that they would go farther afield in the future, and that they had designs on the trade of the whole world.

As the lecturer had pointed out, the British had no authority in dealing with these things. As the report of the Imperial Shipping Committee had said, the Imperial Conference met every few years and placed on record their appreciation of the value of the mercantile marine to the Empire, and there the matter rested. The lecturer had put forward three solutions. One had been the reservation of British trade for British ships. Actually, the whole of the Indian coastal trade was carried by Indian and British ships. Ninety per cent. of Malayan trade was carried by British ships, whilst the whole of Australian and New Zealand trade was carried by the ships of those countries; so that the reservation of British trade to British ships would not help very much in this instance. The next question had been that of the apportionment of the trade between the different countries. This was a dangerous subject to treat generally, but in these particular trades, for instance the trade of Japan and Bombay, there were practically only two countries concerned, in this case Japan and Great Britain, and it should be possible to make a unilateral agreement giving 50 per cent. of the trade to each party; but he understood that both in the case of the Indian and the Australian trade attempts had been made to get a fair percentage and had failed. Then in the case of the Indian share of the trade being divided between Great Britain and Japan, if the British trade were again to be divided with India, British shipping would be no better off than at present with their 25 per cent. or 22 per cent., except that we would have an agreement and the trade would be divided up and would be remunerative, whereas at present it was not so. The third solution put forward by the Committee had been the question of subsidies. Personally, he hated subsidies, but it was really the same as rearmament; other people armed, and so Great Britain had to do so in order to defend herself. The British Government had said recently that they were going to vote what was called a Liner Defence Fund, and a Commission would be established to which British lines in any part of the world might make their complaints, and if it could be found that any of them were due to subsidies, then the fund would make a contribution in order that the shipping company might hold its own with foreign competitors.

Certainly this matter of Japanese competition in the Orient should be discussed by members of the Governments concerned, in India, Malaya, New Zealand, Australia and, of course, Great Britain; and this should be done without delay. At present the Japanese were occupied in

China, but if something were not done in the meantime, the competition from this source would be very severe in the future. A good deal of trouble had also been experienced in dealing with the United States and the trade to Vancouver and San Francisco from Australia and New Zealand. The American Matson Line had built two very fine ships costing 6 million dollars each, 75 per cent. of which had been borrowed from the United States Government at, he thought, about 1 per cent. interest. Of course, the British company concerned had not been able to meet that competition, and had referred the matter to the Imperial Shipping Committee in 1932, and nothing had been done; then the matter had been referred to the Imperial Shipping Committee in 1936, and then, rather belatedly, they had started to discuss the matter with the Governments of Canada and New Zealand and Australia, and immediately differences of opinion as to procedure and detail had arisen; he had never understood why no one had had the imagination to say that the ships should be laid down and the details settled afterwards; meanwhile, discussions had gone on, and the ships had never been laid down, and now prices had risen and they would cost very much more than if they had been started in 1936.

Observations had been made about the Indian and Australian freights; if something were not done to assist British companies in those trades they would inevitably be driven out, the Japanese would therefore get a complete monopoly, and in the end, of course, having a monopoly, would take advantage of it to put up the rates. This was one reason why it was vitally urgent that something should be done.

Replying to comments made during the debate, Lord Essendon said shipowners did desire to make conditions at sea as comfortable as possible. No doubt many years ago conditions had been bad, but they had been improved in many ways. The Board of Trade had made regulations. The crew now had quarters amidships instead of in the foc'sle, and there were regulations with regard to food; notwithstanding what had been said, British companies did sometimes suffer in competition with companies where wages might be higher but where the crew was less numerous. He had been surprised to hear the statement made by one of the speakers that Japanese wages were higher than British wages. That was definitely not correct. Neither could he believe that the Japanese had a crew of 123 men to a British crew of 94. A Canadian who had just returned from Japan had told him that Japanese wages on land were sometimes as low as twopence an hour, twelve shillings a week, and it was unlikely that it would be much more favourable on board ship.

Concerning war risks, the Government had decided that, as in the last War, ships should be insured at the original cost of the ships less depreciation at the statutory rate for the period of the ships running. This became operative after the outbreak of war; until then the ships were covered by a Club under a mutual scheme; but after the outbreak of war 80 per cent. of the risk was taken by the Government and 20 per cent. by the Club, and appropriate premiums charged according to the

risk at stake. Under this scheme matters had been conducted satisfactorily during the last War.

During the Abyssinian War, a boat of the Prince Line, instead of going round the world through Suez and along the Mediterranean and across to New York, had gone round by the Cape of Good Hope because the insurance premiums had been so high in the Mediterranean. This had taken four days longer, but £1,700 had been saved in canal dues through not going through the Suez Canal.

MR. W. L. HICHENS replied that it was true that the difference between the cost of living in Japan and the currency depreciation as between that country and Great Britain might disappear entirely, but the fact remained that this had caused the disadvantageous position of the latter in the past. The Committee which he had proposed would deal with all such questions and would not give any subvention if it were not needed.

The chairman had referred to free rubber going out to America in Japanese ships. This had been mentioned in the report of the Imperial Shipping Committee, and was an illustration of the point he had tried to make; owing to their vertical organisation, the Japanese were able to pay a price rather higher than the market price for free rubber in the Malay States, they carried it at the agreed price, and sold it rather below the market price. There was a profit on the whole transaction because the freight rates approved by the Conference left a good margin over expenses. There was a simple way out of the difficulty, *viz.*, by an allocation of tonnage, but nothing was done, and nothing was done because there was no imperial authority in existence able to take action. Had the committee he had suggested been in existence, the problem could have been solved. The chairman had also referred to the delay over the negotiations for subsidising the building of new ships for the Australian–Canadian service. A central Imperial authority could have dealt with the matter promptly and the present fiasco could have been avoided.

Very often there was a tendency when mentioning British shipping to mean English shipping, and not imperial shipping, and when subsidies were discussed it was taken for granted that they would come from England and that the Empire would neither be consulted nor contribute. The time had come when the shipping of the Far East should be regarded as an imperial matter which, though it greatly interested the Chamber of Shipping, should be dealt with by some other authority. He suggested the Imperial Committee which he would like to see set up.

Finally, what he had said about the Japanese he had not meant in any critical spirit. On the whole they had done what they were perfectly entitled to do. Occasionally, perhaps, they had done what many business men were sometimes apt to do, namely observe the letter of an agreement and use all their ingenuity to get round the spirit of it. Their success was due to their great activity and superior organisation. The British Empire could not hope to meet Japanese competition in the future unless it had a more active and vigorous organisation than it had had in the past.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

Any book reviewed in this Journal may be obtained through the Publications Department of the Institute. Members of the Institute wishing to cable an order may use, instead of the title of the book, the number which it bears, e.g., " Areopagus, London : Send Book Twenty May Journal : Smith."

Books marked with an asterisk (*) are in the Library of the Institute.

GENERAL

1*. PEACEFUL CHANGE : Procedures, Population, Raw Materials, Colonies. Proceedings of the Tenth International Studies Conference, 1938. (Paris : International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation. 8vo. 685 pp.)

THE first and most valuable part of this book is, in effect, a summary of the work of the International Studies Conference during the years 1935–37. This summary, which consists of reports of five Secretary-Rapporteurs on different aspects of the problem of securing " peaceful change " in international affairs, is particularly valuable for the reason that the work of the Conference has already stimulated the publication of a large number of individual books and studies—Mr. C. R. M. F. Cruttwell's *A History of Peaceful Change* among them—which provide unusually useful material for comparison and co-ordination. The report of discussions at the Paris meeting of the Conference in 1937, which fills the latter part of the book, is perhaps rather less valuable, though the interplay of various national points of view sometimes provides interesting reading.

It is not the business of the Conference to reach fixed conclusions, still less to make definite recommendations to Governments. This fact may seem to some readers to lend a somewhat academic note to its proceedings, but, in fact, the examination of such problems as are created by the distribution of raw materials and colonies is both practical and penetrating though Mr. Carl Major Wright's report on the Danubian question may seem to have an interest which is, unluckily, mainly historic to-day.

Inevitably, most of the writers and speakers who contribute to this volume tend to look towards development of international control for an answer to most of the questions which they raise. It is suggested, for example, that migration should be planned and perhaps supervised by some central institution, and repeated reference is made to the possibility of establishing international companies to develop colonial territories and raw materials. On the other hand, the very real difficulties—psychological as well as material—created by the shrinking of trade and the growth of autarky are not blinked.

There is, perhaps, a good deal of wisdom in M. Herriot's suggestion to the closing session of the Conference that the conflict with which we have to reckon is one " between the two verbs *to be* and *to become* "—between the Latin idea of a fixed legal framework for the world and the German conception of perpetual evolution. J. M. REID.

2*. MODERN CONSTITUTIONS SINCE 1787. By John A. Hawgood. 1939. (London: Macmillan. 8vo. xii + 539 pp. 16s.)

THE advanced student will probably find the most permanently valuable part of this work to be the bibliography, which assembles the essential works on all State constitutions of the last hundred and fifty years in a very convenient and comprehensive form. There are, however, one or two odd slips; Professor Brogan (No. 70 in the bibliography) is uncomfortably linked with Lord Bryce in the past tense, and "W. C. Macartney" (Nos. 284 and 295) seems to be a combination of two very different people, "C.A." and "W.F.R." The book itself is something of a *tour de force*, and has the defects of that quality. It should (in theory) be impossible to give a complete summary of all constitutions adopted (and many not actually adopted) during the last hundred and fifty years in 466 not very large pages. Mr. Hawgood has done it and, what is even more surprising, has made a tolerably readable book in the process. The interest comes mainly from the ingenuity with which classification is blended with chronology, and from the tidy (one might almost say "elegant") way in which a mass of arid fact is fitted together and made coherent. There is also a good deal of effective writing, occasionally overstrained ("If the governing principles of fascism jump the Alps and eventually seep through to the Piraeus, they are not damned by that fact in itself"); and (except for misprints, which are too numerous) the accuracy is beyond reproach. But the great defect of the compression of so much learning into so little space is that there is little new in it for the advanced student, yet the beginner is likely to find the allusiveness of the style rather too much for him. This will make an excellent class text-book, but only under the guidance of a first-rate lecturer. W. J. M. MACKENZIE.

3*. DIPLOMACY. By Harold Nicolson. [*Home University Library*]. 1939. (London: Thornton Butterworth. 8vo. 256 pp. 5s.)

A BOOK on Diplomacy has been badly neeeded for some time, and Mr. Nicolson, who dedicates his work to Horace Rumbold, "an ideal diplomatist," was the ideal author to supply it. His pages are filled with the wisdom of experience distilled with the mastery of an accomplished man of letters.

He begins with the origins of the art in ancient Greece when "heralds were invested with semi-religious authority," then carries us swiftly through the power-politics of Macchiavelli and his successors and the "profit-politics" of the Hanseatic League to the "Old Diplomacy" of yesterday and the "New Diplomacy" of to-day, dropping many a pearl by the way. "The worst kind of diplomatists," we are told, "are missionaries, fanatics and lawyers; the best kind are the reasonable and humane sceptics." The diplomat needs "truth, accuracy, calm, patience, good temper, modesty and loyalty," to which formidable list he promptly adds "intelligence, knowledge, discernment, prudence, hospitality, charm, industry, courage and even tact." After this, it is not surprising that Mr. Nicolson does not think it easy for amateurs, even when they are premiers or foreign ministers, to fill the diplomat's rôle. He has some interesting passages on "diplomacy by conference" and the value of "personal contacts," on the difference between "policy" and "negotiation," on the growing importance of economic issues and on the possibilities and limitations of the Geneva system. There is a piquant chapter on "Types of European Diplo-

macy," those characterised being the British, the French, the German and the Italian.

The book is enriched by a useful glossary of diplomatic terms and a short bibliography.
A. Z.

4*. WORD WARFARE: Some Aspects of German Propaganda and English Liberty. By John Gloag. 1939. (London: Nicholson and Watson. 8vo. 154 pp. 3s. 6d.)

MR. GLOAG, who has had large experience of commercial propaganda, had an excellent idea. Immediately after the September crisis he flew to Germany "to learn something of Germany's reactions to the crisis and to observe how their propaganda worked." The result is disappointing, since what we are offered is less a case-study of the Nazi propaganda machine in action at a crucial period than a traveller's impressions of some of the more familiar parts of that machine. On this level the book is lively, and sometimes penetrating. The writer has a particular interest in architecture and design, and his observations on the manner in which these have been used to express National-Socialist ideas form the most original feature of his book. With his conclusion that "The strength of German propaganda to-day is the perfect co-ordination of all its branches. Its weakness is exaggeration," most students would probably agree. He also believes that Great Britain "has the courage and invention to use perhaps to better advantage than our neighbours that great contemporary weapon—propaganda," and that she should use these qualities for more extensive propagandism forthwith.
TERENCE H. O'BRIEN.

CHURCH AND STATE

5*. NATIONAL SOCIALISM AND THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH: being an Account of the Conflict between the National Socialist Government of Germany and the Roman Catholic Church, 1933–1939. By Dr. Nathaniel Micklem. 1939. (London: Humphrey Milford, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 8vo. xvi + 243 pp. 8s. 6d.; to Members of the R.I.I.A., 6s. 6d.)

IN a Foreword to Dr. Micklem's book Lord Astor defines "the issues raised in the conflict between the Catholic Church and the National Socialist State" as "of fundamental importance for the destinies of Mankind." It is in that spirit that this work is written and the Council of the Institute has been fortunate in finding in Dr. Micklem one who possesses a clear grasp of the first principles involved and an exceptional power of expounding the philosophy of National-Socialism in contrast with that of historic Christianity.

For this reason the first seven chapters of the work are of the greatest importance. No one who has read them can fail to understand the challenge which National-Socialism offers to the civilisation of Europe. For Dr. Micklem shows clearly that the conflict in Germany is not merely another phase in the age-long controversy between Church and State, but that the very existence and meaning of the Christian Churches are threatened by the Nazi *Weltanschauung* which, in effect, defines as political any religious teaching likely to produce opinion or conduct deviating from the strict Party point of view. Whilst, therefore, the Party leaders profess support of "positive Christianity" and, to quote Dr. Micklem, "are willing to tolerate and even commend any form of Christianity which, in their view, eschews politics, that is, which

accepts the politics of the Nazis themselves," these "politics" insist upon racialist views and, still more important, on views of Right and Justice wholly incompatible with a Christian standpoint. There results a "tragic and inevitable conflict between two philosophies that are finally irreconcilable" (p. 31).

It is not only, however, an analysis of the principles at stake which Dr. Micklem has given us. The second, and longer, of the two sections into which his book falls contains a detailed analysis of the struggle between the Catholic Church and the National Socialist State year by year from 1933 to 1938. Here the tactical methods of the Nazi State can be studied, particularly the combination of false accusation to undermine an opponent's moral standing with a subsequent use of forcible suppression when it is thought tactically desirable. That method has been used so effectively both within and without Germany against all opponents of the régime since 1933 that it deserves to be studied and recognised by all who wish to understand the present German State. That the issues between it and Christian civilisation are fundamental is overwhelmingly proved by Dr. Micklem's scholarly analysis both of the ideologists of the Nazi movement and, even more convincingly, by his restrained and accurate recital of the facts of the religious struggle in Germany during the past few years. E. J. PASSANT.

6*. CHURCH AND STATE. By Karl Barth. Translated by G. Ronald Howe. 1939. (London: Student Christian Movement Press. Sm. 8vo. 90 pp. 2*s.* 6*d.*)

THE original German edition of this book is entitled *Rechtfertigung und Recht.* "Justification and Justice," writes Dr. Barth in the opening sentence, "indicates the question with which I am dealing in this work." Immediately he queries, "Is there a connection between the justification of the sinner through faith alone completed once for all by God through Jesus Christ and the problem of Justice, the problem of Roman law?"

In dealing with this problem, the author bases himself on the Reformation confessionals, making it clear that the two are there not in conflict, but can well exist side by side each competent in its sphere. Complaining that, with the exceptions of Luther in World Authority and Calvin in the majestic closing chapter of his Institutio, Reformation confessionals do not tell us all we might have expected, he proceeds to an examination of the scripture texts bearing on the subject.

This little book is the research work of a powerful and independent mind into the foundations on which a Christian doctrine of Church and State should be established. A splendid text-book for circles of study to use, it presents difficulty in its language to the ordinary reader which must have tried Mr. G. Ronald Howe, the translator.

JOHN LOVE MORROW.

ECONOMICS AND FINANCE

7*. LA NATIONALISATION ET LA CONTRÔLE DES USINES DE GUERRE. Par A. Bigant. Préface de M. Gidel. 2e édition. 1939. (Paris: Editions Domat-Montchrestien. La. 8vo. 231 pp. 40 *frs.*)

M. BIGANT in this volume has made a valuable contribution to the literature on the subject of the nationalisation and control of the manufacture and trade in arms. He traces briefly the history of French laws relating to the manufacture and sale of munitions of war from

the fourteenth century to 1935. After commenting on the various acts passed in 1935 on the manufacture, exportation and control of the private manufacture of arms, he devotes most of the volume to the law of August 11th, 1936, which was hastily passed through the French Chamber and Senate, practically without opposition.

The law gives carte-blanche to the Government to nationalise partially or wholly any suitable establishment and to indemnify any companies so taken over. The law does not specify the nature of the control to be imposed on companies not taken over.

M. Bigant thinks that the 600 million francs paid in indemnities could have been more usefully employed by enlarging existing Government establishments.

The author devotes several chapters to the consideration of the definition of war materials; to the number and nature of companies taken over by the Government and the indemnities paid to them; to the financial participation by the Government in companies which it did not fully own; and to the nature and extent of Government control of private manufacture of arms.

In his conclusion M. Bigant expresses the view that the law of August 11th, 1936, constituted a new step towards the integral socialisation of private property which has raised anxiety in commerce and industry, the extent of which cannot be measured now.

M. Bigant is specially qualified to write on this subject, and his book should be in the hands of all who are following this phase of industrial development. DAVID CARNEGIE.

8*. WORLD FINANCE, 1938–1939. By Paul Einzig. 1939. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. 8vo. xiv + 307 pp. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

THIS volume supplements the author's *World Finance since 1914* and *World Finance, 1935–37* and *World Finance, 1937–38* and brings the picture up to 1938–39. In the preface Dr. Einzig says that the book will probably be subject to criticism on the ground that it is too political for a book which purports to describe financial developments, but that the introduction of politics requires no apology, for this factor has become more important in the sphere of international finance than all the other factors put together. That part of the book which deals with finance is, as might be expected, very informative. Dr. Einzig's political views, whether the reader agrees with them or not, are always interesting, but sometimes he allows the political aspects to run away with him and to occupy space which might usefully be devoted to a closer analysis of the effect of the political factors on economic and financial questions. An example of this is to be found for instance in his chapter XXIX on "Arms and the Pound."

Another criticism which might be made on this volume is that it reads somewhat disjointedly, and as if it were a collection of notes.

In spite of these grumbles, the book is a useful history of the financial events of the past year. It is easy reading, with many flashes of Dr. Einzig's pawky humour.

The financial problems of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Germany, Spain, Japan, and China, are all dealt with in this volume. Explanations of many financial transactions are made clear to the lay reader, *e.g.*, why the fear of imminent war causes a flight by hoarders from gold to the dollar, while the process is reversed from time to time by scares of a dollar devaluation. BARNARD ELLINGER.

9*. MONEY AND BANKING 1938–39. Volume I: Monetary Review. Volume II: Commercial and Central Banks. 1939. (Geneva: League of Nations Economic Intelligence Service; London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 173, 202 pp. 5s., 6s.)

THESE annual surveys take the story of world monetary developments up to March 1939, the first volume providing the survey of developments during the past year, and the second setting out the statistics and factual data relating to 44 countries. These volumes are, of course, indispensable to all students of international monetary developments.

The Review volume deals with developments under four heads: Exchanges and Gold; Currency, Credit and Government Finance; Structural Changes in the Banking System; the Bill of Exchange. Of special interest is the treatment of problems of what are now known as extra-budgetary funds (a topic first given its proper emphasis in Great Britain by Professor N. F. Hall), and the estimates of bills outstanding in the London money market on the basis of receipts from stamp duties, a method the present reviewer first heard put forward by a member of Chatham House, Mr. R. H. Jessel, some years back. But these are only small points if we look at the picture as a whole, for the Review covers the behaviour of currencies and financial institutions during a peculiarly difficult year politically. The League Intelligence Service, by its up-to-date handling of the vast quantities of information which it has collected, is putting under an obligation not only the economists and financiers of to-day, but also the historians of the future.

A. T. K. GRANT.

10*. A JOURNAL OF REPARATIONS. By Charles G. Dawes. With forewords by Lord Stamp and Doctor H. Bruening. 1939. (London: Macmillan. 8vo. 527 pp. 21s.)

THIS book might be looked upon as an echo of "old, unhappy, far-off things," if we were not even to-day paying the penalty for the economic dislocation caused by extravagant reparation demands, and if we were certain that history would not repeat itself in a very unpleasant fashion. It does not profess to make any substantial contribution to the elucidation of the financial and economic problems with which the Dawes Committee were faced, and which, to their credit, they did not attempt to solve; they sought merely to prepare conditions under which a solution, which meant the final determination of Germany's debt, would be possible. It will be more appropriately placed on the bookshelf where Memoirs are stacked than in company with technical or semi-technical literature.

The book will appeal primarily to those who were themselves occupied with the administration of reparation, and particularly with the Committee's activities. It has, however, a wider human interest, and is worth reading for the self-portrait, almost unconsciously depicted, of a great American citizen who has served his country in many honourable and important posts. His qualities stand out—candour, loyalty, modesty, simplicity, shrewdness, a touch of sentimentality, and a capacity both to give and to inspire affection. One quotation will illustrate the nature of the man: "This could not properly have been published during the years of international interest in and discussion of the experts' plan—indeed, I publish it now with some hesitation, for I fear my appraisement at the time of the individual contributions to a group effort of ten men does not do full justice to them all." I

wonder if any of us who worked in or for the Committee would have disclosed in his contemporary notes such consistently good temper and such sincere generosity.

Incidentally the book pays a well-deserved tribute to that seventeen-stone soldier of fortune, Colonel Logan, without whose efforts the Dawes Committee would probably not have come into being as it was constituted and at the time it was constituted. It contains an admirable report from his pen, one of those reports which made those of us who were sometimes privileged to see them in confidence wonder how he could write with such conciseness and ability and talk like "poor Poll" in a Franco-American jargon of his own, which Monsieur Loucheur once described as "the third official language of the Reparation Commission."

But why should potential purchasers be offered at one guinea a book of 527 pages, of which more than half consists of material already published? ANDREW MCFADYEAN.

11. MERCHANTS OF PEACE. By George L. Ridgeway. 1938. (Columbia University Press; Oxford University Press. 8vo. xiii + 419 pp. 18s.)

THIS somewhat enigmatic title is used for a comprehensive and interesting history of the International Chamber of Commerce from its beginnings in 1905 to the present day. The I.C.C., as it is called for short, is a technical bureau consisting of representative business men organised in national committees throughout the world, with a central secretariat in Paris.

Many people may be surprised to learn what an active part was played behind the scenes by this body in post-War efforts at reconstruction in Central Europe and in laying the foundations for the Dawes Plan. When the problem of economic reconstruction led on to the question of trade barriers and tariffs, the I.C.C. was found in the vanguard of those advocating a liberal commercial policy. The I.C.C. participated actively in the World Economic Conference of 1927 and the movements which arose from this conference, and since 1931 has thrown its weight into the movement for world economic disarmament.

The author of this book claims that the International Chamber of Commerce, owing to its international and non-political character and the opportunity it affords for technical co-operation, has been a vigorous factor for international economic goodwill and for peace.

T. COBBOLD.

12. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS. By P. T. Ellsworth. 1938. (New York: Macmillan. 8vo. 529 pp. 18s.)

AN author who in 1938 attempts to write a text-book on international economics is faced with a formidable task. Without altogether neglecting the so-called classical theoretical approach, he will probably also feel obliged to expound the more modern theory based upon a general equilibrium theory of value, and may even be disposed at least to indicate the modifications necessitated by recent work on imperfect competition. He must say a good deal about the monetary mechanism of international trade, and will also be expected not only to explain the conventional arguments for protectionism, but also to describe the bewildering complex of quotas, exchange controls and clearing agreements which must be the normal everyday working

material of every realistic student of international trade as it is in fact conducted to-day. Professor Ellsworth attempts all these things, and if he has not succeeded in the impossible task of producing the perfect text-book, he has at least produced a clearly written and on the whole well-arranged piece of work which should be useful to many students. Even the most arduous effort in endeavouring to keep in touch with all the current devices for restricting and controlling trade is likely to be defeated, and it is not surprising if those who make the effort shrink from the further endeavour, which may also be doomed to failure, to fit the facts into some kind of systematic and co-ordinated theoretical framework.

Two points of criticism are of sufficient importance to receive specific mention. Despite the imperfections of the purchasing-power-parity concept, one may regret Professor Ellsworth's relegation of that doctrine to a secondary place, whence it is not easy to see the solid advantages to be gained from considering gold-standard adjustments as merely a special case of the general theory of equilibrium. Nor is it entirely satisfactory to set on one side the analysis of the effects of restrictions upon migration or upon capital movements, on the ground that the rationale of such restrictions is very similar to the justification offered for trade restrictions. The effects of trade restrictions may be different according as they are, or are not, combined in greater or less degree with restrictions in the other two directions mentioned, but as this is a field in which systematic study has not yet gone very far, it might be unreasonable to expect an author who makes no claim to originality to undertake its exploration.

A. G. B. Fisher.

13. The Industrial State. By Zoltán Magyary. 1938. (New York and London: Nelson. 8vo. xi + 203 pp. *7s. 6d.*)

The organisation and administrative systems of governments need frequent modification, but in few periods have the changes been so rapid as in the post-war world. Yet they are rarely reviewed internationally, and this makes Professor Magyary's book specially welcome. His main argument is that technical developments resulting from the industrial revolution, together with the great increase in government participation in economic affairs, have involved rapid growth of public administrative services staffed by experts with permanent appointments, and a shifting of interest and influence from the legislature to the administration. Just as in big industrial undertakings efficiency has necessitated the application of the principles and methods of scientific management, so public administrations must adopt these principles and methods. Experts should be led by technically trained superiors, and the problem must be solved of reconciling professional competence with popular responsibility, especially as the purely political method of selecting ministers is becoming more and more unsatisfactory.

Professor Magyary outlines post-War changes in the organisation of government administration in many European countries and the United States. He calls attention to difficulties in some countries resulting from the persistence of eighteenth-century political principles, especially liberalism, under conditions to which he considers they are no longer appropriate. Economic life from being private has become a public business, and yet the machinery of the State has not been properly adapted to this change. Among general tendencies noted is that for the powers of the chief executive, whether prime minister,

president, or chancellor, to increase both in relation to other ministers and to parliament. The prime minister can no longer remain *primus inter pares*. Only a strong chief executive, assisted by his own civil general staff for purposes of supreme direction, administrative co-ordination and control, can cope with the complex functions of the "industrial" State. Special attention is directed to the solutions adopted in dictatorship countries, and to the less drastic changes made by the democracies. Professor Magyary shows a faith, which many would not share, in government by a super-man with an almost military hierarchy of control. Such a system is not really efficient in a complex community, and would be unworkable for any length of time in countries with a reasonably intelligent population. J. HENRY RICHARDSON.

14. STUDIES IN INCOME AND WEALTH, Volume Two. By the Conference on Research in National Income and Wealth. 1938. (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research; London: Macmillan. 8vo. 342 pp., tables. 14*s*.)

15. CAPITAL CONSUMPTION AND ADJUSTMENT. By Solomon Fabricant. 1938. (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research; London: Macmillan. 8vo. 271 pp. 12*s*.)

THESE volumes present the results of further stages in the researches noted in *International Affairs*, November–December, 1938 (Vol. XVII, No. 6, pp. 840–1), but are devoted more exclusively to the economic and statistical problems presented by efforts to measure the volume of capital. Dr. Kuznets, the Chairman of the Executive Committee which is responsible for *Studies in Income and Wealth*, tends to write down the value of some of the claims made for such measurements, but within the more modest limits which he permits there is still ample scope for such careful work as is here exemplified. A. G. B. F.

16. LES EXPORTATIONS DE LA FRANCE ET LES NOUVEAUX PAYS INDUSTRIELS. By Claire Pohly. 1939. (Geneva: Librairie Georg. 8vo. 138 pp. *Frs. Suisses* 4.)

THIS doctoral thesis, presented to the Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences in the University of Geneva, deals with the effects of industrialisation upon the trade of older countries, a process which on more than one occasion has been held by those who have an insufficient appreciation of the importance of elasticity and adaptability in national economies to threaten Europe with ruin. An examination of the statistics of French trade with the United States and Japan shows these fears to have been much exaggerated, and suggests that broadly speaking the additions to world production ascribable to such industrialisation are *net* additions and not merely the displacement of production formerly reserved for the older countries. A. G. B. F.

17. THE BRITISH TARIFF SYSTEM. By E. B. McGuire. 1939. (London: Methuen. 8vo. 312 pp. 10*s*. 6*d*.)

A useful, if pedestrian, study of a dull, but important subject, the administrative and technical side of British tariff policy. The theoretical excursions, however, add little to the value of the book for the expert, and are for the most part not sufficiently penetrating to be useful to the general reader. A. G. B. F.

18*. FREEDOM AND THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM. By Friedrich A. von Hayek. *Public Policy Pamphlet No.* 29, edited by Harry D. Gideonse. 1939. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Sm. 8vo. 38 pp. 25*c*.)

REFUGEES

19*. THE REFUGEE IN THE UNITED STATES. By Harold Fields. 1938. (New York and London: Oxford University Press. 8vo. 229 pp. 10*s.* 6*d.*)

THE initial difficulty which confronted Mr. Fields in compiling this work lay in the policy of the United States Government, which makes no discrimination between refugees and other immigrants. No questions are asked as to the motives for immigration to the United States. The refugee who arrives in the country counts as a unit in the quota of immigrants admitted, and is not enumerated as a member of a special class. The chief value of this book lies in its description of the laws and regulations which govern immigration generally, and which, save in certain small details, are identical for all immigrants, refugee or other.

Mr. Fields states that this official attitude towards immigration is also the attitude of the general public. "So far as that public is concerned, its reflexes and reactions on the immigration issue definitely tint the general attitude towards the refugee. This observation is strongly evident in any analytical study of migration movements to American shores."

The value of the devoted work of very numerous philanthropic organisations which deal with immigrant refugees is apparent from the record of their activities contained in this book. Their influence is doubtless responsible in considerable part for the rapidity with which refugees, in common with other immigrants, are assimilated in the general population of the country. Another point made by the author is the valuable contribution to culture and to industry made by distinguished individual refugees, of whom he has compiled a list of Russians (pp. 112–114) and of Germans (pp. 157–159). Similar lists could doubtless be compiled of immigrants who are not refugees in origin.

The book suffers from lack of an index, and the bibliography, while by no means exhaustive, includes many ephemeral magazine articles.

JOHN HOPE SIMPSON.

LAW

20*. THE LAW OF TREATIES. British Practice and Opinions. By A. D. McNair. 1938. (Oxford: Clarendon Press; Columbia U.P. 8vo. xxx + 578 pp. 30*s.*)

THIS volume is the result of a belief of the members of the Department of Public Law and Jurisprudence of Columbia that " the decisions of foreign offices reflect and mark the practice of the time and yield authoritative evidence of what international law really is." Therefore, they agreed that " it seems obviously desirable, if not imperative, at the present time to endeavour to ascertain the conclusions of foreign offices—governmental decisions—on International Law. To make those decisions available would constitute a service of large practical value to every agency, governmental or otherwise, that professes interest in learning what the law of nations really is." To achieve these desirable objects, the members of the Department properly believed that it was necessary to find a competent and interested individual, a citizen of the country the opinions and practice of which it was proposed to study, and one who had the confidence and

goodwill of the Government and the officials of his country. Without this combination of qualifications and co-operation, a study of this kind would be impossible. The present volume, which deals with "treaties" in the United Kingdom, is the first one in this series of studies to be written, and it is a most interesting and valuable book. Dr. McNair is one of the outstanding authorities on international law in the English-speaking world; he is a British subject and a citizen of the United Kingdom; and his ability, his judgment and his discretion make him an ideal person for a task of this kind.

The book is divided into four parts: "The conclusion of treaties"; "the interpretation of treaties"; "the scope of the operation of treaties"; and "the termination and modification of treaties." It is based upon the opinions of the legal advisers of the Government and the decisions of British courts. While this material is of the greatest importance, two or three facts should not be forgotten in estimating this volume's place in relation to the "general," as contrasted with the "British," law of nations. First there are a number of other sources on which those looking for "the law" would rely; second, legal advisers may sometimes, like the attorneys for an interested party, feel that it is their function to make the best possible case for their country and Government or, in a word, their opinions may be subjective rather than objective; third, it is not always certain that the views of the executive or Government coincide exactly with those of the courts, as, for example, in the recent case of Kawasaki Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha of Kobe *v.* Bantham S.S. Co. Ltd. [1939], 1, A.E.R. 80; fourth, Dr. McNair, in addition, points out that it cannot be assumed that the action taken by a government follows the legal advice given it, and he does not attempt to follow each incident to its diplomatic or judicial conclusion. One appreciates why this was not done, but it would be interesting and instructive in many cases to know whether the views of the law officers of the Crown as to what the law in a given situation is resulted in a settlement or other action in accordance with that law. On the other hand, in a time like the present, when international law is being constantly assailed, volumes like that of Dr. McNair, which give concrete and practical illustrations of its existence and value, are so praiseworthy that these criticisms are in the nature of passing regrets that there are not more volumes of this character. NORMAN MACKENZIE.

21*. THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR DENIAL OF JUSTICE. By Alwyn V. Freeman. 1938. (London: Longmans, Green. 8vo. xix + 758 pp. 36*s*.)

THERE are not many problems in the field of international public law of such practical importance as the denial of justice in the "cadre" of the international responsibility of States. Before the beginning of this century, international "delinquency," when alluded to in treatises and manuals of the law of nations, was treated on the model of private law, as Grotius had already done. The apparition of Anzilotti's *Teoria generale della responsibilità dello Stato nel diritto internazionale*, in 1902, with his definition of delinquency as existing by the mere fact of a violation of a disposition of the customary or written international law, with *or* without fault of the State's organs, has provoked, in the last thirty years, the publication of a series of important monographs, which, supported by a project of the Institute of International Law and by a very learned piece of research at Harvard

University, no less than by some very important judgments of the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague, led to the elaboration of a certain number of rules constituting a sort of codex of international responsibility.

But if the different elements necessary for its existence seem to be laid down in general terms, there is one question, arising particularly in the relations with or between the American States, which has, till now, not been resolved in a satisfying manner—the conception and the content of "denial of justice." Monographs on international law—Borchard's admirable *Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad* (New York, 1915, 1927) is an exception—have drawn very little attention to it, though some special studies and a number of judgments of international arbitral courts have aimed at the elucidation of this difficult subject, and it was not before the appearance of the valuable book of the Greek professor Eustathiadès, *La responsibilité internationale de l'Etat pour les actes des organes judiciaires et le problème du déni de justice en droit international* (Paris, 1936) that the doctrine and practice of international law were provided with a sort of treatise on this subject.

The present study by Dr. Freeman, admirable by his mastery of the problems which must be considered in connection with that of denial of justice, a comprehensive knowledge of the relevant European and American literature and of the "cases," now constitutes the standard work on the subject. After having explained in brief the actual status of the problem of international delinquency and of the acts of the judicial power, the learned author discusses in a very lucid, logical, and systematic manner, always having in mind the development of the questions concerned through theory and practice (the Hague Codification Conference included), the different definitions of denial of justice, and its various forms in practice. The most important part of the work is the third part. Here he explains, first, the "local remedy" problem, discussed this spring (1939) by the Permanent Court of International Justice; also the attempts to restrain diplomatic interposition and the international standard of substantive and of procedural justice.

The different official, semi-official and private projects for codification are printed in very useful form in the annex to this excellent work, together with a bibliography (pp. 727–741) of no minor usefulness.

KARL STRUPP.

22*. CANADA AND THE LAW OF NATIONS. By Norman MacKenzie and Lionel H. Laing. 1938. (Toronto: Ryerson Press; New Haven: Yale U.P.; O.U.P. 8vo. xxvii + 567 pp. 27s.)

THE editors have given us a very useful collection of cases affecting Canada and Canadians, chiefly decided in Canadian Courts, but including, on issues on which there is no Canadian authority, cases affecting Canada determined in the courts of the United States or the United Kingdom. They have refrained from discussion or comment, no doubt wisely, and they have given much that is interesting and useful.

As the book will become a standard work, it is desirable to suggest certain changes in future editions. The matter on private international law is clearly out of place. To give nineteen pages to a judgment of King's Bench, Quebec, which discusses the extra-territorial effect of laws (pp. 402–421), is without value to students of international law, nor have the other cases adduced any relevance. The defence

urged (p. xiii), that the treatment accorded to foreigners by other countries in these matters often gives rise to diplomatic intervention, is not supported by evidence, and in any event none of the cases adduced can be justified on that ground. The case *Re Munshi Singh* (pp. 269–72) deals with a British subject, and raises no point of international law; nor does the *Brooks-Bidlake* case (pp. 265–8), nor the *Union Colliery* case (pp. 238–41), nor *Cunningham* v. *Tomey Hamma* (pp. 236–8), nor *Quong-Wing* v. *R.* (pp. 241–2). All these cases have constitutional interest, but no international bearing. It is also desirable that the editors should indicate, for the benefit of those not expert in British constitutional law, the exact value to be placed on the Chief Justice's views of the international status of Canada (pp. 12–29), in view of the fact that the Privy Council rejected his main thesis regarding federal power, and declined to pass judgment on his other essential points. The cases on war issues from Stewart are not of much value, and that on consular liability for libel (pp. 143–7) is hardly relevant. On nationality should be given *Thomas* v. *Acklam* and *Auchmuty* v. *Mulcaster*. It is odd to find translations as well as the originals of judgments in French. One version should suffice.

A. BERRIEDALE KEITH.

23*. VISIT, SEARCH AND SEIZURE ON THE HIGH SEAS. By J. L. Frascona. 1938. (Privately published, Rahway, N.J. 8vo. xiv + 161 pp.)

THE rapid development of submarines and aircraft as vital weapons in the conduct of modern war renders the study of the principles of visit and search on the high seas an actual problem. The problem is not confined to belligerents, but also directly affects neutrals, as the controversies raised in the Great War, particularly by the United States, abundantly prove. Mr. Frascona has made a constructive attempt to codify the main principles of this important branch of naval warfare and, for this purpose, has prepared a Convention accompanied by an illuminating survey and commentary to the fifteen articles of his Convention. He has throughout been guided by the praiseworthy effort to retain as many as possible of the existing rules, whilst at the same time subjecting them to such modifications as the exigencies of modern weapons and the altered circumstances of naval warfare have rendered imperative.

C. J. COLOMBOS.

24*. DIE VÖLKERRECHTLICHE STELLUNG DER INTERNATIONALEN KANÄLE. By Dr. Heinrich Rheinstrom. 1938. (Budapest: Révai. 8vo. 73 pp.)

Dr. Rheinstrom has very successfully marshalled in his monograph all the available material regarding the theory and practice of international canals. Both the Suez Canal and the Panama Canal receive detailed treatment in this work, which also contains an excellent summary of the Straits Convention of Montreux of 1936. The principle there reaffirmed of the freedom of navigation would appear to deserve a wider universal recognition, whilst the whole subject of international canals seems now ripe for codification on the lines already laid down so long ago as 1921 by the Barcelona Conference.

C. J. COLOMBOS.

COLONIAL QUESTIONS

25*. THE GERMAN COLONIAL CLAIM. By The Rt. Hon. L. S. Amery, M.P. 1939. (London: Chambers. 8vo. 190 pp. Maps. 7s. 6d.)

26*. JUDGMENT ON GERMAN AFRICA. By G. L. Steer. 1939. (London: Hodder and Stoughton. 8vo. xi + 351 pp. 12s. 6d.)

27*. GERMANY'S CLAIM TO COLONIES. By F. S. Joelson. 1939. (London: Hurst and Blackett. 8vo. 343 pp. 8s. 6d.)

A YEAR ago there was to be found, among those best qualified to form an opinion on the subject, a considerable and influential section to whom the idea of making some cession of colonial territory to Germany, as part of a general pact to ensure world peace, was by no means unacceptable. Very few would subscribe to any such proposal to-day. A study of Mr. Amery's book is calculated to reduce even further the number of those who still cherish thoughts in that direction. It is a book such as one would expect from the pen of a scholar, a student of history and a statesman who, both as Under-Secretary and later as Secretary of State for the Colonies, has enhanced the record of British colonial achievement. The fallacies underlying the Nazi cry for a fresh colonial outlet are mercilessly exposed. A clear analysis of the juridical and moral basis of Germany's claims, of the economic aspect of the case and of the strategic and political considerations involved, leads the writer to the conclusion, which the reader, too, will find difficulty in avoiding, that there is no justification for the German demand for colonial retrocession. On the contrary, Mr. Amery finds an overwhelmingly strong case, first on the ground of moral responsibility, and secondly on the ground of our own safety and existence as an Empire, against any concession. "To the demand for territorial surrender voiced by the present rulers of Germany there can, in honour and safety, be no other reply than an unqualified and uncompromising negative."

Nevertheless Mr. Amery does not lay down his pen without an endeavour to find a "constructive solution, not only to the position of Germany, but to the general relation of colony-possessing to colony-less Powers." He adumbrates the building up of a European economic system and the eventual development of a true European Commonwealth. We might waive our rights under the "most-favoured nation" clause in the European countries concerned and in their colonial possessions and induce the British Dominions and the United States to waive theirs. The colonial areas which are subject to the conditions of the Congo Basin Treaties or of a B Mandate would remain free to the trade of the whole world until eventually assimilated to one or other of the main economic groups. Under some such plan Germany would have—but only when she is freed from revolutionary ferment and prepared to recognise the mutual responsibilities of the European family of nations—an opportunity of winning peacefully her "place in the sun."

From the pages of Mr. Amery, *Times* Correspondent at the Cape before and during the South African War, we turn to those of Mr. Steer, *Times* Correspondent in Abyssinia a generation later. Mr. Steer's book is nearly twice as long as Mr. Amery's and takes three times as long to read, for it embraces a detailed account of Germany's colonising enterprises in South-West Africa, the Cameroons and Tanganyika. But the reader will find the time well spent. The respective performances of

German administrators in those three fields form a striking contrast. There is a tendency on the part of the public to judge Germany's fitness for colonial responsibilities by her record in South-West Africa. This is indeed a grisly record, and one which, if it stood alone, could earn only one verdict, namely permanent disqualification from sovereignty over native peoples. The record, however, of German administration in Tanganyika, though it affords ground for no great pride, is not one to be wholly ashamed of. There is not much to choose, perhaps, between the brutal extermination of the Hereros and the ruthless suppression of the Maji-Maji rebellion, but in Tanganyika the Germans did set up eventually, under the Dernburg régime, a system which ensured at any rate a certain rough justice for the natives, provided them with schools and promoted their agricultural development. The present reviewer recalls a letter written in or about 1909 by George Grey, of honoured memory, on a journey through Tanganyika to Kenya, where he was to meet his death. In it he paid tribute to a number of praiseworthy features of German rule.

It is in the Cameroons—the account of which forms one of the most attractive passages in Mr. Steer's book—that Germany can show the best record. Her occupation and administration of this rich area of Africa were comparatively free of bloodshed and oppression. On the one hand Puttkamer, with his commercial mind and easy morals, and on the other the missionaries, had laid the foundation of a state which, but for the War, might have played a leading part in African colonial affairs.

Not even the Cameroons, however, still less Tanganyika, and certainly not South-West Africa could be returned to Germany, in Mr. Steer's view, without incurring (apart from the economic and political issues involved) the gravest strategic risks: not, at any rate, to the Germany of to-day. Like Mr. Amery, he admits the possibility of an eventual settlement. But it would have to be a settlement with "a Germany which did not actively prepare for war and whose race philosophy was more akin to our own," and one which would somehow be guaranteed to last. This might be effected by general disarmament and by the establishment of an international inspectorate to ensure that disarmament was genuine and permanent. If a working agreement on such lines were reached with Germany, Mr. Steer would not oppose the retrocession of her former colonies. He would stipulate, however, that they must remain, although under German sovereignty, subject to the mandate system, and that Germany must undertake to adopt a native policy no less liberal than that of Britain, France and the South African Union. Even with these safeguards the change of masters would, he admits, be rather hard on the natives. But he thinks that the hardship is one which they might reasonably be called upon to suffer for the sake of world peace.

After reading all that Mr. Amery and Mr. Steer have to say on the subject one might feel that there was not much more to be learned regarding "Germany's Claim to Colonies," which is the title of Mr. F. S. Joelson's book. This would be a mistake, for, while much of the ground covered is the same, Mr. Joelson not only reinforces the case made out by the other two writers against retrocession but imports additional evidence and arguments. He refers, for example, to the probability that a proposal to surrender Tanganyika would be forcibly resisted by the British settlers in East Africa. Moreover his survey

covers a wider field than does Mr. Steer's, for it includes New Guinea, Western Samoa and other former German possessions in the Pacific, which are apt to be lost sight of when the destiny of more important territories nearer home is under discussion.

Mr. Joelson is a member of the Council of the Colonial League. His book must have been written before that institution came into being, but, had he written it expressly for the purpose of furthering the objects of the League, he could not have fulfilled the task more effectively. One of the most interesting chapters is that headed "Various proposals examined." Is there any solution which might satisfy Germany and yet not be detrimental to our honour or to our safety? The only one which Mr. Joelson regards as practical is that put forward by Mr. Amery and referred to above, namely that Great Britain should waive her rights under the most-favoured-nation clauses. He thinks that this, though unacceptable now, might one day be welcomed by Germany. Meanwhile he suggests that the negative policy of refusing to discuss German colonial claims should be accompanied by a positive policy of expediting development in our African heritage. "The more effectively we develop the colonial estates committed to our trusteeship, the less can our discharge of it be impugned by envious Powers."

C. H. RODWELL.

28*. ANNUAIRE DE DOCUMENTATION COLONIALE COMPARÉE. Année 1937. 3 vols. 1938. (Brussels: Institut Coloniale Internationale.)

THE three volumes published by the International Colonial Institute are indispensable to the serious student of colonial affairs, and if the International Colonial Institute did no more than produce each year this carefully edited and methodical publication it would more than justify its existence. The information contained is a direct reproduction from official publications containing full statistical information, details on the organisation of justice, education, and of economic and social life generally, and a summary of legislation and official orders. Though the information contained in Volume III on British colonies is easily available to English readers, that in Volume I (on Belgian Congo, Netherlands India, Italian Africa, and the Portuguese Colonial Empire), and in Volume II (on French Overseas Territories) is by no means so easily come by. Moreover the information is compiled year by year on the same plan, and as this is the eleventh year of publication it is possible to pursue any single subject systematically over the period.

Although the purely statistical and legal matter is mainly of interest only to specialists in the various aspects of colonial economy and administration, these volumes present material of more general interest, as they contain in many cases the speeches of Governors and Governor-Generals in opening the local government or council as the case may be, and in some cases speeches by the Ministers for the Colonies in the home Parliament outlining general colonial policy. These speeches usually contain a review of general political, economic and financial conditions and indications of policy. In the present volumes unusual interest attaches to the speeches of the Minister for Italian Africa and to the Budget statement in the Italian Chamber. Signor Lessona showed the dangers of too hasty settlement schemes, and stressed the importance of preliminary public works, for which a six-year plan was laid down. There are speeches by two great colonial administrators, M. Jules Brevié, Governor-General of Indo-China and by M. Pierre Ryckmans,

Governor of Belgian Congo, both of whom used the occasion to express their views on aspects of colonial administration of more than local and temporary interest. M. Brevié deals with the poverty of Indo-China and the possibility of developing her natural resources in a way which would make her a great outpost of France in the Far East. The principle of tariff assimilation could not be pushed to its extreme consequences or Indo-China kept in a permanent state of economic vassalage on the pretext that her products should not compete with those of France either on the French or the local market. Such a condition of inferiority would rapidly become intolerable, if for no other reason than the advance in industrial equipment to be made sooner or later in neighbouring States; French industrialists and capitalists could create in Indo-China an Asiatic centre of French activity for the supply of Eastern markets. The first step to raising the standard of living was the extension of plantation and peasant farming and the agricultural development of the highlands.

M. Ryckmans explained the difficulty of a colonial régime in which payments had constantly to be made abroad for the use of capital. The profits made by shareholders of the companies working in the Congo and the pensions of officials paid out of the Congo budget were not spent in the colony, but in Belgium or elsewhere; hence a continuous drain on Congo resources. He painted a vivid picture of the difficulties of native labour, the false economy of negligible wages, and the coming competition between plantation and native production. On the development of native courts of justice he showed how new precedents arising out of new situations were constantly emerging, precedents which would in their turn become custom. Whatever the shortcomings of native justice the injured parties got some satisfaction; "hatred, instead of exploding in murderous quarrels, wears itself out in interminable litigation, and chicanery—even pushed to the degree possible with the natives—is less anti-social than private vengeance."

MARGARET BRYANT.

29*. NEW TENDENCIES IN COLONIAL POLICY: A critical examination and explanation of the proposals of the Labour and Peace Movements for dealing with the colonial question, leading to a pacifist conception of the remedy for imperialism and war. With an Introduction by Leonard Barnes. 1939. (London: Pacifist Research Bureau. 8vo. 16 pp. *2d.*)

30*. WAR AND THE COLONIES: A Policy for Socialists and Pacifists. A statement on the international and colonial situation leading to proposals for a World Conference and the liquidation of imperialism. 1939. (London: Pacifist Research Bureau. 8vo. 15 pp. *2d.*)

WAR 1914–1918

31*. THE WAR BEHIND THE WAR, 1914–1918: a History of the Political and Civilian Fronts. By Frank P. Chambers. 1939. (London: Faber and Faber. 8vo. xv + 620 pp. Maps. *16s.*)

THIS book claims, and, to the best of the reviewer's knowledge, justly, to be the first work in any language to attempt to depict the domestic history of the more important countries engaged in the Great War during the course of its progress. It is written by a scholar who has done his best to use first-hand sources, though, as is modestly stated, "no claim is made to meticulous accuracy in any field."

The method of treatment is ingenious and perhaps the best under the circumstances. The book is divided into three parts, each containing a series of chapters devoted to individual countries. In the first part the record is brought approximately to the end of 1915, in the second to the end of 1917, while in the concluding section, devoted to 1918, the narrative quickens and is pulled together into a single chapter of 60 pages. The notes, which are collected at the end of the volume, extend to 28 pages, followed by a bibliography covering another 20 pages and lists of the British and French war-time cabinets. Thus readers who wish to extend their knowledge over any part of the large area covered summarily, but very readably, in the volume are given every opportunity of doing so.

The countries dealt with are Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, Turkey, Belgium, Poland and the United States. Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa are reluctantly omitted. So is finance. But these admitted omissions are a testimony to the completeness of the rest of the survey. A. Z.

32. SERBIA E L'INTERVENTO IN GUERRA DELL' ITALIA. By Mario Toscano. 1939. (Milano: Giuffrè. 8vo. 152 pp. *Lire* 18.)

THE author has tried to present an impartial account, based on the published documents now available, of the Italo-Serbian difficulties arising out of the secret treaty of London of April 26th, 1915. The passing of the years and the improvement in Italo-Yugoslav relations since 1937 have facilitated his task, but it is a difficult undertaking for a member of either nationality. The question, naturally intricate, was complicated by the fact that the articles in the press on both sides were usually written by Dalmatians, who imported into the controversy the local and racial animosities of their coast-towns, just as, in the 'nineties, the Irish question was embittered by the fact that the leader-writers on both sides were often Ulstermen and Irish Nationalists. Moreover, Sonnino, the Italian minister of Foreign Affairs, was temperamentally unsuited to compromise, as the author candidly admits, while the Consulta was not always well-informed about the intensity and extension of Yugoslav feeling.

While Sonnino insisted on having his " pound of flesh," promised by the Allies at other people's expense as the reward of Italy's entry into the War, he could not have been expected to anticipate the effect of the United States' entry, which ultimately caused the drastic overhauling of a secret treaty which they had not signed. There were, however, Italians, like Bissolati, and newspapers, like the *Corriere della Sera*, in favour of a conciliatory policy, while the views of their opponents were cleverly expressed by an Italian caricature, which showed an Italian soldier delighted at the disappearance under his blows of an aged double eagle in the Adriatic, only to witness rising from the waves a young and vigorous three-headed eagle.

A further difficulty, as the author points out, was the error of France and Britain in thinking that they could bring Bulgaria and Roumania into the War on their side by giving them concessions in Macedonia and the Banat at Serbia's expense, thus making Serbia the more reluctant to accept the Italian demands and even to collaborate with the Italian troops. His summary is that " at the base of the Italo-Serbian tension was a whole series of misunderstandings, wrong estimates, defective information, and internal negative influences. Italy had concluded

the treaty of London without knowing exactly the trend and value of the Yugoslav movement."

But he errs in assuming that the terms of the secret treaty were not known for long in Rome. Certain persons there outside government circles received them a few weeks after the signature. At this moment it is interesting to find Supilo arguing that a Yugoslav State would "serve as a bulwark against the German *Drang nach Osten*, a fact whence France and England would derive the greatest advantages." The railway connecting Split with the interior, which one of the documents advocated, has since been made, so that Dalmatia, economically, as well as politically, is no longer "a face without a head." Delcassé's ignorance of where the Bačka was may be paralleled by Lord Riddell's remark to the reviewer at the San Remo Conference: "Can you tell me where Fiume is?" and by Briand's ignorance of the Banat. "Valona" (p. 127) should be Volosca; "Serbia" (p. 124) Russia.

William Miller.

33*. Canada's Last War—and The Next. By C. P. Stacey. Reprinted from the *University of Toronto Quarterly*, Vol. VIII, No. 3. April 1939. 8 pp.

A review of the first general instalment of the *Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War, 1914–1919*. General Series, Vol. I: *From the Outbreak of War to the Formation of the Canadian Corps, August 1914–September 1915*. The reviewer points out the lessons to be learnt from the book, not the least important being the need for adequate supplies.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

34*. Land Utilisation in Australia. By S. M. Wadham and S. L. Wood. 1939. (Melbourne University Press, for the Australian Institute of International Affairs; Oxford University Press. La. 8vo. xix + 360 pp. Maps, illus. 21s.)

This is an admirable book. It has a real importance for anybody who is concerned to understand the present trend in the economic life of the world as a whole; those who have a special interest in Australia will find it both indispensable and fascinating. It performs for Australia the same function which the "Frontiers of Settlement" series performs for Canada. After an historical survey of the settlement and development of the country, and a discussion of the geographical controls, it discusses the rise and present position of each separate rural industry—wool, wheat, dairying, meat, sugar, fruit, etc. In every case it examines with precision and understanding the sum of factors—geographical, technical, commercial, social, and political—which are necessary for an appreciation of the industry's past and present. The writing is unpretentious and clear, and the argument is illustrated by excellent maps and charts. The map on page 120, for example, which indicates the seasonal variation of rain throughout a period of ten years in twenty selected pastoral areas covering the whole range of Australian climate, is a most simple and forcible device for conveying the essential information. And the book is full of maps and diagrams almost as good.

England is unfortunately still cursed with scores of busy-bodies who rush into print with pronouncements about the vast empty spaces of countries which they have never seen, or have seen without understanding. For any person to speak about Australia's vast open spaces without having read this book should be made a criminal offence.

The inexorable nature of the geographical controls cannot be too often stated. "Whatever the standard of living accepted by the inhabitants," the authors of this book state and prove, "four-fifths of the country could not be more densely settled because of rainfall deficiency or other factors. When the proportion of barren upland is deducted from the remaining 20 per cent. which is *climatically* suitable for more intensive development, the disparity between people and land takes on an altogether different complexion." Anybody who digests the account given in this book of what has been achieved in the mastery of new and difficult problems of soil and climate, will be impressed by the magnitude of the task completed, not by what still remains undone.

It is the economic factor which will decide whether or not the Australians are enabled to carry on the work according to their capacity for so doing. And this economic factor is not Australia's concern only. Historically, all the "new" countries, some inside and some outside the Empire, have depended for their development on investment; and investment has been motivated by the prospect of effecting sales in a profitable market. Is this prospect only temporarily clouded, or permanently? What inducement have private investors to-day to put their money into the development of food and raw-material producing countries? Will they do in this century for Africa (but for the advancement of its Native peoples) what they did in the past century for Australia? It is hardly likely. Will the government then do the job? For the whole colonial Empire? That too is hardly likely. What then is the answer to the problem? History has the answer up her sleeve; it may or may not be pleasant for the British Empire and its peoples.

W. K. HANCOCK.

35. ENGLAND AND THE CONTINENT. By Carlo Scarfoglio. 1939. (London: Putnam. 8vo. 338 pp. 7s. 6d.)

THIS is an interesting, provocative, and at times irritating book: interesting because it gives an insight into current Italian interpretation of British foreign policy since 1660; provocative, because every page contains its dogmatic assertion or sarcastic observation; irritating, because of its flamboyant and egoistic turn of phrase. Nevertheless it is a book which should be read by all students of international affairs, as its thesis is widely accepted in Europe as true. Briefly, Signor Scarfoglio's thesis is this. Under the guise of a crusading self-righteousness, born of Puritan parents, England, through the Whig party—the Tories being the supporters of appeasement—has pursued with Machiavellian ingenuity and pertinacity a policy of aggrandisement, using the continent of Europe as her catspaw. As "an island of innocence in an ocean of sin," England has felt it her duty to convert the heathen, and in so doing has won an Empire. It is not a flattering thesis, but it is proved to Signor Scarfoglio's satisfaction by an examination of England's part in the great European wars. "In the short space of two hundred and fifty years," he says, "starting with the initial impulse given by Cromwell, England has not only participated in but has actually led twelve continental wars, in addition to many petty wars of her own." And again, "She has also coaxed, deluded, or bullied into war continental nations who would greatly have preferred to stay at peace." While this is no doubt complimentary to England's powers of persuasion, it is difficult to believe that her allies invariably fought at her side without considering their own interests. Signor Scarfoglio has also many interesting things to say about more recent events, parti-

cularly the Italo-Abyssinian question, but space does not permit of reference to them here. *England and the Continent* can be guaranteed to dispel any self-complacency we may feel about the part we have played in European affairs. K. C. Boswell.

36*. An Empire Prepared: a Study of the Defence Potentialities of Greater Britain. By Donald Cowie. With a Foreword by Lord Lloyd. 1939. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 277 pp. 6*s*.)

37*. How Strong is Britain? By Count Pückler. Translated from the German by Edward Fitzgerald. 1939. (London: Routledge. 8vo. vii + 263 pp. 7*s*. 6*d*.)

These two books cover much the same ground and arrive at much the same conclusions. Count Pückler is perhaps a trifle more critical, but he is admirably fair. Things move so fast in these days that he is not quite up-to-date in his facts as regards British rearmament, particularly as regards the army. The position of British home anti-aircraft defence arrangements for instance is considerably better than he describes. But from the general tenor of his book he would gladly have given us an additional credit mark if the facts had been at his disposal. The conclusions that emerge are that the British Commonwealth is in many respects better prepared for war than in 1914.

Mr. Cowie quotes a conversation he had recently with a German who had spent some time in Australia. "He would report to his authorities that Australians would not fight in a British war again—because Australians did not like Englishmen and all the Australian Universities preached pacifism." Count Pückler does not fall into this error. But underlying his book is the curious assumption that, inherent in the British outlook and position, is something that will prevent Britain from opposing German aims.

> The British Empire is the greatest Empire in the World. Great Britain has command of the seas and she is richer than any other nation. In modern history she has never been defeated by force of arms, and by 1941–2 she will stand before the world powerfully armed indeed. With all its riches and all its power the British Empire has determined on a great undertaking. It wishes to make itself the crystallisation point of a new and bigger commonwealth of peoples, and one in which peace and justice will reign. But in advancing to this undertaking it has left one flank uncovered: it is no longer in a position to resist moral weapons.

But if Count Pückler has not fallen into the same error as Mr. Cowie's German acquaintance he appears to have misread some other signs fairly successfully.

The curious thing is that Count Pückler has succeeded in defining the British moral case in terms which supply all the splendour and vision needed to inspire the crusade which German policy is rapidly forcing on to our shoulders.

Mr. Cowie makes no mention of this question of moral aims. If we were to devote a little more time and trouble to the subject we might spare ourselves a lot of trouble in the long run. B. T. Reynolds.

EUROPE

38*. FRANCE AND MUNICH: Before and after the surrender. By Alexander Werth. 1939. (London, Hamish Hamilton. 8vo. 447 pp. 12s. 6d.)

39. DE LA FRANCE D'AVANT-GUERRE À LA FRANCE D'AUJOURD'HUI: Vingt-cinq ans d'Évolution de la structure économique et sociale française. Recueil d'études présentées par Mm. Charles Rist et Gaëtan Pirou. 1939. (Paris: Sirey. 8vo. xxiv + 593 pp.)

READERS of Mr. Werth's two previous books (*France in Ferment*, 1934, and *The Destiny of France*, 1937) will know what to expect from this new volume. To others it may be said that here is a book by a working journalist living in Paris who, combining perspicacity and first-hand knowledge with a gift for lucid exposition in a lively style, is one of the very few writers who are able to make intelligible to English readers the intricate convolutions of the French political scene.

In this book Mr. Werth traces from the French angle the course of events in Europe from the end of 1936 to the end of Czechoslovakia. His bias is clearly anti-appeasement and anti-Munich, but his criticism is so reinforced by facts and so moderate in tone that his account is in effect a very fair if damning indictment of the retreat of the democracies before Herr Hitler's adventurous advance in Central Europe. Internal troubles arising out of the Front Populaire interlude were partly the cause of France's inability to take a strong, coherent line in foreign policy, and a symbol of the state into which the country had drifted was to be seen when on the day that German troops marched into Austria France was without a government. From then till September 1938 the general pacifism was so played upon by M. Flandin and German propaganda that it finally became a helpless and confused defeatism. The story of that spring and summer of 1938 with the reiterated pledges of support for the Czechs given by the French government and an increasing anti-Czech Press campaign, much of it semi-official, is a shameful page in French history. Mr. Werth rubs it in that since April the French had relinquished the Czechs to Great Britain who was prepared to be much stronger in their defence than France, who was, after all, their ally. The detailed account of the events of August and September with the curious part played by M. Bonnet make fascinating and distasteful reading. The book is rather long, and is not free from minor error in the less necessary chapters (*e.g.*, on Spain), but it is a valuable contribution to the bibliography of "Munich" and to our knowledge of France during an unhappy moment of her history.

Mm. Rist and Pirou have edited this heavily documented collection of articles by various authorities comparing conditions in different branches of French economic life in 1914 and 1939: agriculture, industry, commerce, banking, national revenue and the budgetary system, the colonial empire, etc. It is impossible to do justice to the book in a short notice, but, apart from its obvious value to economists and statisticians, who will revel in the tabulation (almost a column of figures to a page), there are many interesting points for the ordinary person.

E. D. GANNON.

40. THE LABYRINTH OF EUROPE. By Michael Burn. 1939. (London: Methuen. 8vo. xi + 307 pp. 12s. 6d.)

MR. MICHAEL BURN probably does not tell the student of international affairs anything which he did not know before he read this book; yet he has made a valuable contribution to our study of the problems which confront Great Britain in its foreign relations. For he is generally as fair as a man who writes on this subject can hope to be. He is, in the main, objective, but he has definitely his own point of view, which he expresses without that common partisan blindness which cannot see what it does not want to see. For that reason he is not likely to please the fanatic on either side of politics. He has, however, succeeded in interpreting both the hopes and the misgivings which Munich and post-Munich policy aroused in the average mind. He has some hard things to say of this, not only about British statesmen, but also about their critics for the nature of their criticism. "I have little or no praise for the terms of the Munich settlement," he writes, "but I felt no humiliation at Mr. Chamberlain's adventure. It seems that those who look for peace are bound to rouse ridicule and bombast, which their purpose does not wholly obliterate."

In this book he discusses the ambitions of Russia, Germany and Italy, the chances which he thinks have been missed after the Munich Agreement, the policies of Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Churchill, and he comes to the conclusion that whatever our attitude to foreign lands, we have sadly neglected our own and our Empire. In his introduction he discourses on some of the more recent changes since the main book was written; the guarantee to Poland and the new spirit abroad in England.

He adds, "The policy of 'appeasement' has not collapsed. 'Appeasement' was only one half. The other half was rearmament, partly to reinforce the negotiation, partly to insure against negotiation failing; negotiation having failed, power politics come into their own. We should, however, not let ourselves be carried too far by them; Germany has aroused a bellicose spirit of disgust which is not normal in Englishmen, and might prove dangerous. It has to be shown that we do not desire the encirclement of Germany in order to destroy her; therefore, if we get our Grand Alliance, she must at least be invited to join it." E. J. PATTERSON.

41. THE ELEVENTH HOUR. By Vincent Sheean. 1939. (London: Hamish Hamilton. 8vo. 317 pp. 10s. 6d.)

42. EUROPEAN JUNGLE. BY F. Yeats-Brown. 1939. (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode. 8vo. vii + 409 pp. 10s. 6d.)

MR. SHEEAN'S book records in the main the defeat of causes dear to the author in Spain and in Czecho-Slovakia, together with the triumph of the "uncreating word" in Germany. The first thing to say about it is that it is good *reportage* and all the better because the author mainly sticks to his last. Next, if the history of the last two years is properly regarded as a struggle between good and evil, then the record cannot well be other than pessimistic. Yet Mr. Sheean goes too far in his tendency to put down the bulk of the trouble to human, and particularly to British, folly and weakness.

Strange are the differences between the views which different people can hold regarding the same events. While Mr. Sheean deplores the victory of the Swastika, Major Yeats-Brown is obsessed by a fear of Bolshevism. His book, not a very important performance, suffers

from a certain lack of proportion. On page 272 the bombing of Guernica is made light of: "less than a hundred people were killed." On page 273 he describes the blowing up of 40 Requetés by a hidden mine. This he calls a "real atrocity." W. H. JOHNSTON.

43*. GERMANY PUSHES WEST. By Dr. Gerhard Schacher. 1939. (London: Hurst and Blackett. 8vo. 256 pp. 10*s*. 6*d*.)

DR. SCHACHER's book was written before the destruction of Czecho-Slovakia, and consequently before the British Government's rather hasty adoption of a policy of guarantees and alliances. One cannot blame him for not having foreseen the latter development: and indeed he might plead that his book pulled its weight in forming such public opinion as may have sustained the Government in this policy.

The psychological basis of the work seems to lie open to criticism. The position is apparently that Dr. Schacher dislikes Germany, that consequently he would like to arouse resistance against her in Great Britain and that he therefore tries to make one's flesh creep by arguing that the next threat will be against the West. The thesis is not worked out convincingly; nor does one feel that the real issue between Germany and the West is that of authoritarianism against democracy; it is, more prosaically, that of poverty against riches. W. H. JOHNSTON.

44*. HITLER CALLS THIS LIVING! By a member of the German Freedom Party. 1939. (London: Sidgwick and Jackson. 8vo. 226 pp. 6*s*.)

THE German Freedom Party is one of the smaller, less important, opposition groups in Germany, though many of its members are men of considerable standing. This book gives a useful cross-section of present conditions in Germany. The first part, letters from Germans in various parts of the Reich, is a vivid personal account of the discontent prevailing among certain sections of the German population. These letters might, however, be extremely misleading, for they leave the impression that many Germans, instead of a small and impotent minority, are opposed to the Hitler régime.

The economic chapters in this book are the most interesting. They contain few facts that are unknown, but they include figures on wages, taxation, etc., in a convenient form. The book would, in fact, be a useful work of reference if there were an index, but even the tables in the appendix do not make up for this curious lack.

MARGARET GOLDSMITH.

45*. LE DOCTEUR SCHACHT. By Henri Bertrand. [*Les Contemporains vus de près. 2e Serie, No.* 9]. 1939. (Paris: Gallimard. Sm. 8vo. 222 pp.)

This little volume does not profess to embody the results of deep or original research. But it is a delightful study of Dr. Schacht's life and influence up to the moment of his resignation from the Presidency of the Reichsbank, in January 1939. The political and economic background is sketched in lightly but fairly and in front of it we see clearly the gallant figure of Dr. Schacht himself. The author is careful not to obtrude his own views and we must thank him for an illuminating, sympathetic and eminently readable account of one of the great figures in contemporary political life. L. M. FRASER.

46. EUROPAS SCHICKSAL IM OSTEN. Herausgegeben von Hans Hagemeyer. 1939. (Breslau: Ferdinand Hirt. La. 8vo. 208 pp. Maps.)

A series of twelve lectures given at the fourth Reichs-conference of Herr Alfred Rosenberg's "Dienststelle für Schrifttumspflege." Their aim is

to provide a historical, philosophical, and sociological foundation for t[h] doctrine of German supremacy in the Eastern " Raum " in general and f Germany's mission as saviour of European civilisation in particular. T[he] fact that, up to 1933, the Jews were principally responsible for the diffusi[on] of German culture and ideas in eastern Europe is—somewhat paradoxical —noted with an expression of pained indignation (p. 167). E. A. ALPORT.

47*. SPAIN, THE CHURCH AND THE ORDERS. By E. Allison Peer 1939. (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode. 8vo. 219 p[p.] 10s. 6d.)

PROFESSOR PEERS has written an able and at times impassione defence of the Catholic Church in Spain. The historical account of t[h] Orders does full justice to their record in saintliness, education ar scholarship, and disposes easily of the charge of incalculable wealth in land of poverty. On recent events the author is frankly partisan, an invites counter-polemic. If the Catholic Church is still " the Church (the Spanish people " and " religion is still the Spaniard's princip reality," how explain that one-half the people was to side with i enemies in the Civil War? And if one argues hatred of God, a hatred (" unexampled ferocity," as the underlying motive for the persecutic it suffered, a people can only hate the God it knows, in this case the Gc of Spanish Catholicism. Faced with this problem, Professor Pee can only reply that, far from having failed in its mission, the Church i Spain has been persecuted in the measure of its faithfulness, Chri[st] having repeatedly foretold that His followers must expect no less. H first chapter recognises indeed that a heavy charge has lain against th Church in respect of its attitude to progress. Had he included amor his appendices some of its more recent pronouncements, his reade[r] would be able to judge how compatible its attitude remains with an conception, however narrow, of twentieth-century liberalism. An had he not been concerned with the atrocities of one side only he coul scarcely have written of " crimes to which in modern history it woul be difficult to find a parallel." Spanish trade unionism now has i martyrs no less memorable than those of the Church.

WILLIAM C. ATKINSON.

48. LA GUERRA CIVILE IN SPAGNA: I. LA DISINTEGRAZIONE DELL STATO. By General Francesco Belforte. 1938. (Milan Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale. 8vo. 224 p[p.] Illus. *Lire* 15.)

IN this, the first volume of a trilogy on the recent events in Spai[n] General Belforte covers the period that led up to the civil war. Hi case is stated in his title and with arguments and documents he woul show how under communist and masonic influence Spain was rapidl disintegrating. Had it not been for the opposition of General Franc and his supporters, Spain would have been won to communism an would have been only the first in a list of subsequent conquests. Her was more than sufficient justification for Italian intervention. Photc static prints of letters and numerous photographs support the author contention, but in these days of intensive propaganda their value i doubtful. Friends of the writer will herein see more confirmation c their creed, enemies a further example of the lengths to which part propaganda can go.

The second and third volumes will treat respectively of " Foreig Intervention in Red Spain " and " The Campaign of the Italia Volunteers." S. G. WEST.

49*. Les Espagnols et la Guerre d'Espagne. Par Général Duval. 1939. (Paris: Librairie Plon. Sm. 8vo. Maps. 237 pp.)

The views of a distinguished French general on the military aspect of the Spanish War must inevitably be treated with respect, and *Les Espagnols et la Guerre d'Espagne* contains sufficiently detailed information to be of interest to those with some knowledge of military matters. Général Duval visited Nationalist territory in July 1938, and he describes some of the more important military operations prior to the final offensive against Barcelona.

The principal aim of the book was not, however, to analyse the military problems and lessons of the Spanish War, but to persuade French opinion that General Franco was bound to win and should therefore be supported before it was too late. General Franco and his forces are represented as "sans peur et sans reproche." On the political side Général Duval follows closely the usual line of argument of supporters of the Nationalist cause, and he has no new or original material to contribute from this point of view. The question of German and Italian intervention is glossed over and dealt with in only a few vaguely-worded paragraphs. Helen F. Grant.

50*. Francisco Franco. By Joaquín Arrarás. 1938. (London: Bles. 8vo. 224 pp. *7s. 6d.*)

Here is no profound psychological study of a victorious warrior-chief, but a simple and reassuring record of the early career of the man in whose hands the future of Spain at present lies. Chance sent Francisco Franco Baamonde into the Army rather than the Navy, but the Service once chosen, his qualities of courage and leadership brought him rapid promotion. At twenty-three he was the youngest major in the Spanish army, and was beginning to learn that heroism was not enough. Remembrance of the British disaster at the Dardanelles remained with him throughout the Moroccan campaigns, which are described in detail, and the "little major's" experiences under Millán Astray in the Foreign Legion, which he eventually rose to command, taught him lessons of military strategy which he was subsequently to employ in the Spanish civil war. For his successes in the field Primo de Rivera promoted him to general at the early age of thirty-two, but his outspoken speeches later made his political opinions suspect and he was "honourably exiled" to the Canaries, from which he returned in 1936 to lead the movement for the regeneration of Spain. The portrait is incomplete, but the impression left is that of a soldier of proved ability with latent qualities for statesmanship. S. G. West.

51. La Renaissance de l'Espagne. By the Comte de Saint-Aulaire. 1938. (Paris: Librairie Plon. 8vo. 325 pp.)

The rebirth of a nation is an epic theme, and the author of this book is convinced that in Spain a great moment has brought forth a great generation. Famous figures and episodes in peninsular history are called to witness, and by analogy we are assured that Spain once again is finding her spiritual integrity through "the magic of poetry, science and suffering." Chapters on the "soviet protection" in Spain, the Church, the Mediterranean, France and Spain, and Spanish foreign policy during the civil war form a poetical mosaic in which hero-worship of General Franco is enthusiastically patterned. The position of Gibraltar and the attitude of England are made the subject of careful scrutiny, but adulation becomes lyrically rash when it is contended that

Franco committed no strategical errors. The future of Spain, in the author's opinion, lies in the restoration of a monarchy which is independent of class and party. S. G. WEST.

52. THE NEW STATE. By Victor Pradera. Translated from the Spanish by Bernard Malley. With a Foreword by H.R.H. The Prince of Asturias. 1939. (London: Sands. 8vo. 320 pp. 8s. 6*d*.)

THIS book is commended by the Spanish Minister of Justice as "the most accurate concretion of Spanish political thought." Its nature may be gauged from the notable dependence of Parts I and II, entitled "Man" and "Society," on St. Thomas Aquinas. Rousseau is the arch-enemy: his "shallow brain" and "frenzied imagination" loosed all our present evils. Democracy to Sr. Pradera constitutes "an absolute error"; its political parties, now in a state of festering decay, are despised and repudiated by all, its governments have no legitimate foundation, and nobody now defends the parliamentary régime. Part III, on "The Government of Societies," comes nearer to earth on occasion, though its central postulate of a representative monarchy may still raise doubts as to the authority with which Sr. Pradera speaks for the New Spain. The outline includes a king free from ministerial sanction, an advisory Council or Councils of State, and a Cortes representing "bodies and classes" that, far from interfering in the action of government, will limit itself to "providing the law with the element of common good." The army is to continue a political institution. Education remains the prerogative of the Church, and economic activity shall equally be subject to the divine commands. All protest and evasion here are useless. "Indeed they are distinctly inconvenient to national economy." Sr. Pradera's work ends with the discovery, already suspected by the reader, that "the New State is no other than the Spanish State of the *Reyes Católicos*, Ferdinand and Isabella."

WILLIAM C. ATKINSON.

53. POLITICS: A PORTUGUESE STATESMAN. By Artur Ribeiro Lopes. Preface by Prof. Manuel Rodrigues. 1938. (London: Methuen. 8vo. viii + 136 pp. 5s.)

BY endeavouring to chart the cross-currents and eddies of popular imagination, of traditional beliefs and of sentimental reactions, often swayed by "emotional logic" to express a political manifestation or a theatrical gesture, Senhor Ribeiro Lopes seeks to explain facts in the social life of Portugal and of foreign countries, facts of the present time and of times now past; he portrays the characteristics of certain men, and from his deductions has portrayed what he claims to be the causes and meaning of the Portuguese revolution. It would be difficult to contend that he has succeeded in his major aim, though it may be conceded that his chapters, "Speeches by Oliveira Salazar" and "Corporativism," which are perhaps the most interesting in his book, go far towards elucidating the reasons for the remarkable transformations which Portugal has undergone during the last thirteen years. His conclusions, though often brilliantly pertinent, are too vaguely correlated to inspire confidence in the soundness or adequacy of his analyses, and the constrained literalism of the translation makes the pursuit of his arguments irksome. Among vignettes of Paul Claudel, Teste, Valéry, Anatole France and Charles Maurras, his sidelong glance at "The Italo-Ethiopian Conflict" reveals a refreshingly clear comprehension of the British character. S. G. WEST.

54*. REVOLUTIONARY PORTUGAL (1910–1936). By V. de Bragança-Cunha. 1938. (London: James Clarke. 8vo. 282 pp. 7s. 6d.)

THE lack of a history of Portugal during the second and third decades of this century has for some years proved a serious handicap to students of contemporary politics, and in his present work the author of *Eight Centuries of Portuguese Monarchy* has made a valuable contribution. In an introductory survey, he skilfully traces the history of Portugal from its foundation in the twelfth century to its decline in the nineteenth, emphasising those elements in the national consciousness, evolved or acquired by contamination with French culture and the philosophy of decadence, which led inexorably to the revolution of 1910. Thereafter we have a clear and able record of the complicated history of the chaotic years, 1910–1926, during which there were not less than sixteen revolutions and forty changes of ministry. The failure of parliamentary government—" one of the unhappy accidents of an unhappy history "—demonstrates how ill-requited was Portugal for the benefits which she had conferred upon Europe by her discoveries of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The author is too pained and disappointed to give due credit to the achievements of the present régime, whose programme, in his submission, has failed to awaken the nation to the duties of citizenship. But, despite his defeatist attitude, he has produced a book for which future historians will be grateful.

S. G. WEST.

55. " BEHOLD OUR NEW EMPIRE "—MUSSOLINI. By Louise Diel. Translated from the German by Kenneth Kirkness. 1939. (London: Hurst and Blackett. 8vo. 286 pp. Map, illus. 10s. 6d.)

IN October 1937 Frau Diel, a German journalist, went, at Signor Mussolini's personal request, to see for herself what things were like in Italian East Africa after eighteen months of Italian occupation, and spent several months in a somewhat hectic tour of the country. Her book is successful as a record of high-speed travel and industrious enquiry rather than as a fund of original information, and one is left with a feeling that it could have been written equally well from official documents and previously published books without the expense of a journey to Africa. Much of her information is unsupported by any proof and is of such a kind as to tax the credulity of the reader. Take for instance the sentence—" this much discussed ' Deep Lake ' which is said to have a depth of nearly seven thousand feet which lies six thousand feet above the sea." Geologists are asked to believe, therefore, that the bottom of this lake, which few will recognise as Lake Tana, has been found to lie one thousand feet *below* the Mediterranean. A veiled threat would seem to be intended behind the words " No one could prevent Italy from using the waters of Lake Tana to make fertile the dry land of Eritrea." The lie of the land makes it impossible and surely no engineer ever has or is likely to put forward such a fantastic proposition. Abyssinia is not without its books of fiction and one can only assume that Frau Diel has added one to the list. R. E. CHEESMAN.

56. THE SLOVENES: a social history. By Dragotin Lončar and A. J. Klančar. 1939. (Cleveland, Ohio: American Yugoslav Printing and Publishing Co. 8vo. 77 pp. $ 1.00.)

THIS is a useful little book, well worth reading, on a little-known subject. It is hardly more than a slight essay, leaving much un-

touched; and not quite free from excessive patriotism. Yet it gives a clear account of Slovene social and economic history from earliest times until 1913 (the most modern period is not covered) and makes use of many works in Slovene and German which are not easily available to English readers. The chapters on the sixteenth century are particularly interesting. C. A. MACARTNEY.

57*. POLAND: KEY TO EUROPE. By R. L. Buell. 1939. (New York: Knopf; London: Jonathan Cape. 8vo. 358 pp. 10s. 6*d*.)

BOTH the author and the public are fortunate in the publication of this book: the former in that it has appeared at just the right time, the latter because it has been done by a skilled and impartial observer. Too many books on present issues in Europe have in them, as the Americans say, more heat than light. Buell is as near free from the former as a man well could be, and he throws light on every subject he touches. Well-disposed, but in places frankly critical, the book is in a class by itself among existing books on present-day Poland.

From the title one can see that the book discusses not only what is going on inside Poland, but what is happening round about as well. The opening chapter serves as a warning of what is to come: a firm belief that Poland came back on the map of Europe because she has a right to be there, but a conviction that grave economic and social problems have to be solved before the road ahead can be viewed with confidence. The author welcomes the confidence with which the nation's leaders face their tasks, but suggests that "a greater capacity for self-analysis and a healthy intellectual scepticism" might also profit them.

No review worthy of this comprehensive study is possible in the space allotted to me here. It is encyclopaedic in scope, yet avoids unnecessary detail. Only education and religion are omitted from the survey. One might express regret that the press, the co-operative system, and the Trades Unions did not get some attention; but books that are too big are as useless as no books at all.

We have a brief but suggestive account of the past. Then come closer studies of the political system, the economic dilemma—including the land question, and minorities. What we have here on the past history of Ukrainians is too sketchy to be of much value, but the statement of the present-day issue is good.

Surveying foreign relations the author is outspoken to a degree. He has no patience with the diplomacy that killed the League of Nations, and abandoned "collective security" only to have to get back to it by side-paths. Some of his statements will provoke controversy, as, *e.g.*, his view that Polish policy "systematically undermined the position of Czechoslovakia." But in a two-page Appendix he could welcome the declaration of Mr. Chamberlain of March 31st, and rightly say that it opens a new era in European relations.

W. J. ROSE.

58*. GDANSK [DANZIG]. By Jan Kilarski. Translated by B. W. A. Massey. 1937. (Warsaw: Maritime and Colonial League of Poland. 8vo. 259 pp. Illus.)

MOST people do not know that there can be had in English two thoroughly good books on Dantzic: one by Askenazy (Cassells, 1922), and the first part of Morrow's study, published by the Oxford Press in 1936, called *The Peace Settlement in the German-Polish Borderlands*.

The former is short, but clearly written—the work of a master historian. The latter has less about the remoter past, but a very full study of the post-War period.

Kilarski's book is something quite different. It is a finely conceived guide-book to Dantzic, with a fund of historical materials explaining how the beauties of the city came to be what they are; with special emphasis on the part played by Poles, and on the relations of the city with Poland. It belongs to the sumptuous series called "Glories of Poland" published for Polish readers by a Poznan firm. There will be plenty of objection in certain quarters to its inclusion in this series; I shall only express my regret at the title. Scarcely anyone in the English-speaking world knows that the city had two Latin names—Dantiscum and Gedanum (or Gdanscum), and that the Germans seized on one while the Poles took the other. Both names, of course, stem from an ancient Slav place-name. Why not Dantzic, which is the accepted English form, just as Munich is, or Vienna?

But the book itself is the thing. The translation has been done by Professor Massey of Poznan University, and is a model of smoothness. The chapters have been well-arranged, and the reader who is free from prejudices will get a new notion of how two neighbour peoples have together wrought economic and cultural values down the ages. There is no more objection to a Pole's writing about Dantzic as a one-time "Polish" city than to a German's writing in the same way about Strasburg. The pity is that a place which ought to be a bridge uniting two communities is rather a bone of contention. All this will hurt the Dantzic people themselves more than anyone else; just as the quarrels on the Rhine have caused the worst sufferings to the Alsatians.

The book should stimulate tourist interest in one of the grandest cities of northern Europe. No better *vade mecum* than Kilarski's can be desired for a three days' stay in the Free City. W. J. ROSE.

U.S.S.R.

59*. THE FALL OF THE RUSSIAN MONARCHY: A Study of the Evidence. By Bernard Pares. 1939. (London: Jonathan Cape. 8vo. 504 pp. Maps, illus. 18*s*.)

PERHAPS nobody in Great Britain has a better claim than Sir Bernard Pares to pronounce judgment on the mass of evidence that has accumulated since 1917 of the drawn-out collapse of the Tsarist régime. In *The Fall of the Russian Monarchy* he reviews the entire reign of Nicholas II, but concentrates on the last six years—that is, the period after the death of Stolypin. He has combed very painstakingly the published material and availed himself of much private information from distinguished refugee sources. For his conclusions he has drawn most heavily upon the testimony and confessions contained in the volumes of the report of the Extraordinary Commission of Investigation set up by the Provisional Government immediately after the March Revolution. His analysis is well informed, comprehensive and fair-minded.

With all its merits, however, the book is not altogether satisfying as history. Questions of style apart, what troubles a reader is the romanticism of Sir Bernard's interpretation of events. His central thesis is that revolution was brought about not from below but from above. In other words, if autocracy had been wise and patched itself up in constitutional form at the eleventh hour there would have

been no bread riots, no Petersburg Soviet, no Army Order No. I, etc. Now this is surely to substitute for the overworked Marxian thesis of the "inevitability" of the Revolution a Liberal daydream. Where should the Tsarist bureaucracy have found wisdom to maintain the Tsarist scheme of things? It is true enough that Nicholas and his advisers threw away every apparent opportunity for conciliation; but was conciliation really possible within the social structure of autocracy? It is indisputable that the transition from a democratic Republic in embryo to the Bolshevik triumph is full of "ifs," yet who but the Bolsheviks grasped the need in 1917 for a revolutionary policy based upon the sanction of the peasant masses in wartime?

Tsarist apologetics and latter-day Bolshevik fantasies notwithstanding, after 1905 the disillusioned peasantry alone provide the essential clue to the downfall of the monarchy; and the peasantry are sadly neglected in Sir Bernard's otherwise valuable study. It is impossible to do justice to the events by focusing attention on Tsarskoe Selo and making Rasputin the villain of the piece; it was not so much Rasputin as a rotting system of absolutism that threw up Stürmer or Protopopov. In any case, Sir Bernard surely exaggerates the popular influence and the capacities of the Liberals in the Third and Fourth Dumas, who represented hardly anybody but themselves. He has dealt faithfully with the circumstances of collapse; if one may say so the chain of cause and effect that is history is only fitfully apparent in his pages. R. D. Charques.

60. Features and Figures of the Past: Government and Opinion in the Reign of Nicholas II. By V. I. Gurko. [*The Hoover Library on War, Revolution, and Peace.* Publication No. 14.] 1939. (Stanford University Press; Oxford University Press. 8vo. xix + 760 pp. *27s.*)

The choice of the title reveals the author's sense of his limitations, and it is the same modesty to keep the subject within the field where he can speak from direct knowledge that has decided the structure of the book. The first hundred pages are a "Who's who" of the government in the early days of Nicholas II., written from personal observation which a post in the Imperial Chancellery offered. Four hundred pages are devoted to the period 1902–1906, when, as Assistant Minister of the Interior in charge of the Peasant Section, M. Gurko was at the centre of affairs during the critical years of the Russo-Japanese War and the Revolution of 1905. Dismissed from office in 1906, he could obtain his information only indirectly, and so the period from that date to 1916 is condensed into ninety pages. The Editor's Notes comprise one hundred pages in small type and a further thirty pages of an Appendix, containing extracts from D. N. Shipov's *Reminiscences*, shows the events of 1905 from another angle. An excellent index completes the painstaking effort that marks the whole book.

Lenin once said, "Without the 'general rehearsal' of 1905, the victory of the October Revolution, 1917, would have been impossible." By keeping strictly to an account of the immediate administrative problems and conferences, M. Gurko depicts this "rehearsal" in a more realistic manner than he could have done had he made it the conscious aim of the book. His position of being near but not at the top is a definite asset. He participates in important decisions, but he he not impelled by the need of a deposed statesman to select the

evidence to justify a policy. Being on the side which tried to stem the rising tide of revolution has the effect of emphasising its irresistible force, and the contest as depicted may leave even the most confirmed "evolutionist" with some doubts whether a change affecting the principle of government can be made by peaceful means. The peasant problem is the recurring theme, and the reader may wonder whether the Collective Farm in the U.S.S.R. is due to Marx or to tradition. The book is as unambitious as a photograph album, but in the same way it conveys the atmosphere of a period. And at times it raises the question how far Soviet Russia is the same character in overalls and shaved.

H. Foster Anderson.

61. In Search of Soviet Gold. By John D. Littlepage and Demaree Bess. 1938. (New York: Harcourt, Brace. 8vo. xv + 310 pp. $ 2·75.)

In spite of its flimsy title, *In Search of Soviet Gold* is a treasure for all seriously interested in Russian affairs. It is also a good bracing story of hard work and travel in the remoter corners of Central Asia for the general reader. John D. Littlepage, "a plain American mining engineer" from Alaska, was invited in 1928 by the Soviet Government to come to Russia and reorganise the Soviet gold-mining industry. This book is an account of the ten years he spent in and out of Russian mines from the Urals to the borders of Sin Kiang. No other foreigner has had the same opportunities of observing the development of the Soviet system in this wide area, and nobody could be more objective in his judgments. The main interest was gold and the speeding up of gold production in the U.S.S.R. Politics or Communism only interested him in so far as they helped or hindered him in his work. He was lucky in his chief, an old Bolshevik named Serebrowsky, for whom he retained the greatest admiration to the end. Under their dual leadership Soviet gold production rose to second place in world production. In spite of this good service to Russia, Serebrowsky lost his job and disappeared in 1937. Unfortunately professional ethics forbid Mr. Littlepage to give the exact figure of Soviet gold production, a secret the world would very much like to know. Fortunately no such scruples dilute his story of sabotage in the mining industry. Here at last is evidence which seems to me convincing, and which I have sought for years in the vast, perplexing trial literature, that the charges brought against the Trotzkyist "wreckers" in the recent trials were in many cases substantially true.

Again and again in the copper-mines of the Urals, as in the gold-mines of Central Asia, Littlepage relates how carefully laid plans were deliberately overthrown and efficient engineers removed at the instigation of the anti-Stalin faction of the Communist party. Nobody reading these matter-of-fact accounts of lack of co-operation and obstruction can fail to be convinced that there was widespread industrial sabotage in the U.S.S.R., and that men like Piatikoff, whom many hitherto believed innocent, were really deeply involved in these schemes. Littlepage's suspicions that something was amiss in the Russian political industrial world were first aroused in 1931, when he accompanied a Soviet purchasing delegation to Berlin and noticed that inferior mining materials were being supplied by certain German firms; he was amazed to find that the Russians were not pleased to have these discrepancies pointed out to them. The position was eventually clarified for him when Piatikoff testified on trial that anti-Stalin

conspirators, headed by Leo Trotzky, needed foreign currency to build up a fund for their work abroad, and that in return for orders certain German firms were willing to oblige them with currency in lieu of orders placed with them. It is characteristic of Littlepage's dead-sure method that he refuses to generalise about political conspiracy in Russia as a result of this particular episode.

Soviet rule in Central Asia is a matter of great speculation to the outside world. Littlepage saw thousands of Kirgiz and Kazaks driven from their pastures into the mines and factories of the country to be drastically remoulded. The Communist authorities insisted that tribesmen who had never seen a machine in their lives should be given 50 per cent. of the responsible positions in industry. The chaos in the mines under these conditions is easily imagined, especially as the newcomers were supposed to receive the same wages as regular miners and the mine managers were expected to show a profit.

The gold-mines of Kazakstan are now being rapidly opened up and, according to this expert, are among the richest in the world. Little has been heard outside of Russia of the Soviet gold rush, which followed the decision of 1933 to legalise the old-time prospectors outlawed in 1929. So great was the desire of the Soviet Government to increase the production of gold that a series of otherwise rigidly applied principles were dropped in favour of the private prospector or lessee. They are actually paid *for their gold* in *gold*, or rather in scrip, negotiable in the Gold Trust Stores, where they can get goods otherwise unobtainable in the Soviet Union, and in their actual work they are less restricted by red tape than any other group of Soviet workers.

The Empire which the Tsars ruled in Central Asia is only a skeleton of the structure which the Soviets are busily developing there. Littlepage believes that Russia's future greatness lies east of the Urals, and that Stalin has set his face deliberately eastward, realising this fact. The Asiatic party secretaries are the " king-pins " of this region, and in force and power differ little from the Governors of pre-War Russia. They are as strictly (perhaps more strictly) bound to Moscow than their predecessors, and the ruthless elimination of many Asiatic Communist leaders in 1938 showed the fate awaiting them if they play with dreams of independence. Though Russia retired from Manchuria under Japanese pressure in 1932, she is stretching deeper into the heart of Asia every year, through outer Mongolia and Sin Kiang. There is no strong Communist party in Sin Kiang, according to Littlepage, but the Soviet military advisers to the military Governor are a very strong influence for Russia. Littlepage entirely deprecates the report that the Soviet population in the Far East would welcome a Japanese invasion.

Littlepage left Russia in 1937 lamenting the effect of the trials on the nerves and initiative of his old colleagues.

VIOLET CONOLLY.

62. HAMMER, SICKLE AND BATON. By Heinz Unger (in collaboration with Naomi Walford). 1939. (London: The Cresset Press. 8vo. ix + 275 pp. 8*s*. 6*d*.)

THE Marxist ideological inquisition did not even spare music in its tests of orthodoxy. But music gave considerable trouble to the authorities. In the first place, nobody in Russia really had any clear ideas as to what they meant by revolutionary music, so they came to the rather arbitrary conclusion that revolutionary music was synonym-

ous with new music. There was a time when no cacophony, if it were modern, could be too outrageous to be supported by those responsible for the nation's music. Mr. Unger, a German musical conductor of repute who worked with all the big Russian orchestras, including the Leningrad and Moscow philharmonics, from 1924–1937, has an interesting story to tell of the desperate efforts of musical directors and lecturers to make tolerable programmes under these conditions. How Wagner, from being notoriously bourgeois, became "a great revolutionary" and Brahms anti-religious are dialectical tours-de-force in the service of music worth reading about. The public ear could not be revolutionised to mere cacophany and through the box-office gradually succeeded in re-throning the classical favourites on the programmes. Mr. Unger found the Russian orchestras emotionally responsive but lacking in attention to technical accuracy. He notes the declining standards of musical appreciation in musical centres like Leningrad since audiences largely composed of factory workers with free tickets have succeeded the old intelligenzia. Mr. Unger's extensive notes on living conditions in Russia during the thirteen years that he traversed the country with his baton contain nothing new. He left Russia for the last time in 1937, profoundly depressed by the spiritual bondage of the people: a man without a country, since his native Germany imposed the same restrictions on creative art and thought. VIOLET CONOLLY.

63. BEFORE and AFTER STALIN. By Cyril Jelita-Wilczkovska. Translated from the French by George Knupffer. 1939. (London: Selwyn and Blount. 8vo. 251 pp. *7s. 6d.*)

MR. JELITA-WILCZKOVSKA is a Russian monarchist of a new kind. A Monarchist who is neither anti-Soviet nor anti-revolutionary, but on the contrary believes that the revolution was not only a spiritual necessity but the sole way out of an impasse for Russia. He wants "a supra-national, socialist and liberal monarchy . . . a hereditary monarchy, symbol of imperial unity, guarantee of the continuity and stability of the national policy." He also wants to keep the Soviets. No anomaly here *in se*, except that the whole idea of monarchy is impossible and anathema to this Communist-schooled generation of Russians. Every page of the book is marked by the same lack of reality and fervent dreaming. It is difficult for a non-Russian who has not absorbed the Dostoievskian conception of the Russian soul to treat a book like this sympathetically. It is verbose, extravagant, romantic. Mr. Jelita-Wilczkovska insists on the predominance of the same spiritual and eminently Christian forces of the people throughout Russian history, before and after the Revolution. His analysis of Russian history from this point of view is a masterpiece of elimination, for the people in Russia have played a relatively late and weak rôle and neither they nor their rulers, old or new, were characteristically Christian. "The history of Russia," declares Mr. Jelita-Wilczkovska, "is not the history of a country but of a world." This is the world of Eurasia, and its future possibilities intoxicate his imagination. "Gripped with that breath of Messianism whose singular power every Russian has experienced," he announces "a mission of spirituality and peace for the West, a mission of humanism and progress for the East . . . sublime vocations worthy of a great people. All our past seems to warrant it. Destiny has overwhelmed us with gifts. All that remains is to exploit the possibilities which have been lavished

upon us." Geography has suggested this hyperbole, but in this case geography does not lead very far. VIOLET CONOLLY.

64. WORLD AFFAIRS AND THE U.S.S.R. By W. P. and Zelda Coates. Foreword by the Rt. Hon. Arthur Greenwood, M.P. 1939. (London: Lawrence and Wishart. 8vo. xxi + 251 pp. 6s.)

THIS brief review of the foreign policy pursued by the U.S.S.R. during the last four years comes at a particularly appropriate time, when that country's long-standing belief in the "indivisibility of peace" and the need for a "united front against aggression" has gained official recognition in Great Britain. The survey begins, appropriately enough, with a review of Hitler's aims as set out in *Mein Kampf*, and ranges over the situation in the Baltic, the defeat of Abyssinia, the civil war in Spain, the *Anschluss*, events in Czechoslovakia, and the war in the Far East.

Although based on the somewhat irritating assumption that "Russia is always right," the book provides a useful background to recent events and an interesting record of Soviet policy.

MARGARET MILLER.

THE MEDITERRANEAN

65*. THE MEDITERRANEAN IN POLITICS. By Elizabeth Monroe. Second Edition. 1939. (Oxford University Press. 8vo. ix + 259 pp. Maps. 10s.)

IT is a double tribute to Miss Monroe that her work should have remained so much in date up till March 15th, and that she should have been able to produce a second edition so soon. This will be all the more welcome because in more than one case, notably Palestine, recent events have shown how sound is Miss Monroe's judgment.

In the second edition mention is made of the new Malta Constitution, and of the effect of Italian claims in Tunisia. The section on Palestine has been revised: the chapter on Spain and the final chapter have been brought up-to-date.

A French translation (*Les Enjeux Politiques en Mediterranée*, published by Armand Colin) has now appeared. Although this was published before the second English edition it contains not only the modifications noted above, but also an account of the results of the Palestine Conference and of the events which took place in Albania on Good Friday. The final chapter is almost wholly new.

S. H. PEROWNE.

66. LA CONQUÊTE DE LA MÉDITERRANÉE. Par Marc Bernard. 1939. (Paris: Gallimard. Sm. 8vo. 42 pp.)

THE author, French descendant of a Catalan family, argues in this slight monograph that, in their plans for "encircling France in the Mediterranean," Germany and Italy seek to utilise Catalonia. He shows the strategic importance of the Balearic islands, which Great Britain recognised when she held Port Mahon in the eighteenth century—an importance still greater in these times of aviation. He traces the theory of the Mediterranean as an Italian lake to the Italian Nationalists, Federzoni and Corradini, the predecessors of Fascism. The reviewer can confirm this from a conversation which he had with Corradini in 1911 at the outbreak of the Libyan war. To his question

why Italy was going to Libya, Corradini replied: "for historical reasons." Asked what those were, the Nationalist spokesman said: "Because Septimius Severus was born at Homs." To which the reviewer answered: "That argument would apply also to Britain, for he died at York."

But the author considers Catalonia a key to the situation from the French standpoint both geographically and politically. He somewhat exaggerates the importance of the land whence his ancestors came, though curiously, in his historical sketch of Catalan achievements, he omits the Catalan domination of Athens in the fourteenth century. Seven strategic plans illustrate his pamphlet. WILLIAM MILLER.

NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST

67*. KAMAL ATATURK'S LAND: The Evolution of Modern Turkey. By August Ritter von Kral. Translated by Kenneth Benton. 1939. (Leipzig: Braumüller; London: P. S. King & Son. 8vo. xi + 283 pp. *7s. 6d.*)

THERE are so many books written lately on Turkey that the Turkish counterpart of H.M. Stationery Office must be doing a roaring trade in blue books.

The present treatise embodies the author's reactions and impressions after a long residence in Turkey. The original issued in Vienna in 1935 was in its second edition by 1937. There are no new facts, but that, as stated above, hardly reflects on the author, who deals with his subject in a very thorough and informative way. The chapters on industry, banking, finance, education, press and social reform are full and comprehensive. The chapter on railway construction reads like an answer to an engineer's prayer, although it might be better understood if maps were placed adjacent to it; perhaps this might be rectified in subsequent editions.

The chapters on foreign policy relate by now to history; the book was written prior to the Anglo-Turkish pact; on the other hand the importance of a regenerated Turkey in the peace of Eastern Europe is rightly emphasised.

It is difficult to understand the extraordinary number of words in italics; moreover since the translation is intended for English readers it would have been a more gracious choice to have had it printed in this country. NESTOR.

68*. LA POLITIQUE ISLAMIQUE DE L'ALLEMAGNE. Par Bernard Vernier. 1939. (Paris: Paul Hartmann, for the Centre d'Études de Politique Étrangère. 8vo. 117 pp. 15 *frs.*)

ALTHOUGH German propaganda and cultural and economic penetration in the Near and Middle East is naturally not proclaimed from the house-tops, this booklet shows how surprisingly large is the quantity of information to be gained from a thorough and methodical combing of the French and German press, and it is probable that an equally thorough examination of the Arabic and Turkish press would supply much additional information. Even as it is, however, there is enough material, set out with names, figures and dates, to show how far Germany has succeeded in recovering her former position and in overcoming the obstacles placed in her way. No doubt a good deal of this activity does not have the sinister significance that the author seems to imply, but the care devoted to remedying the defects of German

organisation during the last War (which is outlined in a preliminary chapter) is deserving of special attention. In spite of its small bulk and deplorable proof-reading of names, no more important work than this has been issued by the Centre d'Études de Politique Étrangère.

H. A. R. G.

69*. GREAT BRITAIN AND PALESTINE, 1915–1939. [*Information Department Papers No. 20a.*] 1939. (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 8vo. x + 142 pp. 2*s.* 6*d.*; to Members of the Institute 2*s.*)

THIS is a revised and enlarged edition of the valuable paper issued in January 1937. The narrative has been continued to May 1939, the numerous statistical tables have been brought up to date, and the new material includes maps and a bibliography. The fullness of its documentation and the comprehensiveness of its analysis make it an indispensable introduction to the study of contemporary Palestine.

A few details might be corrected in a future edition. A paragraph on p. 19 gives the impression that the anti-partitionists were victorious at the Zionist Congress of 1937. The Report of the Partition Commission was published in November, not October, 1938 (p. 94). It was not to a "Round Table Conference" (p. 106) that Arab and Jewish delegations were invited in November 1938. The representative of Transjordan did not take part in the preliminary conversations between the Arab delegations in Cairo (p. 107). On p. 108 Ali Maher Pasha and Abdul Rahman Bey Azzam are telescoped into one person. Exports of local manufactures are said (p. 67) to have remained more or less stationary in recent years, whereas they have more than doubled since 1934. There are also one or two omissions. The Arab Conference held at Bludan in 1937 is discussed, but there is no mention of the more important assembly at Cairo in the following year. And the author fails to explain Arab opposition to the latest White Paper, largely because he does not mention the provision (reprinted however in an Appendix) that at the end of the transitional period there may be a further postponement of independence. H. BEELEY.

70. THE WILD ASSES. By W. V. Emanuel. 1939. (London: Jonathan Cape. 8vo. 352 pp. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

IN the summer of 1936 a company of fifteen persons set out from London, under the auspices of the National Union of Students, to visit Iran and Afghanistan. At Warsaw seven Austrians joined them, making twenty-two in all. There were twelve men and ten women in the party; their ages ranged from nineteen to fifty-six; their pursuits appear to have been as varied as their ages.

The party sallied forth equipped with faith, a sympathy for strange lands and peoples and a proper disregard for the discomforts of Eastern travel. To these admirable qualifications, the author of this book added an observing eye and a facility for graphic and entertaining writing. I cannot call him a conventional traveller, because he confesses that the only map he had was one which he hastily tore out of a school atlas.

To your good traveller, however, the day's adventure is the thing; and in this sense Mr. Emanuel is a good traveller. He has a quick eye for what is different, new, surprising. He writes of these things with sympathy and understanding. If the people of a village look strange to him, he reasons that his party no doubt looked strange to the

villagers. (From certain remarks which he lets fall, I should imagine that his party would have looked a little strange, even in Bloomsbury.)

The party travelled to Iran by the quickest, cheapest and, on the whole, most satisfactory land route—that via Berlin, Warsaw, Shepetowka and Baku. Only they left the train before it reached the Caspian at a little town which in Czarist days was called Vladikavkas. There they took the motor-bus for Tiflis, crossing the Caucasus by the military road—surely one of the most splendid bus rides in the world. From Tiflis they travelled to the Iranian frontier by that uncomfortable train which skirts the base of Ararat.

The party visited, in turn, Tabriz, Teheran, Meshed, Yezd, Shiraz and Ispahan. The book is a safe and sympathetic guide to the more important sights in these places. In Meshed, through the courtesy of the Iranian authorities, they had the rare experience of visiting the Shrine of Imam Reza and the Mosque of Gauhar Shad. But to me, at least, the most important (as also the most thrilling) chapters of the book are those which describe the crossing, in six cars, of the Great Salt Desert, from Meshed to Yezd. The journey has been made before by Europeans; but never before has a party of twenty-two men and women started off gaily in six cars to cross one of the world's most awful wastes—and in the month of August! No wonder the British Consul in Meshed wrung his hands and the Iranian authorities declined all responsibility. But in Iran God protects the mad. The caravan reached Yezd none the worse for the harrowing experience, except for a few broken springs and a leaking feed-pump. But the party might well have left their bones in the Kavir. All honour to the Buicks and Chevrolets which carried them across; and to the indefatigable Iranian drivers.

One by one the forbidden places of the earth are yielding up their secrets. Last year I met in Yezd an agent of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company who was about to establish a line of petrol stations across the Kavir on that same trail. Perhaps by now the thing is done.

In the middle of the Great Salt Desert, half-way between Meshed and Yezd, the party spent half a night in a garden in the Oasis of Tabas. I am sorry that Mr. Emanuel did not tell us more about Tabas. A good friend of mine once told me that Tabas is one of the world's wonder spots. It is set, he said, a green gem, in the midst of a desert as large as France. So soft and balmy is the climate, so fertile the soil, so cherishing the streams, that flowers and fruits, which in less favoured localities are never seen in the same garden, here grow side by side. "It is the one place on the earth," my friend said to me, "where one can live." As the world moves from one madness to another, I remember Tabas, set in the midst of the Kavir. "There," I say to myself, "the European has not obtruded his corroding foot; there is sanity; there one can live. I shall arise and go to Tabas."

Mr. Emanuel has made an excellent book which every intending traveller to Iran should read. The traveller, as well as he who takes his journeys by his own fireside, will find it entertaining, informed, sympathetic. It lacks the stodginess which makes so many travel books a weariness of the flesh. His purple patches are not too purple; his records of day-to-day events are never banal.

Mr. Emanuel might have added a chapter for us on the governance of Iran: he might have given us some notes on the technique of reconciling autocracy with an elected Chamber; on the Army; on Education; on State Capitalism and Industrialisation; on the all-

important question of finance. Yet, after all, this is his book, and perhaps he chose to leave out these mundane matters. For which relief, no doubt, many of his readers will thank him.

On page 91 Mr. Emanuel heard the clack of the carpet weavers' shuttles; did he?

"The Village that Was" is a charming rendering of the name Deh Bid; but, unhappily, it is an incorrect one. A. CECIL EDWARDS.

INDIA

71*. THE LAW OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION. By M. Ramaswamy. 1938. (London: Longmans, Green. 8vo. xlii + 450 pp. 21s.)

MR. RAMASWAMY's book is a study of the structure of India's new Constitution as projected in the Act of 1936, with a commentary and legal interpretation of some of its most important provisions. Convenience of reference has been much facilitated by the verbatim reproduction, along with the commentary, of all the most important sections of the Act, though this method has of course much increased the bulk and cost of the book. This running commentary fills the last seventeen chapters, the most important being those on the Federation of India, the Federal Executive and the Federal Legislature (vi, vii and viii), the Governor's Provinces (ix), Legislative Powers (xii), Legislative Lists (xiii), Federal Finance (xx), Federal Court (xxiii) and the Indian High Courts (xix). The commentary is lucid and well reasoned, and founded on an adequate knowledge of the basic principles of Federal Government and of the many and various constitutional problems for which solutions have had to be found, as they have arisen, in American, Canadian and Australian practice.

The Indian Federation, because of the unprecedented nature of its historical antecedents, will necessarily be different from every other federal system. In India no agreed compact has been arrived at by the peoples of the federating units. The views of the majority of the Indian people cannot, argues the author, be said to have been represented in the new Constitution, for the previous system of Government was unitary and irresponsible, and the Provinces were not autonomous. The constitution did not even carry out the recommendations of the British Indian delegation to the Joint Select Committee on several important points. Mr. Ramaswamy expresses his disappointment at the failure of the new Constitution to "enable India to be the mistress of her own household or to achieve equality of status with the sister nations of the Empire in any reasonable space of time." On page xl he speaks of the reservation of defence and external affairs, which are the very soul of "Dominion autonomy," as the most striking defect of the new Constitution. He emphasises the contrast between the freedom of the Dominion legislatures and the numerous restrictions on the powers of the Federal and Provincial legislatures, especially the provisions on "discrimination," which seem to him to be calculated to prevent the enactment of legislation designed for the building up of national, infant and key industries. He singles out for special condemnation those provisions of the Act which, contrary to all constitutional precedent, have abolished the system of direct election for the Lower House, thus "putting back the hands of the clock of progress for many years" (p. 146), and he regrets the limitations on responsible government implied in the "special responsibilities" of the Governor-

General and the Provincial Governors. He thinks these are likely to lead to constitutional deadlocks "unless great circumspection is exercised by the Governor" (p. 167). Equally objectionable seems the reservation in the hands of the Secretary of State of control of recruitment and conditions of employment in the more important services (xli).

Limitations of space permit only brief references to some of the more important of the many interesting points of constitutional law and practice which come under discussion. Chapter XII describes the new system of distribution of legislative powers between the centre and the federal units and explains why the framers of the Constitution found themselves compelled to adopt this particular method for India (p. 219). On p. 227 it is shown how, as regards the important matter of "residual powers," the position of an Indian State *vis à vis* the central authority will be quite different from that of a Provincial unit. The reader will find a clear explanation of the intricate provisions regulating the manner of entry of each Indian State into the Federation by a separate instrument of Accession, and of the consequent multiplicity of constitutional documents, and variability of the federal powers from State to State according to the terms of each instrument.

The dual rôle of future Governors-General is explained in relation to the Federation on the one hand and the Indian States on the other (p. 136). Not the least interesting part of the book is the postscript, which describes the post-War constitutional development of Ireland culminating in the Irish legislation of December 1936.

In spite of his outspoken criticisms of the new Constitution, Mr. Ramaswamy is sufficiently well versed in constitutional history to know that the spirit of compromise and adjustment is necessary for orderly development in politics as in other fields of human activity. "The Britisher," he says, "is a realist who has it in him to rise above barren legalism and indefensible imperialism," and he is certain that this attitude will "have its own healthy reactions on the Indian problem."

Students of that problem will find in this book, to quote Professor A. Berriedale Keith, "a helpful and suggestive treatise."

F. G. PRATT.

72. THE INDIAN STATES AND THE FEDERATION. By M. K. Varadarajan. 1939. (Oxford University Press. 8vo. xi + 292 pp. 12*s*. 6*d*.)

THIS book is another attempt to discuss the legal and constitutional position of the Indian States in the Federation. The writer looks at the problem from the point of view of the States and indicates the difficulties and dangers which may attend adhesion to the Federation.

The protector of the interests of these States will be the Governor-General, who will be more directly under the influence of the representatives of the Indian Legislature. There is indeed a danger that the Paramountcy of the Crown may develop into a Paramountcy of British India. Interference on behalf of a ruler may involve a crisis in British India, while, on the other hand, in the event of a Governor-General failing to take action to protect the interests of a ruler, the latter has no remedy. It is even possible that the Government of India Act itself may be amended by Parliament under pressure of political agitation, and this danger can by no means be avoided.

Advice is given to the States as to the stipulations which they may profitably make as a condition of adhesion. Some of these relate to the tributes exacted from individual States, notably Mysore, and the revenues of territories ceded by States, in both cases under treaties guaranteeing the maintenance of armed forces for the protection of the rulers of the States concerned. Owing to the change in conditions since the agreements were made, it would be more equitable to abolish these tributes, which are at present of small value to British India but weigh heavily on individual States. The author urges the return to the States of the Cantonments in their territories, and in particular of the Civil and Military Station of Bangalore to Mysore, as in the interests not only of that State, but of the inhabitants of that area. There are other interesting chapters dealing with such subjects as the Federal Court and the Federal Railway Authority. Anyone interested in the question of federation should read this work. H. S. CHATFIELD.

73. THE PRESENT CONDITION OF INDIA: a Study in Social Relationships. By Leonard M. Schiff. Foreword by Jawahar Lal Nehru. 1939. (London: Quality Press. 8vo. xi + 196 pp. 6s.)

To evaluate the social conditions of a country within five years of the inauguration of a new constitution would be difficult in the most favourable circumstances. To attempt it in the midst of a world revolution is clearly impossible.

And yet in his *Present Condition of India* Mr. Leonard Schiff has nearly succeeded. But it is only a question of nearly; and if this most interesting book is to be read with profit to the reader and fairness to the author, the inherent impossibility of the task must never be forgotten.

Mr. Schiff appears to have recognised this, and instead of dealing with his subject as a composite whole, he wisely contents himself with a survey of some of the more outstanding problems and difficulties which attach to its chief components—namely the Peasant; the Industrial Worker; the Babu; the Rajah; the Sahib; and lastly, Religion.

Of these, by far the most interesting chapters are the first two, and in dealing with these we see the author quite at his best: informed, sympathetic and constructive.

His closing chapter, entitled "A Letter to an Average Englishman." is the least good. That England has blemishes on her past record is as obvious as it is inevitable. But when it comes to an apology for terrorism as being the natural reaction of "a proud people of ancient lineage humbled to the dust," or to an insinuation that in our treatment of India, England has "set the pace for the brutalities of the Fascist Powers," Mr. Schiff is clearly losing his balance.

None the less it is a book worthy of careful study, and Mr. Schiff is to be congratulated. EDWARD VILLIERS.

74. AN ESSAY ON INDIA'S NATIONAL INCOME 1925–1929. By V. K. R. V. Rao. 1939. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 173 pp. 6s.)

IT was a happy thought to invite Mr. V. K. R. V. Rao, who is undoubtedly one of India's foremost and best-equipped young economists, to contribute an estimate of India's National Income, as the first Dadabhai Naoroji Memorial Prize Essay.

Mr. Rao first surveys the previous estimates, starting with that of Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji himself, and suggests revisions which correct obvious errors and bring them more into line with modern concepts of what constitutes " the national income." This enables conclusions to be drawn as to the trend of average incomes in India. He then makes his own estimates, on a comparable basis, for an average of the years 1925–9. His results suggest that, after allowing for changes in the level of prices, there was a rise in income per head from Rs. 44 in 1867–8 and Rs. 55 in 1895 to about Rs. 78 in 1921–2, but that since then (up to 1929) little change occurred. When allowance is made for the unequal distribution of wealth, the annual *per capita* income of the masses would work out at about Rs. 64.

In the absence of a Census of Production and of comprehensive and usable income-tax returns, a different method of calculating the National Income has to be followed in India from that in vogue in the West. Mr. Rao's method is—after a cursory discussion of the available data and statistics—to assess the number of incomes in India, to divide them according to sources of income, to discuss each source and calculate the value of incomes derived therefrom, and then to estimate certain deductions which must be made in order to arrive at the net consumable income. He has undoubtedly made ingenious use of his scanty and unreliable material, and has framed what is probably a more intelligent guess than has hitherto been available. But his results must still be placed in the category of " intelligent guesses." He himself admits that they provide no guide to the relation between incomes and taxable capacity, nor a basis for international comparisons.

Mr. Rao cannot, of course, be blamed for the lack of reliable data. But the reader has a right to claim much fuller explanation of the methods pursued and of the " estimates " which are frequently made to provide some basis for that quite considerable number of incomes about which no direct evidence exists. As it is, there is no clue to the probable margin of error involved, and although the explanations given suggest that Mr. Rao has proceeded in a sensible and unbiassed manner, they are often insufficient to enable acceptance of the conclusions except by an act of faith in Mr. Rao's integrity and competence. For instance, there is no discussion of the reliability of the agricultural statistics, despite what Professor Gregory has recently called the " accumulating volume of evidence pointing to the conclusion that the output of Indian agriculture has been under-estimated."

A very inadequate explanation is also given of the estimates of the value of livestock products, which Mr. Rao assesses at Rs. 362 crores per annum, as compared with an estimate of Rs. 1000 crores made in 1937 by Dr. Norman Wright. One is left with the impression that Mr. Rao's estimates form a reasonable culmination of the type of investigation hitherto pursued, and probably afford some guidance as to the trend of incomes in India, but have little or no value as a measure of " absolute " or " real " income. This would be most unsatisfactory if this essay were to be judged as an independent piece of work. It appears, however, that Mr. Rao has been engaged on another estimate, for the year 1931–2, based on personal investigations, the results of which are shortly to be published. It is to be hoped that this latter work will contain the much fuller methodological and statistical explanations which are essential to enable the reader to gauge the value and reliability of the results.

Attention may be called to one or two minor errors. On p. 97,

" 370 millions " should read " 370 hundred millions." On p. 161 it is erroneously said that the proportion of taxation per head to national income per head is less in India than in any other country quoted. An impression of somewhat hasty compilation is given by the presentation of the statistical tables, which have no clear headings, and by the frequent omission to state clearly the units of measurement and other details essential for accuracy and facile reference. VERA ANSTEY.

75. TESTAMENT OF INDIA. By Ela Sen. 1939. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 286 pp. 7*s*. 6*d*.)

IN *Testament of India* Mrs. Ela Sen has given her impressions of nine of the most prominent Indian politicians of to-day, and has supplemented her picture of the Indian struggle for freedom, as seen through the activities of the leaders, by short accounts of one or two important movements, *e.g.* the Peasant Movement, Terrorism, Communalism and the Women's Movement.

Mrs. Sen writes as a convinced Congresswoman, who sees nothing but misfortune to India in the British connection. She is unwilling to admit that any good thing can come out of Britain. Her anti-British bias is particularly noticeable in the chapter on the Women's Movement, which every fair-minded Indian admits is enormously indebted to the pioneer work of Englishwomen in educating Indian women for responsibility as teachers, doctors and citizens.

When allowance has been made for Mrs. Sen's limitation of outlook, much interesting information can be gleaned from her accounts of important personalities better known in India than in Britain. Of the nine described, two, Mr. Jinnah, quâ Moslem, and Pandit Malaviya, the Right-wing champion of orthodoxy, are treated with the derision to which their vacillating allegiance to Congress entitles them in the author's eyes. The other seven are warmly appreciated, especially the lofty and disinterested Jawaharlal Nehru, who earns a further meed of praise as a Socialist, since the author believes India must be reconstructed on a Socialistic basis.

For the same reason Mr. Sabhas Bose's meteoric career is described with sympathy, and that of Mr. Rajendra Prasad (who succeeded Mr. Bose in the highest post open to any Indian, the Presidency of Congress, on May 1st, 1939) gives another instance of the immense sacrifices many brilliant young men have made for the Congress cause.

But perhaps for English readers the most illuminating chapter in the book is that on Terrorism, which is described from the inside with intense sympathy for the terrorists.

The book has been written in slovenly haste, with an over-facile pen which will not wait for the author to clarify her thought. The poet Tagore is said to have expressed his love of beauty in " actual phraseology " and to have " tangibly " contributed to creative criticism, and so on. Nevertheless the matter, in spite of the manner, casts a useful sidelight on contemporary India. H. GRAY.

AFRICA

76*. REPORT OF THE RHODESIA–NYASALAND ROYAL COMMISSION (Cmd. 5949 of 1939). 1939. (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office. 8vo. x + 283 pp. Maps. 7*s*. 6*d*.)

THE terms of reference to the Rhodesia–Nyasaland Royal Commission required them to enquire and report " whether any, and if so

what, form of closer co-operation or association between Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland is desirable and feasible."

The three territories have many features in common, and they are faced with problems of economic, social and political development which, despite the different stages of progress attained in each, are fundamentally similar. The Commission therefore find no difficulty in concluding that there is no form of public endeavour in which co-operation between the three territories would not lead to valuable results. They are also unanimous in the view that an extensive programme of development in all directions is called for in the two northern territories, and more especially in Northern Rhodesia. A tribute is paid to the relatively greater advance made by Southern Rhodesia with its larger resources.

As the result of the local interest in the subject, a considerable part of their report is, however, devoted to an issue which is not specifically mentioned in the terms of reference, that of the amalgamation of the three territories as the most complete form of closer co-operation and association. The alternative of federation is considered and rejected as impossible. Such an amalgamation would involve the application of the constitution of Southern Rhodesia to an area of 500,000 square miles with a European population of 68,000 and a native population of some four millions. In practice it would involve an immense extension of the responsibilities of Southern Rhodesia with its 55,000 white inhabitants.

The main Report recommends the definite acceptance by His Majesty's Government of the principle of amalgamation, and its early application to Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland coupled with the taking over by the British Government of the crushing burden of the Nyasaland debt. The Commission does not consider that the conditions are yet present for the extension of the policy to Southern Rhodesia, partly because of its different native policy and of the unanimous native opposition north of the Zambesi, and partly so that the European population of the combined territory might be better prepared both in numbers and experience for the great extension of their responsibilities. The inequality in the development of the three territories is a further reason for delay.

As a transition stage the Report recommends the establishment of an Inter-Territorial Council meeting regularly and with a permanent secretariat. Its functions would be on the one hand to examine the existing Governmental services of the three territories and bring about the greatest possible measure of co-ordination, on the other hand to survey the economic needs of the whole area, and frame plans for future development. It is apparently considered that, except perhaps in the case of Nyasaland, local resources would provide the necessary funds.

Constitutional changes are proposed in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland so as to increase the responsibilities of the European representatives both in the Legislative and Executive Councils, while also providing additional representation of Natives. In the interests of administrative efficiency a considerable measure of devolution of authority, both by the Colonial Office and by the local Governments, is recommended.

The fundamental difficulty is that of reconciling the native policy of Southern Rhodesia with that of British tropical Africa as repeatedly laid down by Secretaries of State for the Colonies. A decision on this point, involving the whole problem of the sphere of native oppor-

tunities, will become more urgent with every step of native advance, and the results of that decision will have repercussions over a much wider area. That this aspect of the question was fully realised by the Commission is clear from the Supplementary Notes in which two Members definitely oppose the acceptance of the principle of amalgamation, and two others, while accepting it as a desirable aim, consider that it is not inevitable but contingent on the establishment of certain conditions, and that the present position must be regarded as largely experimental. ALAN PIM.

77*. THE CAPE COLOURED PEOPLES 1652–1937. By J. S. Marais. 1939. (London: Longmans, Green. 8vo. xxiii + 296 pp.)

THIS book is an important contribution to the study of South African history and sociology. The coloured people are the product of miscegenation "in its various permutations and combinations"; in the last resort, the Europeans are responsible for their existence, and their history is indissolubly linked with that of the European settlers, whether on the frontier, which they helped to extend and defend, or in the towns, where they were traditionally the craftsmen. In 1926 General Hertzog emphatically asserted the partnership of European and Coloured in that "civilisation" whose privileges the Bantu could not hope to share. But to-day, the Coloured are being pushed into the position of a separate and subordinate caste. Economically, the ground has been cut from under their feet. During the nineteenth century they failed, under *laissez-faire*, to hold their positions on the land; State intervention is now undermining their position in the cities. At the same time changes in the franchise laws have reduced their political strength, and further changes are threatened. Their future, Dr. Marais concludes, is dark.

Such an estimate of the future must be treated with great respect, coming as it does from one who has with such learning and judgment illuminated the past. Dr. Marais has written a standard book. The judicious blending of respect and critical independence with which he discusses the work of his predecessors—Theal, Cory and Macmillan—is an example to all writers who have to follow eminent pioneers. His documentary method is scrupulously exact and his judgment unfailingly fair. Moreover, he has a good style and a sense of proportion. His special study fits into the general history of South Africa's multiracial community. W. K. HANCOCK.

78*. THE AFRICAN TO-DAY AND TO-MORROW. By Diedrich Westermann, with a Foreword by Lord Lugard. Second Edition. 1939. (London: Oxford University Press, for the International Institute of African Languages and Cultures. Sm. 8vo. xx + 355 pp. Illus., maps. 8*s*. 6*d*.)

IN the second edition of his survey of the sociological problems of modern Africa, Dr. Westermann has added a new classification of African races, further data on the conception of the High God in African religion, and information, in the sections of the book to which it is relevant, on the recent important legislation on native affairs in the Union of South Africa. The detailed suggestions for inquiries on the spot, which were appended to each section of the first edition, in order to demonstrate the practical value of anthropological research, are not reproduced, but even without them the book provides a stimulating reminder of the number of problems which still await solution. L. M.

79. THE BANTU IN THE CITY: a study of cultural readjustment on the Witwatersrand. By Ray E. Phillips. 1938. (Alice, South Africa: The Lovedale Press. xv + 452 pp. 10s.)
80*. METHODS OF STUDY OF CULTURE CONTACT IN AFRICA. (Memorandum XV.) (Reprinted from *Africa*, vols. VII, VIII and IX.) With an introductory essay by B. Malinowski. (Oxford University Press, for the International Institute of African Languages and Cultures. 8vo. xxxviii + 105 pp. 2s. 6d.)
81. NATIVE STANDARDS OF LIVING AND AFRICAN CULTURE CHANGE. (Memorandum XVI.) By Margaret Read. (Oxford University Press, for the International Institute of African Languages and Cultures. 8vo. 56 pp. 1s.)

A GENERATION ago the native problem in South Africa was mainly a rural problem of tribesmen, as it still is in East and West Africa. But ever since 1914 natives have been drifting steadily to the towns of the Union. To-day there are hardly less than a million who are more or less permanently living away from tribal conditions. Their position is a precarious one, because not only do the Europeans refuse to regard them as citizens, but also hold that they do not even "belong" in the towns, that their "proper place" is in the native reserves, if not on the farms. In the circumstances it is perhaps not surprising that the legislation passed to control the movement of urban natives is inspired by fixed ideas rather than ample knowledge.

Knowledge of the precise position of these natives has been lacking, at least in book form, and only those people who sit on the Joint Councils will be aware of the main facts that Dr. Ray Phillips records. The author is an American missionary who brought to his work in South Africa a knowledge of negro life and inter-racial activities in the United States. For his book he has gathered from dozens of sources every scrap of available information bearing on the life of natives on the Rand (excluding those at work in the mines); and what he could not find in blue books and official records he elicited by questionnaire and personal inquiries. The result is a mass of valuable material ranging from wage rates and articles of diet to religious tendencies and tastes in films.

But if the ordinary reader is content to be informed in this way, the anthropologists would point out that some things might well have escaped Dr. Ray Phillips that would have emerged with the use of their own technique. There is still a good deal of misunderstanding about the theory and practice of anthropology. Those who want to appreciate its results will welcome this series of articles reprinted from *Africa* with a new introductory essay by Professor Malinowski himself. He analyses the accounts written by six of his best-known pupils of their methods of field-work, commending some and criticising others.

Dr. Read is another member of the functional school of anthropologists, and her booklet illustrates the application of the technique to a particular problem. Taking the Ngoni highlands of Nyasaland as her province, she shows convincingly that "standard of living" is no simple concept. The avowed aim of raising native standards will not succeed unless it is closely allied to the preservation of the traditional social organisation, not least in the economic sphere.

JULIUS LEWIN.

82. THE SOUTHERN BANTU. By L. Marquard and T. G. Standing. 1939. (Oxford University Press. 8vo. vii + 262 pp. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

IF I had been reviewing this book in London instead of on a farm alongside a numerous native population in the Northern Transvaal, I might have been less critical of chapters I to V. As, however, this book has been written apparently for students before matriculation, I think Mr. Standing should have laid more emphasis on the fact that his contribution is only a very rough and broad outline of Southern Bantu life, magic and religion.

He wants his readers to believe, apparently, that only sable horns are used as trumpets (p. 36), that one wife acts as cook (p. 25), that if a wife did not bear any children, all that happened was that she was returned to her family and the " lobola " cattle were returned to the husband (p. 50), and that the lean period when they were short of food only lasts from August to October (p. 30). It is as much as if I wrote, " The English live in brick houses, wash their clothes on Mondays and their bodies on Saturdays, eat oatmeal porridge, play golf and hunt." As it is, the serious student may well lose faith in the worth of the remaining chapters by Mr. Marquard, which give quite a good summary of the Bantu on farms, mines and in the towns, with chapters on legislation, administration and education, together with the last two chapters on their life and treatment in Southern Rhodesia, the Protectorates and South-west Africa. G. G. THWAITES.

83. AFRICAN WOMEN: a study of the Ibo in Nigeria. By Sylvia Leith-Ross (Leverhulme Research Fellow), with a foreword by Lord Lugard. 1939. (London: Faber and Faber. 8vo. 567 pp. Maps. 15*s.*)

" THE social anthropologist can fulfil a practical function by providing material which will enable the African governments, in directing their own policy, to see that the process of adjustment to new conditions shall cause as little disturbance as possible to African society." Mrs. Leith-Ross's vivid and intimate account of Ibo women in three stages of development provides an admirable example of the function Lord Hailey had in mind when he gave the social anthropologist his blessing. Her studies in the south-eastern area of Nigeria were undertaken in consequence of a serious administrative problem, or series of problems. The " Women's War " of 1929 illustrated in an alarming way the danger of neglecting the social anthropologist when introducing so great a novelty as direct taxation. In connection with the slow and delicate task of subsequent reorganisation, it was recognised that women investigators had an essential part to play in studying a society in which women appear to fill a leading position, as cultivators, as traders and as members of some hidden intangible communion.

Mrs. Leith-Ross writes not as a mere visitor to Nigeria, but as one with many years' experience in Northern and Southern Provinces. She possesses not only the secret of establishing human contacts and personal confidence, without which much learning may be vain, but also an admirable English style, which makes her book, as the publishers truly claim, " much better reading than nine out of ten popular travel books." It deserves the attention of administrators, educationalists, missionaries, and of all interested in the position of women in the modern world. H. MATHESON.

84*. STATE INTERFERENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA. By F. J. van Biljon. 1939. (London: P. S. King. 8vo. x + 322 pp. 15s.)

THE merit of this volume consists in the introduction which it affords to the study of the vigorous policy of State intervention in the economic sphere which has been pursued in recent years by the Government of the Union of South Africa. Farmers, industrialists, Government enterprises such as the railways, European workers and "poor whites" have enjoyed a most varied diet of protection, assistance, subsidy and encouragement, the multifarious courses following one upon the other with such increasing speed, particularly after the depression of 1929–30, that little time has remained between meals for the not unimportant process of digestion. The *enfants gâtés* have not all remained equally appreciative of their good fortune, and when their stomachs have turned the cooks have been blamed. An inquiry into the national housekeeping is not untimely.

By providing a description of current legislation, Dr. van Biljon has assisted in that inquiry, and it is doubtful whether it would be right to expect him, as a Civil Servant, to do more. He does, however, attempt a good deal more, both by way of justifying various policies of the present Union government (or, as he would say, "of Government") and of advocating plans for the future. He would like *inter alia* to see both a vigorous policy of encouraging European immigration and the removal of repressive legislation which holds back the advance of the backward native population, and one could wish that he had demonstrated the practicability of either. In general, his discussion of current trends is marred by his uncritical approval of most of the experiments in monopolistic marketing, apparently because they are monopolies, and by his eager anxiety to provide them with an ultra-modern academic backing, which may indeed bewilder the South African legislators who are responsible for the schemes, and shock the economic theorists who are expected to approve them. "It is an accepted principle that monopoly is desirable if it leads to a sustained output of a product which would not be forthcoming under competitive conditions" (p. 42); one hardly expected to find the proverbial yachts of the monopolist millionaires accorded so unqualified an approval in a doctoral thesis of the University of Pretoria.

ARNOLD PLANT.

85*. MY TANGANYIKA SERVICE—AND SOME NIGERIA. By Sir Donald Cameron. 1939. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 293 pp. 10*s*. 6*d*.)

THIS book is an account by Sir Donald Cameron of his work and experiences as Governor of the Mandated Territory of Tanganyika from 1925 to 1931. There are also some allusions to Nigeria, where he held the office of Governor from 1931 to 1935.

Sir Donald is an outstanding authority on the theory of Indirect Rule, the essence of which is, in his own words, "to administer the Africans as far as possible through the instrument of their own indigenous institutions, if they are still functioning, instead of through the administrative officer directly to the people as a mass."

The account of his interpretation of this theory, and of how he applied it in Tanganyika and strengthened it in Nigeria, is a very important contribution to the literature dealing with Colonial Administration. Examples of difficulties overcome in the process add greatly

to its practical value, and some day-to-day reminiscences about his life and work in the country supply a personal touch which will appeal to his readers.

Sir Donald is frankly critical of conditions as he found them when he took up the reins of government in Tanganyika, and he quotes many expressions of appreciation by Africans of the form of native administration which he gradually built up. E. R. J. HUSSEY.

86. TAFARI ET CIE: Memorie raccolte e compilate da Aldo Cassuto. By Costantino Paleologos. 1938. (Trieste: Delfino. 8vo. 278 pp. *Lire* 12.)

A CLEVER journalist has strung together anecdotes and observations recounted to him by a Greek resident in Addis Ababa who at the end of his twelve-year stay was in the employment of the Ethiopian Government. Hailé Selassié appears as astute, urbane, entirely self-seeking, and at the end a traitor to his friends. His Europeanising programme is resolved into a calculation that he could best keep his own throne by support from outside: while he is represented as ruining any serious modern enterprise by wanting the whole profits for himself. Italian students of Abyssinia up to 1934 gave a different appraisal of the now-exiled ruler. The atmosphere of Addis Ababan journalism (there were 100 Special Correspondents there during the war) is well conveyed.

C. J. S. S.

FAR EAST

87. CHINA FIGHTS FOR FREEDOM. By Anna Louise Strong. 1939. (London: Lindsay Drummond. 8vo. xii + 231 pp. 5*s*.)

88. CHINA FIGHTS FOR HER LIFE. By H. R. Ekins and Theon Wright. 1939. (London: McGraw Hill. 8vo. xix + 355 pp. 10*s*. 6*d*.)

89. SPOILS OF OPPORTUNITY. By Janet Mitchell. 1938. (London: Methuen. 8vo. viii + 290 pp. 10*s*. 6*d*.)

MISS STRONG'S political sympathies sometimes betray her into some rather wild assertions on matters of history. It seems quite impossible to kill the lie that England made war on China to force opium upon her, which is never mentioned in the Treaty of Nanking and which British merchants were afterwards sternly warned by their Government they would take to China entirely at their own risk. But other writers have done worse without Miss Strong's saving grace of splendid descriptive powers and complete selflessness. She has seen the Chinese in battle, in retreat, in their hospitals, where their stoic endurance must surely be the wonder of all time; she has travelled with the refugees, lived among students building up their universities anew in Western China and spent long weeks in the Communists' Spartan camps. And what she sees, the reader sees through her eyes. Much of her story is tragic, some of it humorous, always it shows us a people at war, as the Chinese never have been before, with a grim determination which every act of Japanese ruthlessness only strengthens. Miss Strong's observations on Communism are particularly valuable as she knew it at first hand in 1926–27, in the first heat of Russian ideology. Now it has become something very different, of which there is no reason to be afraid. That the future of China belongs to the Communists, probably still further moulded to Chinese taste, there seems little doubt. Miss Strong has written a grand book.

China Fights for her Life reminds one of the "candid photography" so popular with devotees of the modern miniature camera. It is less a study of China than a "close-up" of General and Mme Chiang Kai-shek, who are undoubtedly the most remarkable pair of people in the world to-day. At the same time the authors are probably right in thinking that, even without the Chiangs, the Chinese would have stood up to the Japanese, whose aggression had gone beyond endurance by the new nationalist spirit. The book is interesting but marred by shoddy journalese—"the poker-faced militarist," "the frail little general," and the incessantly "slender hands of Mai-ling." Such epithets, whenever General or Mme Chiang is mentioned, are extraordinarily irritating.

Miss Mitchell certainly saw plenty of life from the time when she struck out from the padded comfort of a well-to-do Australian home—studying the piano in London during the War; as Australian delegate to the I.P.R. conference in Honolulu; as Thrift-Director in Sydney until the world slump left nothing to be thrifty about; and in Harbin during the Japanese occupation of Manchuria. Although rather excessively interested in her own emotions, she manages to make her story interesting, especially the description of those luckless, shiftless, lovable people, the White Russians of the Far East. O. M. GREEN.

90*. CHINA AT WAR. By Freda Utley. 1939. (London: Faber and Faber. 8vo. xv + 306 pp. Map. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

THE different reception given to Miss Utley and her writings is a measure of the two protagonists in the Far East. Japan refused to let her land. In China, where she was most open in criticism, she was assisted to get the material for such comment, and was even thanked for her efforts.

Not that criticism is the only thing in the book, but it is perhaps the most valuable, particularly the criticism of the methods of dealing with the Chinese wounded. At the beginning of the fighting there were no facilities; valiant efforts are now being made to build up an organisation and there is a good account of this. But the efforts often break down because the moral responsibility towards the wounded is still hardly recognised, and only now is it being realised that men will fight better if they know that casualties will be cared for. Miss Utley got right up to the firing line, struggling through back areas; she saw at first hand the callous way in which the wounded were treated; she spoke out, and partly as a result of this conditions are improving. Perhaps her audience was more amenable because she was prepared to understand the difficulties. Thus she found lorries returning empty from the front and refusing to lift wounded; there was a reason for this, and the reason was removed. On her way to the front and in Hankow she saw also the effects of Japanese bombing on civilians, worse by far than anything that has got into the press.

The knowledge that Miss Utley obtained of actual facts she has used in an analysis of the political situation in China. When allowance is made for confessed biases her estimate of the possibilities of continued Chinese unity, of the possibility of the Generalissimo moving towards the Left to widen his support, of the problems, agrarian and other, that were inherent in China but have been aggravated by the present trouble, and of how the various parties, though uniting vigorously to defeat the invader, are looking two or three moves ahead to the time

when the invader will not be the main problem, these and other forecasts are worth study. Even if one does not agree with her conclusions it is good to be reminded that China will be in existence, one, three, or five years hence and that when the invader has gone, the present intense unity will at least take a different form, and that possibly the shaping of that form is as much before the minds of the able leaders of China as other and more immediate problems.

The book is strongly recommended. The photographs alone are worth having. B. WARD PERKINS.

91. TSO TSUNG-T'ANG, Pioneer Promoter of the Modern Dockyard and the Woollen Mill in China. By Gideon Chen. 1938. (Yenching University, Department of Economics. Sales Agent: The French Bookstore, Peiping. 8vo. v + 93 pp. 3s. (abroad).)

THIS monograph is the third in the series entitled *The Pioneer Promoters of Modern Industrial Technique in China*, by Professor Chen. Tso Tsung-t'ang is less familar to most Western students of Chinese history than are his great contemporaries, Tseng Kuo-fan and Li Hung-chang, yet his services in preserving the Manchu dynasty from the rebellions which came within an ace of destroying it in the mid-nineteenth century were equally important. The ultimate defeat of the Taipings was in no small degree due to his outstanding merits in military leadership and organisation, while to him alone belongs the credit for the suppression of the Mohammedan uprisings in Shensi and Kansu and the reconquest of Sinkiang for China at a time when it appeared permanently lost to her.

In this able and well-documented monograph Professor Chen describes another aspect of the career of Tso, namely, his efforts to introduce Western technique into China, particularly in the matter of the construction of dockyards, the building of steamships and the establishment of arsenals and woollen mills. Tso's attention was first directed to these matters through contact with Lin Tse-hsü, the Commissioner Lin of "Opium War" fame, and by his own experiences in the war with the Taipings. He was quick to grasp the importance to China, not merely of acquiring foreign vessels and guns and of hiring foreigners to train her men in the use of them, but of learning how to produce them for herself, so as not to be dependent upon the West. Thanks to his efforts the Foochow dockyard was established in 1866 with the assistance of French experts, and while Tso Tsung-t'ang himself was called to the north-west in the same year, his energetic patronage ensured the successful development of the enterprise, which has had a continuous existence since its foundation.

The second part of Professor Chen's work is concerned with the establishment by Tso of arsenals at Sian and Lanchow and of a woollen mill in the latter city. While Tso Tsung-t'ang looked upon the introduction of Western machine industry from the standpoint of defence, as was natural under the circumstances, he also cherished far-reaching schemes of economic development for other than purely military purposes, but these ideas mostly perished with his own death in 1885. His mill at Lanchow, in which German technicians were employed, was opened in 1880 and ceased operations after 1882, when Tso had left the north-west. It still exists and has been in operation from time to time since his day, but with little success.

While therefore Tso deserves his place as a pioneer of modern

industrial enterprise in China, his efforts in this direction had little permanent result, save at Foochow. As Professor Chen remarks, fate seems to have worked against Tso, in that he was barely able to start his schemes before being despatched elsewhere. Like most innovators, Tso Tsung-t'ang was inclined to overrate his own achievements, but Professor Chen shows their limitations and sets them in their correct perspective as isolated efforts in a background of inertia and reaction. F. C. JONES.

92*. JAPAN: GOVERNMENT—POLITICS. By Robert Karl Reischauer. 1939. (New York and London: Nelson. 8vo. xiv + 221 pp. Bibl. 7s. 6*d*.)

THE death of Dr. Reischauer during the aerial bombardment of Shanghai in 1937 was more than a personal tragedy; for the world could ill spare a man who possessed, through his thorough knowledge of the Japanese language and his imaginative grasp of the emotional dispositions of the Japanese people, a unique capacity for interpreting Japan's political system to the Western world. He did not live to finish this book. It was left for his wife and friends, working on the manuscript and notes which he had left behind, to complete his task. This responsibility they have admirably discharged, and the result is the most satisfactory and authoritative short account of Japan's political system available in a Western language.

Dr. Reischauer realised that Western readers often misjudge entirely the Japanese system of government because they concentrate their attention on the political machinery, which bears a superficial resemblance to that of the West, and because they fail to understand the nature of Japan's political ideology. So he begins his study with an examination of the outstanding characteristics of Japan's political thought and of the evolution of her government down to the establishment of the Constitution in 1889. He then describes the various organs of government which at present exist and indicates the relations between them. In the second part of his book he traces chronologically the working of the political system during the last fifty years. He shows that from 1889 to 1918 real authority rested with the *Genro*, and that during those years the political history of the country was largely a history of the internal conflicts within that group. He then describes how, between 1918 and 1932, the party politicians succeeded in some degree in wresting power from the military and bureaucratic groups, only to lose that power in the following years. Western readers are familiar with the broad outlines of this development; but Dr. Reischauer's account has a balance and a grasp of significant detail which few others can rival.

Of necessity, some of the difficulties of Western students must remain unresolved in so short a book. For instance, Dr. Reischauer here and there uses the term "aristocracy" to describe the group which has exercised the main political authority in modern Japan. Yet, in view of the diverse social origins of the Japanese leaders and the peculiar social status of the groups they led, it may be questioned whether this term, which calls up before the Western reader the picture of the great English landed families of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries or the Prussian Junker class, is appropriate. A brief discussion of the Japanese social system would seem to be a necessary preliminary to an adequate understanding of political forces in recent times.

There is another apparent contradiction which remains unexplained. Although Dr. Reischauer emphasises the complete subordination of the individual to the community in Japanese political thought, he writes his account of political conflicts largely in terms of personal rivalries, and he reiterates the proposition that " men, not laws, are the determining element in Japanese politics." This is certainly a more realistic method of treatment than the popular but (for Japan) misleading Marxist interpretation of political struggles. Yet it leaves much obscure. May not a clue to the difficulty be found in the different conceptions of leadership held by Japanese and Westerners and in the peculiar relationship in Japan between the leader and the group to which he belongs? The only slip which the reviewer has detected in this excellent book occurs on page 153, where it is stated that in January 1930 a ban was placed on gold exports; in fact, it was then that the ban on gold exports was removed. G. C. ALLEN.

93. CHINE ET JAPON 1938 : Les coulisses du drame. By R. D'Auxion de Ruffé. 1939. (Paris: Editions Berger-Levrault. 8vo. xii + 421 pp.)

CASUAL visitors to the Far East, however intelligent, seem doomed to be misled, and a study of documents is not enough. The only reliable guides are those who have had years of personal contact with the people, in administration, education, the market-place and the home. Further, it is doubtful whether anyone has a satisfactory knowledge of both peoples. This makes final conclusions of a moral nature extremely difficult, for every virtue or vice exhibited by one country seems to be matched by its equivalent in the other. In spite of the complexity of the problem, as M. Ruffé remarks, Japan has had against her 80 per cent. of the public opinion of the world, and this was exemplified in London last spring, when Parliament passed legislation to support Chiang Kai-shek's currency, almost without discussion.

Any student of Sino-Japanese problems who puts reason before sentiment should read this book even though it is propagandist in tone, contains a number of exaggerations and some revolting photographs, and probably over-emphasises the importance of Russian influence in China. Most of the points raised by M. Ruffé, who has lived in China many years as a French newspaper correspondent, have yet to be answered : for example, that China, outside the occupied areas, is still administered by military cliques imbued mainly with interest for their own families, hatred for foreigners and disregard for the Chinese people; that these cliques deliberately egged on the passionate Japanese military and met every attempt at appeasement with outrages; that Manchuria has never been an integral part of China; that the " unequal treaties " hit the foreigner rather than the Chinese; that the Chinese attempts to put down the opium traffic have been hypocritical in the extreme.

M. Ruffé, however, does not know Japan, and we have yet to see whether his optimism concerning her success in Chinese administration will prove warranted. She is learning a great deal, but will only respond to patient encouragement. Threats bring out what, to Western eyes, seem to be her worst qualities. The events of the last few months hinge on this fact. Western ignorance of the Far East is directly affecting the lives of 500 million people. M. Ruffé's book indicates some of the depths of this ignorance. N. SKENE SMITH.

94. TO-DAY IN MANCHURIA: the young Church in Crisis. By T. Ralph Morton. 1939. (London: Student Christian Movement Press. 8vo. 128 pp. 2*s.* 6*d.*)

THIS little book gives an interesting and well-written account of the experiences of the Christian Church in Manchuria since the Japanese occupation. It describes the situation prior to 1931, the initial years of chaos and suffering which followed the Japanese invasion and the manner in which persecution of the Chinese Christians began. The author does himself less than justice in making no claim to be impartial, for he reveals a balanced judgment and a keen insight into the workings of both the Chinese and the Japanese mind. In particular he has shown clearly not only how, but why, the Japanese acted as they did in Manchuria and, one may add, as they are now doing in China; and his book is consequently of value to all readers. F. C. J.

95*. SPECIAL UNDECLARED WAR. By Frank Oliver. 1939. (London: Jonathan Cape. 8vo. 368 pp. Maps, illus. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

WHILE frankly admitting that he likes the Chinese better than the Japanese, Mr. Oliver emphasises that he has striven after impartiality and objectivity in giving us this record of the Sino-Japanese struggle. In this he has, generally speaking, been successful, though there are times when his personal predilections come to the surface in the form of irony and cynicism.

In the main this book is a straight-forward record and commentary on the present conflict and of events and developments leading up to it. As such it should be of permanent value, both to the future historian and to the general student of Far Eastern affairs. Its value is enhanced not only by the lucid presentation of the principal facts and by the generally high standard of accuracy, but also by the shrewd observations with which it is interspersed. In a brief review such as this it is not possible to do more than indicate the nature of these comments.

In referring to the deplorable breakdown of Japanese discipline which occurred after the entry into Nanking he remarks that, by behaving as they did, the Japanese lost " the chance of a lifetime." Given reasonably tactful and considerate treatment, he contends, the population of Nanking, after what they had been through, " probably would have welcomed any invader who brought security and orderly government." Later in the book, after paying high tribute to the Japanese soldier as a fighter, he adds: " That is the soldier on the battlefield. It is the soldier off the battlefield who has ruined the possibility of genuine friendship between two neighbouring peoples of the same race."

If criticism is to be made it is in regard to things omitted by the author rather than in the material he provides. His tribute to Baron Shidehara, for example, is well merited; but whereas he says, rightly enough, that Shidehara was " let down by the Army," he fails to add that it was China's failure to respond to his pre-1931 policy of friendship which gave the Army the pretext for letting him down.

M. D. KENNEDY.

96. JOURNEY TO A WAR. By W. H. Auden and Christopher Isherwood. 1939. (London: Faber and Faber. 8vo. 301 pp. Map. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

As a contribution to the ever-swelling volume of literature on the " China Incident," this book cannot be rated very highly. The

authors, it is true, travelled widely in China, had interviews with most of the leading Chinese personalities, and witnessed personally a number of Japanese air raids. With such opportunities for seeing and hearing at first-hand what was going on, something very much better might have been expected; but in point of fact the comments and observations made are, for the most part, smart rather than clever and are mainly notable for a somewhat irritating facetiousness.

Chiang Kai-shek, "Madame," Donald, von Falkenhausen, Feng Yu-hsiang, Agnes Smedley, and Peter Fleming were among the more outstanding figures encountered and interviewed; but little or nothing of value seems to have been said by any of them, as the accounts of these interviews are confined almost wholly to semi-humorous comments on the personalities and characteristics of the individuals concerned.

Lest this be considered unduly critical, it should be added that there are many good passages of descriptive writing, the numerous photographic illustrations are well produced, the authors appear laudably unbiased in their outlook, and there are occasional sidelights of considerable interest on such matters as the relations between the Kuomintang and the Communists and the attitude of "White" Russians towards their "Red" brethren *vis-à-vis* Japan.

M. D. KENNEDY.

97*. AGRARIAN CHINA: Selected Source Materials from Chinese Authors. Compiled and Translated by the Research Staff of the Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations. With an introduction by Professor R. H. Tawney. 1939. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. xviii + 258 pp. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

THE Institute of Pacific Relations has rendered a real service in publishing these "source materials" for the study of what is probably the most basic of all China's many problems. The most hopeful thing about the book is the impressive evidence which it affords of the vast amount both of field-work and hard thinking which so many of the young scholars of China are devoting to the agrarian problem. This must be emphasised, for otherwise the book leaves a very painful impression, so dark is the picture which it presents and so stupendous the difficulties in the way of rural reconstruction which the authors describe. The extracts are culled from many sources. Some are from periodicals such as the *Shun Pao* (Weekly Forum) and the *Chung-Kuo Nung-Ts'un*. Some are publications of the Sun Yat-sen Institute for Advanced Culture and the Research Society for Chinese Agrarian Economy. Two or three of the most outspoken have a semi-official character such as the Report on Poppy-Growing in Yunnan, edited by the Rural Reconstruction Commission of the Executive Yuan, and the revealing picture of "Military Requisitions and the Peasantry," a monograph published by the Academia Sinica.

But varied as are the sources and very different in natural conditions as are the parts of China which are described, there is astonishing unanimity as to the basic causes of the evils which scourge the afflicted peasantry of China and as to the reasons for the relative failure of the efforts so far made to remove them. That landlordism, whether in the traditional semi-feudal form or in the more modern aspect of commercial capitalism, is becoming as great a curse to China as it was to Czarist Russia and that the position of the small peasant and landless worker is becoming more and more intolerable, that the

intervention of foreign industrial capital has in the main increas rural poverty and insecurity and that, without a radical reform of t land-system, the drastic curbing of the power of vested interests a the education and organisation of the peasantry, there is small prospe of success for rural co-operative societies—these are the constant recurring themes of this melancholy but salutary symposium. It true that the criticisms are destructive rather than constructiv None of the authors avowedly advocates the Communist solution of th rural problem and no accounts of conditions in districts which ar or have been under "Red" control are included. By implication th majority of the writers favour the official Kuomintang programme o land-reform and peasant ownership as defined by Dr. Sun Yat-sen and are primarily concerned with the diagnosis of the evils which have to be removed before that programme can be realised. Almost the only article in the whole book which delineates a successful experiment is one describing four hopeful farm settlements in the Ho-tau Plain of the Upper Yellow River in Suiyuan, of which it is said that "they all seem imbued with the spirit of creative effort and a real determination to succeed." The accounts of other frontier regions such as Northern Manchuria, Paotow and Ningsia and of newly reclaimed areas such as the coastal marsh belt of Northern Kiangsu, now the premier cotton-growing district of China, reveal commercial exploitation at its worst; in the last case "what began as an effort toward collective ownership has resulted in private property on a huge scale" and "56·86 per cent. of the land is in the possession of only 1 per cent. of the total land-owning families."

Attention in Great Britain and America ought to be directed to the two articles entitled "Tobacco Marketing in Eastern Shantung" and "Foreign Industrial Capital and the Peasantry in Honan," for if the facts there given are correct they constitute an appalling indictment of the methods adopted by well-known Western companies in relation to Chinese peasant cultivators. In the Preface to the volume responsibility is disclaimed "for statements of fact or opinion contained in the translations, though every effort has been made to check their accuracy." But the prominence which these articles acquire by inclusion in a volume issued under the auspices of the I.P.R. demands that the statements there made should be fully investigated by the responsible authorities. The concluding paragraph of the second of these two articles reads as follows: "It is now clear that foreign industrial capital has fully utilised the weakness of the Chinese political and economic system to assert its power and advance its profit, but the students and peasants have come to realise more and more that their increasing poverty . . . is chiefly due to the formidable alliance of the bureaucrats, rotten gentry and foreign capital." Such generalisations have of course been made before, but in this and other articles in the book they are supported by what seems an impressive weight of evidence.

The book would be considerably improved by a good index.

P. M. Roxby.

98. Bauernkrieg in China. By Gustav Amann. 1939. (Heidelberg: Kurt Vowinckel. 8vo. 158 pp. Ill. *Rm.* 6.50.)

As a German engineer who has been close to Government circles for many years, Mr. Amann has had unusual insight into Chinese events, personalities and policies. He brings out in this, the third

instalment of a continuing "History of China in Recent Times" that there was not in 1927 that complete break between Communists and capitalists which has subsequently been read into the events of that year. Many of those who supported the Kuomintang did not give up their faith in the early realisation of a representative people's State. And many of those who withdrew from public life in silent condemnation of the Government's tactics, nevertheless believed in evolutionary socialism rather than in class conflict to the better end.

As in his previous book, Mr. Amann again paints a sympathetic and understandable portrait of the generalissimo; but he does justice also to the Communist leaders and, indeed, gives a remarkably objective account of the succession of campaigns to eliminate Communism. Whatever there was of ruthlessness on either side is not stressed as much as the undoubtedly sincere attempts made to effect agrarian reforms. Those of the Government, as here presented in some detail, certainly exceed in scope the demands of military strategy, though the necessity of pacifying reconquered areas provided the occasion for them. BRUNO LASKER.

99*. SÜDOSTASIEN: Ein Kampffeld der Zukunft zwischen Weiss, Rot und Gelb. By Dr. Kurt Wiersbitzky. [*Macht und Erde*, Heft 10]. 1938. (Leipzig: Teubner. 8vo. 70 pp. *Rm.* 1.50.)

A rapid survey of South-Eastern Asia, emphasising its economic significance to foreign Powers, and touching briefly on the international importance of the struggle between China and Japan.

THE UNITED STATES

100*. THE AMERICAN DEFENSE OF NEUTRAL RIGHTS, 1914–1917. By Alice M. Morrissey. 1939. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press; Oxford University Press. 8vo. xii + 230 pp. 10*s.* 6*d.*)

101*. WILSONS DIPLOMATIE IN DER FRIEDENSFRAGE 1914–1917: [Beitrage zur Geschichte der nachbismarkischer Zeit und des Welt-Krieges, Heft 40]. By Arnold Meine. 1938. (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. 8vo. 156 pp. *Rm.* 6.)

DR. MORRISSEY argues in this well-documented book that the United States Administration was not really neutral during the period of the World War before American intervention. "The policy of the United States was not only discriminatory but avowedly so." The attitude of Administration and people towards the cause of the Entente was a complex of three things, emotional, political and economic; these things inclined them to look favourably upon the British navy's handling of neutral shipping and to ignore the protests of the German Government. "Wilson himself had the idealist's dangerous capacity for righteous indignation and an equally alarming impatience of legalistic arguments and attitudes." The great bankers openly sympathised with the Entente. The author seems to hold, though "negative evidence on this point cannot be conclusive," that the bankers desired American participation in the war in order to safeguard the investments which they had already made.

This book has great interest for the British people as well as for the Americans. The Americans should read it in conjunction with Grey's *Twenty-Five Years*. Here they will find that in 1914–17, in spite of the sympathy of the Administration, American neutral policy was felt by the British Government to be very galling and hampering. British

readers, on the other hand, will learn that the U.S. Administration was going as far as it could to help the Entente without committing itself to participation.

Dr. Morrissey's book explains very fairly the German point of view in regard to Wilson's administration of neutrality in 1914–17. It is well that this view should be explained. On the other hand, perhaps more credit might be given to Wilson's consistency and to the fact that he never concealed from the Germans the result to which their policies were leading in regard to the United States. His "strict accountability" note was, as Dr. Morrissey observes, sent at the very opening of the submarine controversy. Dr. Morrissey's final judgment on 1917 is: "The United States went to war with Germany because it passed a moral judgment on her behaviour, because it insisted upon a broad interpretation of neutral rights, and because after developing a huge economic interest in one side it lacked an economic deterrent in going to war with the other."

Herr Meine's study, too, is a very well-documented work, the evidence which it marshals points to the same conclusion as Dr. Morrissey, namely that the moral and "ideological" sympathy of Wilson and indeed of the United States Administration and people for the Entente cause vitally affected the American policy of neutrality. The author points out the dramatic effect of the sinking of the *Lusitania* which fanned American opinion to "white-heat." He is of opinion that Lansing from the first considered German methods of warfare as certain sooner or later to bring the United States into the war on the Entente side. He also stresses the influence of Colonel House on President Wilson.

R. B. MOWAT.

102. COURT OVER CONSTITUTION: a study of Judicial Review as an Instrument of Popular Government. By Edward S. Corwin. 1938. (Princeton University Press; Oxford University Press. 8vo. xi + 273 pp. $2.50.)

103. FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT: his life and achievement. By Basil Maine. 1938. (London: John Murray. 8vo. vii + 286 pp. 10*s.* 6*d.*)

PROFESSOR CORWIN is a leading authority on the interpretation and development of the American Constitution, and in *Court over Constitution* he writes with insight and erudition, not unmixed with a certain sprightliness, on the rôle of the Supreme Court in American affairs. The present volume is perhaps one for the specialist rather than for the layman; but its bearings are of general importance, and Professor Corwin brings out the essence of that 150-year-old conflict between Court and Legislature which is implicit in the Court's review power of Federal legislation. From time to time this latent conflict produces a major crisis in American public life, the most recent example being the storm which centred around the Court's decisions holding invalid much of President Roosevelt's New Deal legislation. It was a challenge which the President did not hesitate to accept; and although his proposals for altering the composition of the Court brought about his first serious defeat in Congress, more recent decisions suggest that the President's offensive was not in vain, and that the Court has begun to conform more nearly to a public opinion which has of recent years changed radically in its outlook on social and economic questions.

The late Lord Balfour once expressed the view that, of all the attributes that go to make up the statesman, the most to be desired was courage. Mr. Maine's biography of Franklin Roosevelt lends emphasis to this dictum. The record of the President's earlier years is that of a rather ordinary young man reared in a sheltered environment, and hardly to be distinguished in outlook or ability from a thousand others of his class and generation. But almost from the moment of his entry into politics, at the age of twenty-eight, as State Senator for New York State, Roosevelt showed himself to be a resourceful and determined fighter, who from the outset was ready to challenge the entrenched and often corrupt forces of political privilege and power.

This is an intimate and readable study of the President. It does not attempt—to do so would, indeed, be premature—to estimate the significance for his time and generation of one whose dynamic personality may well be a determining factor in the history of democracy as we know it.

ARTHUR LOURIE.

104. I THINK ALOUD IN AMERICA. By Odette Keun. 1939. (London: Longmans, Green. 8vo. viii + 349 pp. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

CONGRATULATIONS to Odette Keun for the wit and wisdom of her book and for her rare realisation of two fundamental facts—that it takes longer than a week to write a credible book on the United States, and that the city of New York is not the apex and epitome of American life.

Her observations are cruel—" There is not enough personality in the average American to fill a thimble." And kind—" No European can have the faintest notion of the courtesy and kindness and miraculous patience of American officials." And just—in spite of her Republican friends' unceasing talk of the " fiend in the White House," she feels able to divine in him a " keen taste for justice, generosity and humaneness."

The very contradictions of the book are the contradictions of America itself. She sees a land now of privilege and privileges, but with the splendid original vision of " genuine liberty, genuine self-government and genuine self-respect " never entirely lost.

EDNA W. FORTINGTON.

105. DIE NEUTRALITÄT DER VEREINIGTEN STAATEN. By E. Neumann. [*Veröffentlichungen der Hochschule für Politik, Forschungsabteilung.*] 1939. (Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt. 8vo. 126 pp. *Rm.* 5.)

A BOOK on United States neutrality is very timely. Herr Neumann's work is compendious, comprising 117 pages, exclusive of eight pages of useful bibliography. It gives a historical account of the neutral attitude and aspirations of the American people. It also carefully describes the laws or system of laws which the United States has from time to time enacted in order to preserve its neutrality. The interest of the subject for students and for politicians is to observe the relation between the historic and permanent desire of the Americans for neutrality on the one hand and their feeling of antagonism towards an aggressor on the other. This feeling, which is or was very widespread in the United States has, in Herr Neumann's opinion, been considerably modified since the failure of the " Italian-Ethiopian Sanctions Conflict," and since, in consequence of that failure, Switzerland, the

Netherlands and the Scandinavian States have withdrawn from the Sanctions method. With this thought Herr Neümann concludes his examination. R. B. MOWAT.

106*. AMERICA AND THE STRIFE OF EUROPE. By Professor J. F. Rippy. 1939. (University of Chicago Press; Cambridge University Press. 8vo. xiii + 264 pp. 9s.)

PROFESSOR RIPPY'S book is a clear and penetrating survey of American foreign policy since 1789. The "motivation" of this policy has been threefold: Isolationism, Expansionism, and Pacification of Europe, and the three have been often intermingled. Most interesting is the section dealing with American expansionism. Self-defence, ensuring the non-interference of European Powers in the Caribbean Zone, "manifest destiny," and "shouldering the white man's burden" have all played their part. All these causes and their justification are illustrated by extracts from speeches from public men of the time which make most illuminating reading. The active steps taken by Presidents Theodore Roosevelt, Bryan and Wilson, to pacify a troubled Europe are also analysed. Professor Rippy concludes with observations on possible American policies towards current international problems, and he believes that isolationism will not win the day.

K. C. BOSWELL.

107. THE NEGRO IMMIGRANT: His Background, Characteristics and Social Adjustment, 1899–1937. By Ira De R. Reid. 1939. (New York: Columbia University Press; London: P. S. King. 8vo. 261 pp. 14s.)

THIS book deals with immigrant Negroes into the United States since the Civil War. Coming from French, Spanish, Portuguese and British possessions they arrive already equipped with these languages and outlooks and consequently have to undergo a more difficult process of adjustment than do their white brothers with the same qualifications, owing to the bi-racialism of the United States. As the author expresses it:

> To move from an area where class and caste are catholic to a bi-racial set-up, where the Negro group is only partially accommodated to the whole social environment, creates problems of individual and group adjustment that, though not quantitatively manifest, are qualitatively operative.

The several curious and significant results of these difficulties are fully described. Among them may be quoted the prejudice of resident Negroes owing to the often better education and greater sensitiveness of the immigrants. It is estimated, for example, that in New York as high as one-third of the Negro professional population—particularly physicians, dentists and lawyers—is foreign-born. As for the British West Indians, having been taught to stand up for their rights they are inclined to become great litigants, and to stand upon their dignity, hence the railroads hesitate to employ them owing to their tendency to resent the supposed insults of passengers. However, as in all such cases, the second and subsequent generations, born in the new environment, conform to it more easily; but the process is an interesting study. H. A. WYNDHAM.

108*. AMERICA AND THE NEXT WAR—AN ISOLATIONIST'S ESTIMATE. By C. Hartley Grattan. Reprinted from the *University of Toronto Quarterly*, Vol. VIII, No. 3, April, 1939.

LATIN AMERICA

109. A History of Mexico. By Henry Bamford Parkes. 1939. (London: Methuen. 8vo. xii + 432 pp. 16s.)

Mr. H. B. Parkes, the writer of this new and up-to-date "History of Mexico," puts first things first. He begins this history by a reference to Man's first beginnings—in the table-lands of Asia—from whence sprang two streams of migration, one towards the East and another towards the West, which eventually met and mingled on the American continent. To quote Mr. Parkes, "the history of their mingling is the history of Mexico and of other Latin-American countries."

From a beginning so far away in time and space the author brings his readers quickly to the New World of Columbus and so to Mexico and the epic of its conquest by that mere handful of Spaniards of tremendous energy and hardihood whose exploits there, whenever thought of, take one's breath away; and who is there who is not sorry and even aggrieved that admiration must be mixed with horror at the instances of their unbridled greed and callous cruelty?

So repugnant is the evil they did that it costs an effort to be fair in review and to give due credit to the great work really done by the minority of men of good-will among the conquering race, and to the prolonged, strong and sincere and even heroic efforts made by the Spanish Monarchy and the Catholic Missionaries to protect and raise the conquered inhabitants: efforts which were obstructed and hampered at every turn by the lust for power and riches ever persisting among the majority of the European invaders. Not that cruelty and oppression were strange to the American races: very far from it, as our author shows. It is the tragic contrast between the message of Divine Love that was carried to them and the reprobate conduct of the predatory adventurers which so rankles and disturbs. Readers of this history will see that the contrast and the conflict continue, while to-day the opposing elements are more clearly distinct in badge and banner. Church and State are no longer so apparently confounded together as they were, to the spiritual detriment of the Church, in the days of the Spanish Imperial rule; the Church is now being treated as an enemy by an atheistic State with a social and artistic cult which seeks inspiration in the latent Indianism of the population. European and Christian values have suffered from the grave faults of their ostensible representatives, and the issues both in politics and education and in social structure are still obscure.

This obscurity is admitted in the author's judicial "conclusion" in which he recognises the blemishes and the disappointing results of the latest Revolution, but sees here and there some examples of honest co-operative peasantry which suggest to him "that Indian Mexico is emerging from the four-century interlude of white domination and that the Indian races have enough vitality to slough off the habits created in them by oppression and exploitation and to create a future of their own."

It is quite impossible in a short notice to review this carefully compacted history. It is packed with all pertinent facts and alive with interest. The extent and variety of the authorities and research on which it is based are reflected in a bibliography which occupies over eight pages of close print. Political "ideology" is not obtruded, and the anti-ecclesiastic background is not more emphasised than prevailing fashion and philosophy would lead one to expect.

The earlier sections are of much more general interest than those that recount the welter of factional strife which, but for the interlude of the Diaz régime, has been the miserable experience of Mexico ever since the triumph of the French Revolution. It is worth saying that in the latest phase several important experiments in monetary, financial and social matters have been made and with instructive results.

All readers will welcome the good index, and the stranger to Mexico will be glad to be able to glance time and again at the front and back cover maps. R. D. HUTCHISON.

110*. AN EYE WITNESS OF MEXICO. By R. H. K. Marett. 1939. (London: Humphrey Milford. 8vo. xi + 268 pp. 8s. 6d.)

THIS is a well-got-up book and gives a straightforward and unpretentious account of people and things Mexican as seen to-day by a normal, kindly Englishman of good education, who made a long stay in Mexico and was so happily placed as to see, learn and understand much more than do most Englishmen who visit that country.

The eye that here witnesses does not show itself to be of poet, painter or philosopher, and there is very much in Mexico that remains invisible and unappealing to the unblest vision. But here we may not be quite fair to the author, who admits having acted as correspondent of *The Times*. His discipline as such may have influenced him in repressing enthusiasms that could not have failed to be neutralised in the alembic of that journal. The illustrations are few but really illustrative of the text, which reads easily, whether it deals with character or circumstance.

The chapters likely to be of greater general interest are those which tell of the "old order" (mainly in its rural aspect) and of its passing; of "The Revolution" (1910 and still going on); and of the social and economic effects of this long unrest. In dealing with these matters the author has observed and studied carefully, and he evidently gathered copious and authentic information. His presentation is at once full and fair and his appreciations generally acceptable.

The notorious economic failure of the collective farming and industrial experiments of the Cardenas dictatorship is shown clearly and quite dispassionately. The effects of these experiments on the character and prospects of the masses they are meant to benefit are considered, but judgment is wisely withheld. The honesty and good intentions of President Cardenas are recognised, while the deplorable effects of his measures are made evident, and the sinister influences that have been playing upon his socialistic enthusiasms, exploiting his virtues, his limitations and his prejudices are sufficiently indicated.

The book ends on a questioning note: "Whither Mexico?" It is altogether a welcome, matter-of-fact book and one which gives the reader some solid ground on which to venture an answer to the question it asks. R. D. HUTCHISON.

111. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE GENERAL CLAIMS COMMISSION, UNITED STATES AND MEXICO, under the Convention of September 8th, 1923. By Dr. J. G. de Beus. 1938. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Roy. 8vo. xii + 342 pp. 6 *guilders*.)

THOUGH not a book for the layman, this is a valuable contribution to the study of international jurisprudence. It deals with the more important decisions of the cases presented to the General Claims Commission created by the United States and Mexico for the settlement of the claims of their respective citizens against the other Government

which arose from the revolutionary disturbances in Mexico during the period 1910–20. The prevalence of lawlessness throughout these years while the power and authority of Government were constantly shifting from one "caudillo" to another, and the illegal occupation of Vera Cruz by the American forces in 1914, produced instances of international delinquency of a most varied and intricate character, and of great interest to the international lawyer. A long and perhaps the most interesting chapter is that devoted to the "Calvo" clause, which has for a long time past been a thorn in the flesh of the Mexican concessionaire, and on the whole the conclusion at which it arrives, namely that after a case has been decided by the Mexican Court resort to diplomatic procedure is not necessarily excluded, may offer him some comfort. A melancholy reflection is to be drawn from the fact that though the Commission sat for five years, 1924–9, only 148 cases out of 3617 were finally decided, and it would seem unlikely that the Commission will ever sit again. The language is clear throughout and the English excellent. VINCENT W. YORKE.

112*. DER BRASILIANISCHE INTEGRALISMUS. By Karl-Heinrich Hunsche. 1938. (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. 8vo. xi + 247 pp. *Rm.* 6.80.)

THERE is nothing remarkable in the fact that the first thorough European study of the Integralist Movement in Brazil should be written by a German well acquainted with that country: what is, perhaps, interesting is that it is written with considerable restraint and a genuine desire to present the real objectives of the movement.

"Integralism" has its leader, Plinio Salgado, who founded it in 1932; its prophet, the distinguished Brazilian author, Gustavo Barroso; its "shirt" (green); its sign, a Greek sigma; its militia; and other familiar features. Or rather, it had all these things and many others, but at the end of 1937 it was proscribed as an organised movement, and driven underground. By that time it had reached two million adherents; but such figures are of no great significance in Brazil, and many observers think that its influence has been greatly exaggerated.

The similarity between Integralism and Nazism, although it is certainly more than shirt-deep, is hardly much more than skin-deep. In particular, Integralism, being a Brazilian product, cannot hope to stand for racial purity; the vastness of the country compels it to grant concessions to democratic and federal forms; its anti-Semitism not only loses much of its significance, but is economic rather than political or racial; and it definitely seeks to avoid a religious conflict, and to appeal to Christian sentiment. It has more in common with Fascism, although here, too, there are notable differences.

The reader who has other sources of information on this topic will not follow Dr. Hunsche all the way in his exposition. But his book is to be recommended for its careful outline of the movement and the ample appendices with documentation illustrating his points.

KENNETH GRUBB.

113. AMERICA SOUTH. By Carleton Beals. 1938. (London: Lippincott Co. 8vo. 559 pp. 15s.)

ANY attempt to promote understanding and goodwill between the peoples of different nations is of value in these uneasy times, and Mr. Carleton Beals in *America South* has made a valuable contribution to the literature on Latin America intended for the average citizen. His

[illegible] understates the scope of the book, since Mexico an [illegible] America receive equal consideration with the southern conti[illegible]

The author has the advantage of an historical mind, and he rightl[y] sets out to explain modern phenomena by tracing their origins an[d] developments in history. It is perhaps inevitable that, when so muc[h] information is summarised in one volume of moderate proportions the reader should at times feel inclined to question, if not the facts, th[e] way in which they have been presented. The final chapters on Pan-Americanism and the Monroe doctrine are of topical interest, an[d] Mr. Beals achieves in them a fine impartiality.

The book has an excellent index, but lacks documentation. It ha[s] the virtue of being both serious and extremely readable.

J. DUVAL RICE.

ERRATUM

In Mr. C. W. Jenks' review of *Le Contrôle de l'application des Conventions internationales du travail* on p. 544 of the last issue (July-August) of the Journal, the sentence beginning on line 9 from the bottom of the page should read :

> Brazil and the United States are at present in this position; Japan is still formally so, though she has notified her withdrawal; and Chile, Hungary, Peru and Venezuela, which have given notice of withdrawal from the League but have officially notified their intentions of retaining membership of the Organisation, are prospectively so.

FOREWORD

With this issue, which completes our eighteenth volume, the publication of *International Affairs* will be suspended, until further notice. Although the Institute will, it is hoped, be able to carry on a number of its former activities, the uncertainties attendant on the war have put an end to the reading and discussion of papers on the pre-war scale. Under war conditions, too, it is to be anticipated that the output of books for review may shrink. Thus, apart from difficulties of printing, circulation and finance, it is not expected that the particular type of material for which the Journal has established its reputation will be sufficient to justify its continuance for the present.

From this melancholy but inescapable decision it is permissible to look back on what the Journal has accomplished. It made its first appearance in January 1922 as a modest brochure of 32 pages. Its contents were an editorial and two papers, the first of which was by Professor Gilbert Murray on *Self-Determination of Nationalities*: there were no reviews. In the editorial the not unfamiliar prophecy was hazarded that the Journal would "meet a much-felt need." It would bring papers to members who had been unable to attend the meetings at which they were read. "Our ambition," the Editor went on to say, "is that the Journal shall ultimately become a source of information and a guide to judgment in international affairs, to which the publicist may profitably resort in discharging his function of forming the opinion of the wider public to which he appeals."

In that first year, 1922, the total bulk of the Journal was 201 pages, against the 900, and occasionally the 1000, pages which the annual volume now comprises. A Review Section was started on a humble scale; and the discussions on papers, most of which remained unprinted, were condensed into one short note appended to each two-monthly issue. In those days the material was not always easy to come by. There were no stenotypists; and we owe it to Mr. Geoffrey Gathorne-Hardy that, by reconstructing them from his own long-hand notes, he preserved some of our most valuable discussions from oblivion.

In March, 1924, the Journal broke new ground by reporting a full-dress debate on *The Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance*,

with the late Lord Balfour in the Chair, Lord Cecil leading for the Treaty and Mr. Amery against. Thereafter it grew and developed steadily until in 1929 it settled down into its present form and fashion. In that year it recorded the memorable dinner given at the Mansion House to our most generous benefactor, Sir Abe Bailey. Two years later it dropped its earlier and clumsier title and became *International Affairs*; at the same time it was made available on sale to readers who may be interested in foreign relations without being members of the Institute. Now its array of solid, sober volumes fills a particularly valued shelf in many a library, both public and private, in this country and across the seas.

In these eighteen years the Journal can claim to have fulfilled the ambition of its founders. Mr. Gathorne-Hardy, its first editor, built it up from its small beginnings; and his counsel and experience have been continuously at its service. In the editorial chair he was succeeded by Miss Cleeve, under whose wise and firm guidance it brings together all that is best in the expert knowledge which comes to Chatham House by way of papers, discussions and *aperçus* of the swelling literature on international relations. To members who cannot attend the meetings in Sir John Power's handsome lecture-hall it has carried a lively picture of the Institute's work, and it has provided a "guide to judgment" which must have materially informed and enriched the public opinion of Great Britain and the Dominions. Its outstanding feature has been the considered presentation of a point of view by one authority for debate and discussion by other authorities having special knowledge of the subject-matter or holding varying opinions. At times the debates have been rich in controversy and verbal sword-play occasionally engendering more heat than light; but for purposes of publication the endeavour has always been to select the more thoughtful or thought-provoking material, and to promote the leisured and deliberate digestion of ideas.

All this must now be laid aside, with regret and reluctance and only under pressure of war. In what form the task will be resumed, who can tell? But that it will be resumed, with even increased usefulness, is the earnest hope of all of us. Meanwhile members of the Institute will continue to obtain, in the fortnighly *Bulletin of International News*, a prompt and concise review of the changing world.

MODERN TURKEY[1]

BAY BURHAN BELGE

THE Ottoman Empire was the successor of two empires of widely different character: the Byzantine and the Seljukian Empires. These two empires, which had long been in conflict on behalf of the Cross and the Crescent, ended by exhausting each other, and the Successor State was in many ways a compromise. The Ottoman Empire inherited from the Seljukians the lead in the Islamic World; from Byzantium it inherited all the Christian territories which had belonged to it, together with the secular strife between the two Roman Empires. Thus Muslims and Christians had to live together as subjects of the same Empire. The new State extended and intensified these two inherited policies; it aimed at the union of all Muslims on the one hand and, on the other, the protection of Orthodox Christians as against Rome, and conquest at the expense of Catholic countries.

A definite distinction was made from the beginning between the Muslim and the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire, to each of which separate and well-defined functions were allotted. Muslims were eligible for all public services within the State, and were expected to pay the "blood-tax." Christians were ineligible for State service, but had to maintain its economic life and to meet the fiscal demands of the Empire; in fact, they were for a long time the only ones to pay taxes in money and kind, which were regarded as an equivalent to the blood-tax from which they were exempt. Consequently, the functionaries and soldiers of the Empire were Turks, or Christians converted to Islam, while the economic life of the Empire was carried on by Christians, whose interest in its defence and existence was limited, since they did not share in its administration nor directly in its defence.

The State itself, represented at first by the dynasty alone and later by the administration and the army, was forced to a series of compromises throughout its long existence. One of its first measures was the liquidation of the old nobility and of the Turkish feudal families of Anatolia, a process which was still

[1] Address given at Chatham House on June 13th, 1939; The Lord Meston, K.C.S.I., LL.D., in the Chair.

going on at the time of the conquest of Constantinople. A characteristic feature of Ottoman policy was that, throughout this process, the Ottoman sovereigns preferred to make terms with the feudal Byzantines—themselves ready to betray their own masters—rather than with the princely Turkish and Muslim houses of Anatolia, although the Ottomans themselves were originally only one of the different Anatolian dynasties of which the Seljuks of Konieh were the overlords. Eventually they completed the liquidation of these principalities, centralising these local administrations under their own rule.

While they were applying this policy of centralisation and the conquest of Muslim countries in Asia with a view to the union of Muslim States, they had to content themselves in Europe with consolidating the political, military and financial advantages they had already gained.

The price they paid in Asia for their dual policy was the temporary repression of Turkish national sentiment. They had to persuade the Muslims to accept the idea of living side by side with Christian populations in spite of the heritage of hatred left from the struggle to defend themselves against the Crusaders. It was the more difficult to induce acceptance of this political tolerance when, after the conquest of Constantinople and the disappearance of the Byzantine Empire, Orthodox Christians in Europe came under Ottoman rule. It is certain that both before and after the conquest there was both understanding and collaboration between the Ottomans and the Byzantines, and that this fact facilitated the rapid conquest of the Balkan peninsula. The Patriarchate of Constantinople and the great Phanariot families were compelled to be subservient to their new masters. In Serbia and Macedonia there might be found families preserving their feudal rights and controlling the local administration in the name of the Sultans, while members of their families were serving in the Ottoman administration and army. Faithful servants of the Empire were certain to find friends at the Court.

Compromise, therefore, was the policy all along the line. There were reactions against this policy, and symptoms of the Ottoman national idea became apparent long before the conquest of Constantinople. The feudal Turks of Anatolia complained to Timur (Tamerlane). Timur lived in the land of his ancestors and wished to unify his people and to dominate the commercial routes between Asia and Europe. Fine soldier and statesman, he represented the last superhuman effort of Asia to create for

itself a backbone and to gain a definite and permanent path to the other continents. The complaints of the Anatolian feudal lords, maltreated or driven out, drew him towards Asia Minor. His adversary was Beyazit (Bayezid) the Thunderer, hero of Kossovo, the battle which had decided the fate of the Serbian realm. He himself had married a Serbian princess, and Serbian soldiers fought by his side at the battle of Ankara.

Timur did not want war. He sought to reason with Bayezid and to persuade him to repudiate the formula of compromise, to rally to the Islamic and Turkish cause, to effect a reconciliation with the Anatolian dynasties and to make a common front, clear and categoric, against the West, beginning with Byzantium.

Bayezid, with incomparable arrogance, rejected all these proposals and insulted their author. In the resulting struggle between the two Turkish leaders Bayezid was made prisoner, and the Ottoman Empire suffered its first submergence. The Turkish people, divided by the murderous shock between its two sections, lost their only chance of forming one immense unit in their country of origin. Timur was soon lost in the Asiatic gulf, and Chelebi Mehmet (Mohammed I), the son of Bayezid, succeeded by great effort in rebuilding his realm. If the two conquerors, instead of mutual destruction of their strength, had amalgamated, history might have followed a different course.

This was the first reaction against the form of the Ottoman State. Others followed. Fatih Mehmet, *i.e.* Mohammed the Conqueror, was the creator of the State organisation which, we repeat, inherited from Byzantium as well as from the Seljuks the principal lines of policy :

1. Mohammed destroyed Byzantine power.
2. By liquidating the feudal princes of Asia Minor he merged the Turks of Anatolia into a single unit.
3. He created a basis for collaboration between the Muslim and the Christian subjects of the Empire.
4. He continued and extended the policy of his ancestors.

Himself deeply interested in Western literature and art, he gave different educations to his sons. He hoped, perhaps, to effect a compromise by which the Empire, with the support of the Orthodox Church, might become the Muslim sword of Orthodox Christendom.

His policy threw into strong relief on the one hand the difference between his two sons, Bayezid the Pious as against Cem the poet and Western sympathiser; and between the two

centres of ideas, Edirne and Brusa. Edirne (Adrianople) provided a meeting-place for the best and most audacious soldiers of the Empire, and stood for conquest; while Brusa (the first capital of the Empire, later succeeded by Edirne, and, after the Conquest, by Istanbul) was the centre of Ottoman theology, and provided a focus for those who sought, first, the consolidation of the Empire and, secondly, a Pan-Islamic policy.

Bayezid the Pious, representative of the spirit of Brusa, won the day. His was the victory of the reaction against the policy of Mohammed the Conqueror. The introduction of the Caliphate into the Ottoman Empire was the work of Yavuz Selim, the victor over the Emperor Safévites Sali Ismael. He was a champion of Islamic imperialism, and he defended Sunnite (Orthodox) Islam against Shiism. At the battle of Chaldiran, where the Emperor Safévites lost his sceptre, throne, and wives, Turks were fighting against Turks.

But neither the Caliphate nor Selim effected the amalgamation of the several Muslim peoples within the framework of the Empire. His son, Suleiman the Magnificent, again abandoned Muslim tradition and prejudices, and set out for the conquest of Vienna. No solution of the dual policy was reached. The form of the Empire State, still based on compromise, was neither understood by Muslims nor loved by Christians. Nevertheless, it subsisted until the Empire sustained its first reverses, began to crumble during the decline of the Empire, and eventually succumbed before the aggressive thrust of a new idea: the Nation.

The new concept was derived from the West. It laid down the principle that the blood-tax and the fiscal tax should be paid by all citizens. It came armed with the cultural gains of the Renaissance (at war with Scholasticism and Theocracy) and with the growing power of that terrible enemy, the machine, which upset the structure of society based upon manual labour. Above all, the new concept embodied the notion of personal freedom.

It came too late, however, to instil new life into the Ottoman Empire. For decadent elements, fed on Scholasticism, only realise the danger when the opportunity for change has gone—that is, when sentence of death is passed. And Scholasticism, I may add, is not only a thing of the past; it reappears whenever mankind attaches itself to dead values.

The Ottoman Empire was beaten, first on the battlefield, then in its general policy, then in its system of production and exchange, and finally in its administration, morals, traditions and

customs. Its real enemy was the fatal optimism which nourished and sustained ignorance of facts.

When, only a century ago, the Empire began to revise its ideas, to recognise the superior organisation of Europe and to understand and imitate Western economy, the cause was already lost. It was being transformed into a market open to all the products, material and spiritual, of expanding Europe. The new form of economy was already taking shape. The introduction of the science, of the industrial, commercial and financial technique of the West led to enlarged external trade, the accumulation of capital, investment and re-investment and the rest of the apparatus of the capitalist system.

Faced with this economic revolution the Empire continued to encourage empiricism as against science and to support theocracy. The implications of the new conditions of exchange of the raw materials and agricultural products of Turkey for the manufactured products of the West were not thoroughly understood. The results of this lack of understanding became apparent in an adverse trade balance, the export of capital and an increasing lack of capital at home, successive foreign loans and growing insolvency, a steady fall in earnings, bringing with it increasing poverty and wretchedness.

Moreover, in 1848 practically all European countries acquired, willingly or by force, citizen rights, the rights of man. In every country the economic middle classes attained political power. But the famous Ottoman formula of government permitted nothing of the kind. The middle-class citizen of the Empire was not and did not feel himself bound up with its fate—for *he was not a Turk.*

What then was the connection between the Turk and the Ottoman? Who was the Turk? They had never allowed him to say. For six centuries he had been dying on the advancing frontiers or in the defeats of the Empire; he had been governing the country; he had even made his language subservient to the language of theocracy or to the involved and solemn language of the Court, and he was never at any time allowed to call himself by his own name. For the existence of the Empire was based from the very outset on its own repudiation. But in 1848 it was no longer possible to ignore him—for not only the Christian subjects but also the Mussulman subjects of the Empire were against the State and sought to form themselves into a nation. Egypt, flying its national flag, had already broken away; others and still others were to follow it.

The Tanzimat reform [the policy outlined on the Decree of the 15th November, 1839], as seen by the simple people, brought nothing good with it. A constitution would only hasten the downfall. Reaction was reaching its zenith. The conflicting ideals of Edirne and Brusa, of Cem the Western and Bayezid the Pious were again in opposition, but this time as passive submission on the one hand and as self-defence on the other. A savage and gloomy melancholy prevailed, a sign of collapse.

The systematic exploitation of the Empire, the combined rapacity of its nominal subjects occupied in trade and financial schemes, coupled with the intrigues which the Vienna and St. Petersburg confederates were ceaselessly plotting against it, did not prevent certain Turkish intellectuals and impassioned politicians from seeking to put everything right by using the wonder-working drug of the revolutionary principle of 1789.

There was a lack of clear-sightedness and of realism among the idealists known as the Young Turks. They were to create modern Turkey. In 1908 one of their party rose to power and applied the drug. After a dazzling but very brief improvement the Sick Man failed to revive. But well before his death, and before the application of the drug, many expedients were tried: for example, the formula of "divide in order to rule." Abdul Hamid found himself in the position of being able to divide Europe in order to reign in his palace of Yildiz. For to be exact, he only reigned within its precints; elsewhere terror reigned. He no longer desired any kind of reform. He saw that every effort to repair anything in the crumbling house only ended in destruction. The best course was non-interference and trust in the physical laws of inertia for the preservation of the Empire. He had a long reign; he played with Pan-Islamism. He presented to the Kaiser a railway corridor with the results now known.

But, even at this time, the soul of the Turk was receptive to the universally seductive idea of nationalism. And after very grave trials the ferment of this idea salvaged from the Empire the very definitely modern Turkey which you recognise and which you now trust as a friend.

This Turkey was the product of a revelation—the spontaneous and impressive revelation of the national conscience. And the man who symbolises the change is Atatürk, though it now falls to his intimate friend and collaborator, Ismet Inönü, to consolidate Atatürk's achievement and to guide the destiny of the new State. Before proceeding further, I must point out that the two men were never divided. They had the support of the sons

of the country who had always known how to die, but who now learned from their great leaders an exceedingly important thing, namely, how to live in order to build a great country and to face death only when their work was threatened. War is therefore no longer our trade, but the force with which we can always meet those who would hinder us in our noble and peaceful task.

Of these leaders, one who left us so early and the other who has our whole confidence and all our love, please permit me to say that they are not of those whom demagogy produces. They are of those whom a nation, tried by inexpressible sufferings, succeeds in producing—not accidentally, but always because it has need of them and always at the moment of crisis. This power is the faculty of nations destined to live. When Atatürk fell ill, people asked us " What shall we do? " We have shown them. We have elected our new leader, and in order to have no crises of leadership Inönü is going to train several for us. There will be an abundance of choice. And in the end the nation will become its own leader.

You democratic nations of Europe are too impatient. You should agree that democracy is not a matter of written words. It can only be lived. It only exists when it has been instilled by education, and it is never mass-produced, but made to measure, for each nation has its own virtues and its own defects. We are very well aware of our goal. And we know that democracy is only an advanced phase of collective education, a kind of good manners, the privilege of educated people who are vaccinated against all pathological tendencies. Moreover, a preliminary to the creation of democracy should be to put a nation into its proper place in that history that we are in the process of making and living. To do this it is above all necessary, when an Empire is in course of dissolution, to have the vision of a master and the level-headedness of a mathematician.

If you aim too high, the body of the community will suffer and one day you will see it defeated and losing consciousness. For the body of a nation is like that of an individual, only more subtle and less well understood. It also has a nervous system, a circulation of the blood and a digestive system. Force the nervous system, and the nation may become a somnambulist and enter his neighbour's house. As for the circulation of the blood, you know what the choleric are like. As for the digestive system, woe to the nations that suffer from hypertrophy or malignant ulcers. Either nothing will tempt them or nothing will appease them.

And would it not be an error to set the aim of a nation too low? The builders of nations must have a sense of proportion. Do not you agree that Atatürk had the vision of a master, of a man who knows when to advance and when to halt? And I should like to suggest that his friend Inönü has the most surprising mathematical sense in the exact assessment of the possibilities of his people and of his country. But when a nation has found itself, its work is not finished. It must be adjusted to the rest of the world. Otherwise it will either get out of gear in the world or it will end by being subject to adaptation, which may go so far at times as to suspend its very existence. History is full of examples of nations which, mistaking their real strength and miscalculating the force of circumstances, have had to pass through the purgatory of reality, sometimes to reappear, sometimes not, on the list of poverty-stricken nations.

Builders of nations must therefore understand thoroughly the times in which they live and the realities of the outside situation which they have to meet. They must remember that their nation is a fraction of humanity, and that it will so remain.

This fraction has a numerator and a denominator. For the individual the numerator represents interests more or less egotistic, and the denominator stands for the interests of the country and its laws and customs. It is the same for the nation. The numerator is what is its own, that which makes it what it is and not some other. One likes colours because they are different and aesthetically pleasing. Each nation in its country may be compared to a magic gardener cultivating the loveliest of flowers. Why not multiply those gardens? See those which are cultivated, those of the nations that have had the possibility of freeing themselves, both against themselves and against others. Was it otherwise with the old gardeners? Why are we reconstituting ourselves by our scientific researches, making use of the history of Greece, of Egypt and others? The denominator represents what the nations may yield in order to reduce themselves to the same common denominator. For, as all individuals must reduce themselves to the same common denominator, without which there is neither a nation nor even a social and political collectivity, but anarchy and collapse, so nations, seeing that they must form communities within the world, should have a common denominator. What does this denominator imply? It means the faculty of living in harmony with all the others, and *vice versa*, without surrendering the principle of difference inherent in the numerator. Without this proviso, we fall into another kind of

"totalitarianism," and, if we failed to comprehend the essential differences between nations, we should destroy national entities which have their own personality and their own destiny, and push them into an amorphous mass. For though we know that each nation is a part of the common humanity we all know that each has its special accomplishment, its special perfection to be attained.

Atatürk determined the denominator in this way. Will you allow me to read?

"Nations should not have to experience sorrow and affliction. The duty of the leaders is so to direct them that they accept life joyfully and happily. At one time I read many books to find out what the philosophers had to say about life. Some of them saw everything in black, 'since,' they said, 'we are nothing and we shall again become nothing, there can be no room for joy and happiness in the ephemeral life of this world.' I have read other books written by more reasonable philosophers who said: 'since we are nothing and in any case we are going towards the void, let us be gay and joyful during our existence.' My natural inclination is to prefer this last conception of life, applying to it certain limiting conditions. Man as an individual is destined to perish. To work, not for himself, but for those who will come after him, is the first condition of the happiness that every individual may attain in life. No sensible man can act otherwise. Complete joy and happiness in life cannot be acquired except by working for the existence, the happiness and the glory of the generations to come. In acting thus, a man should not ask himself whether those who come after him would understand that he had worked in this spirit. I will even say that the happiest people are those who intuitively prefer that their services should remain unknown to all future generations.

"Everyone has his likes and dislikes. Some like gardening and the cultivation of flowers. Others prefer to make men. Does the one who cultivates flowers expect anything from them? Whoever makes men should adopt the mentality of the gardener. Only those who act thus are fit to serve their nation, their fatherland and its future. A man who seeks his own happiness before that of his country and of his nation can only be second-rate. Those who assume for themselves an essential importance and believe that the existence of the country and of the nation to which they belong rests exclusively on their person, cannot be considered as having served the happiness of their nation. Only those who think of the generations to come after them give their nation the capacity to live and progress. It is an error to think that action and progress cease as soon as a man leaves the scene. The same consideration is applicable to societies distinct from one another. But to-day all the nations of the world are more or less one, or are on the way to become one. A man should think of the peace and prosperity of the nations as much as of the existence of his own country and should try to help on the happiness of all nations in the same

measure as he would help that of his own. All sensible men recognise that by working in this sense they lose nothing. For, to desire the happiness of his fellow-nations is another way of desiring his own happiness and his own tranquillity. If harmony does not reign among other nations, a country will work uselessly for peace that it will not succeed in acquiring. That is why I advise those for whom I care that statesmen should above all desire to be the creators of the life and the happiness of their own nation.

"But after that they should cultivate the same idea with regard to other nations. World events prove clearly to us that we cannot be sure that the incident which seems to us an infinite distance away may not one day or another touch us very closely. That is why we must think of all humanity as one body and each nation as a member of this body. No matter what injury affects any part of the body, does it not affect the whole body? One little illustration. I am a soldier. During the Great War I was at the head of an army. There were in Turkey other armies and their commanders. I occupied myself not only with my army, but also with the others. One day, while I was delaying because of some question relating to the movements of the troops before Erzerum, my aide-de-camp said to me: 'Why do you trouble about matters that do not concern you?' I replied: 'How can I direct my own army if I do not know the exact position of the others?'"

As for Inönü, he has underlined in a recent speech on this question that all attacks against the lives of nations should cease, just as those against the lives of individuals have ceased, and that we should agree to a community of all nations that love peace, should respect the rights and the spiritual and material patrimony of the others, and be ready to aid the law of collaboration by that of force.

The Turkey of to-day, as you all know, is employing all its strength to regain lost time. The Ottoman formula was replaced by that which we call the Kemalist formula, which asks that the Turkish nation shall live in a region where other nations enjoy the same independence. It is as if the palace of the Empire had been burned down and the ground thus made free had been parcelled out, and that each one wanted to build on one of those lots a house for himself such as he liked and as he was able to build. One would thus obtain on the grounds of the former imperial palace another picture, another architectural realisation, something more democratic, that is to say, less sumptuous as a whole, but more solid in its foundations.

To give the best of modern life to the Turkish people and to teach them to live in peace with all the peoples surrounding them and with whom they have passed so many centuries of

common life, that is the thesis of the external policy of Kemalism. From that principle the conclusion of the Balkan Pact and that of the Saadabad derive. But the condition *sine qua non* of this policy is that all the peoples living in the same region should enjoy their independence indefinitely. If dangers from without should endanger the peace of the region and prove that these little countries could not claim the right to keep their independence—then it would be necessary to revise our new State formula. If only the big nations are to enjoy their independence and if they seek to impose themselves as judges or masters, it would be easy to oppose to them a new formula capable of bringing them to reason.

That is why Turkey has just placed herself entirely at the service of peace and the pacific collaboration of the peoples. First, she is trying to mobilise the whole region so as to let any intruder know in advance that she has no need either of professors of ideas or of masters of ceremony, and that, neither in the Balkans nor on the Asiatic threshold, does she want any such intruders.

As for our internal reforms, you are perhaps somewhat disappointed that my address has not been mainly concerned with them. I have preferred to give you an analytic explanation of the facts, accompanied by a synthesis of the spirit of modern Turkey rather than to repeat to you facts on which you are already informed. The Turkish reforms are the result of a work of adaptation which has lasted more than a century and a half. To deal with them properly I should need a series of lectures, for they not only symbolise the political genius of the Turkish people, but have also an intrinsic value, in the light which they throw on the spiritual relations between the East and the West and on the gulf which has so long separated them and, above all, on the mission that theTurkish people have just taken upon themselves, to repeat their efforts to unite both spiritually and materially these two worlds which seem so opposed, but are in reality only two sides of the same medal.

Like every other national union, Turkey also must clear away the elements that oppose union. Moreover, those elements tending to facilitate union and to reduce antagonisms must be encouraged and fortified. Therefore Kemalism began by determining which " trends " are refractory to union. What were these " trends "? They were, first, Islamic scholasticism, which prolonged its influence in Turkey until the first quarter of our century. This made necessary the liquidation of the theocracy in the person of the " Caliphate " and of all its political derivatives

and the establishment of a régime of laicism, in which men regained their human liberties, whilst religion was lifted from the ground where it had been humiliated and bowed down and was placed where it ought to be, that is to say, in the spirit of the believers and in the house of worship. Because theocracy meant an autocracy of fanaticism and of religious formalism, Atatürk found it necessary to fix the boundaries between daily life and religion and to prevent the latter from advertising itself in the street; consequently all religious officials, no matter to what religion they belonged, could only wear their uniform when on their duty and in their respective temples.

If you are thoroughly acquainted with the Oriental spirit, you will not be surprised that this step had to be taken. For the East attaches much to forms, even after the substance has gone. While in the West—a very characteristic benefit conferred by Hellenism—the form dies with the substance and recreates itself with it, a process engendering what we call dynamism, in the East the form has a permanent symbolic value. That is why it is important in the East whether a man wears the fez, the tarbush, the turban, or even the hat. In the East the fez or the tarbush are symbols, and you cannot attack what they represent unless you attack and destroy the symbol.

All these symbols were therefore eradicated in order to give free opportunity to develop the scientific spirit. For this spirit ought infallibly to link the East and the West. As science is mathematical, it brings to the people both liberty and equality. It gives us the "new man" and the "new human." Instead of having human societies imprisoned in specific empiricisms and wedded to dissolving prejudices, refractory and disjunctive, we are journeying towards a period when science, having become the property of all people, will liberate them from their respective prisons, will transform them according to their individual particularities and their (let us use the German word) different *Geopolitik*, into healthy personalities which together will create the new humanity. The "new human" created by science, is the aim towards which "Modern Turkey" is proceeding, and science is the ferment necessary to put an end to the eternal conflict between the East and the West. It offers a bridge to all so that these two worlds may pass across it all that is good and constructive. But it is not to become the passive *pied-à-terre* of one of them, to be robbed thereby of its personality.

It was on these principles that Atatürk acted. He liberated the Turk from foreign and domestic burdens. The war for

independence was a barricade both against imperialism and against tyranny. He freed Woman. From a little sitting hen and a prisoner, she has become an official, a magistrate, member of parliament, judge, officer of the Air Force. Atatürk carried all with him. Every mother is an ardent adept of his doctrine. The Turkish revolution is therefore well defended, not by men with arm-bands and automatic gestures, but by radiant mothers. And the " new man " is born in the most simple manner in the world. No propaganda. The cradle suffices. For the Turkish mother is there to protect him.

Summary of Discussion.

SIR OSBORNE MANCE said that all must be very grateful to the lecturer for dealing with the subject of Modern Turkey upon such a high plane and with such an objective and philosophical outlook. This outlook was perhaps the explanation why the policy of Atatürk had been so successful. It did lead to consistency, which was not the most evident characteristic of some régimes further west.

One of the most important factors of modern Turkey was that while the policy of Kemal Atatürk had been to create a united nation which could live at peace with its neighbours and had no designs on them, the success of this policy had given to Turkey a great international importance. She was now the leader of the Balkan Pact, and the best future that could be wished for the Balkans was that she might succeed through her influence in developing among them that policy which had been so successful in her own country. Naturally Turkey was not as free to help the other Balkan States as she had been in developing her own internal organisation. They were liable to threats and dangers both military and economic. Turkey had given them a lead in showing them how to deal with the military menace. One advantage gained from that military menace was that it had brought the British and Turkish nations closer together again.

Turkey and the other Balkan States were all being subjected to economic pressure at the present time. When the pound had gone off gold, Turkey had remained on gold and had attached herself to the franc, and when the franc had gone off gold she had still maintained her currency on a gold basis. There was no special reason nor was it the moment to say that the Turkish currency would have been more correctly valued if based on sterling than by remaining on gold, and in any case the situation at the time had been very confused. At the present moment, however, Turkish currency was overvalued relatively to the par currency. This meant that currency had to be controlled and therefore trade inevitably had to be controlled. It meant clearing agreements and so forth. The technique of this procedure had been difficult to work out. It had had to be done in

every country by trial and error. All would agree that the agreement between Great Britain and Turkey on this point was one of the failures. The serious thing was that Germany had developed a technique whereby she succeeded in using these clearing agreements in order to get as much of Turkey's trade as she wanted. In the last few years she had had between thirty-six and fifty-four per cent. of Turkish exports and forty-two to fifty-one per cent. of her imports. The possible result of political pressure being applied in due course was rather disquieting, the more so as Germany was pursuing the same policy in all the other Balkan countries. Some counter-technique must be found in order to defeat this technique developed by Germany which was only made possible by these bi-lateral agreements. Happily there was such a technique in existence. Austria had tried a scheme in 1933 which had had many technical advantages over the present arrangement. Here was a direction in which Turkey could again give a lead to the other Balkan States, to help them to rehabilitate their economic situation and to safeguard their economic independence. If there were a new system under which Germany would compete with other nations on equal terms, she would still have a large share of Turkey's trade, and this would be to the benefit of all providing it were done on a fair commercial basis.

MISS ELIZABETH MONROE was grateful to the lecturer for supplying the psychological and historical background to the modern Turkish scene. Most Englishmen knew that change had happened—for instance, that the veil and the fez had been abolished; few saw the scene in the perspective which M. Belge had so ably supplied. On the other hand, she was sure that he had overrated the extent of his listeners' knowledge about modern Turkish reforms. She would like to ask, firstly, to what extent was industrialisation progressing? Which industries were already supplying goods to replace former imports?

Secondly, by what means was education being spread? In Ankara there were excellent schools and training colleges for both intellectual and manual workers, but one of the difficulties before Turkey was the diffusion of this knowledge among a scattered population of sixteen millions, many of whom were illiterate. How was knowledge disseminated from Ankara outwards?

MR. PHILIPS PRICE said that he would like to know something of the eastern provinces of Turkey. He had been in Kurdistan before the War and during the War had been with the Russian Army on the other side of the frontier in Persia, and he remembered the unsettled conditions which had existed at that time and the constant warfare between the Kurdish tribes and the settled peasant population of the Ottoman Turkish Empire. Matters had, of course, been complicated at that time by the existence of the Armenian Christians, but now they had all been moved. It had been said that Atatürk

had had difficulty with the Kurdish tribes, and about ten years ago there had been something like a rebellion there. He had always thought that the only way to get over the difficulty would be to build roads and railways and induce the Kurdish tribes to settle down and cultivate the land. He thought that this was taking place now, and that the Kurds were probably becoming more loyal Turkish subjects, which they had certainly not been in the old days. But it should be remembered in this case that the Ottoman Empire had been quite a different political unit from the Turkey of to-day. There had been no strong national feeling in the country. She had inherited traditions of the old Byzantine Empire with various religions and races each living their own separate cultural and to some extent national lives. With the growth of the national movement and of modern Turkey that situation had very much changed, and he would like to know how far the Kurds had come into the Turkish national movement.

ADMIRAL DRURY-LOWE said that in the Anglo-Turkish Agreement there was a sentence which ran that the two Governments recognised that it was also necessary to ensure the establishment of security in the Balkans, and this evidently depended very much upon the value of the Balkan Entente, upon Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, Roumania, but unfortunately Bulgaria was outside this circle of States and yet her inclusion seemed of the greatest importance. Why was Bulgaria outside the Balkan Pact? It appeared to be because she wished to obtain satisfaction from Greece concerning the outlet to the Mediterranean and the Dobrudja from Roumania. If this were the case obviously it was to Germany's interest to keep this dissatisfaction alive. Was Turkey making any efforts to act as an intermediary between Bulgaria and Greece and Roumania in order to draw Bulgaria into the Balkan Entente and to ensure the security of the Balkan Pact?

The lecturer had said that Turkey herself was at the moment content with the territory she had and her policy was one of peace. Did she not desire to get the Dodecanese islands back from Italy?

MR. HUTTON said that the lecturer had stated that one of the aims of those who had formed the modern Turkey had been to equalise taxation, including the "blood" tax. In modern Turkey was a career in the army equally open to Turks of Greek, Armenian or Jewish origin as to Turks of their own racial origin?

Concerning the possibility of future Turkish expansion, it had been said that the success of Atatürk's policy had lain in the fact that he had forsworn the idea of the Grand Ottoman Empire, but recently there had been put forward the demand for what had been called in the old days the Sanjak of Alexandretta. The League of Nations Commission had shown convincingly that although the Turkish were the largest racial group there they were in a minority

in the Sanjak as a whole, yet this was now part of Turkey and had been so disposed of on racial grounds. Would this expansionist policy lead in the near future to the demand for the return of the oil district round Mosul and Kirkuk, which might also be of value to Turkey and which contained a small percentage of people of Turkish origin?

M. BELGE said that Turkish commercial difficulties were tremendous. Her commerce was dominated to the degree of fifty or sixty per cent. by the German clearing agreements. She had suffered like other countries during the crisis of 1929, but she had tried to keep in touch with the international system of commerce. First of all it had been necessary to keep in touch with the principle of money, and as they had had no money and had been in great difficulties, Germany had presented to all these smaller nations in their hour of need some means of salvation and had not asked them to be faithful to the money principle or to free trade, but she had been very elastic in her manner of dealing with small countries and had enabled them to get rid of the produce which she herself needed for the exchange which they themselves needed. Now, however, the small countries of Eastern Europe had reached the stage at which barter agreements with Germany could help them no more. They were not really trading. Trade was the buying of a commodity which could be used again in other countries. At the moment Turkey and the other Balkan countries were just exchanging products with Germany, and not only was the wherewithal with which to buy from other countries absent, but both Germany and Turkey felt impoverished by the arrangement. They had reached the point where something must be done.

There were two ways of solving the problem. One was to get back to general international trade, but this could not be done because they had separated themselves from the movement and even from the nations of the sterling bloc. Each part of the world, each group of nations, was applying a special formula to itself, and to get back to an all-embracing general formula was at present impossible. Perhaps one day there might be the same sort of commercial relationship between nations as had existed in 1929, but at the moment they were very far from it. There was another way out of the present dilemma, which was that countries who were on very friendly terms like England and Turkey might act together, but they must also bring more people with them. A group must be formed so as to permit triangular trade. Then there would be some hope, but if countries simply made bilateral agreements, they were doing the same thing as Germany was doing by barter agreements, only they were doing it with exchange instead of barter commerce. Certainly something must be done in the near future.

Educational problems in Turkey were very different from those in France or in England. In France and in Germany there had been

discussions as to the type of school required. In Turkey education was first of all a technical question. They must have buildings to house the children, teachers to send to the villages. Books must be printed. Money must be got from the parents of the children to pay for the books and the teachers, or alternatively must be provided by the State. They had a very bad legacy from the past. Education, therefore, was a question of money and of materials. At the moment in Turkey each classroom opened twice with the same teachers and numbers of children because they had not enough buildings to house them all. A very good sign was that whereas in the time of the Empire the children had been afraid to come to school and the parents to send them, now they were crowding into the schools. In time there would be a complete primary instruction in Turkey. At the moment they had this to about fifty-three per cent., but they hoped to go further in the near future. Another way of disseminating education was by means of the Party itself. In each town there was a Party house called the People's House; it had nine sections which dealt with history, arts, geography, sports and physics, and visiting teachers went from village to village teaching how the various things should be done. There was a section for music, in fact for each activity, and the people would foregather in the People's Room in the village. Someone who could read would read to them from the newspaper and there would be musical and other entertainment, and so progress was being made. If they had in Turkey to-day the means of completely educating their people their task would be finished, but the politics of the Empire had left a very bad state of affairs which it would take time to repair. The present régime was being obliged to create everything anew and to change the spirit of the people.

It had been said that in some parts of the East of Turkey there were no roads; in other parts this was also true. The Empire had left them with a very bad heritage; they inherited a few roads and railways, but they had had to clear up the concessions with which these undertakings were burdened.

With regard to industrialisation, he said that Turkey thought some parts of Europe were over-industrialised, because they had created factories to supply goods which they did not need themselves and which they manufactured simply to supply other countries, in other words, export industries. In Turkey they were not trying to build up export industries, but to create industries for which the raw materials were in Turkey, because they did not want to have to import raw materials for their products. But if there were no industry in a country then there was no technical life, and without this there was no applied science, and unless science were applied there was no modern life possible, only theology; therefore modern science must be applied.

One factor operated in Turkey as it did in Egypt. For instance, the time factor did not count as it did in the West, because the life

of the people was not controlled by this generalisation of the scientific idea. In the Western countries even children counted the minutes, but countries without industry only had to think of time once or twice during the year, when it was a question of their agricultural products. After these had been sown and harvested and disposed of, they could go to bed and rise with the setting and rising of the sun, and time did not exist for them.

So although Turkey wanted to have an industrial life she did not want an export industry, nor autarky, because she thought that God had not created any country so complete that it could not be provided with something it needed from another country. They wanted a balanced and proportioned economy. They did not want to remain a purely agricultural country or to become a country in need of raw materials. They were a country of peasants and workers, and they wanted to build a higher grade of life for their people. During the time of the Empire students had been sent to Europe to study chemistry and physics. They had become engineers and had practised in the European countries, but on their return to Turkey they had had to become teachers of chemistry and physics because there was no demand for engineers. Without the application of science there could not be any science in a country, and without technique there was no possibility of applying science, and without an economic purpose technique could not be created. All these things were linked together. This was why Turkey desired to be both an agricultural and an industrial country and to accumulate her own national capital within her own national boundaries. They had a great variety of climatic conditions in their country and could always be sure of a certain amount of agricultural products which they could export in exchange for some manufactured goods. But it was not right that the Turkish economy should be partly under the economy of another nation, and this they were changing.

He had not said that to-day all Turks were paying the same tax, but that the nationalists of the nineteenth century had created a new formula which meant that there would not be two kinds of citizens paying two kinds of taxes, but that all should pay the same kind of taxes. Naturally the minorities should pay and participate in the benefits resulting from taxation as did the other citizens of a country.

It had been asked whether, having secured the Sanjak, Turkey was going to ask for Palestine or Iraq or any other country. At one time it had been Syria and France who had talked about the demands for the Sanjak, now it was Germany and Italy, so it could hardly be considered as objective criticism! The Sanjak had been a matter of particular interest to Turkey, and she had had to persuade the French to negotiate with her on the question. Both sides had come with papers in their hands and the matter had been settled satisfactorily, and no more would be heard on the subject.

THE GERMAN DRIVE IN THE BALKANS[1]

PROFESSOR ERNST JACKH

A REPORT on a recent visit to the Balkan States might be made in one of two ways; either by dealing with each State separately and by giving such an account of their similarities and differences as can be condensed into three-quarters of an hour; or by outlining the intricate Balkan problem as a whole and by building up from my discussions with the leading Balkan statesmen the background of their thoughts, their fears, hopes and aims, their reaction to the European anarchy resulting from the German pressure and countered by the British initiative for collective security.

Well, I suggest trying the second way, leaving details to question time, all the more so as two excellent surveys are available: one by our chairman of to-night—*Danubian Destiny*, and the other by the Information Department of Chatham House —*South-Eastern Europe*; they are both indispensable for any student of the South-East European complex of to-day.

The fundamental fact which underlies all politics and economics is geography, unchangeable in itself throughout all chances and changes. Just as British history and destiny has for centuries revolved round the Channel, so the Danube has been and is to-day more than ever the determining factor in European history. I well remember a German Vice-Chancellor quite rightly saying to me during the Great War that " he who controls the Danube will control Middle Europe and the whole of the Near East." Germany is the source of this great and broad river which flows through the capitals of former Austria, of Hungary and Yugoslavia, unites or separates Roumania and Bulgaria, and in its Roumanian delta reaches the Black Sea and the neighbourhood of the Russian Ukraine and of Turkish Asia Minor. Since the incorporation of Austria and the subjugation of Czecho-Slovakia, Germany is now near controlling Hungary as well, she touches Yugoslavia and approaches Roumania, and is in an all-dominating position. For the whole of South-Eastern Europe Germany is the nearest, the

[1] Address given at Chatham House on June 22nd, 1939; Mr. D. Graham Hutton in the Chair.

only Great Power in an actually ideal situation both for all routes of communication, linking the Black Sea with the North Sea and the Baltic Sea by her river, canal and railroad system, and for the complementary exchange between a great industrial Power and overpopulated agricultural countries, between more than eighty million Germans and as many millions of Danube and Balkan peoples—all between Middle Europe and the Mediterranean.

Now there are, historically speaking, various conceptions of Middle Europe: within my lifetime alone five. Four of them I have actually discussed in conversations with their different protagonists, from the Kaiser to Hitler. The most moderate conception of Middle Europe was that of Bismarck; it was nothing but a military alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary (against Russia), deliberately renouncing the incorporation of the Germans of Austria and any active interest in the Balkan States.

To Bismarck's alliance the Kaiser added the Roumanian alliance, and later the Turkish alliance (again directed against Russia), but still without any Pan-German aims on the part of any responsible statesman.

During the Great War Friedrich Naumann's *Mitteleuropa* suggested the development of the military alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary into an administrative and economic union, maintaining the political sovereignty of the two monarchies.

After the War, Chancellor Brüning and his Austrian counterpart drafted a Customs union between Germany and German-Austria, but this evolution, voted for by both partners and based on self-determination, was turned down by that short-sightedness which, by not giving to the German Republic this least and last chance of peaceful change, struck a blow at German democracy and facilitated the rise of Hitlerism, paving the way for the latest and broadest conception of Middle Europe: that of old Austrian Pan-Germanism, driving to the Mediterranean and dominating all Middle Europe and the Balkans. This determination was so strong from 1933 onwards that Hitler's Foreign Minister Neurath said to me as early as two years ago: "Czecho-Slovakia must be destroyed and we will destroy her"—a plan so premeditated, so ruthlessly carried out that in the Balkan States I met no statesman who did not agree with my description of Hitler as an "Aryan Moses" who up on his Berchtesgaden Sinai was meditating in his colloquy with "his" God and bringing down to "his" Chosen People "his" new Ten Commandments;

after Austria, Sudetenland, Bohemia, Moravia, Slovakia, Memel, who will be the next victim? Poland, Roumania or Yugoslavia, and so on!

Now you will agree with me that geography is the mother of politics. But in the present situation, I am afraid we have to look for the father as well; it is the spirit of Germany of to-day, incarnated in the Führer, who has imbued the German people with what he calls his "divine mission." The aim of all former German statesmen was to build a great, a greater and even a very great Germany, but yet a continental Power, placed by all-powerful geography in the centre of continental Europe. But now Hitler is reaching for the stars of world power, his aim is world power for Germany; he said himself in *Mein Kampf*: "Germany will either become a world Power or will not continue to exist at all. But in order to become a world Power it needs that magnitude which gives it the necessary importance to-day." In comparison with continental power, world power implies sea-power. Only States bordering on the ocean and commanding the seas are in a position to obtain an empire—Great Britain and France, as well as in previous times Spain or Portugal; but never will nor can Germany, centred in the midst of the European continent, become a world Power unless she reaches the sea. To rule the world you must rule the waves. The English Channel can easily be blocked and Germany blockaded, a situation which caused the head of the Hamburg–American line, Mr. Ballin, to say to me during the Great War: "Germany must get out of the wet triangle, out to Boulogne beyond the Channel." Hitler chooses now the only other outlet. It is the way of least resistance, through smaller and weaker States, the broad Middle European corridor to the Mediterranean —in order to shape once more, in collaboration with his ally Mussolini, the "Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation." Such a German–Italian condominium, a Holy Empire of the German and Roman nations, is the ultimate objective of the twin-brothers Nazism and Fascism.

Why all this? In order to obtain so-called "living-space." I say "so-called" because for Germany sufficient living space actually exists, even much more to-day than for Imperial or Republican Germany. More living space still could be available for Nazi Germany if she played the fair game of international co-operation with its live and let-live. But Hitler makes no bones about wanting his so-called "living space" for his so-called "self-sufficiency," *i.e.* sufficient living space to resist any repetition of a blockade. But why should anyone plan a blockade of

Germany, unless in sheer self-defence against the aggressive mentality of Hitlerism?

This analysis of Hitler's new and revived mediæval imperialism of a " Holy Empire " was the object of all my conversations with the leading statesmen of the Balkan States; we all agreed that now after the downfall of the Pan-Slav Russian Tsarism and of the Austrian-Habsburg Imperialism they are threatened by the Third Reich which, incidentally for them, is the third Great Power to menace them. The old-time Pan-Slav cry, " One God, one Tsar, one People," reappears now in the new Pan-German slogan, " One Führer, one People, one Reich," so much so that for the young Balkan States it again boils down to the alternative with which the old Balkan nations were faced: " either to be used as mortar in the edifice of a foreign Power or to be the builders of their own States; to become protectorates of an alien imperialism or to live as independent States," as I put in one of my books as early as 1912. In 1912 and in 1916 again I formulated the desirable development of " the Balkans for the Balkan States " and the formation of a " Balkan Union " for collective security against alien imperialism. But now during my recent visit to the Balkans it was a German diplomat who was frank enough to state to me: " Germany has to have all these Balkan States within her German orbit, and if this means war, well—it will have to be war, and we shall win it." He gave me a new pamphlet by the Nazi authority Rosenberg, approved by Hitler, stating that " The Balkan and Polish and Baltic States must be united with Germany in a firm federation—in various forms of semi or apparent sovereignty, economically and militarily dependent on Germany." Since the Ides of March and that Good Friday when the earthquakes in Czecho-Slovakia and Albania brought to light the volcanic forces of Nazism and Fascism, all their neighbours between Middle Europe and the Mediterranean have felt the tremor, and by this alarm signal have learnt that Hitler ordained them to be stepping stones on his march to sea and world power.

Thus the Balkans are to be a means to what end? It is to challenge the oldest sea and world Power, Great Britain. A Roumanian statesman put it this way: " We are witnesses and victims of a historic revolution, of an approaching conflict between the aggressive Nazism of the youngest but very vital would-be world Power and the defensive conservatism of the oldest and strongest actual world Power." World domination or world co-operation—that is the question. That is why the British

initiative in organising a defence front has been welcomed everywhere, even by alleged pro-German or pro-Nazi politicians, not only in the guaranteed States such as Roumania and Greece, but also in Turkey and even in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. A Bulgarian statesman told me : " British peace front policy has so far prevented world war, and the British guarantees to Roumania, Greece and Turkey are even to our Bulgarian advantage, strengthening our independence." This Bulgarian statement is of special interest in view of Bulgarian claims against her guaranteed neighbours.

As to the present conflict between Germany and Great Britain, one must discriminate between 1914 and to-day. The conflict in 1914 between Imperial Continental Germany and Great Britain's naval power was a secondary consequence of the Franco-German and the Russian-German antagonism. In 1913–14 agreement was reached between Great Britain and Germany on questions affecting Asia Minor, though no document had yet been signed, and conversations had begun on the reconciliation of their interests in colonial Africa. But the present clash between an Imperialism of the Hitler-Mussolini type and the British Commonwealth of a Community of Nations, a League of Nations, is fundamental, universal, historic. Symbolised in Berlin and London, these two principles are clashing: Force and Law.

You will never understand German mentality unless you are aware of three historical facts : first that the Roman law which has shaped the Western mind since Cæsar's time has never reached in the East the Prussian ruling spirit; secondly, that Christian civilisation reached the Prussian part of Germany nearly a thousand years later than Western Europe; and thirdly, that no national of any State is so incapable of understanding the mentality of other nations as the average German. This is why Herr von Ribbentrop was such a " success " in London and is now Foreign Minister in Berlin.

Threatened as they are by this German mentality, all the peoples and every government of the Balkan States are determined to resist and to fight against the exhibition of force; just as in centuries past they fought against the foreign dynasties of the Habsburgs and the Ottomans to which they are successor States, they will fight to-day even more against Hitlerism. To-day they are in possession of their national freedom and political independence for the first time for centuries; and they will fight against Hitlerism—*i.e.* not against political pressure alone (as

was the case under their former oppressors) but against the Nazification of their native character, against the menace to their individual consciousness, to their very soul.

All the statesmen with whom I have spoken think historically, and point not only to this tenacity with which their people have shaken off all foreign yokes, but also to two other established facts. One is that never yet in history has world domination, based on the subjugation of other peoples, been a lasting success—from Alexander, who came from the Balkans, to Napoleon who went to Egypt; and to-day it is still less possible in the case of these national States, always so conscious of their own individuality and at present more so than ever. And the other fact is that in a struggle between continental power (however great—yet always limited) and sea power (commanding the seas—spacious and free), sea power has always proved superior to land power (in the case of Napoleon I, as in that of William II) and it always will. This was experienced by all the Balkan States in the World War. Take Yugoslavia and Roumania, two States which were at first defeated and occupied and—like Belgium which suffered the same fate—were yet eventually victorious; and the two other States—Turkey and Bulgaria, which were victorious for years but finally defeated. For all five Balkan States the decisive factor in the World War was the British freedom of the seas. To-day all experts well acquainted with the state of affairs at Gibraltar, in Alexandria and in the Mediterranean are aware that this potential theatre of war, *par excellence*, is now more securely and strongly than ever in the firm hands of the British and French fleets. During the World War Germany possessed and controlled a much wider territory than even Hitler's Greater Germany of to-day; in addition she had in the south from the Italy of to-day, Trentino and the Tyrol, and Hungary; in the south-east, east and north-east "all the rest of us": Yugoslavia, Roumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Palestine and Arabia; Poland and the Ukraine; Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and South Finland; moreover Belgium and the North of France in the West. Yet these vast territories and "living spaces" did not prevent Germany's eventual defeat—in spite of an excellent army, better than to-day; excellent morale, better than to-day; excellent finances, better than to-day. An underlying cause of defeat was that lack of raw materials which proves the limitation and the impossibility of "self-sufficiency." So-called autarky is only possible in the end if you possess the whole world.

Thus far all these calculations sound encouraging and reassur-

ing, but, again and again, with reference to the repeated attempts at " appeasement," the question was asked by various statesmen : " Does London really mean business? If we resist will you assist us? "

In replying one could point to the speeding up of armaments, quantity, quality, increased expenditure, taxation, sacrifices and risks, guarantees and alliances, yet all that was not enough. It is compulsory military service—conscription—it is this revolution in the whole of British tradition which carries conviction and lays the doubts incessantly sown and fed by German propaganda. Moreover, Russia, *i.e.* the British readiness to organise collective security and " indivisible peace " jointly with the Soviet, that brings the reaction : " London means business indeed ! "

Though the Balkan States must expect initial defeat and devastation of their countries by Germany and Italy, they yet rally round Great Britain. And this not only because they believe in Great Britain's superiority, more and more known to them through the British Council's growing cultural activities all over the Balkan countries, but still more so for preventing war, which must remain the ultimate desire and aim. Hence the welcoming of a Russian pact as a preventive measure. But " Ideology? " they counter with the question : " Is there fundamentally, any essential difference between Hitler's National-Socialism and Moscow's National Communism? " So little that one wonders that Hitler and Stalin do not get together, to dominate together all Europe : the greatest fear of all. In the choice between Hitler and Stalin they are prepared to sink all ideological differences and historical experiences for the preservation of peace and the establishment of a League of Nations order. " Moscow " manning a defensive front to prevent war is more important than manning a fighting front to win a war.

To prevent war not only political resistance, but economic assistance is needed. As a matter of fact, economic war is already being waged, between the revolutionary system of Hitler's national autarky and the conservative tradition of international exchange, between Dr. Schacht's new barter methods and the old-time token practice. The fundamental question is : closed or free economics —State control of production, distribution, consumption, export, import, prices, quantity, quality, even tastes (as for instance in cigarettes) or individual freedom, initiative and competition and international exchange and trade. Imports from Greater Germany to the Balkan countries amount to 30–60 per cent. ; exports from the Balkan countries to 40–60 per cent., mostly tobacco,

oil, wheat, maize, timber and small quantities of minerals. (For further details I would refer you to the two books already mentioned.) The fundamental issue is not the actual German pre-eminence in the Balkans, which is unavoidable for the reasons given, but it is whether Germany does not only use unfair methods (by paying uncompetitive prices or by reselling Balkan goods to free exchange countries), but also misuse her geographical and industrial preponderance for economic monopoly or political pressure—*e.g.* by suppressing the industrial production of these agrarian countries and by regulating their agricultural production, in order to incorporate them in the economic system of Germany and to subjugate them politically according to the demoniac "Erlkönig's" admonition: "Und folgst du nicht willig, so brauch'ich Gewalt!"

So far all the Balkan States have gained material advantages from Germany—so far, but how about the future? One of the Prime Ministers said: "Let us not fall economically into German hands by withholding from us economic and financial facilities, I implore you." Another dictator, wrongly alleged to be "pro-Nazi," replied: "Our agriculture is more important than policy; it is a question of finding a market for our tobacco." Another Balkan statesman rather over-simplified the situation by saying: "Tell Chamberlain to order the British people to smoke Balkan tobacco instead of Virginian. That would safeguard our national independence." Hitler can dictate, but no British Prime Minister. British help is now materialising in what one could call a first-aid treatment by British delegations and negotiations, providing for a long-term policy by joint trading organisations. All the Balkan countries need and want Great Britain to buy more from them, in order to get from us free exchange—to keep up their export prices and to buy raw materials. British help is naturally restricted by other world-wide and Commonwealth obligations such as the Ottawa Agreements, the British share in South-East European trade being only something between 1 and 2 per cent. of British import and export. It can never be the British aim to replace German activity in the Balkans and to prevent Germany from having her pre-eminent position. Britain might even some day favour a German preferential system, which could work for the benefit of all concerned—on one condition, that it should not be misused by the dominating monopolistic mentality of Hitlerism, but organised by a co-operative mind, leaving everybody his "living space."

Part of the tactics of doing everything to prevent war is the

stressing of formal neutrality by all the Balkan States (excepting Turkey, which has just entered into a pact with Great Britain of mutual assistance in the Mediterranean pending a long term agreement). Not only do the two countries at present the object of the advances, or rather pressure, of Germany and Italy—*i.e.* Yugoslavia and Bulgaria—call themselves " neutral " but also Roumania and Greece, the two States guaranteed by Great Britain and whose guarantees are unilateral for the same reason, namely, because they each wish to avoid irritating and provoking the Axis Powers, or giving them any cause or pretext for action. " We are scared to death to make any move," said a Greek politician. " The feeling everywhere is ' Beware of the dangerous dog next door ! ' " Everywhere these " as if " tactics—" act as if we were neutral "—whilst under the surface the attitude of resistance is determined and clearly discernible.

So much for the factors common to the Balkan States : their understanding of their national interests and their reaction to international issues. But even as regards these common factors there are, of course, differences in details to be taken into account, especially the character, likes and dislikes of the respective Sovereigns, their mistrust of one another, and of Moscow. The five Balkan States have something else in common—their national constitutions—all of which are various blends of a system combining authoritarian and democratic elements, either entailing no Parliament at all (as in Greece) or only the semblance of a Parliament—due to the excessive number of parties and cliques. It would be superficial and unjust to label them as " dictatorships " in the usual fashion, for, as I once put it in a conversation with the late Kemal Atatürk in Ankara, just as there are different kinds of " democracies," so there are different kinds of " dictatorships " : one which, as in Turkey, liberates and internationally educates a previously enslaved people, and another which, as in Germany, isolates and enslaves (" encircles ") a previously free people. In four Balkan States, three Kings and a Prince Regent are the dominating personalities in politics, assisted by prudent prime ministers. All four princes are politically talented, remarkable for their astuteness and dexterity, and sympathetic to Western democracy; two of them (the Bulgarian and the Greek) are sons of fathers who lost their thrones on account of their " pro-German policy," which has taught them a lesson, though this fact, as regards the King of Bulgaria, is unfortunately not yet recognised by the King of Roumania and the Prince Regent of Yugoslavia, who judge him by his father, saying : " He twice stabbed us in the back."

The protagonist and head of the Balkan Entente always was and still is, Turkey (pop. 16,000,000). After a military " defeat " in the Great War, she was ultimately victorious owing to the able diplomacy of peaceful negotiations for revision; to-day she is homogeneous, satisfied, stable, the protagonist also of the Near Eastern Entente (Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan), and thus influential in the whole Arab world. Moreover, she is the guardian of the Dardanelles, now open for Western and Eastern co-operation, fortified by British-Turkish collaboration. In 1937 I received the impression at Ankara that a Turkish-British Alliance might be forthcoming—thanks to the two Turkish leaders, Atatürk and Inönü and the British Ambassador, and thanks to the same factors that had made the Turkish-German alliance possible in 1914. The danger threatening Turkey in 1914 was from the expansionist pressure of Russian Tsarism with which Great Britain was allied, and, to face that danger, the protection of Germany was sought, as she had an interest in Turkey's preservation; the threatened danger now comes from the expansionist pressure of German Hitlerism, with which Italy is allied, and, to face this, the alliance and protection of Great Britain is necessary, for Great Britain is now interested in Turkish preservation, just as she was in Disraeli's time. One would have expected Berlin to be alive to the logic and probability of the new pact. But Hitler, Ribbentrop and Papen, when warned by a Balkan statesman in Berlin on the occasion of Hitler's birthday, only received this suggestion with an incredulous smile.

No less firm and real is the solidarity between Turkey and Greece (pop. 7,000,000) which sprang up in 1923 between Inönü and Venizélos in Lausanne and is now deeply rooted since these two Mediterranean States have joined hands over a common frontier. They are now in constant collaboration with each other through wholehearted military staff conferences, and together they put the Eastern Mediterranean at the disposal of Great Britain.

Strong as is this joint position—you might even say union—in the Mediterranean, the Adriatic and Middle-European situation of Yugoslavia (pop. 15,000,000) has become weak since her geographical encirclement by the German and Italian expansion in Austria and Albania. In spite of this, the Government, as well as the army and public opinion, is firmly resolved to adhere to the Balkan Entente as before; up to now all German and Italian attempts to make them break away have failed. The German reproach that Turkey has violated the Balkan Entente

by the alliance with Great Britain was refuted, thanks, partly, to the Roumanian argument with reference to the Yugoslav–Italian pact, which is likewise outside the Balkan Entente. Of course the Croat issue (federalism versus centralism) is at present a weakening factor, as well as the existence of Hungarian and German minorities.

Yugoslavia's fate in the Great War was shared by Roumania. Roumania was occupied also, but also came out victoriously as a result of British sea power. Roumania was eventually doubled in size, so that she is not only completely satiated (pop. 20,000,000) but also burdened with Hungarian and German minorities.

In the midst of all the four States of the Balkan Entente lies Bulgaria (pop. 6,000,000), geographically the "heart of the Balkans," neither properly Mediterranean, though connected with it by the Russian Black Sea and the Turkish Dardanelles, nor immediately Middle-European. In both directions revision is claimed, and still patiently awaited, at the expense of Greece and of Roumania. Such a revision in Bulgaria's favour is canvassed by Greater Germany, who is tempting her to a "dynamic revisionism." This agitation has in fact been unsuccessful, thanks to the reasonable attitude of the King and the Prime Minister. So far Bulgaria appears to be playing the part rather of a patient Cinderella. She knows that the price of the little Dobrudja from German hands would be the whole of Bulgaria. Yet the statesmen of all the Balkan States admit that a genuine peace can be established only by satisfying Bulgaria, so that the Balkan Entente (formed without and against Bulgaria) could be developed into a Balkan Union.

The organisation of the Balkan States into a Balkan association has a history, in which each of the Balkan States has played a positive part for two generations. The Balkan Pact, the Balkan Conferences, the Balkan Entente, are milestones, up to the Salonika Agreement of last year, which was to open the door for Bulgaria into the Balkan Entente by liberating her from the disarmament clauses and by assuming the mutual obligation to abstain from any recourse to force. German–Italian "dynamic revisionism," *i.e.* the annexation of Czecho-Slovakia and of Albania, and the German–Hungarian *rapprochement*, have had two results; on the one hand, revision has become a real issue for Bulgarian public opinion, and on the other hand, any inclination for revision in Roumania has been destroyed for the time being, the Roumanian argument being that "It starts with the revision of a frontier

(Sudetenland) and ends with the destruction of a State (Czecho-Slovakia)."

Bulgaria's claims have been threefold. The first claim, in Macedonia, according to the assurances from all parties concerned, has been settled, though Italy may try to provoke disturbances from neighbouring Albania. The second, a corridor through Greece to the Aegean Sea, has been refused as a territorial concession by Greece, but is obtainable from Greece as part of a commercial agreement. This would include a port either at Salonika or Dedeagatch, or at Porto Lagos, which would be preferable to the Bulgarians.

But the third, the main point and the one which all Bulgarian statesmen equally emphasise as being indispensable, is South Dobrudja, with a population of 200,000. Of all the arguments advanced by both Bulgaria and Roumania, two appear really incontestable. First, economically Bulgaria badly needs wheat from South Dobrudja, whilst Roumania actually suffers from an excess of wheat; what for Roumania is 2 per cent. of her produce would amount for Bulgaria to 16 per cent. Secondly, from the Balkan and European point of view, there is the strategical importance of Bulgaria, which has common frontiers with Roumania, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey. A hostile Bulgaria would tie up parts of all four armies, might threaten the Dardanelles, and might attempt to join Hungarian-German invading armies by means of some of the Hungarian-German minorities in Roumania and Yugoslavia. A satisfied Bulgaria would release these four armies for action against common enemies; a friendly Bulgaria could open to Roumania the shorter route for men and ammunition through Greece and Bulgaria, instead of the roundabout way through the Dardanelles, the Bosphorus and Black Sea. An allied Bulgaria could decisively strengthen the defensive power of a Balkan Union.

At present Roumania is intransigent and speaks of the "patience" and of the "confidence" that are still needed. But could not such "confidence" be obtained by the very means of a settlement between Roumania and Bulgaria? As this is bound to come about on the first day of a European war, could it not be achieved before such a pressure?

A comprehensive settlement between the Balkan Entente and Bulgaria is essential, not a "frontier revision," neither "cession" nor "concession," but a constructive arrangement of give-and-take; economic co-operation (by the joint building of bridges across the Danube and the development of railway communica-

tion); mutual security by friendly neutrality, and eventually military assistance against aggression. Within the framework of such an agreement, and as part and parcel of it, there is required a settlement of the problem of South Dobrudja, all this with the ultimate goal of a Balkan Union, strengthened by unity, to replace the Balkan Entente, weakened by suspicion.

As a policy of this kind would require lengthy negotiations, one might consider as a provisional solution, an agreement between the Balkan Entente and Bulgaria, by which both parties could sink their claims or grievances for a certain time in order to solve them in a calmer atmosphere. For such a provisional measure, British initiative (at least indirectly) would be necessary, following up the results of the Salonika pact and emphasising the example of British sacrifices and risks which could well be followed by risks and sacrifices on the part of the Balkan States.

The ultimate goal is and must in any case be a Balkan Union, in the eventual realisation of which every Balkan statesman believes—a Union with a common foreign policy and a common defence of the living spaces of a Commonwealth of Balkan States, based on collective force and security. Here, too, Germany and Great Britain are inevitably opposed to each other: Germany wants to play off the various individual States, one against the other, because a Balkan Union would handicap the political aspirations of her expansionist demand for her living space, whilst Great Britain must desire a Balkan Union, because British policy must welcome all and every move towards sound regionalism contributing to the organisation and stabilisation of Europe; in the south-east a Balkan Commonwealth as well as in the north-east the Baltic and Scandinavian regionalism or in the north-west the Lowlands group. This must be the way towards a future European organisation and order: a federation of federations.

In peace or after war? That was the ultimate question of all the Balkan statesmen. All the statesmen who have recently met Hitler personally in Berlin on the occasion of his birthday had gained the same impression as I have: he does not want war, but threatens war, consequently risks war, and may so stumble into war.

Reviewing the fundamental contrast and conflict between the two world conceptions I have tried to outline—domination or co-operation, force or law—the ultimate outcome is bound to be clash and catastrophe. Thus war seems inevitable. In this case, and that is one of the tragic aspects of the situation, Germany will be sincerely convinced that she has to fight and is fighting

against suffocation by " encirclement " and for the just cause of her " living space." Encirclement is her slogan, the propaganda resulting from a myth and creating an hysteria. And the rest of the world will be as profoundly convinced that it is fighting against aggression and anarchy and for the defence of freedom, law and order. Thus we shall have to live through a conflict between hysteria and reality, between myth and truth. And the truth will again conquer the myth. Thus defeat seems inevitable for Germany.

But whether war and defeat are actually unavoidable depends on the brain of one man : Hitler, this historic phenomenon of a strange mixture of Mahomet's somnambulism and Napoleonic sense of reality, a visionary who believes in his divine mission. Can he change his mind? I cannot tell. There are, I think, more " cons " than " pros."

In any case two courses must be taken : the one to organise such a predominance of power (military, economic, political, moral) as to make the man of reality realise the hopelessness of his case in view of the clear superiority of the collective forces.

But besides these defensive and more negative tactics there must be a positive strategy, a moral offensive : a comprehensive scheme of constructive imagination and precise proposals, providing for peaceful change, economic co-operation, moral and military disarmament.

Such a scheme combining firmness to resist any aggressive force and fairness to satisfy just grievances must be put to the whole world, to Hitler and the German people. If Germany is invited to join the circle and thus break the " encirclement," the myth of " encirclement " might be dispelled. But the crux of the matter is again : can Hitler be expected to change his mind, and can the world be expected to believe he has done so? You see, all politics ultimately boil down to a psychological issue.

Summary of Discussion.

QUESTION : Would the lecturer give some information concerning Albania?

PROFESSOR JACKH said that the Albanian situation was quite clear. Albania now belonged to Italy and constituted a thrust by the Axis into the Balkan regions. A Balkan statesman had said that one of Mussolini's aims in taking Albania was to be nearer Salonika in case of a race between Germany and Italy for its possession. It now constituted a menace to both Greece and Yugoslavia. With or without Albania, Italy was near enough to Greece for her aeroplanes to reach

that country in a quarter of an hour. He wished to make clear that all the Balkan States felt it necessary, in view of the nearness of the dictators, to maintain an apparent neutrality. In Greece no air raid shelters were allowed to be constructed, not even for the Royal family, because this might annoy a dictator.

QUESTIONS: What were the prospects of an agreement between Croatia and the rest of Yugoslavia? Secondly, was there any reason for Roumania refusing to return the Southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria such as had existed for Czechoslovakia refusing to return the Sudetenland to Germany, namely a natural frontier and valuable fortifications?

PROFESSOR JACKH said that the Croat problem (federalism versus centralisation) had not yet been solved. A solution had nearly been reached, but the army had protested against too much autonomy being given, on the ground that it might endanger the safety of the whole country. It was very probable that a solution would be found to meet both these needs in the not too far distant future.

There was no strategical reason why Roumania could not return the Southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria. The main argument against any Bulgarian claim was the argument of prestige on the Roumanian side, and distrust, particularly as far as the King was concerned. Also in these times of international tension and insecurity it was not thought wise to start negotiations about the revision of frontiers; but all statesmen had agreed that some day this problem must be settled. It was fundamentally a psychological issue, confidence or distrust. The Bulgarian King Boris was wrongly disliked and distrusted. Such a situation needed patience and work in order that confidence might be established.

QUESTIONS: Did the German minorities in the Balkans constitute a danger and were they imbued with Nazism? Could they be considered to weaken Roumania? What was the attitude of the Magyar minorities in Transylvania?

PROFESSOR JACKH said that he had been in Bukovina, the centre of the German minority in Roumania and also the Hungarian centre in Transylvania. The minorities were fairly treated and satisfied for the time being. In the Roumanian museum there were pictures showing the defeat of Roumania by Hungary. If the Roumanian policy were chauvinistic, these would not be allowed to exist. Also in the central square at Cluj there was a monument with Roumanian flags on the ground, showing the defeat of Roumania by Hungary. He had met both Hungarian and German leaders, and the former had expressed themselves quite satisfied with their position in Roumania. The German leaders, on the other hand, were imbued with and poisoned by Nazism. They were very actively against the Government, as were all Nazi minorities in every country in the world. At the end of March, when

the Germans had been expected to come through Slovakia and Ruthenia to the northern frontiers of Roumania, it had been felt that the German minority were not to be trusted, but so far even then there had not been any really dangerous activities.

MR. G. A. SHORT said that the main Bulgarian minority was situated in the Northern and not the Southern Dobrudja. What was the German plan? Was it to establish a condominium as they had done in 1918, giving Bulgaria only the Southern Dobrudja, or was there an idea to put the whole of Bulgaria under a protectorate?

PROFESSOR JACKH said that he could not know what was ultimately in the German mind, but he knew what the Bulgarians thought. They remembered that even in 1918, when Bulgaria and Germany had been allied, the Dobrudja had not been given to Bulgaria but a condominium had been established between Germany and Bulgaria, and to-day they were afraid of receiving even less than at that time. They realised that German policy was to establish German domination down to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. The Bulgarian claims were extremely modest. They only asked for the Southern Dobrudja. They simply wanted this small part with its wheat and its two hundred thousand inhabitants.

MISS RATHBONE asked what was the quality of the Roumanian and the Yugoslav army. Secondly, how far had recent events affected Roumania's attitude towards Russia? She had been in Roumania two years ago and at that time German propaganda had seemed successful in creating a real fear of Russia and a great liking for their own ideology among not only the German minorities but among the young Roumanians themselves. How far had recent events affected this attitude?

PROFESSOR JACKH said that concerning the attitude of Roumania to Russia, all the politicians had said that they fully realised the help that Russia could give them in case of war. They had not forgotten that even in the Great War the only materials Roumania had received from outside had come from Russia. There, next door to them, was a whole continent full of raw materials at their disposition in case of war.

With regard to the youth of Roumania an English professor out there had told him that they were very influenced by German propaganda in favour of an authoritarian State in their own country. A proof that Nazism was not gaining ground in Roumania was that the rule of the Prime Minister and the King was so strong that the Iron Guard had ceased to have political influence.

Concerning the Roumanian and Yugoslav armies, he could not give any first-hand information. No military man would say anything on these subjects. The significant fact he knew was that in Roumania for every hundred conscripts mobilised a hundred volunteers came

forward. The Roumanians as well as the Yugoslavs and the Greeks knew that they would be defeated in the opening weeks or months of any war, but this did not prevent them from making the right decision with regard to international policy, which was to resist and to fight. The mountains also would be a great help to an army.

QUESTIONS: Was there any likelihood of the policy of appeasement being accepted by the other Balkan countries in relation to Slovenia?

PROFESSOR JACKH said that the solidarity of the Balkan Entente, holding together Roumania, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey, was very strong—so much so that to-day it would not be possible for Roumania to negotiate alone with Bulgaria. The Balkan Entente was treating all these questions as one unit, not as separate issues to be settled by individual States. He could not prophesy as to the future, but could only say that for the time being the solidarity of the Balkan Entente was an established fact.

QUESTION: What was the attitude of the Balkan States towards Hungary? Were they convinced that Hungary was bound to throw in her lot with the Axis Powers, or did they think there was still a hope of her remaining neutral?

PROFESSOR JACKH said that all the Balkan States pitied Hungary. They were at the same time surprised at the resistance she had so far put up to the Axis Powers. Nobody doubted, however, that in case of serious pressure being put upon her by Berlin she would have to yield. The Hungarian Secretary of State had told him two years ago that the day on which Germany would achieve the *Anschluss* of Austria, this would put such gigantic pressure on Hungary that whether she liked it or not she would be forced to throw in her lot with Germany.

COMMANDER ROSS said that the lecturer had stated that the present drive of Germany towards the East had no relation to her pre-war policy concerning a Mittel Europa. Surely there had always been a certain desire to dominate in the Germany of the Emperor William II. At that time he had been helping to keep order in the turbulent island of Crete with the aid of Russia, France and Italy, who had been allied with Great Britain. At this moment Germany had withdrawn from the Concert of Europe on a mere plea, in order to make trouble and to get the Sultan on her side, with the results which the lecturer would very well know. The drive towards the East had been going on even in the days of Imperial Germany, and had been simply revived to-day and dressed up in twentieth-century clothes which made it look even more horrible.

PROFESSOR JACKH said that in Imperial Germany there had been no Pan-German aims on the part of any responsible statesman. It had

never been an official policy in any way. It had been the policy of the Alldeutscher Verband, an organisation which had had no real political influence. If anyone cared to look up his books they would see that he himself had not had, before and during the Great War, one Pan-German idea, although he had stood for Mittel Europa. Professor Keynes had said in his book in 1919 that the only way to organise Europe was to create a Mittel Europa and a Balkan commonwealth of nations together with Germany. This could even be of benefit to Great Britain and to the world provided the right mentality was behind it. It was not possible to sin forever against geography. Geography had entitled Germany to organise South-Eastern Europe. The question was whether it should be a Hitler Germany, aiming at domination, or a democratic Germany, aiming at co-operation. He had written in 1916, at the height of the German victories, that their mission was " to Turkicise the Turks, to Greekicise the Greeks, to Bulgarise the Bulgars," *i.e.* to help them to develop themselves, not to Germanise them and to dominate them. They must be helped to develop their own soul and conscience. This was nothing to do with Pan-Germanism, just the contrary. Therefore he had been persecuted by Pan-Germans before, during and after the War. Pan-Germanism had been no part of the official policy of responsible Imperial Germany. He was a liberal and a democrat, but he had, although in opposition, been intimate with the Emperor, because the latter had liked his " Swabian frankness," and he was certain that the judgment of history would be much more favourable to the Kaiser than the opinion of him currently held to-day.

MR. YEO said that few would dispute the statement that Germany was bound to be pre-eminent in the Balkans. Great Britain had an empire with whom she must trade, and however much Bulgaria and Greece would like her to buy their tobacco she could not take much more than she actually needed. The Prussian spirit was at the root of the trouble. At the moment Yugoslavia wanted to buy British aircraft; German workmanship was good, but the materials of British aircraft, especially the engines, were greatly superior. She was selling some aircraft to Yugoslavia, but only a few days ago Germany had secured a contract for selling fifty bombers and fifty fighters, and a condition of the sale had been that Yugoslavia must dismiss all anti-Germans from among their officers and promote those known to be pro-German.

Shortly before the entry of Germany into Czechoslovakia in March the German military attaché in Roumania had been asked what would happen if King Carol were murdered. He had replied that Germany could bring sufficient troops by air to take Bukarest in seven hours and sufficient troops to control the country and to preserve law and order within forty-eight hours. Steps had immediately been taken for the greater safety of King Carol, and Codreanu and other members of the Iron Guard had soon afterwards ceased to live.

MR. G. A. SHORT said that he agreed that geography was the mother of history, and he felt that possibly the reason why the Roumanians were reluctant to cede the Southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria was because of protecting the port of Constantza. It was almost the shape of a saucer, having high ground in the south near the present Roumanian-Bulgarian frontier and to the south of the Danube and then flat land through which ran the Constantza-Bukarest railway. Therefore he wondered whether this were not an economic matter (obviously Roumania could well afford to give away the corn grown there) but a strategical matter involving not only Constantza but also the Silistria bridgehead.

PROFESSOR JACKH said that a good strategical case concerning the Dobrudja could be made by both Roumania and Bulgaria, but actually it was a question upon which not even the military experts were in agreement. What was important was that the political leaders of Roumania quite agreed that it was possible to return it to Bulgaria were it not for the psychological issue. The day that they could trust the Bulgarian King he would receive the Dobrudja, and not before. So it was not really a question either of wheat or of strategy, but of psychology, and if the Balkan Union were one day attained then all such strategical points would cease to exist. That was the idea of the Balkan Union, that these States should be organised into one unit where all these differences of detail should disappear, and there should be one common foreign policy and one common defence against aggression from outside.

PROFESSOR JACKH, in reply to a question, said that he considered the distrust of King Boris of Bulgaria to be entirely unfounded. His father had lost his throne through a pro-German policy. Why should the present king compromise his dynasty by the same action? Again, everyone who knew King Boris personally realised that he had a very well-balanced judgment. He knew all the deficiencies and weaknesses of Germany and the superiority of the Western democracies. Both from the international and from the Balkan point of view he deserved entirely to be trusted by the Western democracies as well as by his neighbours. His behaviour over the past twenty years was proof of this. Bulgaria was the only country which had not made revision a real issue after the War. The Bulgarians realised that they had just claims, but they knew, and so did their king, that to start upon any adventurous policy in this direction at the moment would be fatal. Twenty years had proved that King Boris was to be trusted.

MR. BLACKWELL asked whether, if King Boris were not speedily rewarded for his patience over the past twenty years, there were not a serious danger of his people becoming impatient and his being forced into the pro-German camp. In this case Yugoslavia would be surrounded by Bulgaria and Albania, and she would have little alternative

but to join the German camp herself. He had been travelling in the Balkans for the past month, and he had gained the impression that seventy to eighty per cent. of the people were in favour of England, but that the Governments felt that they must keep in with Germany for economic reasons. He had great sympathy with the Balkans, and greatly desired to see Balkan unity achieved, and felt that this should not be difficult if only Bulgaria's just claims could be met.

PROFESSOR JACKH said that he did not think there was any serious danger of the Bulgarian Government being forced into the German camp through the dissatisfaction of their people. He had been in Bulgaria when the so-called massacres of twenty-three Bulgarians had taken place in the Dobrudja. The King and the Prime Minister had not allowed this news to be published in case it should arouse hostility to Roumania amongst the people. Naturally the news had leaked out by other means, and there had been demonstrations by the students evening after evening in the streets singing the Dobrudja song, but nothing had come of these, and the Bulgarian Government remained quiet and patient, knowing that nothing was to be gained by an adventurous policy. Naturally Germany was continuing to try to stir up trouble, but the Balkan States all realised that Great Britain was behind the Balkans, that she had guaranteed Roumania and Greece, that she was in alliance with Turkey, and even in the case of initial defeat they knew what would come out of another war. Therefore they were patient and quiet and confident of being on the right side in standing beside the Western democracies. They were on the right side, of that there could be no doubt. Those countries felt at present that if they had to fight again they would be fighting not only for their political independence but for their soul.

MR. D. GRAHAM HUTTON (in the chair) asked whether the Balkan States feared an attack by Italy as the vanguard of an invasion from Germany, or whether, on the contrary, they felt that she might even defend the Balkan States.

He had always wondered concerning the interminable dispute over an outlet to the sea for Bulgaria, why Turkey, who had been responsible for the Entente, had never offered her what she needed in this respect.

PROFESSOR JACKH said that Italy had taken Albania so as to be nearer to Salonika in case of having to race Germany for its possession. He felt, however, that on the broad issue Germany and Italy were in agreement, although it was admitted that on the question of the Holy Roman Empire these two Powers might find themselves in competition. Details of how much of the Italian trade in the Balkans had been taken by Germany could be found in Chatham House publications.

Concerning Bulgaria's outlet to the sea, this would have to be an economic and commercial arrangement and not a territorial concession. In pre-war days no one had ever thought of giving territorial outlets to

the sea. Thus Serbia had had no outlet, and a commercially free port had been offered to Serbia at Salonika. This was quite right. Why should each State have some corridor towards some sea? If the same advantage could be gained by a friendly commercial arrangement why should this emphasis always be placed on territorial sovereignty? Sovereignty was the greatest danger to peace; there should be less, not more, of it in Europe. A commercial outlet to the Mediterranean for Bulgaria must and would be found, and no one in Roumania, Greece or Turkey contested that fact. The only matter under discussion to-day was which of three ports should be chosen. The Greeks suggested Salonika, which was refused by Bulgaria because it was too far down, and the Greeks had suggested Dedeagatch likewise. Bulgaria suggests Porto Lagos as an ideally situated port. Neither Greece nor Turkey would give Bulgaria a territorial corridor through their territory on account of the potential threat to the Dardanelles. The most admirable achievement in the Balkans had been the *rapprochement* between Greece and Turkey in 1923, when both had defeated the Great Powers at Lausanne, and Venizélos and Inönü had laid the foundations of a lasting peace between their two countries. Since then they had built up a comprehensive system of collaboration and union which had been symbolised in October 1937 on the anniversary of Turkish national liberty when Atatürk had appeared at the public dance at which all the General Staffs of the countries of the Balkan Entente had been present, and he had started the dance with the very beautiful wife of the head of the Greek General Staff. The same night he himself had had the first intimation of the coming Turkish-British pact. The British ambassador was the only diplomat invited by Atatürk to sit beside him from eleven o'clock in the evening throughout the night until ten o'clock next morning, while the German ambassador was only granted a few passing moments. The able British ambassador who had prepared the present Turkish-British pact had admitted in his first conversation with the lecturer that the British had not appreciated the high qualities of the Turkish character before the Great War. This was true, and it was why they had made it not too difficult for the German-Turkish alliance to be prepared before 1914. Now the whole position of the South-East of Europe and the Near East had changed owing to Hitler's drive towards the Mediterranean calling for a joint front against aggressive Hitlerism.

SOME ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL EFFECTS OF REARMAMENT[1]

By COLONEL DAVID CARNEGIE, C.B.E.

No subject has been so prominently before the world during recent years as that of armaments and the materials required in their manufacture. The extensive and rapid rearmament of the principal nations has increased the dangers of the use of armaments in warfare. Until September 1st of this year, when Germany invaded Poland, hopes were held by many that war would be averted and peace secured through reason and justice. These hopes have been shattered. To remove the causes of war and plan for an enduring peace is the task before the nations. An examination of the economic and social effects of rearmaments, so greatly augmented by war, is our object now, and I propose to consider :—

1. The extent of world rearmament.
2. The general economic effects on world trade.
3. The particular economic effects of rearmament.
4. The social effects of rearmament.
5. Proposals to abolish economic warfare.

1. THE EXTENT OF WORLD REARMAMENT.

The average annual total expenditure by the seven Great Powers—Great Britain, Germany, France, U.S.A., Italy, U.S.S.R. and Japan—during 1908–13 was £376 million. In 1929 the total expenditure by the same Powers was £595 million. During 1939 Great Britain will spend nearly £650 million. Germany spent in 1929 less than £34 million. During the past six years Germany's budget has not been made public, but in his speech to the Reichstag on September 1st of this year Hitler said that Germany had spent over 90 milliard Reichmarks during the past six years.

[1] Colonel Carnegie had accepted an invitation to speak on this subject at Chatham House on October 10th, 1939. Owing to the war the meeting was cancelled, but Colonel Carnegie has kindly allowed the Institute to publish his paper.

The expenditures in the year 1933–34 and in 1938–39 were as follows :—

	1933–34.	1938–39.
Great Britain	£93·5 million	£326·6 million
Germany	671 million Reichmarks	Figure not given
France	12,324,300,000 Francs	11,064,300,000 Francs
U.S.A.	$544,400,000	$1,009,000,000
Italy	4,823,800,000 Lire	6,363,400,000 Lire
U.S.S.R.	1,547,300,000 Roubles	27,044,000,000 Roubles
Japan	872,600,000 Yen	1,246,800,000 Yen

Thus every nation increased its annual expenditure on armaments except France. The U.S.S.R. increased eleven times. The total expenditure by all nations in 1913 was approximately £450 million. To-day it is no less than £3,500 million. In every industrial country factories are springing up under the impulse of emergency never before equalled. The high conceptions of international goodwill and the determined will to secure peace since 1918 have been rudely shaken by the rise of National Socialism in Europe.

To discover the causes of this insane expenditure on national defence is not my object now, but no one will dispute the fact that the international situation to-day is dominated by our relations with Germany and our preparedness and capacity to resist German aggression. Since Hitler assumed power, he and his advisers have made no attempt to conceal their object of world domination. They have demanded great sacrifices from their people with this end in view. On December 7th, 1935, Field-Marshal Göring said, " Iron makes an Empire strong; butter only makes people fat. Either we bought butter and went without freedom, or we achieved freedom and did without butter. We decided for iron. That is one cause of the butter shortage."

The British people believe that their vast rearmament programme has been thrust upon them by Hitler. Up to September 3rd hopes were entertained that, in spite of faith in Hitler's word being shattered, his fear of wrecking his country by economic ruin and bloodshed would have restrained his lust for power. " Up to the very last," said Mr. Chamberlain, " it would have been quite possible to have arranged a peaceful and honourable settlement between Germany and Poland, but Hitler would not have it." Thus Hitler has given the British and French people no choice but to resist and overthrow him.

The war now raging has postponed the work of the League of Nations in its endeavour to establish conditions for disarmament. Meanwhile the very magnitude of world rearmament and its results may so open the eyes of the peoples of the world to the

vast waste of money for the destruction of life and property that a wave of international feeling will result, leading to an overwhelming demand for disarmament.

2. The General Economic Effects on World Trade.

It is not my intention to attempt to assess fully, or even to describe adequately, the economic effects of rearmament on world trade. Every industry and individual contributing to national defence is affected in some way by the huge expenditure on armaments. When the total capacity of any industry is suddenly and severely taxed by Government demands, the interruption to normal production causes dislocation to industry.

The present scale of rearmament has affected almost all industries. Heavy industries, however, have been disturbed most. Shortages of raw materials and skilled labour, together with long hours of work, have been experienced in several countries. Although unemployment in most of the industrial countries has been reduced, a large number of unskilled workers still remain unemployed.

How much of the increased employment can be attributed to rearmament or to the general recovery of trade since the last wave of depression in 1932 cannot be estimated accurately. The facts, however, show that unemployment has decreased in most countries. The world unemployment index computed by the International Labour Office [1] (for fifteen countries) shows a percentage of about 11½ for 1938, as compared with 10 in 1937 and over 20 in 1932 and 1933. Perhaps the most striking reduction of unemployment is in Germany, where the total unemployed in May 1939 was 69,600, whereas in May 1938 there were 338,355 unemployed, and in 1932, 5,575,492. It is authoritatively stated that in spite of the incorporation of Bohemia, Moravia and Memelland, Germany has exhausted its last reserves of labour. Most of the other Great Powers are also suffering from a shortage of skilled labour.

Mr. Ernest Brown, the Minister of Labour, stated in the House of Commons on August 3rd, 1939, that in July " the employment figure was easily the highest ever recorded in the history of the country," and that " the unemployment figure was the lowest since 1929." " An analysis of the last ten years would show that we were now in the midst of a movement, quite apart from that of armaments, which was far bigger than any seasonal

[1] *The World of Industry and Labour*, 1939, p. 38.

movement." "The decrease in the unemployment figure of 783,000 between January and July was some 450,000 greater than the normal decrease in the normal years in which decreases had taken place in the ten preceding years."

Although Mr. Brown did not indicate the nature of the movement to which he referred, the fact that money is going to workers in armaments production gives to them a greater purchasing power, which must stimulate other industries not directly producing arms. When, however, that money is withdrawn, it is hoped that plans will be ready to utilise labour now employed in armaments manufacture.

From the *Statistical Year Book* [1] of the League of Nations an interesting comparison is given of the total numbers of those employed in industries of the seven Great Powers. Taking a base number of 100 for the year 1929, Great Britain dropped to 91·4 in 1932 and rose to 112 in March 1939.

Germany fell to	59·5	in 1932 and rose to	122	in March 1939
France ,,	80·9	,, ,, ,,	83·8	,, ,,
U.S.A. ,,	62·5	,, ,, ,,	86·2	,, ,,
Italy ,,	78·5	,, ,, ,,	116	,, ,,
U.S.S.R. rose to	216	,, Figure not given for 1939		
Japan fell to	87	,, and rose to 154·1 in 1938		

It will be observed that France and the U.S.A. are the only countries which have not regained the 1929 level.

The progress of industrial production during the years 1932, 1938, and the first three months of 1939 shows the same trend as the employment figures.[2]

Taking the index number of 100 for the year 1929 as representing the total production of each country, Germany dropped to 53 in 1932 and rose to 126 in 1938 and to 131 during the first three months of 1939.

Out of the seven Great Powers, Germany dropped to the lowest relative position of industrial production in 1932, but has made the greatest recovery since that year. Every Power has increased its production since 1932 and gone beyond the 1929 production figure, excepting France and the U.S.A.

Taking the same index figure of 100 for the total industrial production of the world in 1929, the figure for 1932 was 69·8, for 1937, 119·4 and for 1938 111·5.[3]

It is remarkable that the only country not affected by the 1932 depression as judged by industrial production was the

[1] 1938–39, p. 67.

[2] *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*, League of Nations, June 1939.

[3] *Statistical Year Book*, League of Nations, 1938–39, p. 180.

U.S.S.R. The production index for 1932 was 183, and 470 for 1938, as compared with 100 for 1929. During the first six months of 1939, according to Press reports from Moscow, ordinary industrial production increased 15 per cent. and production for national defence increased 27 per cent. over the corresponding six months of 1938.

Another general economic effect of rearmament is observed by comparing the international trade in merchandise.[1] In each of the countries of the seven Great Powers imports and exports have diminished since 1929, except in Japan.

Taking the value in millions of the currency of the country :—

			1929.	1938.
Great Britain.	£ (millions)	Imports .	. 1,111·1	858·8
		Exports .	. 729·3	470·9
Germany.	R.M. ,,	Imports .	. 13,447	5,443
		Exports .	. 13,483	5,249
France.	Francs ,,	Imports .	. 58,221	45,981
		Exports .	. 50,139	30,586
U.S.A.	$,,	Imports .	. 4,338·6	1,949·8
		Exports .	. 5,157·1	3,056·8
Italy.	Lire ,,	Imports .	. 21,665	11,124
		Exports .	. 15,236	10,379
U.S.S.R.	Roubles ,,	Imports .	. 3,857·2	1,387·0
		Exports .	. 4,045·8	1,329·0
Japan.	Yen ,,	Imports .	. 2,168·5	2,641·1
		Exports .	. 2,100·9	2,667·5

While it would be only speculation to say that the economic effect upon the external trade of these countries was due to rearmament, it is very significant that the steel industries of the Great Powers increased while the trade in general merchandise decreased, except in Japan.

In the case of the U.S.S.R., while the country's steel output in 1938 was three times that of the output of 1929, her exports of general merchandise in 1938 was about one-third of those in 1929. Then again, although the exports and imports of merchandise in general were less in 1938 than in 1929, the total world production of primary products reached a record level in 1937, and exceeded by 10 per cent. the 1929 level. The output of crude foodstuffs was 6 per cent. higher, and of industrial raw materials 19 per cent. higher than the 1929 level.[2]

There can be no doubt that the increase in the output of raw materials was due to rearmament.

These statistics of world trade make it clear that the vast expenditure on rearmament has not only reduced unemployment and in general raised the standard of living, but has also stimulated trade in most branches of industry.

[1] *Statistical Year Book*, League of Nations, p. 209.

[2] *World Production and Prices*, League of Nations, 1937–38, p. 7.

3. The Particular Economic Effects of Rearmament.

While world trade in general has increased, the heavy industries have had the lion's share. By examining the increase in the productive capacity of the steel industry of each of the Great Powers, some of the economic effects of rearmament can be understood more clearly.

The steel industry is not only the basic industry for armaments, but for most other industries, and its activity is a good gauge of a country's prosperity. The present scale of rearmament has drawn upon the steel industry more than at any previous time in the history of the world.

In addition to the armaments of each country, which alone are composed of 85 to 90 per cent. of steel, steel has been in great demand for building construction. Sir John Anderson said in the House of Commons on August 2nd, 1939, that " a sum total of expenditure of well over £70,000,000 in a single financial year would be required " for what he called the fourth arm of defence. This is little short of the total British National Defence expenditure in 1913. The fact that 2½ million steel shelters had been ordered by the Government is some indication of the steel required for this new service.

From the statistics of iron and steel production given in the *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*,[1] a striking comparison is made of the iron and steel production of the seven Great Powers. During the years 1932, 1938 and the first few months of 1939, the steel industry of the world increased at a much greater rate than all the other industries taken as a whole. For instance, Germany's monthly production of steel in 1932 was 481,000 tons, and in 1938 1,937,000 tons, and 2,041,000 during the first four months of 1939, nearly 4¼ times greater than in 1932.

It is interesting to note that Germany's monthly production from all industries taken together was only approximately 2½ times the monthly production of 1932.

The monthly steel production[2] of the other Great Powers in the first four months of 1939 as compared with the year 1932 was approximately as follows :—

Great Britain	2½ times greater.
France	1⅓ " "
U.S.S.R.	3 " "
U.S.A.	2 " "
Italy	1½ " "
Japan	2 " "

[1] Issued by League of Nations, June 1939.

[2] *Statistical Year Book*, League of Nations, 1938–39, p. 147.

It is quite clear that the monthly steel output of Germany in 1939 of approximately 4½ times that of 1932 was due to the accelerated output of armaments since 1932.

Perhaps the most serious economic effect of rearmament has centred in the problem of raw materials. In the Report on the *Problem of Raw Materials* issued by the League of Nations in September 1937, it is stated that " in examining the problems of raw materials, the question arises of the extent to which the difficulties of certain countries are due to their financial and economic policy, or to their armament policy. Some of these countries would have less difficulty if they devoted their resources to purely productive ends."

There is no doubt that Germany's rearmament programme and her shortage of essential raw materials have greatly deprived her ordinary domestic steel industries of the raw materials essential for their continued production. Her four years' plan for self-sufficiency, adopted in 1934, was evidently inspired by her dependence on foreign sources for raw materials. Many of the changes which have occurred in Germany, affecting her internal economy and her foreign trade, have arisen from a severe and complicated system of foreign trade control, and from the regulation of the kind and tonnage of materials that might be consumed by various industries. Thus normal trade had to suffer to allow for armament expansion.

Dr. Rudolf Eike, a director of the Reichsbank, and one whose opinion is of value, calls attention, in a review of the export trade of Germany for the first six months of 1939, to the failure of the export trade to respond to the increased industrial power of the German nation. The volume of exports in 1938 was at the same level as in 1932, while production for home consumption had doubled during the six years. German exports are not enough, in his view, to provide the food and raw materials required for industrial purposes and national defence. Thus, Germany's restriction of imports to the lowest possible amount has affected adversely her exports.

Germany's serious shortage of iron ore—she imported over 20 million tons of this ore in 1938—led to the decree of December 1937 prohibiting the use of iron and steel in the manufacture of a long list of products for which substitute raw materials can be used. The list includes fences, signs, shutters, railings, gates, doors, etc., but provision is made for this restriction not to apply to products for export.

" It was the business of the German iron industry," said Dr.

Klein at the 127th Annual Conference of the Association of German Metallurgists, at Düsseldorf on October 10th, 1937, "to discover smelting processes for low-grade ores, to economise in the use of foreign alloys in the manufacture of steel."

Germany knows that, if she cares to deal fairly, she can buy the materials she does not possess. Her attempts at self-sufficiency are doomed to failure. She possesses practically no nickel, molybdenum, chromium, and scarcely any supplies of manganese or vanadium, without which high-quality steel, essential for armaments, cannot be manufactured.

For instance, Canada and New Caledonia possess nearly 100 per cent. of the world's nickel. If they refused to ship that metal, it would create a serious position in arms manufacture.

When laying the foundation stone on October 20th, 1937, of the international exhibition to be opened in Rome in 1941, Mussolini said, "All the nations, even the richest, are turning their attention to the problem of self-sufficiency, and Italy must therefore endeavour to achieve the greatest possible economic independence in the shortest time." Italy has a great task before her to become self-sufficient.

The facts are that out of 25 materials regarded as essential for the industries of a country, including the steel industry, Germany is totally without 19 and Italy 21. No industrial nation possesses all the essential raw materials for her industries. France is totally without 19, Japan 17, the U.S.S.R. 15, the U.S.A. 11 and the British Empire 6. These facts merely emphasise that there is no escape from international trade.

The economic problem arising out of the unequal dispersion of raw materials calls for immediate consideration even in these days of war, if peace, when secured, is to be maintained.

The industrial expansion of any nation under peace-time conditions is dependent upon a continuous and adequate supply of raw materials, regardless of their origin. The economic position is, that eight countries together consume, between them, three-fourths of the world's output of essential raw materials for modern industry. They are divided into two groups: those who have plenty and those who have a scarcity. Germany, Italy and Japan are outstanding in the latter group.

Another particular economic effect of rearmament is the capital expenditure on special machinery, plant and equipment, which will be of no use for normal industry when armaments manufacture reaches ordinary peace-time dimensions. It is, of course, remarkable how quickly some kinds of existing commercial plant

and equipment can be converted from peace-time uses to war stores manufacture. This was fully demonstrated during the last war, particularly in the manufacture of certain component parts of armaments. But the fact remains that much heavy and costly plant and equipment specially made for armaments manufacture is of no value for peace-time industry.

Another economic effect is the plan now adopted of distributing the production of arms over a large number of factories in different parts of the country. The plan has some advantages. One is that production of arms may form a part only and not the whole of a company's output, and another is that each company so operating becomes a centre of expansion in times of emergency. The plan has also the advantage of securing a fairly evenly distributed share of remunerative work in the country and ensuring more general employment in wider areas. Then again, Government contracts bring a sense of financial security to employers and employed. Arms manufacturers have no fear of bad debts with the Government. Masters and men have the right to feel that they are supplying materials to defend their country.

Again and again new methods of production devised, both in Government factories and in armament firms, for arms manufacture have been ultimately of service to normal peace-time industry.

Improvements in the design of precision instruments, gauges, etc., which originated in arms manufacture, have resulted in greater, better and cheaper production of arms and commercial products.

Mass production, one of the greatest economies in industry, had its beginning in the production of small arms over fifty years ago—long before its introduction to industry in general. Precision instruments have raised the standard of workmanship in all engineering and allied industries. The arms industry has permeated the whole industrial life of a nation. It has pioneered the development of the highest qualities of steel for use in war. There is no comparison between the effective value of ordinary carbon steel used for armour plates and projectiles sixty years ago and the alloy steels used to-day. Scientific research in steel production, stimulated by the competition of projectile penetration and armour-plate resistance, has transformed every branch of domestic industry where steel is used. Steel's contribution to civilisation, by the prolonged researches of armament manufacturers, is an entrancing story. In spite, therefore, of the huge

losses incurred by rearmament, there is a permanent economic gain to industry in general by the constant element of competition between weapons of offence and defence. I have no doubt that the peoples of the world would be infinitely happier without such gains from the arms industry if they were assured that in the future reason only would be the weapon used in the settlement of international disputes.

Then, again, rearmament has revived the public demand, made at the British Arms inquiry of 1936, for the control of private profits made by armament firms. The Government has met that demand and passed an Act controlling profits. A side-light on such profits was given by Mr. Noel Baker during the debate on the Bill in Parliament. He revealed that the joint profits of thirty armament firms rose from £3,800,000 in 1934 to £11,700,000 in 1937. His object was to urge that the standard year for calculating profits should be 1934 and not 1937. Most people will agree with the control of profits. There is, however, a right and a wrong way of exercising control. There is a useful economic effect in a measure of unlimited profit-making which in the long run may be of service to a country. Profit depends on at least two things: (1) the price of the article, and (2) the skill in its manufacture. The price is controlled by the purchaser and the skill by the manufacturer. Some manufacturers, at a time like the present, when the feverish rush for the supply of armaments is intense, receive orders for arms or their component parts, having had no previous experience in their manufacture. Some manufacturers have greater facilities than others in skill and equipment to do the work required. If the price of the articles is the same to all manufacturers for the same size of contract—which is usually the case—some may make a large profit, others a small profit, and some a loss. Guarantees are sometimes given by Governments that reasonable losses shall be made good, but it must be obvious that it would be an unfair and discouraging procedure to cut down the price of articles made by manufacturers who have made profits because of their research in devising means for cheapening production. Indiscriminate price-cutting would be a loss to the nation, and to industry in particular, as the monetary incentive to improve would be taken away.

When contracts are renewed, the Governments have the right to adjust prices according to tenders. Where there is liberality and licence to make profits without too many restrictions, the incentives to find better and cheaper means of production are

taken full advantage of by manufacturers in their own interests. The Governments therefore benefit in the long run, employees also benefit from the improvement of wages and conditions of employment.

I hold no brief for the private manufacturer of arms. I believe that the time is not far distant when all arms manufacture will be controlled by a national authority in each arms-producing country, and that under such an authority considerable national economy will be effected. At the same time I believe that so long as private manufacture continues, the economic interests of a country may be jeopardised by an unwise control of the profits of armament manufacturers.

Another economic effect of rearmament is the establishment of a Ministry of Supply. It is not often that the fruits of a Royal Commission appear so quickly. Such a Ministry (although wider in scope than the one established) was strongly recommended by different witnesses before the British Arms inquiry in 1936. It was not recommended as a war-time measure, but as one of immediate importance to the nation. Its economic value cannot be measured merely in terms of money. The unification and standardisation of designs, processes, methods of production, inspection, purchases of raw materials, together with a sane regulation, co-ordination and distribution of manufacturing units, are but some of the economic advantages which the Ministry of Supply would bring to the country. If by international agreement some form of Ministry of Supply were established in each country, international economy would result. It would be another step towards the aim expressed in the Covenant of the League of Nations—" To promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security."

For the moment a dark and massive pile of armaments obscures the League of Nations from the public eye. But behind that pile the League is doing the thinking for the business men of the world, not in terms of any particular requirement, but in the best interests of international business.

4. THE SOCIAL EFFECTS OF REARMAMENT.

Rearmament has put a brake on the social services of the nations, which, during recent years, have been directed to improving the material well-being of the people.

In the House of Commons on August 27th, 1939, Mr. Chamberlain referred to the unparalleled strain on the country's finances

for national defence as the barrier to immediate increases in old age pensions.

The general movement of all industrial nations to shorter hours of labour has been checked temporarily by rearmament. For instance, the French Government introduced a forty-hour week in 1936, but by a decree on March 20th, 1939, raised the working week to sixty hours in undertakings working for national defence. Other industrial nations have adopted measures to increase the hours of work on armaments production.

In the 1939 Report of the Director (Mr. John G. Winant) of the International Labour Office,[1] a survey is made of the social services introduced by different nations for raising the standard of living. In that Report he says, " We know that the diversion of a substantial part of the total income of any nation from useful production and services to armaments reduces standards of living. We know these costs are added to each loaf of bread we buy, to every acre of land we cultivate, and to the length of day we labour to earn a living."

There is, however, a section of the public who are socially improved by rearmament. There are millions of workers who were unemployed, for whom the tide of fortune has turned for the time being. Their energies are being used and guided and, whatever else may result, self-respect has returned to them. Their increased income should improve the conditions under which they live.

Then, again, rearmament has forced the people to think about world issues and of the social and economic changes which are proceeding swiftly. Rationalisation of industry with various measures of public and State control are among those changes. Unemployment and housing problems, which once formed separate political party issues, are now the concern of all.

Direct and indirect social effects resulting from scientific research and greater efficiency in industries engaged in armaments production benefit the people. The brains of all professions and trades which have been conscripted for rearmament have contributed to these social effects.

Perhaps the most important social effect of rearmament is a fresh awakening of the people to the insanity of trying to settle disputes by weapons of war. There is a growing and resolute aim that other means than war must be found for settling disputes. Rearmament towards peace can bring confidence to commerce all over the world, if we have faith to see that peace can flourish

[1] *The World of Industry and Labour*, 1939.

even under the shadow of the sword, and economic settlement replace war.

5. Proposals to Abolish Economic Warfare.

The economic and social effects of rearmament force home the conclusion that the nations must unite and remove the causes of economic warfare, if peace is to be securely established. The urgency for determining a sound plan cannot be over estimated. Mr. Harold Butler, warden of Nuffield College, put the position squarely when he said recently, " Unless the implications of a real peace, and particularly its economic implications, have been thought out in advance, unless statesmen and peoples can see the issues with clear eyes when the critical moment comes, the chance may again be lost as it was lost in 1919."

This subject has engaged and is engaging the attention of most public men. It is recognised as one of the utmost importance. As far back as 1919, at the International Labour Conference held in Washington, an Italian Labour delegate proposed that there should be established some system of distribution, under international control, for the fair allotment of the raw materials of the world. At different international conferences since then the same problem of raw materials has been discussed and left unsettled. To supplement supplies of raw materials for their industries nations have introduced and extended plans for self-sufficiency.

During the past ten years at least five of the Great Powers have introduced national economic plans which permit of international trade without regard to the markets of the world and to the productive capacity of each country to supply them. The results have been, surplus production, cut-throat competition, tariff warfare, unemployment and poverty.

There can be no lasting peace until the world economic situation is settled internationally.

Two main considerations in any plan must be borne in mind. These are :—

1. That there must be international collaboration and agreement between the producers in the same industry in all industrial countries on all questions concerning means of production and distribution in that industry.

2. That existing national economic systems must be modified or expanded as may be necessary to afford facilities for the harmonious working of all systems within the framework of an international plan.

The first consideration involves all questions relating to finance (internal and external); supply of raw materials; regulation and development of production; exploration of new markets; pricing of products; transportation, etc. For instance, the iron and steel industry throughout the world would be linked up as one organic whole, and each industry would be similarly organized. This division of the whole industry for an international plan would be but an extension of what has been found to be good organisation for national plans. Further, such an arrangement would permit of the trial of part of the international plan by one industry, so that experience of its operation and results might be gained before launching the complete plan for all industries.

As to the second consideration. In every existing national economic plan it has been found advisable to divide industry as a whole into divisions, and to control each independently. The composition and number of divisions or groups are not the same in each country, and some readjustment of groups, therefore, would be necessary in each country to enable them all to function smoothly in an international plan.

The principles governing such a plan and the kind of machinery of organisation I have set down elsewhere.[1]

Something more than machinery of organisation is required. A new spirit is essential. Those cruel and hateful suspicions responsible for economic warfare and rearmament must be replaced by goodwill, kindliness and harmonious co-operation. If economic warfare is to cease and disarmament follow, there must be the fullest and most frank examination and settlement of all injustices in a spirit of good will and mutual understanding.

[1] *World Economics and Peace: Plan of Reconstruction.*

Address to the Whitstable Branch, League of Nations Union, 23rd January, 1939.

DR. TOYNBEE'S STUDY OF HISTORY[1]

PROFESSOR R. H. TAWNEY

FIVE years have elapsed since the appearance of the first three volumes of Professor Toynbee's great work. He then disentangled twenty-six civilisations, including five which had been "arrested," from the infertile jungle of primitive societies; examined the causes of their genesis and growth; and equipped the reader for the study of other phases of their life-history, by suggesting categories and criteria which might aid him in grappling with problems so complex as to seem, at first sight, insoluble. Civilisations, however, are not only, as he has already made evident, rare and recent phenomena; they are also mortal, and the number of the dead exceeds that of the living. Sixteen, on Professor Toynbee's estimate, are now defunct, leaving ten survivors, of which three, again, are "arrested," while the condition of the remainder is hardly one of rude health. The mortality-rate is somewhat high. In view of it, not only the growth of civilisations, but their decline, demands investigation. What diseases account for it? Through what pathological stages do the patients pass, before final dissolution puts an end to their misery?

These questions are the theme of the second instalment of Professor Toynbee's book. Of the three volumes composing it, Volume IV is concerned with the "breakdowns" of civilisations, Volumes V and VI with the process of "disintegration," which in most, though not in all, cases breakdowns have as their sequel. Civilisations, it will be remembered, were defined as "intelligible fields of study," in the sense that, unlike the fragments called States, they are largely self-determined, so that their history can be understood without constant allowance being made for the impact upon them of external forces. In their period of growth a creative minority sets a standard of achievement, which commands, in virtue of its inherent cogency or charm, the allegiance of the majority, with the result that leaders and led are carried forward together in a common upward movement, meeting each new "challenge" with a triumphant "response." The note of their period of decline is a caricature, so to say, of the harmonious energy of the phase of growth. The minority, losing the power to captivate and inspire which was the secret of their spell, attempt to retain by force the position which they no longer hold by merit. They cease to be "creative," and become merely "dominant." The majority react to coercion either by open resistance or by sullen acquiescence. If they are—to use Professor Toynbee's language—an "external proletariate,"

[1] *A Study of History*, Volumes IV, V, VI. By Arnold J. Toynbee. 1939. (London: Oxford University Press. Vol. IV, xvi + 656 pp.; Vol. V, 712 pp.; Vol. VI, 632 pp. Set of 3 volumes: £3 10*s.*; to Members of the Institute: £2 8*s.*; set of 6 volumes: £6 2*s.* 6*d.*; to Members of the Institute: £4 3*s.*)

they struggle fiercely against incorporation in a degenerate system, which excites, in place of the admiration once given it, only hatred and fear. If they are an " internal proletariate," they remain in the society which oppresses them, but are no longer of it. They offer the embittered submission of the serf, not the cheerful cooperation of the approving partner. The result in each case is the same; it is the destruction of social unity. The symptom of the breakdown of a civilisation, in short, is its relapse into class-war.

The forces which give rise to this process of degeneration are tracked through six hundred thrilling pages, with a range of knowledge and subtlety of insight which leave the reader breathless in his effort to keep pace with them. Fatalistic interpretations of catastrophe, from Lucretius to Spengler, are given short shrift. Loss of command over the environment, whether physical or human—the defeat of civilised man by the mosquito or by the barbarian—is examined only to be dismissed. The fault is neither in the stars, nor in the recalcitrance of the materials to be subjugated, but in ourselves. " We are betrayed by what is false within."

If the mark of a vigorous civilisation is the ability to control, within limits, its own future, the failure of that capacity for self-determination is the weakness which besets it when its energies begin to flag. The causes of that failure are to be found in the perversion of the qualities and attitudes which, in the past, conferred success. " Mimesis "—the process by which the influence of the creative minority was disseminated—is not without its perils; it may easily slip into the mechanical docility of human automata, unable to move save at the word of command. Growing civilisations are fertile of institutions; and institutions, again, if they shelter life, can also stifle it. The secret of vitality is perpetual adaptation in response to new emergencies; but the effort, once made, is not easily repeated. The city-state, or the mother of parliaments, or military prowess, or an economic technique which caused the country commanding it to be " the workshop of the world," becomes an object of idolatry. It perpetuates itself, long after a changing environment has turned its virtues into vices, so that victory at one stage spells defeat at the next. The greater the height reached, the heavier the fall; for earlier triumphs breed a mood of intoxication, in which the victors employ for their own destruction the weapons forged to win them. They make a peace which is ruinous, not only to their enemies, but also to themselves. They destroy minor tyrannies, to enthrone a major tyrant in their place. They employ their hardly-won mastery of the secrets of nature to squander on objects futile, mischievous, or both, resources which, wisely used, might raise life to loftier heights.

The effects of such breakdowns do not end with the appearance of the antagonisms which are their symptom. Breakdown may, indeed, as in the case of Egyptian and Chinese society, be followed by " petrifaction," which averts dissolution at the cost of paralysis. More often the slide backwards, discussed in Volume IV, proceeds at an accelerat-

ing pace, through the phases examined in volumes V and VI. The "responses" to successive "challenges" become progressively feebler. The schisms, vertical and horizontal, continue and widen, the former producing internecine warfare, the latter social discords of increasing bitterness. And behind these conspicuous marks of disease lies a subtler and more sinister psychological perversion. The visible schisms which drive a rift through societies on their downward course are the outward manifestation of spiritual schisms afflicting individual souls. A reckless surrender to appetites and an overstrained asceticism; a flight from present miseries by a vain attempt to recall to unreal life a past when they were not felt, or to anticipate a future in which, it is assumed, they will have been overcome; a collapse of cultural standards which their enfeebled representatives are too spiritless to maintain against the pressure of mediocrity—such are some of the morbid phenomena marking the stages on the road which leads to destruction.

In such circumstances, societies threatened with disintegration seek a Saviour, but seek him in the wrong quarter. He comes, whatever the mask which he wears, as a hero attempting to reverse by force a process which, being spiritual, force is impotent to correct. The triumphs of the sword are temporary; the wounds inflicted by it are permanent; and the weapon, once seized, cannot later be laid down. Thus, in the successive alternations of rout and rally, each retreat loses more ground than the last, and each advance recovers less. "The Time of Troubles"—to use the rubric borrowed from Russian history to which Professor Toynbee has given a generalised significance—appears to be wound up, when peace is restored by a "Universal State." But the disease has gone too far, and the remedy comes too late. The institution intended to bring salvation is itself infected with the malady which it would cure. The Universal State collapses. The disintegrating society passes into dissolution.

An attempt to summarise Professor Toynbee's argument necessarily fails to do it justice. One of the qualities in his work which most dazzles and delights is its sustained combination of speculative power with a mastery of historical fact in a number of different fields. When both are in action together over nineteen hundred pages, their effect is almost irresistible. But they need a broad front on which to deploy, and no epitome can convey the impression made by their united impact. His learning overflows into annexes, which would make, by themselves, a substantial volume. He is never at a loss for an illustration to point his moral. He strides with unfaltering steps through half a dozen civilisations, of which the majority of his readers will know nothing but the names; while—a more remarkable feat—even those of which they supposed themselves to understand at least a little are seen in a new light when Professor Toynbee has touched them with his magic wand. He has little fresh to tell us on the economic aspects of social growth and decay, in which—to judge by the small space he gives them—he is not himself much interested; but he appears to the layman to be

equally at home in military technicalities, such as the evolution of different types of equipment, of which he gives a brilliant sketch, in political thought, and in obscure phases of religious history. His knowledge is so much part of himself that he seems less to carry it than to be carried forward by it. Fertility, vitality, energy, inexhaustible *élan* are the words which first rise to one's lips when one puts these volumes down.

It is of the nature of a book so massive and so dynamic to sweep the reader off his feet. But it would be a poor compliment to the author if—to use his own language—the initial " rout " were not followed by a " rally." Confronted by a highly intelligent elephant, moving at the rate of a hundred yards in ten seconds, the judicious traveller takes to the nearest tree, where he presumably meditates at leisure, after recovering his breath, on such vulnerable points as elephants may possess. The student of Professor Toynbee's volumes, after conquering his natural disposition to surrender at discretion, will be well advised to imitate that example. In the first instance, at least, he will not challenge the assumptions implicit in the author's general scheme. The frame is less important than the picture, and the plan of the book than the discussion which fills it. That the discussion is of the highest interest and importance goes without saying. The question is whether it is also convincing. The breakdown of civilisations, as Professor Toynbee rightly says, presents an urgent and fascinating problem. His object is to analyse the causes by which, in general, these disasters are produced. Has he succeeded in that task?

His success has certainly been remarkable. As a treatment of its subject, the book stands by itself. No one can read it, without an increasing consciousness of moving on heights to which few historians lift him. No one can lay it down, without feeling inspired and fortified by a great body of new ideas, which, whether accepted or not as they stand, are full of fruitful suggestion. Some of the particular arguments employed and conclusions reached stand on a different footing. They require to be examined one by one; and here, it seems to me, certain questions suggest themselves. Professor Toynbee's method is to formulate explanations, and then to illustrate, test, and confirm them by passages in the history of different civilisations. The first step in that procedure is unexceptionable, provided that the explanations offered are, not only real explanations, but also so important as to justify their inclusion to the exclusion of other competitors. The second step is equally proper; but it is, of its nature, somewhat more precarious. It involves detaching particular developments or episodes from their context in the life of the society to which they belong, and then using them as evidence of the general conclusion which it is desired to establish. The question inevitably arises: are they really evidence? Do they illustrate what they are intended to illustrate? Are they intelligible when removed from their historical setting, and presented without reference to the past and future of the societies in which they occur?

The use of comparative methods in history can be highly illuminating. We need much more of it, and Professor Toynbee has rendered an immense service by the example he has set. But analogy is not proof. Comparison, in order to be successful, must deal with a segment of the societies compared sufficiently large to ensure that their essential characteristics are disentangled from mere accidents or externals. It must not treat as fish all that comes to its net. It must not rely on incidental occurrences, or isolated aspects of a particular society at one point in its history. Such things may provide an author with the apt illustration which, at the moment, he needs; but their significance, when they are seen against their own background, may largely disappear, or may be different from that assigned to them when they are separated from it.

Such commonplace cautions must obviously have been present to Professor Toynbee's mind. There are moments, however, when he seems to treat them with less respect than they deserve. The use—to give one trifling example—which he makes of Herodotus's moving story of the two soldiers in the force holding Thermopylae who " went sick " before the final engagement, and of whom one, on hearing that the position had been turned, insisted on going back into the line to be killed with the rest, while the other wangled his way home, is surely a case—though a minor case—in point. The same moral struggle, ending in the same different decisions, must have faced thousands of men in all wars in which individuals retained any discretion as to their conduct; certainly it did in the last war. Is it not a little fanciful to cite it as an example of that " schism in the soul," which, in Professor Toynbee's book, is the individual and psychological counterpart of the social drift towards disintegration?

His account of Marx, again, as a Hebrew prophet touched by the Christian tradition, and foretelling a Messianic Kingdom of this world, is highly suggestive. It is a welcome antidote to the dreary pedantry which treats the utterances of a fiery spirit as a political cookery-book, all recipes and nostrums. Much the same parallel, less brilliantly worked out, must have occurred to many students of the flaming footnotes of *Capital*, and of the exultant inevitability of the theory of history associated with its author's name. But Marx, after all, whatever his spiritual ancestry, was a man of his own day. His ethical premises—which are usually ignored by his English popularisers and critics—were those of the French Revolution; the environment which suggested his economic conclusions was that of the first phase of industrial capitalism in England. It is partly, indeed, the latter fact which has caused him to " date " in Western Europe, and to continue to seem up-to-date outside it. When the schism in the body social caused by the struggles of " the internal proletariate " is under consideration, the case of Marx is clearly apposite. It is a question, however, whether the nature of that schism and those struggles is best revealed by touching lightly on the context of mid-nineteenth-century Western Europe, in which Marx wrote, and underlining those aspects of his thought which, however significant, have

little direct relevance to the particular situation with which he was concerned.

Professor Toynbee—to give a third example—argues in a striking, and to me convincing, passage, that the " breakdown " of civilisations cannot be explained merely by a decline in man's ability to control his material environment, but that, on the contrary, such a decline is the result of causes of a different kind, producing political and social dislocation. Among his other examples he cites the bad condition of river-conservancy works in China in the present century, when a larger number of Chinese engineers with Western technical qualifications were available than in the past, but when political disorders made it difficult or impossible for them to apply their skill to an urgent problem. His views, it may be remarked in passing, on the supply of Chinese engineers are more optimistic than those of some Western technicians, with Chinese sympathies, who were in a position to know the facts; but, leaving that small point aside, his statement of the case does not seem to me to hold water. He appears to assume that, before the shock given to China by the forcible intrusion of the West, public works were effectively maintained, and that the fearful flood of 1931 was an exceptional occurrence.

Probably, at certain periods, conservancy works were better looked after than in the present century; and certainly dislocation caused by the impact of the West was partly responsible for their later neglect. But it is almost certainly untrue that, under the old régime, the works in question were maintained so effectively as to prevent recurrent disasters. Both Chinese and European scholars have investigated the history of flood and famine in China. The conclusion suggested by their work is that those catastrophes occurred over large areas at short intervals for several—perhaps many—centuries before the present one; nor should that surprise Professor Toynbee, since elsewhere he assigns the Chinese " breakdown " to a fairly early date—the last quarter of the ninth century. The most significant fact, indeed, is surely the opposite of that emphasised by him. It is the failure of a great civilisation, in spite—or perhaps, because—of all its brilliant achievements in other fields, to master the problem of taming an unfriendly nature, which the West, in some other respects so inferior to China, has in recent times largely succeeded in solving. The point is not a trifling one, since it concerns the characteristics of two important cultural types, differing sharply from each other both in their virtues and their limitations. To ascribe to the exceptional circumstances of one passage in the history of either weaknesses which, in reality, have deeper roots is to do it a disservice. It is to divert attention from defects which it is both important and practicable for it to overcome. Here again, Professor Toynbee's error—if it is an error—appears to arise from citing as evidence of his thesis a particular incident or phase in the life of a society, which, when seen in its own setting, has a different significance from that which he gives it.

The grand scale on which the book is planned makes occasional slips

of the kind inevitable. Its protagonists are "civilisations," and it is not easy to put a hook in the jaw of these leviathans. Since the dissection of each from head to tail is impossible, pieces must be cut from them for inspection and comparison; and these fragments do not always look the same on the dissecting-table as when they formed part of the living organism. Yet a reviewer, as he makes that criticism, pauses in self-reproach. What other work, he asks himself, throws half so much light on half so wide a field? And how much of its revealing power is not due to the imaginative insight which detects affinities that escape duller eyes! That quality is seen at its best in the author's treatment of topics allied to that "Suicidalness of Militarism" which forms the title of one of his sections. He depicts the Hellenic world as taking a fatal plunge downhill with the Peloponnesian, and later, the Hannibalic, wars; the Dark Ages as prolonged, and their darkness deepened, by Charlemagne's thirty years of intermittent conflict with the Saxons; the East Roman Empire as never recovering from its ruinous victory in the Bulgarian war of 977–1019; the Indic civilisation in Ceylon as irretrievably injured by "the social malady of warfare." When he approaches nearer our own day, he devotes some passages of great interest to the contrast between the appalling ferocity of the wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and the comparative innocuousness of the decorous and leisurely manœuvres which characterised some wars, at least, in the age which followed. His account of the growth, under the influence of industrialism and democracy, of a totalitarian warfare more atrocious than any yet seen is, in spite of all that has been written on the subject, original and instructive.

These passages throw much light on the causes and consequences of the change in the methods of war; but they do more than that. They suggest the region in which we should look for one major cause of war as an institution periodically threatening civilisations with ruin. Professor Toynbee's own views on that subject might, perhaps, be inadequately summarised by saying that he regards war primarily as the nemesis of "parochial sovereignty." He gives as one of his examples the breakdown of the Hellenic world in the fifth century before Christ. Its most progressive regions had undergone an industrial revolution. As a consequence, their economic life was now on an œcumenical scale; but their political organisation remained that of City-States. Attempts were made to transcend "City-state sovereignty"; first by treaties, and then by the imperialism of which the League sponsored by Athens is the classical example. They did not succeed. The result was the breakdown in which Hellenic civilisation received its first, and most deadly, wound. The problem remained to be attacked by Alexander, and solved by Rome. Whatever the merits of the Roman solution, the price paid for it was heavy. It was the final end of the period of creative activity which had been the peculiar glory of an earlier age.

Parallels with the Western world to-day, which also possesses its explosive economic system, its parochial sovereignties, and its essays in

unification by way of empires, are too obvious to require emphasis. They give point, it would probably be agreed, to Professor Toynbee's analysis. They also, perhaps, suggest certain additional considerations. It is quite true, of course, that the failure to create a political system corresponding with the practical realities of human intercourse is pregnant of disaster. But is that the whole story? Are there not more terms in the problem than those which here are rightly most emphasised? Are not the internal conditions, material and spiritual, of the societies concerned to be counted among them?

A European naturally meditates, as he studies Professor Toynbee, on the four or five major catastrophes undergone by his own continent during the last three centuries. When he reflects on their causes, he will give a high place—perhaps, indeed, the highest—to the attempt of those centuries to organise Europe on the basis of national States which know no superior, and will point, with Professor Toynbee, to the ruinous effect of "parochial sovereignty" in a world which has long been outgrowing it. But will he not, also, feel obliged to stress forces of a different kind, which have their source, less in the system as a whole, than in the varying characters of its component parts? Will he not, for example, find it necessary to consider the tendencies generated by certain types of political and social organisation; the unequal development of different societies, which has caused the leaders of some to regard them as the step-children of history, and others, more fortunate and weaker, as their natural prey; the disposition of states which have been made by war to seek opportunities to repeat in different circumstances the triumphs of the past; the reluctance of "satiated" powers to make concessions till too late; the explosive forces of long-repressed national aspirations? Public opinion in Western Europe and North America has felt for some time so genuine a horror of war that it is disposed to regard that sentiment as the common possession of all rational men. But, as the history of England and France—to mention no other countries—is sufficient to show, the attitude of different societies to war varies with their varying circumstances. It appears to change with changes in the stage of development at which they stand; and the idea that, at the present day, the hatred of war is universally shared is, unfortunately, an illusion. If that is so, the supersession of "parochial sovereignty" by an international system more consonant with the facts of modern life, becomes, not less, but more, urgent. Are not, however, the stability and success of such a system likely to depend on a parallel effort to remove genuine grievances, meet unsatisfied needs, and thus foster a political mentality which looks to peace, not war, to satisfy its requirements and solve its problems?

Professor Toynbee, it is probable, would not dissent from that suggestion. If he does not himself labour all its implications, it is not that he is unaware of them, but that he is concerned with a different aspect of the subject. The theme of his study is civilisations, not particular peoples or states, and he deals with civilisations as units. They are units, and that truth—since it is constantly ignored

—cannot be too often or too strongly emphasised. But some of them, at any rate, are highly articulated units, composed of different members with peculiarities of their own, which both enrich, by their diversities, the human heritage, and threaten periodically to reduce it to ashes. Unifying forces have never been wholly absent; but different peoples have been subject, for long periods of time, to pressures varying in kind and intensity; have enjoyed different opportunities; have been conscious of different weaknesses or privations; and have developed, as a consequence, different political and social psychologies, which it is of vital importance to attempt to understand.

Professor Toynbee, thinking in terms of civilisations, is more interested in qualities common to all societies composing a civilisation, and in the relations between them, than he is in their distinctive characteristics and their internal development. It is, perhaps, for that reason that, though he offers the reader a highly instructive discussion of the failure to appreciate the political significance of the growth of a world economy, he gives a comparatively small space to the economic aspects of his subject, and is not at his happiest in dealing with them. He touches lightly on the relation of man to his natural environment; on the growth, arrest, and decline of populations; on the social reactions of changes in technology, trade-routes and economic geography. His picture of the rural England of George III as an Arcadia unaffected by international commerce is remote from reality—consider only the economic repercussions, more than a century before, of the breakdown of Central Europe in the Thirty Years War—while his suggestion that it was not until the nineteenth century that " the livelihood of the people at large " was thought to be " dependent upon foreign trade " betrays illusions which, as far as England is concerned, a glance at the records of parliamentary proceedings at any date after—say—1600 would have been sufficient to dispel. His brief section on " The Impact of Industrialism upon Private Property " is not worthy of its title. That which follows, on " The Impact of Democracy upon Education," though it states some pointed truths, does not go as deep as Professor Toynbee's treatment of other subjects has taught us to expect. It is true, no doubt, that much pretentious nonsense has been written on economic and social history; but it is not, unfortunately, unique in that. It belongs to the topics whose importance should not be over-estimated, but which, if neglected, are apt, in the fullness of time, to take their revenge.

The first feeling of a reviewer who puts down these volumes is that of his own inadequacy, his second one of gratitude. He cannot hope to do justice to this latest addition to a still uncompleted work, still less to pass judgment on it. But he is conscious of having enjoyed the fruits of a memorable effort of historical creation. Few men except the author would have been capable of it. The book does not, in my judgment, lose, but gain, from the note of personal conviction which runs through its pages, and from the occasional confessions of faith in which conviction finds its voice.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

Any book reviewed in this Journal may be obtained through the Publications Department of the Institute. Members of the Institute wishing to cable an order may use, instead of the title of the book, the number which it bears, e.g., "Areopagus, London : Send Book Twenty May Journal : Smith."

Books marked with an asterisk (*) are in the Library of the Institute.

CHURCH AND STATE

1*. THE VATICAN AS A WORLD POWER. By Joseph Bernhart. 1939. (London; New York, Toronto: Longmans, Green. 8vo. 456 pp. 15s.)

2*. ITALY AND THE VATICAN AT WAR. A Study of their Relations from the Outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War to the Death of Pius IX. By S. William Halperin. 1939. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 8vo. xvii + 483 pp. 15s.)

THE steadily growing prestige of the modern Papacy has led to the appearance of several books dealing with the history and fortunes of the Holy See. Dr. Bernhart's work may be recommended as a good summary of the mission and achievements of the Vatican through the centuries. The author is himself a Roman Catholic, but this does not prevent him from sketching boldly the deep shadows on the record, the weakness and occasional wickedness of individual wearers of the tiara, the ignoble compromises dictated by political considerations, the sordid ambitions which did not scruple to use the most sacred things for worldly ends. But this very candour serves only to strengthen the author's central thesis: that the Papacy, despite the failings of some Popes, has ever stood for a spiritual ideal, for the defence of the eternal values against the strange gods that have been set up in their stead at various periods of history. The continuity of this mission is well illustrated by the uncompromising opposition shown by Pius XI to Nazism and Bolshevism alike, and now that these two powers of darkness have temporarily coalesced, the wisdom of the late Pope's attitude will be admitted by many outside the Roman obedience. Naturally the attempt to condense the story of almost two thousand years into a volume of little more than four hundred pages has forced the author to jettison much important material, but his sense of perspective has enabled him to preserve all the essentials of the picture. The book is admirably translated by Mr. George W. Schuster.

Professor Halperin's work offers a striking contrast in at least one respect: although about fifty pages longer than Dr. Bernhart's, it covers only seven years of papal history. True, the seven years between the occupation of Rome and the death of Pius IX were extremely important, for they saw the "Roman Question" assume those characteristics which were destined to embitter the relations between the Vatican and the new Italian State for over half a century. Of Professor Halperin's competence to deal with this complex subject

nobody who has read his previous book, *The Separation of Church and State in Italian Thought from Cavour to Mussolini*, will have the slightest doubt. He is also to be congratulated on the tireless industry with which he has raked the files of obscure and long-since-obsolete journals in order to reconstruct for us a controversy, the intense bitterness of which seems curiously unreal to-day. It would be difficult to imagine a more impartial study. Indeed, Professor Halperin is so anxious to allow each side to state its case fully that he is far too prone to efface himself altogether; in many cases his own view, which would have been of much assistance to the reader, is withheld. As a result the work should be described as a source-book rather than a history. It is to be hoped that Professor Halperin will eventually carry his researches down to the conclusion of the Lateran Treaty of 1929; his industry and impartiality will both be invaluable in guiding the student through the thorny labyrinth of the Roman Question.

C. S.

3. VITA DEL CARDINALE GASPARRI, SEGRETARIO DI STATO E POVERO PRETE. By Francesco Maria Taliani. 1939. (Milan: Mondadori. Sm. 8vo. 302 pp. 20 *lire*.)

PIETRO GASPARRI, son of poverty-stricken Umbrian peasants, professor in the *Institut Catholique* of Paris, codifier of the Canon law, and Cardinal-Secretary of State, was undoubtedly one of the most remarkable men of our time. Colonel Repington, no bad judge, found him possessed of "more statesmanship than all our War Cabinet put together," and this testimonial has been confirmed by most of those who were in contact with him. His share in the Lateran agreements of 1929 alone would have sufficed to earn him a place in history, but he had other and—who knows?—more lasting achievements to his credit. The present account of him by a friend who knew him for many years will be read with interest, but those who look for any real light on the career of the great Cardinal will be sorely disappointed. What Signor Taliani has to say about the "poor priest" whose heart was ever with the simple folk of his own parish is certainly edifying, but when he comes to speak of Gasparri's political views and activities he is in an awkward predicament. As Italian Minister to Holland, Signor Taliani is a Fascist official, and it would be highly dangerous for him, for example, to refer to the many caustic *bons mots* at the expense of the régime which were attributed to the Cardinal and which often earned for him the violent attacks of the Party press. Instead, he has chosen to spin a fairy story of Gasparri's deep sympathy with the rising Fascist movement, of his faith in Mussolini as a man of destiny, and of his "disapproval" of Pius XI's subsequent quarrels with the Duce: all very palatable to Fascist readers, no doubt, but calculated to cause nothing but discreet amusement to those familiar with the Cardinal's real views.

C. S.

4*. THE GERMAN CATHOLICS. By Robert d'Harcourt. Translated by R. J. Dingle. 1939. (Burns, Oates and Washbourne. 8vo. xiii + 274 pp. 7*s*. 6*d*.)

THIS book covers much the same ground as the study by Dr. Micklem which was recently published by Chatham House. It is adequately documented and pleasant to read; but it lacks the objectivity of Dr. Micklem's narrative, for M. d'Harcourt writes as an ardent and indignant son of the Church. Nothing, however, could

detract from the gravity of the indictment:—the diabolical cleverness with which, first, the clerical Party in the German State was shattered, and then an unceasing war of attrition has been waged on the Church, until the faithful are now reduced to the "life of the Catacombs." M. d'Harcourt does not, and thinks that the Germans themselves do not, take the neopagan antics too seriously; lip service will still be paid to Christianity, if it accepts the spirit of combat and racial heroism, complete State control, and the substitution of the mysteries of Nordic blood for its ancient sacraments.

The treatment of the Catholic Church during the last six years; the alternations of tolerance and persecutions; the specious promises of the 1933 Concordat and their ruthless violation—the whole story is typical of Hitlerian diplomacy and duplicity. With the majority of Catholics, it looks as if their resistance has wilted under the strain; but a leaven of the faithful still accept the courageous guidance of Cardinal Faulhaber, and the remarkable encyclical, *Mit brennender Sorge*, of March 1937 must have rallied a powerful, though necessarily silent, volume of resentment against the Nazi attempts to destroy the moral consciousness of the German people.

Mr. Dingle has given us a distinguished translation of a valuable monograph. MESTON.

5*. THE CHURCH AND THE POLITICAL PROBLEM OF OUR DAY. By Karl Barth. 1939. (London: Hodder and Stoughton. 8vo. 87 pp. 2*s*.)

THIS vigorous Christian criticism of Nazi politics, and summons to political and military action against Nazism, is all the more weighty because it comes from a Swiss theologian who has always been singularly careful in drawing the line between theology and politics. Nazism, Dr. Barth holds, is not only an "anti-Church fundamentally hostile to Christianity," but also a "fundamental dissolution of the just State," and the Church must not only itself seek to be more truly the Church in the face of this menace, but must also call upon the State to be more truly the State. In Switzerland this book has been widely discussed not only in religious periodicals but also in the daily press, particularly from the point of view of Swiss neutrality. A. N. PRIOR.

6*. ENCYCLICAL OF H. H. POPE PIUS XII (*Summi Pontificatus*). 1939. (London: Catholic Truth Society. Sm. 8vo. 46 pp. 2*p*. New York: American Press. Sm. 8vo. 33 pp. 5 c.)

7*. VOM WESEN UND WERKEN DER AUSLANDS-KIRCHEN. By Hermann Stöhr. 1939. (Stettin: Okumenischer Verlag. 144 pp.)

GENERAL

8. EUROPA UND DER ORIENT. Untersuchungen zur englischen Vorkriegspolitik in Borgeschichte und Verlauf der Balkankrise 1912. By Werner Schröder. 1938. (Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer. La. 8vo. 230 pp. RM. 8.40.)

IN order to analyse and explain British foreign policy before the world war, the author has chosen that period which he thinks particularly indicative of the fundamentals of British policy, namely the years 1909–12, culminating in the Anglo-German *détente*. This result of Sir Edward Grey's and Kiderlen-Waechter's close and loyal collaboration caused dismay in Petersburg and in Paris; but the author

succeeds in establishing beyond doubt Sir Edward Grey's sincere and unswerving efforts for a Franco-German and Russo-German *détente* and for a European settlement satisfactory to Germany as well. The simultaneous endeavours of Grey's German partner, von Kiderlen-Waechter, justify the speculation that a similar collaboration between them in 1914, each putting on the brake in St. Petersburg and in Vienna respectively, and both adopting their successful tactics of the London Ambassadors' conferences, would have prevented the outbreak of the world war in 1914. At the same time the fundamental difference between Imperial Germany, aiming at a co-operative understanding, and Hitler's Germany, attempting world domination, becomes obvious. Churchill's words of 1912 sound again like a prophecy: "The hammers that clanged at Kiel and Wilhelmshaven were forging the coalition of nations by which Germany was to be resisted and finally overthrown."

ERNST JACKH.

9*. IN THE MARGIN OF HISTORY. By L. B. Namier. 1939. (London: Macmillan. 8vo. viii + 304 pp. 7*s*. 6*d*.)

THIS book consists for the most part of a series of reprints of papers already published in various reviews and journals. In one of them, "German Arms and Aims," first published in June 1935, there is a very interesting forecast of recent events. Many readers will turn to the section called "Judaica," and especially to a paper on "Palestine and the British Empire," written for private circulation in November 1936 and now published for the first time, which reasons the Jewish case with great cogency. The argument is strengthened by diagrams of the expansion of areas of acute Jewish emigration need or persecution on the one hand, and of the progressive reduction in Jewish settlement areas in Palestine on the other—a cruel juxtaposition. M. B.

10*. RELIGION AND THE ORGANISATION OF PEACE: An Agreed Statement by Leaders of Many Denominations. Edited by Vivian Carter. 1939. (London: Peace Book Co. (London), Ltd. Sm. 8vo. 48 pp. 6*d*.)

THE views put forward in this little pamphlet have the support of many well-known religious leaders in Great Britain. It sets out to show the importance of moral and religious ideals in the organisation of world peace, and maintains that national patriotism must be transcended by the higher ideal of universal brotherhood and the acceptance of the obligations of a common world citizenship.

11*. THE GREAT ILLUSION—NOW. By Norman Angell. 1938. (London: Penguin Books, Ltd. Sm. 8vo. 282 pp. 6*d*.)

SIR NORMAN ANGELL'S thesis, first set out in *The Great Illusion* in 1908, is familiar to all readers of this *Journal*. This "Penguin Special" is divided into three parts: (i) an argument showing the relevance of the original theme to the crisis of 1938 and why the fallacies exposed in 1908 obstruct the application of effective remedies; (ii) an abridged version of the original book; and (iii) the type of policy for which the book's conclusions call. Sir Norman writes:

"The conclusion to be drawn from the argument of this book is not that since war is profitless the danger of attack is past. Men are not guided by the facts, but what they believe to be the facts. Only when the futility is realized will the futility deter. One-sided disarmament is therefore of no avail and is not here advocated. But while maintaining our arms we must maintain our efforts to

create a new order based on the recognition of those mutual obligations between nations which are necessary for fruitful co-operation. Such efforts are now unpopular so that statesmen dare not make them and take the risks involved. . . . This book is designed to . . . prove that though truly war will not stop itself, apart from human endeavour, man can, since he makes war, also make wars to cease."

12*. WE SAW IT HAPPEN. By Thirteen Correspondents of the *New York Times*. 1939. (London: George G. Harrap and Co., Ltd. La. 8vo. 372 pp. 8*s*. 6*d*.)

THE jacket of this book describes the contents as "history in the raw." The first paper, by G. E. R. Gedye, describes scenes in the various capitals of Central and South-Eastern Europe in the last thirteen fateful years, and provides a kaleidoscopic picture of these countries which gives life to the colder pages of historians. A paper by Ferdinand Kuhn gives a penetrating study of English class distinctions, so alien in the view of an outside observer to democratic principles and yet consonant with an astonishing national unity; of a realist general policy which cares for essentials, but gives way on non-essentials; of apparent failure to follow this traditional policy, resulting in political blunders which, taken together with the economic changes in the outside world, would appear to lead necessarily to the destruction of British world power, but have not done so. But for English readers perhaps the most important and instructive are the papers recording the varied phenomena of American life from the achievements of Babe Ruth at baseball to the magnates of Wall Street and the New Deal, not omitting the tragic history of the Sacco–Vanzetti case.

It is a live book, and it brings home the fact that American journalism has a great and serious side too often discounted. M. B.

13*. FOREIGN CORRESPONDENT: Personal adventures abroad in search of the news. By Twelve British Journalists. Edited by W. Hindle. (London: George Harrap. 268 pp. 10*s*. 6*d*.)

THE list of names of the writers whose adventures make up this book is sufficient indication of the interest of the stories they tell and of the quality of the manner of telling them.

Mr. F. A. Voigt writes of his experiences during the Kapp *Putsch*, when there was a Red Army in the Ruhr; Mr. O. D. Callagher of his adventures during the fighting in Shanghai; Mr. Ion Munro throws a great deal of light on the character and ways of Signor Mussolini, and explains the technique of interviewing him; Mr. Arthur Koestler describes his travels about Palestine in the summer of 1937; and Mr. Alexander Henderson paints a vivid picture of the last agony of Czechoslovakia.

In lighter vein are Mr. Vernon Bartlett's thumb-nail sketch of the game of chasing news in Geneva, and Mr. Douglas Reed's recollections of some amusing experiences in Germany and elsewhere which have done something to relieve the atmosphere of tragedy and tension in which he has been fated to do so much of his work. There is also a delightful account by Mr. H. D. Harrison of how he was "undone by Mickey Mouse" in Yugoslavia.

The other four contributors deal with serious events.

Mr. George Steer describes the last days of the Emperor Haile Selassie in Addis Ababa, Mr. Darsïe Gillie contributes an estimate of General Pilsudski's character and achievement in ending the civil war in Poland in 1926, Sir Alfred Watson recounts his experiences in Bengal in 1931 and 1932, when he was seriously wounded by a terrorist; and

Mr. Karl Robson writes of the fighting round Teruel at the end of 1937, when an English and two American journalists were fatally wounded.

H. L.

14*. MAHATMA GANDHI. Essays and Reflections on his Life and Work, presented to him on his seventieth birthday, October 2nd, 1939. Edited by S. Radhakrishnan. 1939. (London: George Allen and Unwin. La. 8vo. 382 pp. 7*s*. 6*d*.)

THIS tribute to Mr. Gandhi contains papers by as many persons distinguished in life or letters as Mr. Gandhi has birthdays, with a short selection from his writings. Of the many interesting papers in this book attention may be drawn to a penetrating study by Mr. Stephen Hobhouse. General Smuts, Mr. Gandhi's old opponent in Africa, writes of him as " distinguished by that universal and eternal human which is the hallmark of true greatness of spirit." And he concludes: " It is curious how in these days of European confusion and decline Asia is steadily moving to the front. Among the greatest men on the public stage of the world of to-day are two Asiatics—Gandhi and Chiang-Kai-shek, both moving immense masses of men along noble lines to a destiny which in essence is one with the high Christian ideal which the West has received but no longer seriously practises." M. B.

15*. GENERALIZED FOREIGN POLITICS. By Lewis F. Richardson. (The British Journal of Psychology Monograph Supplements XXIII.) 1939. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. La. 8vo. 91 pp. 8*s*. 6*d*.)

THE paper, an abstract of which was read at the British Association in 1938, tries to represent the international struggle in mathematical terms. It is therefore hardly for the general reader, but the study of it will repay those who are sufficiently conversant with the forms of mathematical presentment to follow the argument. The author seeks to explain in mathematical terms why so many nations were reluctantly but steadily increasing their armaments as if they were mechanically compelled to do so. He states his thesis as follows: " They follow their traditions which are fixtures and their instincts which are mechanical; and because they have not yet made a sufficiently strenuous intellectual and moral effort to control the situation. The process described by the ensuing equations is not to be thought of as inevitable. It is what would occur if instinct and tradition were allowed to act uncontrolled."

M. B.

16*. THE NEW PROPAGANDA. By Amber Blanco White. 1939. (London: Gollancz. 8vo. 383 pp. 7*s*. 6*d*.)

THIS book is " addressed to a mainly progressive audience "—meaning, on internal evidence, to those who are prepared to make the assumption that propaganda as practised by Fascists everywhere, and by the British National Government in particular, consists in the dissemination of more or less ingenious falsehoods, whereas the mind of Communists, Socialists and opponents of the British National Government in general, being " engaged in an attempt to reach the truth . . . is not a mind that can turn readily to the invention and propagation of lies, be they never so paying in the short run." Such naïve partisanship will hurt nobody. But it rather gets in the way of Mrs. Blanco White's serious ambition to apply the methods of psycho-analysis to the study of propaganda and of political opinions.

The question which preoccupies her most is why so many people whose interests are surely on the other side of the barricades vote for the National Government; and one of the conclusions at which she arrives is that many of them are "timid people" in search of a Father—in fact, of a "new focus for their childish feelings." It helps to explain the success of the Soviet régime that "Lenin, alive or dead," has performed this function for it. What seems to be required elsewhere is "some heroic left-wing figure"—one would have been tempted to say "a Führer" but for the fact would so rankly contradict views expressed by the author in an earlier chapter. In short, Mrs. White makes a good many interesting observations, and has suggested a new field of enquiry. But systematic and fruitful work in this field will require, perhaps, someone with a profounder knowledge of modern psychological methods, and certainly someone with more of the scientific spirit which investigates the properties of an explosive without pausing to inquire to what particular use it will be put. E. H. CARR.

17*. CONTEMPORARY WORLD POLITICS. Edited by F. J. Brown, C. Hodges, J. S. Roncek. 1939. (New York: John Wiley. London: Chapman and Hall. 8vo. xiv + 718 pp. 25s.)

"SINCE the mass of available material can be mastered by specialists only, the symposium, each chapter written by an authority in his respective subject, aims to synthesise the available material in world politics for those who are looking for a foundation to the all-embracing and all-important field to-day." This plan, quoted from the editors' preface, is admirably carried out. The book is divided into six parts: World Conflict—Major Foreign Policies—Regional Interests—World Organisation—Making World Opinion and Roads to World Peace. Each section has an introduction and summary, which avoids the rag-bag effect of many symposiums, and each of the thirty-five different authors gives a bibliography at the end of his contribution. The first five chapters, on World Conflict, are a survey of the variety of forms conflict may take or is already taking in the modern world, with a sketch of the underlying causes. The contents of parts two and three are clear from the titles. Part four deals with the League and Diplomacy, part five with the Press and Propaganda, and the last section embodies the theories of peace held by the various political ideologies and religious denominations.

The book is in no sense propaganda. There is, indeed, no villain of the piece, unless it be the tragic irrationality of man, which is the dominant impression one gathers, whether reading of American failure to co-operate, of the twilight of the League, or of the imperial aspirations of Japan. Depressing as this impression may be, it is none the less evidence that the book is as fair a survey as any document on contemporary politics can hope to be. One or two writers seemed to assume too much knowledge for a beginner, others too little, but that is an inevitable drawback to all books covering so vast a field. Wherever possible, greater clarity is given by diagrams called fact pictures.

A. G. ELLIOT-SMITH.

18*. EUROPE ON THE EVE. By Frederick L. Schuman. 1939. (London: Robt. Hale. Demy 8vo. xxviii + 573 pp. 18s.)

HERE is another trans-Atlantic review of the kaleidoscope of recent politics in Europe. Professor Schuman tackles his subject with magnificent verve and in much picturesque detail; it is a narrative,

he starts off by telling us, "of madmen and morons engaged co-operatively in demolishing the ruins of European civilisation." After that, it is not surprising to learn that Hitler is a "mental pluralist to the point of a multiform schizophrenia." Despite eccentricities, however, the book is a startling picture of the European chaos between 1933 and 1939; and there is much material for history in it. Its conclusions will not, it is true, command universal approval. It is difficult to believe that the British Cabinet was ever "pledged, at Il Duce's command, to Fascist victory in Spain"; or that Mr. Chamberlain meant "Tory Britain to assist Japan to exploit a conquered China"; or that there was a "conspiracy" at any time between his Government and the "Fascist-Triplice." If such is the pabulum on which a Williamstown professor can feed his pupils, there is something to be said for counter-propaganda in the States. But Professor Schuman writes as a "social scientist" who believes that "the opiates of ignorant optimism have no proper place among possible remedies for the sickness of a disordered civilisation."

MESTON.

19. UNEASY OCEANS. By Lt.-Comdr. Kenneth Edwards. 1939. (London: George Routledge. 8vo. vii + 382 pp. Illus., maps. 15*s*.)

THIS book gives a thorough review of the naval conditions leading up to the present situation, from the immediate post-war years until to-day. It is very useful that the events which led to the Washington Conference, the ending of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and subsequent re-armament should be reviewed, and the events are here traced in an unbiased manner.

The various fleets of the big naval Powers are carefully reviewed in Part II, and the strategy of each is discussed and related to the offensive and defensive power available. The chapter on German naval strategy is particularly interesting at the present time. Part II terminates with a review of the strong and weak points of the various nations. In Part III the author considers the conduct of a war in the Mediterranean, in the North Sea and in the Baltic. He then weighs up the position of the United States, and in what manner her support would influence these campaigns. He shows the difficulty of a campaign between the United States and Japan, and discusses Japanese strategy in that campaign. His conclusion is that the United States would win in the end. He then discusses the British Empire against Japan, giving his opinion in favour of a British victory and the collapse of Japanese power.

He then considers a world war in which Russia would be drawn into war against Germany. He points out that Italy is not anxious for war, and ends up on a note of doubt, consequent on President Roosevelt's peace proposals, as to whether it will, in fact, eventuate.

These last chapters have a curious interest at the present time, enabling us to compare such very recent prophesies and speculations with what has actually happened and is happening.

C. V. USBORNE.

20*. WORLD OUTLOOK. By Sir Frederick Whyte, H. Wickham Steed, A. Morgan Young, C. J. S. Sprigge, Sir Bernard Pares, G. P. Gooch, A. P. Newton. Foreword by Sir Robert Pickard. 1939. (London: Nicholson and Watson. 8vo. vii + 177 pp. 5*s*.)

THE authorities and their subjects are Sir Frederick Whyte—the U.S.A.; Mr. Wickham Steed—Republican France; A. M. Young—

Imperial Japan; C. J. S. Sprigge—Mussolini's Italy; Sir B. Pares—Soviet Russia; G. P. Gooch—Third Reich; and A. P. Newton—Britain and the British Commonwealth.

It is excusable to pick out the monograph of Mr. Gooch. Bebel said a generation after Sedan—" Das Volk ist noch immer siegestrunken " : in some sense that is true to-day. But though the Hohenzollerns ruled a hard-working, highly-educated and almost too well disciplined community, becoming increasingly rich and filled with confidence, it may be doubted whether Herr Hitler to-day enjoys these advantages. In 1890 the principle of limited liability was jettisoned and the creation of Bismarck thirty years later was nearly swept away. Was the Weimar Constitution an adequate replacement? Apparently not. Is the Third Reich adequate? The question is in process of being answered. H. J. COOPER.

21*. THE END OF ECONOMIC MAN : A Story of the new Totalitarianism. By Peter F. Drucker. 1939. (London : Macmillan. 8vo. 251 pp. 8*s*. 6*d*.)

MR. DRUCKER has given us the kind of book we greatly need. In times like ours, when Western society is labouring through an intense social transition, there is small value in over-sized compendia of facts and figures which, like Bolingbroke's fruit, are rotten ere they are ripe, but all the more need for the intelligent essay which tries to pierce through to the meaning of our experience.

Mr. Drucker argues that what the Western world is experiencing is not a bothersome interlude, caused by a few wild but ephemeral dictators, but one of its great historical mutations. A whole social order has collapsed, and a new order is waiting to be born. That has happened twice before, in both cases, as to-day, through a decaying faith in the prevailing concept of man in society. In the thirteenth century the concept of Spiritual Man, in the sixteenth century that of Intellectual Man, disintegrated when it became clear that the " society based upon them could not realise freedom and equality in the sphere which it regarded as alone socially constitutive." To-day we witness the collapse of the society based on the concept of Economic Man, which had been the foundation of *bourgeois* capitalism and, in its distilled form, also of Marxian socialism. When Marxism, in its Soviet experiment, failed to bring about freedom and equality through the supremacy of the economic sphere, the concept collapsed : there is no prospect beyond Marxism for Economic Man.

War and depression carried the process to its logical end. A society supposed to rest on reason and material progress was laid low by the irrational bolting away of the mechanical forces. But while the old order collapsed, no new order arose, no new concept lay " ready under the surface to take the place of Economic Man." A religious revival might have done it, but the churches could not tear themselves away from established institutions so as to lead a new revolutionary social order. In that social vacuum Fascism found its chance, like a weed in untilled soil; it exploited the despair of the masses and gave them a spurious new faith, by substituting a belief in sheer organisation for the lost belief in a social creed and order. Hence the essential feature of totalitarianism is the " attempt to substitute non-economic for economic satisfactions, rewards and considerations as the basis for the rank, function and position of the individual in industrial society." Such a system can be kept going only by a thorough *Wehrwirtschaft*, which in

turn drives the totalitarian States inescapably into conflict with the West, though they know it to be suicidal.

What of the future? Mr. Drucker argues that if war comes, and the West can win it only by going Fascist itself, then Europe will still be lost to totalitarianism. Therefore the only real defence against it is to release new basic forces in our own society, to try to develop " a new, free, and equal non-economic society on the foundation and from the premises of our existing economic society." The rather obvious and rather vague concluding part does not keep up the standard of the analytical part of the book. Occasionally Mr. Drucker springs upon the reader a somewhat extravagant and not always relevant argument; and now and then he lets an epigram run away with the sense of a point. But, except for the inadequate conclusion, these are small blemishes in a highly intelligent book. DAVID MITRANY.

22. DEMOKRATIE UND DIKTATUR. By Paul Ritterbusch. (75 pp. RM. 3.30.)

23. GRUNDFRAGEN EUROPÄISCHER ORDNUNG. By Georg Hahn. (208 pp. RM. 6.0.)

24*. VÖLKERRECHTLICHE GROSSRAUMORDNUNG. By Carl Schmitt. (88 pp.) Publications of the Institute for Politics and International Law in the University of Kiel. 1939. (Berlin–Vienna: Deutscher Rechtsverlag.)

Two of these small books would not be worth reviewing were it not that, taken together, they have a suggestive topical interest. They all theorise round the usual vacuous concepts of blood and soil and leadership, but, as if under some common inspiration, they apply them not to the Nazi State, but to a coming European *Grossraum*. Professor Ritterbusch holds that the root evil is the pluralistic conception and organisation of the party-State, which denies and disrupts the historic national unities. Judaism is the carrier of that disruptive idea and Bolshevism its ultimate expression. For Dr. Hahn also Bolshevism is the Satanic, mortal enemy of all the fundamental values of European tradition. " It must indeed be the first time in history that an ideology has with such iron consistency raised disorder to a principle and seeks to achieve it in the whole world." A real European order alone can save Europe from chaos: not an order based on a complex of abstract juristic norms, but on a community of outlook, will and action; nor one linking up States, but peoples, who are the real carriers of European international law and do not need the State as intermediary. Germany has become the standard-bearer of that new order because in National-Socialism she has produced the essence of a positive universal conception, which is lacking both in the democratic West and in the Bolshevik East. (Incidentally Dr. Hahn tells us how superior to the French system of " collective security " is the German system of bilateral agreements, naming as examples the German–Polish pact, the Anglo-German naval agreement, the Anti-Comintern pact, and the Munich pact.) An appendix added after the incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia into the Reich says that this event marked not only the end of the bad old system, but also the beginning of the " European era of the National-Socialist Great German Empire " (p. 190).

The learning and ability of Professor Schmitt inevitably lifts whatever he writes above such crudities. But he, too, expatiates against the empty positivism of the old international law, of which the security of the communications of the British Empire—that is, a sheer *status quo*—

was a characteristic product, and contrasts it with the Monroe doctrine. A sound body of international law must be related to a concrete spacial factor: the Monroe doctrine is the first and most successful application of the *Grossraum* principle, and one which could be used as a model elsewhere; for it contains also a second essential element, the forbidding to extraneous Powers of the right to intervene. (The pamphlet's second title is " Mit Interventionsverbot für Raumfremde Mächte.") The third indispensable element is the presence of a powerful people who can radiate its political ideas into the *Grossraum* and is capable of acting as its guardian and protector. DAVID MITRANY.

25*. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. By The Right Hon. Anthony Eden, M.C., M.P. 1939. (London: Faber and Faber. 8vo. 356 pp. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

MANY readers will be glad to have this volume of collected speeches covering the period from 1924, when Mr. Eden made his maiden speech in the House of Commons (on the subject of air defence), to the address delivered in New York in December 1938.

In a brief preface Mr. Eden is at pains to remove the " strange legend that the efforts of this country to improve relations with the Powers of the Berlin–Rome Axis are of recent growth." That such a view could be seriously held is a testimony to the shortness of the public memory. These pages should certainly go far to dispel it. A. Z.

26*. WORLD FEDERATION. By Oscar Newfang. (Féderation Universelle. Translated by Pierre Gault.) 1939. (New York: Barnes and North. 8vo. xi + 118 + 122 pp.)

THIS book contains a plan for converting the League of Nations into a World Government. The League, it is argued, " at present possesses in rudimentary form the three essential functions of a single effective acceptable world authority." What is needed is very simple. " The Assembly must be enabled to act definitely and finally by majority rule; the World Court must be given obligatory jurisdiction in all international disputes; and the Council is to be furnished with adequate armed power to enforce the laws of the Assembly and the decisions of the Court." This last process is to come about through " the transfer in each decade of one tenth of the present armament of each of the member States to the authority and immediate control of the Council." The second half of the book contains a French version of the same project.

In its disarming simplicity the scheme is a model of its kind.

A. Z.

27. DEMOCRACY AND WORLD DOMINION. By Edwin D. Schoonmaker. 1939. (New York: Richard R. Smith. 8vo. 331 pp. \$3.)

THIS is a vehement and ill-balanced attack on the Western Powers in general, and on those elements in the United States which try to make the American public " line up with the Democracies." While it will not carry much conviction to the pedantic or to the ignoramuses, who, Mr. Schoonmacher asserts, will not see that the great menace to European and world peace is Asiatic Russia, international Jewry and the other enemies of Aryanism, Mr. Schoonmaker has some shrewd hits at certain types of complacent British and French propaganda. But the more responsible members of the isolationist school in America,

such as Professor Borchard, may murmur "*Non tali auxilio*" as they notice Mr. Schoonmaker's free-and-easy way with history. As an expression of long-term resentment of the wrongs of Versailles, this book has some interest. Even on its own level, however, it could be improved. For example, if Mr. Schoonmaker had pursued his researches further, he would have discovered not merely that the French did not pay any part of the cost of the war as it went on, but they did not pay all of the normal cost of civil government. D. W. B.

28*. A HISTORY OF BOLSHEVISM FROM MARX TO THE FIRST FIVE YEARS' PLAN. By Arthur Rosenberg. Translated from the German by Ian F. D. Morrow. 1939. (London: Oxford Univ. Press. 8vo. viii + 250 pp. 5*s*.)

29*. DEMOCRACY AND SOCIALISM. By Arthur Rosenberg. 1939. (London: Bell. 8vo. xi + 369 pp. 12*s*. 6*d*.)

OF these two books *The History of Bolshevism* is a cheaper edition of a book first published in German in 1932 and in English in 1934. It is a short review of events and ideas which went to the formation of the present system of Government and policy in Russia since the days of Karl Marx. The author knew the movement usually called Communism from the inside, and his account of the changes which have taken place in the ideas and practices of those who are usually called Communists or Bolsheviks is candid and illuminating. There is one consistent principle underlying the whole development—a distrust of common folk. Marx, Lenin and Stalin were all consistent revolutionaries. They believed that they knew what was best for the majority of men; and were determined to give it to them. But events proved too strong for the success of their original plans, and more than once ideas and theory were made to fit unforeseen facts. The result, Dr. Rosenberg argues, is a dictatorship in Russian State Capitalism, which has no influence upon the opinion or the policy of manual workers in other lands.

In the second book, on Democracy and Socialism, the English edition of which was completed in March 1939, Dr. Rosenberg shows no understanding of Democracy. After four years' residence in England, as the author confesses, "it requires a certain amount of courage" for a German professor, trained in the conceptions of autocracy, to understand a principle of Government and social organisation which is based upon a certain trust in common folk. The events of the past century, since 1848, are well presented in a summary form. But the field covered is far too extensive for anything more than a text-book. A preliminary section of forty-eight pages refers to Jefferson and the Chartists; and the last section, of a similar length, deals with the period from 1895 to the present. But the writer knows Marxism better than any other social theory, and his remarks upon the British Labour Party hardly indicate an understanding of a point of view that is not based upon authoritarianism. He concludes with the very indefinite statement that "in modern times no real democracy has yet perished." What "real" democracy can possibly be, it is difficult for anyone to understand who does not accept the Hegelian-Marxian ideas of social development. In any case, public discussion of public policy and free criticism of those in authority in States, Churches and Political Parties have to be studied in detail and in practice before any understanding of democracy is possible. And as for Socialism, the reading of doctrinal

treatises is a very unsafe method of discovering what particular parties which are called "socialist" are trying to do. C. DELISLE BURNS.

30*. THE NEW DEMOCRACY AND THE NEW DESPOTISM. By Charles E. Merriam. 1939. (London: McGraw-Hill. 8vo. viii + 278 pp. 15s.)

THE chief purpose of this book is to indicate the kinds of adjustment which will have to be made in the democratic tradition to meet new situations in the social, economic and technological aspects of civilised life. Professor Merriam's work is always remarkable for its clear expression of contemporary social relationships and their implications. In this new book he gives a summary account of the quasi-philosophical assumptions of those who now believe in and work for democracy. But his analysis is that of a scientist rather than of a philosopher. The assumptions to which he refers are such as that of "the essential dignity of all men" and "the desirability of popular control." But the more valuable part of the book is concerned with the methods by which such "assumptions" or principles are applied in the art of government. Some of the defects in systems of government, now called democratic, are shown to be due not to democratic principles or methods, but to the fact that new social conditions have created unforeseen difficulties, the solution of which can be discovered only by experiment. "The incapacity of democracies is 'a lie that has become a legend,' especially with those who half hope it is true because of specially privileged situations which might be jeopardised by democratic action." It is essential, therefore, that any form of democracy which is to survive should be "new," to meet new conditions; and in fact government in all the countries now called democratic is new in its principles and methods as compared with government in the dictatorships.

The second part of Professor Merriam's book, only fifty-eight pages in length, deals with the new despotism in Germany, Italy and Russia. But this section of the book is hardly adequate. The connection between thinkers, like Hegel, and such a person as Hitler, is obscure. But Professor Merriam pays too much attention to theories discovered by brigands after they have attained power, and not enough to the social conditions which made despotism possible. The Soviet form of despotism is hardly touched upon; and the Secret Police and Concentration Camps as instruments of government are not discussed.

C. DELISLE BURNS.

31*. POPULATION AND PEACE. A Survey of International Opinion on Claims for Relief from Population Pressure. By Fergus Chalmers Wright. 1939. (Paris: International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation (League of Nations); London: Allen and Unwin. 373 pp. 7s. 6d.)

DR. WRIGHT'S book is one of a series of studies on the subjects discussed at the International Studies Conference held in Paris in 1937, and, though it is based partly on studies presented to the Conference and on the Paris discussions, the author draws on a wide variety of other sources. He examines the validity of the claims put forward by certain Powers, notably Germany, Italy and Japan, to possibilities of territorial expansion because of undue pressue of population at home.

The general subject of the Conference was Peaceful Change, and the

nain question before the section handling demographic questions was iow far the difficult question of population pressure could be met vithout recourse to force. Since the Conference took place two of he plaintiffs have resorted to expansion by violent means, but the notive has not been, presumably, to find direct opportunities for settlenent, as in each case the countries invaded are not vacant; indeed, in Poland the pressure of population on the means of subsistence has long been extremely serious. The population question in the conquering country is nevertheless relevant, because the conquests were certainly expected to increase the national wealth in one way or another.

In spite of the fact that change to-day is by warlike, not by peaceful neans, the present study is extremely useful, because the distribution of population in relation to the present and potential wealth of national units has been a cause of political unrest, and it will remain an urgent question which must be solved when the war is over, if anything more han a brief immunity from war is to be achieved.

The book is rich in references of great value to serious students of lemographic conditions generally. MARGARET BRYANT.

32*. REFUGEES: A Review of the Situation Since September 1938. By Sir John Hope Simpson. 1939. (London: Oxford University Press, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. vii + 114 pp. 3s. 6*d*.)

ANY person who has tried, on however small a scale, to contribute o the work of the organisations assisting refugees knows how hard t is to see the issues clearly in the oppressive atmosphere of tragedy vhich overhangs such work. Sir John Hope Simpson, in the present valuable supplement to his great Survey, *The Refugee Problem*, has succeeded in separating the basic issues from the fog of emotion—pity, lespair and the sheer anger of the decent man—which clouds them in nany minds. That he is not immune from such emotion is apparent rom an occasional phrase, all the more telling for its rarity; but the outstanding value of his work lies in its deliberately dispassionate emphasis on the essential need not to allow day-to-day urgencies to obscure long-term problems.

In the introductory section of Chapter I, and in Chapters III and IV, he shows us refugee Europe on the move—a hunted, persecuted lood of " involuntary migrants " storming frontiers, swamping private charity, damming itself up against legal barriers until the reluctant eyes of governments can no longer remain averted. In Chapter V we see that flood even seeping into China and adding its quota to the stream already flowing away before the armies of Japan. Four hundred thousand from Spain; 186,000 from the Sudeten areas into Bohemia and Moravia; 100,000 penalised by the Nuremberg laws, from Germany, and some 400,000 still to come from the *Reich*; and literally millions from the Japanese-occupied areas of China; that was the record of the ten months from September 1938 up to the completion of Sir John's present review at the end of June 1939.

Chapters VI to XI carry the story of this pitiful flood into the countries of refuge. The record of these countries varies. That of France, both in money expended and in refugees received, is nobly worthy of a land which—to quote Sir John—" cherishes the right of political asylum as an essential principle of the Revolution." On April 27th, 1939, there were 453,000 Spanish refugees in France (most of whom have since returned to Spain), besides many entrants

from Central Europe. Great Britain's record in financial assistance, private and governmental, is creditable; in asylum, relatively niggardly. The figures of refugees received in the small and closely settled countries of Holland and Belgium are generous by comparison. Private charity in the United States, as in Great Britain, has made large contributions to relief; but her immigration laws are rigid, as are also those of Latin America and the British Dominions. There can be no doubt, as Sir John points out, that humanitarian sentiment in all the receiving countries has been restrained by the realisation that it was being used as a tool in the German game of blackmail—only Sir John puts it more politely. Nevertheless, the names of the States listed under the heading " Countries of Refuge " is not without " ideological significance."

Much valuable information regarding legal conditions of entry is set out under each receiving country, and in Chapter II Sir John deals with changes in official international machinery dealing with refugees. It is illuminating to see how the official attitude had to be modified under stress of circumstances.

Interesting as are the ten chapters which set out the record of man's inhumanity to man in certain countries over a period of less than a year, and the extent to which it has been met by the mobilisation of humanitarian sentiment in other countries, it is in the first chapter of the book that its greatest value lies. There Sir John draws the conclusions which emerge from his acute analysis of the facts in the rest of the book. In Section 2 of the chapter he describes how the carefully built up private case-working organisations have been swamped by weight of numbers, and sets out his own constructive proposals for dealing with the immediate situation. But final settlement is, as he says, " the core of the problem," and in Section 4 he analyses it. The section is only eight pages long, and is so compressed that no summary could do it justice. It is an additional tragedy that the outbreak of war will probably prevent the governments of " the countries of refuge " from considering, and possibly implementing for the salvation of millions of refugees, the long-term principles of successful settlement here set out. H. J. HARVEY.

33*. SECURITY. CAN WE RETRIEVE IT? By Sir Arthur Salter. 1939. (London: Macmillan. 8vo. xv + 390 pp. 8*s.* 6*d.*)

THIS is more, and less, than an ordinary book. It is a sort of compendium of and guide to most of the issues and aspects in the grave situation which was faced by England last summer. It considers the things that required to be done at once, by way of preparing the country for war, as well as the wider issues that should be kept in mind and nurtured, by way of helping to bring about a more lasting peace. And Sir Arthur throws in, by way of good measure, pen sketches of Lord Baldwin, of the Prime Minister and of a few other members of the Cabinet.

The many strands of the argument are woven around two propositions. With her island immunity gone, with her control of the seas gone, the new danger for England, as Sir Arthur sees it, is twofold: one is the danger of accepting a military challenge in conditions of marked inferiority; the other of having a policy so nationalistic as to harden our opponents. Sir Arthur's new book is a carefully considered programme of what should be done to prepare against these two dangers, military and diplomatic. Part I discusses the new

strategic situation in its military and economic aspects, especially as affected by Germany's aggressive policy (throughout the book Italy is mentioned only in passing); the steps which would enable England to meet that challenge effectively, both in defence and offence, are dealt with in Part III. Sir Arthur is highly critical of the recent past. In the absence of a Ministry of Defence, the 1937 re-armament programme was bad, and "what was badly planned was inadequately executed," because of "executive incompetence" and division. Ultimately, however, all these deficiencies can be traced back to the "personal equation" of those in control of policy. Those mistakes could still be mended by industrial mobilisation, through a Ministry of Supply, the mobilisation of scientific and other experts, by laying in reserves of food and raw materials, and by economic adaptation to the conditions which might arise in case of war. A special chapter deals with air-raid precautions, and another with "national unity." Sir Arthur would have a parliamentary Committee of Foreign Policy and Defence, and a national government under Lord Halifax.

The recent history of the League and of collective security is analysed in Part II, and so in Part IV Sir Arthur comes to the foundations of a new peace. He calls for a bold peace policy which might reach the mind of the German people—"our peace aims should be identical with our war aims"—but any concessions must be part of a general settlement, broad and public. He would do away, for psychological reasons, with the war-guilt clause and such matters; he would agree, as regards trade, to delimiting certain spheres of influence, and in regard to colonies he would transfer responsibility and advantages from an imperial to a world basis. There are many other suggestions, and while Sir Arthur admits that the conception behind them will make them unacceptable to the present German Government, he insists that there is all the more reason to put them before the world now, openly and clearly. To that end he himself supplies a draft manifesto of British policy extending over twenty pages.

This is a characteristic piece of pre-war work. It is written by one who from a long and varied experience sees clearly the nature of the task, what needs to be done and how. DAVID MITRANY.

34*. GOVERNMENT AND THE GOVERNED. A History of Political Ideas and Political Practice. By R. H. S. CROSSMAN. Foreword by The Rt. Hon. H. A. L. Fisher. 1939. (London: Christophers. 8vo. 306 pp. 8*s*. 6*d*.)

MR. CROSSMAN'S book deals with the origin, rise and destiny of the modern nation State, and with the theories in which a justification has been sought for maintaining, transforming or overthrowing the nation State. These theories are associated with a series of outstanding figures in the history of political thought, and the forms into which their thinking has been cast have exerted a potent influence on subsequent history and on the shaping and ordering of human society.

This is so with Niccolo Machiavelli, the political prophet of the Renaissance, who in his doctrine of naked power, of the secularisation of politics, and of the centralisation of undivided sovereignty foreshadowed not only the rise of the nation State in its classical monarchical or constitutional forms, but farther ahead yet in its logical outcome in the totalitarian governments of to-day.

Yet another political writer who not only sought to justify the political *status quo* of his time, but also affected the course of later

political history, not least in America, was John Locke, who refusing to accept the necessity of the State absolutism advocated by his elder contemporary, Thomas Hobbes, sought to provide against it by urging a system of checks and balances, a division of the Sovereign Power between legislature and executive which would safeguard the inalienable rights of the individual, and more particularly of the individual property-owner. Locke, then, is the prophet of the *bourgeois* Liberal State, in which, at least in its earlier stages, the main emphasis is laid on the sacrosanct character of property and the property-owner: and as such he exercised no inconsiderable influence on political theory and practice for a century and more after his death. The constitution which emerged from the American War of Independence was based on the principle of a rigid division of sovereign power, of checks and balances in government, largely designed to protect private business enterprise from undue State intervention; and even the France which emerged from the Revolution was a *bourgeois* State conceived largely as a nation of property-owners with little regard for the interests of the landless multitude. Indeed even after the Industrial Revolution, the *bourgeois* capitalistic order of society, with the Government as its official protector, continued to be regarded as the last word of civilised man, and socialism itself in the constitutional forms which it took in Western Europe and America was "merely the translation into terms of working-class needs of the old *bourgeois* ideals." Here again the social and political order found its *ex post facto* vindication in the political manifestoes of Burke, the utilitarian philosophy of Bentham and James Mill, and the political economy of Ricardo: while religion, too, was called in to lend the weight of its authority to the motives and methods of the industrial enterprise of the time.

Yet there is nothing changeless in political thought and practice, and no permanent validity either in the capitalistic basis of society or in the nation State itself as its traditional political expression. Accordingly a new philosophy has emerged in the writings of Karl Marx, which has found its most thorough-going concrete expression not in countries in which a settled order of *bourgeois* society had already established itself, but in Russia, where *bourgeois* idealism had been mercilessly crushed and feudalism remained supreme.

Yet Lenin and the founders of Soviet Communism believed in a political order which should transcend the fixed boundaries of the nation State and an economic system in which production should be organised for common use and not for private profit. And it is the tragedy of the Peace Treaties and of the League of Nations that reconstruction after the Great War took the form of entrenching the nation State, with its separate self-determined sovereignty, more strongly than ever, and the re-establishment of the capitalistic basis of industry and trade. National Socialist Germany and Fascist Italy have only carried to its logical issue, in a world which has already outgrown it, this idolatrous worship of the nation State; and the hope of a new and peaceful Europe lies in re-planning its political and economic structure along lines which will express its fundamental unity. "One thing is clear," says Mr. Crossman in his last paragraph, "the epoch of National Liberalism is over. Economics and politics alike demand both a co-ordinated public control of industry and finance, and a larger unit than the old nation State." It is with this task that Mr. Crossman confronts the present generation and for which he supplies the historical background.

P. A. MICKLEM.

35*. FASCISM AND BIG BUSINESS. By Daniel Guerin. 1939. (New York: Pioneer Publishers. xxxvi + 339 pp. Demy 8vo. $2.00.)

M. GUERIN'S work has been well translated, badly printed, and enriched by Mr. Dwight Macdonald with a sprightly preface, in which he displays the Governor of Texas campaigning "on a platform of the Ten Commandments, Mother Love and hillybilly music." If the reader is not disheartened by this at the outset, he will find plenty of documented proof that Fascism in Italy and Germany was begotten and nurtured by the owners of the heavy industries. M.

36*. GRENZEN: in ihrer geographischen und politischen Bedeutung. By Dr. Karl Haushofer. (*Schriften zur Wehrgeopolitik*. Bd. I.) Second revised edition. 1939. (Heidelberg: Kurt Vowinckel. 279 pp. RM. 12.25.)

PROFESSOR KARL HAUSHOFER is the leading exponent of that "geopolitical" outlook on world affairs which has so greatly influenced National Socialist conceptions of long-term foreign policy. That his erstwhile assistant at Munich has since become Deputy Führer of the Reich gives Dr. Haushofer's views an added interest at the present time. His book on frontier problems, written in 1923–4, and first published in 1927, contains a mass of information drawn from all parts of the world to illustrate the "Grenzkampf um Lebensraum auf der Erde." The text of this new edition has required remarkably little revision, except where here and there attention is drawn to the fundamental "geopolitical" principles underlying recent National Socialist achievements, such as the Rome–Berlin axis. There are, however, far more sketch-maps and diagrams (mainly from the periodical *Geopolitik*) which should make the peculiar phraseology of "geopolitical" arguments easier for the uninitiated. M. L.

37*. STEP BY STEP, 1936–9. By The Right Hon. Winston S. Churchill. (London: Thornton Butterworth. Demy 8vo. 366 pp. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

38*. THE SECOND WORLD WAR: First Phase. By Duff Cooper. 1939. (London: Jonathan Cape. Cr. 8vo. 346 pp. 10*s.* 6*d.*)

WHATEVER the fates may have in store for us, we ought never to forget how one powerful voice has all through the last seven years been raised in warning us of it. The series of his speeches which Mr. Churchill published recently, and now this collection of his letters covering the period from March 1936 to May 1939, form a permanent record of his untiring call upon the country and the Government to prepare for exactly the ordeal which we are now facing. As a running history of recent events, these letters are valuable; as a commentary on our foreign policy, their value is even greater, though not free from controversy; but as a sustained effort of political foresight, they have a special claim on our admiration.

In October 1936 Mr. Churchill foretold Franco's victory in Spain. In February 1937 he wrote of the Czechs as "resigned . . . to the possible deprivation of life, home and freedom." And so on, until in November 1938 comes the mournful sentence: "By this time next year we shall know whether the policy of appeasement has appeased, or whether it has only stimulated a more ferocious appetite." Finally, in April this year he gives compelling reasons for his assurance that Italy would stay out of war.

Mr. Churchill's verdicts on men and motives are as acute as his prophecies. There is an inimitable passage, too long for quotation, on the "Baldwin-MacDonald régime." A distinguished colleague wields "undue influence in the Cabinet as a vague, sincere advocate of making friends with everybody"; and what could be more apt than the "barbed blandishments" of Mr. Gandhi? The temptation must be resisted, however, to quote further from pungent phrase and painted page.

Mr. Duff Cooper adopts the same method as Mr. Churchill, but his record is a shorter one, as it is only a year since he left the Cabinet because, in his own phrase, he could not "accept the word 'appeasement' as a substitute for a policy." Looking back across the interval, he mourns it as "a tragic year of successful aggression unforeseen, of decisions too long postponed, of chances missed."

Mr. Duff Cooper lacks the incisiveness and the consistence of Mr. Churchill. In October 1938 he was pointing out the grave consequences of guaranteeing Czecho-Slovakia; but in April 1939 he was urging the extension of our Polish guarantee "to Holland, Denmark, Switzerland, Greece, Jugoslavia and Roumania." In January 1939 he sided with the Prime Minister against Mr. Eden over Italy; but by April he was admitting that Mr. Chamberlain's "visit to Rome had been only waste of time." In November 1938 he was pressing for a Ministry of Supply; and yet he voted with the Government in their refusal to create it.

On general topics there is much interesting comment. Excellent reasons are given for a reform of the Diplomatic Service; and also of the Cabinet; for how can the Government of Great Britain be carried on "by a score of middle-aged and elderly gentlemen meeting together once a week when Parliament is in session"? Similarly, how can the work of the Treasury be conducted "in conditions which the Ministry of Health would never permit in a modern factory"? But the most interesting passage is that in which the lie categoric is given to critics who suggest that the policy which culminated at Munich was dictated by our lack of preparedness for war and our deficiency in armaments.

MESTON.

39*. THE MIRRORS OF VERSAILLES. By Elizabeth Kyle. (London: Constable. Cr. 8vo. xiv + 345 pp. 10s.)

THIS delightful book, if its reviewer may so speculate without impertinence, was originally designed as a study in the pathology of Europe's new frontiers. But, when she came to the writing of it, Miss Kyle fell in love with the characters whom she had chosen as her national types; and so we are taken on a round of visits to them in their homes, through unfamiliar lands and by unfrequented ways. We start with a glimpse of the old impoverished Hungarian noblesse in their small, dusty castles. We then drop into a mediæval colony of Saxon-Germans in Transylvania, side by side with a young Roumania cherishing bitter memories of Magyar tyrannies. Next we find ourselves in a small Bosnian township, where the old orthodox Moslem Serbs are sending their sons—and now their daughters—to be educated in Paris. Thence we are whisked off to Bohemia, the only dull visit we have to pay; and we end in Latvia, struggling out of its dislike of the Germans and its fear of the Russians into an unstable existence of its own. Throughout the pilgrimage Miss Kyle has been giving us fascinating pictures of the scenery of the different lands and the habits of their

peoples. She brings us home with three convictions: first, that new frontiers do not dissipate old hatreds; second, that without Jews and gypsies Eastern Europe would be impossible; and third, that a new structure of society will have to be devised which will integrate all the warring racial types and prejudices which swarm from Alps to Urals, from the Baltic to the Adriatic. MESTON.

40*. GLIMPSES OF WORLD HISTORY. Being further letters to his daughter, written in prison, and containing a rambling account of history for young people. By Jawaharlal Nehru. 1939. (London: Lindsay Drummond. Demy 8vo. xvi + 993 pp. Maps. 10s. 6*d*.)

THE leader of the Indian Communists has been following Sir Walter Raleigh's example during his periods of imprisonment. His work, however, consisted of a series of pleasant chatty letters to his daughter, which he has since worked up into this massive volume. And they are a mixture of history with the Pandit's own reflections on philosophy and politics. Naturally he thinks more highly of Lenin than, for example, of Mr. Gladstone; but, when his bias is discounted, the result is an extraordinarily agreeable book, surveying mankind from the Ice Age to Munich. MESTON.

41*. THE TRAIL OF OPIUM. The Eleventh Plague. By Margaret Goldsmith. 1939. (London: Robert Hale. Demy 8vo. 286 pp. 12*s*. 6*d*.)

MISS GOLDSMITH has joined that estimable, but sometimes irritating, class of people who are never satisfied with the pace of human progress. The abuse of opium and its derivatives is vastly more difficult to check than the abuse of alcohol; yet in the last thirty-five years it has been strikingly abated by the action of governments and, more recently, of the League of Nations. For anyone, however, who has helped in that process Miss Goldsmith has little or nothing good to say, and one works through her treatise in some hope that she at last has devised a remedy for the evil which will ensure its more rapid extinction. But she can offer no solution, " until if ever, from somewhere, a lasting international and social peace has been restored," and the " cultivation, manufacture and distribution of drugs are not only Government controlled, but Government owned."

Miss Goldsmith has read up her subject and brought together much interesting material, but too much of it is tinged by an enthusiasm which is hardly distinguishable from bias. It is, for example, quite untrue to suggest that the late Lord Brassey's Opium Commission was packed and its evidence doctored. It is wholly unfair to quote only one, not particularly eminent, witness on the vexed question of the prophylactic uses of opium-eating in India, *e.g.*, among the Sikhs. Similarly, there is not a word about the co-operation which lasted for years between India and China for reducing exports from India rateably with the suppression of cultivation in China. And is it historically accurate that " all outstanding discoveries in materia medica have brought tragedy as well as relief to humanity " ? MESTON.

42*. ANTI-SEMITISM. By Jacques Maritain. 1939. (London: Bles. 57 pp. 3*s*. 6*d*.)

THE lecture of which this book is an expanded version was delivered in Paris at the Théâtre des Ambassadeurs on February 1938 and,

with some additions, at the Cosmopolitan Club, New York, in December. In spite of its small compass, M. Maritani's book is a capital contribution to the literature of the subject; it could hardly be otherwise, for he views the question from the angle of a devout Catholic and a profound and acute student of Catholic philosophy. To use his own words, he looks on the " dispersion of Israel in its divine significance and . . . the problem of anti-semitism considered in its spiritual essence." No more conclusive indictment of anti-semitism from the Christian point of view has been written in our time. M. B.

43*. ORGANISED LABOUR IN FOUR CONTINENTS. By H. A. Marquand and others. 1939. (London: Longmans, Green and Co. La. 8vo. xiii + 518 pp. 15*s*.)

THE collaboration of many scholars and experts was necessary in a comprehensive work of this kind, which considers the origins, present position and prospects of trade unionism in France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Scandinavia, the U.S.S.R., the United States, Canada, Mexico, Australasia and Japan. The individual studies are by nationals of the countries concerned except in the case of Italy, the U.S.S.R. and Mexico. Dr. van Aartsen, who writes on Italy, is attached to the International Agricultural Institute in Rome, and has the best opportunities for making an objective study of the place of workers' organisations in Fascist economy. Mr. Maurice H. Dobb, who contributes the section on the U.S.S.R., is already well known for his work on Russia; and Dr. Zeuch, who writes on Mexico, is trustee of an American foundation.

The general editor concludes from the mass of useful material collected in this book that the optimism among trade unionists, natural in 1919, when the establishment of the International Labour Organisation seemed to give an international sanction to the Labour organisations, is not warranted to-day. In the interval the establishment of a complete system of Communism in the U.S.S.R. and of a totalitarian economy in Japan, Italy and Germany has modified and reduced the functions of trade unionism in those great countries. Professor Marquand maintains that though classic trade unionism was a product of the private ownership of industry and the existence of a proletariat, there is still room, even in the U.S.S.R., for consultation, and even bargaining, between workers and management over conditions and methods of work and the correct relation between needs and efficiency as a determinant of earnings. In the totalitarian countries, although a form of private ownership of industry exists, there is not a possibility of really equal collective bargaining even under the machinery of the corporate State as established in Italy. " The necessary adjustments of labour conditions to changing techniques—the solution of problems of fatigue, output, contentment, efficiency, and so on—are made by authoritarian decree. The extent to which these are paternal or brutal, or include any provisions for ascertaining the opinions or reactions of labour, may vary with the character of the régime." But although collective bargaining by labour may not be on an equal footing, it would be an error to suppose that it is nugatory.

The Italian Carta del Lavoro, established by law on December 13th, 1938, provides an enlightened policy and legal equality for the agents of production, subject to subordination to the superior interest of production (*i.e.*, the State). Dr. Aartsen points out that the industrial labourer can only bring forward his wishes through official channels,

and his association, "before backing his desires, will first see that their fulfilment does not harm production as a whole." Nevertheless, though this principle may overrule the demands of labour, the workers' organisations do have some part in social-welfare work of all kinds. If practice does not conform with theory, it must be borne in mind, says Dr. Aartsen, that a large part of the work is new, and that financial means are often inadequate and the right man for the job is not always available.

On the Labour Front, which in the Third Reich has taken the place of the suppressed Labour organisations, Dr. Roll says that, although it has been given certain functions of conciliation and arbitration, overlapping with other institutions created for the purpose, it is mainly used as a "method of keeping together the masses under some central control, and as a convenient instrument of co-ordination in so far as changes in national economic policy involve certain changes in labour structure."

In spite of all these reductions in trade unionism the International Federation of Trade Unions, which originally had strong centres in Germany and Italy, now represents 20,000,000 workers, as against 18,000,000 in 1919. This is due to the renewal of relations with organised labour in the United States. Professor Marquand concludes that even in democratic nations trade unionism is operating in an industrial system more and more interpenetrated with State power. "No man can say whether war can be prevented, or whether, if it occurs, trade unionism and other civilised institutions will survive."

MARGARET BRYANT.

44*. DICTATORSHIP IN THE MODERN WORLD. Edited by Guy Stanton Ford. 1939. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press; London: Oxford University Press. 8vo. xiv + 362 pp. 15s.)

As the editor, Mr. Guy Stanton Ford, states in his preface, this collection of monographs by a number of eminent professors at United States universities is a third, enlarged and revised edition of the original, which was published in September 1935.

An introductory essay by Mr. Max Lerner opens the series. He describes what he terms the "pattern of dictatorship," shows the technique by which power is gained, retained and consolidated in dictatorship countries, and puts forward the suggestion that nature may not be on the side of democracy and that the "real aberration may prove to have been the democratic effort of the last few centuries." Short historical outlines of some thirty dictatorships now in the world follow in eight monographs, and more detailed examination is given to the dictatorships prevailing in Germany, Italy, Russia and Turkey. But one cannot help regretting that for the sake of completeness there is only a passing reference to Poland and Hungary, and none to Spain and Portugal, except in the Chronological Tables at the end of the volume.

Mr. Henry R. Spencer, in his outline of the Mussolini régime, points out that the study of dictatorships in Roman times is a necessary preliminary to an understanding of the present day in Italy and he describes the date of January 3rd, 1925, as a turning point in the character of the régime now in power.

Mr. Harold C. Deutsch contributes two essays on Germany. In the first he traces the origin of dictatorship to deeply rooted facts in German past history, and attributes its chief strength and justification to the necessity for harmonising old and new forces. In the second

the author describes the formation of the "only unlimited régime of its kind in Europe," and in view of its continuing solicitation of the approval of the masses and its one party system he suggests that for the first time the democratic age may have made its entry into Germany. He contrasts this view with that of Spengler to the effect that the present régime is only a transition. In conclusion he hazards the opinion that the future of the movement will depend upon the course of foreign politics, which so far had made for the adjournment of disputes.

Mr. Hans Kohn traces back the origins of democracy to the Hussite movement in the fifteenth century, which was opposed to the authoritarian movement as represented by the four great Empires into which Central and Eastern Europe was divided. He points out the surprising resistance offered in view of the historical facts to fascist and communist doctrines, and he claims that the final result will be fought out internationally, the success or failure of democracy depending on how far an international democratic consciousness is evolved.

Mr. John Hazard, in a masterly analysis of Soviet organisation, answers the question whether it is a confusion of terms to describe the Soviet Union as a democracy resting upon proletarian dictatorship. He does this by outlining the Soviet philosophical approach to the problem of government, describing the historical background to democracy in the Russian Empire, the character of Soviet leadership and the achievements of the Soviet Union. He lays special stress on the claim put forward by the protagonists of the régime to the effect that it is transitional in character, and gives this as the reason for the inequalities allowed to exist in wages and in "individual property," other than that relating to means of production.

Quoting Article 2 of the Constitution of April 20th, 1924: "The Turkish State is republican, nationalist, populist, statist, secular and revolutionary," Mr. Thomas K. Ford deals seriatim with these subjects and shows the truly immense achievements of the Turkish Republic, particularly in the modernisation of agriculture (70 per cent. of the population being engaged in farming), the extension of the railway system and the creation of an industry on modern lines. He explains the seeming paradox of absolute republicanism combined with absolute dictatorship as being possible through the one-party system which Turkey has in common with Germany, Italy and Russia.

Two further essays on dictatorship in the Far East and in Latin America are followed by four papers on economics, propaganda, the position of women and the question of succession in dictatorship countries. The series is concluded by an estimate of the prospects of democracy by Mr. Denis W. Brogan, in which he points out the weakness inherent in democracy through the power of choice, not merely assent, from below between alternative courses of action and its corollary, a weakness in democratic judgment, which is affected by irrelevant emotional associations, fostered by the party system for the purpose of uniting its followers. After a recital of the weaknesses and assets of democracy and dictatorship, he draws the inference that the growing realisation of these weaknesses and of the necessity for their correction will save democracy from extinction, and that whereas "the chief danger to democracy is death by international violence, the chief danger to dictatorships is that they may commit suicide."

A useful comparative chronology is inserted at the end of the volume.

In spite of the possibility foreseen by Mr. Odegard in his monograph on propaganda that the democracies might demonstrate more effectively than they do now their capacity for making the life of the ordinary citizen secure as well as free, the conclusion one might draw from this collection of essays is that dictatorships were likely to remain permanently established.

And yet from the present alignment of the Powers, which does not correspond either with racial theories or with a division into dictatorships and democracies, one must, I think, infer that either the present system of alliances is unstable or that the forms of government are always subject to change and that some other criterion must be sought for determining their relative survival value. Is not this their ability for adapting themselves to changing conditions of life and the fact that they aid rather than impede such changes? Or is it that they favour or hamper that synthesis between thought and action to which Mr. John MacMurray alludes in " Clue to History " ?

GEORGE DE JANASZ.

ECONOMICS AND FINANCE

45*. THE ECONOMIC BASIS OF CLASS CONFLICT AND OTHER ESSAYS IN POLITICAL ECONOMY. By Lionel Robbins. 1939. (London: Macmillan. 277 pp. 6s.)

THE heat which has sometimes been engendered in recent years in the course of academic discussions of economic theory has had the incidental and unfortunate consequence that many people who have not taken the trouble to familiarise themselves with the actual work of Professor Robbins have been persuaded that he is a rigid doctrinaire, hopelessly out of touch with modern trends, and likely to be as ineffective in practice as King Canute in stemming the inexorable movement of the tides. There are, indeed, certain to be profound differences of opinion about the conclusions which Professor Robbins draws from his analysis, and it may well be thought that he pays insufficient attention even to some of the elements which illustrate most clearly the factors in modern economic life with which he is particularly concerned. He does not omit to draw attention, for example, to the cramping effects of the vested interests of social groups, but a complete analysis would spend more time on these monopolistic influences which are so deeply rooted in our social life as to require little or no legal protection to ensure the realisation of the ambitions of those who profit from them. What, however, has not been sufficiently realised is that it is not possible, unless one is quite blind to some of the fundamental facts in the present situation, to ignore the reasoning upon which Professor Robbins bases his conclusions, and this, unfortunately, is precisely what many of those who have written him off as hopelessly out of date have attempted to do, with damaging consequences both to the consistency of their reasoning and to the effectiveness of their practical policy. The main theme in this volume of reprinted lectures and essays is the evil inherent in " all forms of group organisation involving powers of exclusion and restriction." Much of the thinking which to-day believes itself to be collectivist is in reality, he maintains, based on nothing but " the consolidation of group interest." Socialists are likely to do nothing but harm to their own cause if they are too irritated by their consciousness of the divergence on fundamental

issues between Professor Robbins and themselves to pay careful attention to this point of view, and it requires no great penetration to observe already the unfortunate consequences of the woolly thinking in other quarters which, in furthering the modern trend towards control and quasi-monopolies of all kinds, has simply refused to attempt any considered appreciation of the realistic and practical criticisms which Professor Robbins has offered of their schemes.

It would be an error, strange though this will appear to many, to imagine that Professor Robbins's point of view has no relevance to the economic organisation which is appropriate for war conditions, for it would betray a romantic optimism to suppose that the dangers involved in the attempt to consolidate group interests are any less to-day than they were six months ago. Professor Robbins's analysis of the economics of territorial sovereignty is especially timely. "It is not the attitude of federalists but the attitude of those who think they can preserve both liberty and national separatism which really deserves the epithet utopian. It is not international liberals but the *soi-disant* practical politicians who still live in cloud-cuckoo land." It may well be that the criticisms of national sovereignty based upon economic considerations are not only important from the standpoint of the ultimate reorganisation of the world, but also have immediate and pressing urgency from the standpoint of day-to-day wartime economic policy.

ALLAN G. B. FISHER.

46*. WORLD ECONOMY IN TRANSITION. By Eugene Staley. 1939. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations. 340 pp. 12*s*. 6*d*.; to Members of the Institute, 10*s*. 6*d*.)

IF devoted to the improvement of human welfare, modern technology should have tended more and more, by overcoming distance, to increase the interdependence of different parts of the world, and, by the present-day facilities for exchange of commodities and services, to increase the general standard of living of all peoples. Modern political tendencies, with their increasing worship of nationalism have, however, done much to prevent or impede such progress. Such is the main theme of Professor Staley's book, and it is to this argument that Part I is mainly devoted. Parts II and III deal with the problems of progress, the world's resources, population pressure and the advantages and disadvantages of free enterprise on the one hand, and large-scale planning on the other, and how they can both be made to work side by side. In the same way, later in the book, the possibility of carrying on international trade between totalitarian States and those countries enjoying a free economy is fully discussed. "The real difficulty," says the author, "in dealing economically with the dictatorships stems from their political philosophies rather than from their methods of economic organisation. The world can afford to tolerate very divergent economic and political systems in different countries and adapt itself to getting along with them," but not, says Professor Staley, if one set of nations desires to pursue aims of economic welfare, and the other those of military aggression.

Part IV of the book shows how all efforts to promote economic welfare can be nullified if resources are used not for this end, but in preparation for war. The book was written, of course, before the outbreak of the present war, and the wastage of beneficial human endeavour which will result from actual warfare will emphasise all the author's arguments. But when the war is over, reconstruction must take place, in preparation

for which as many people as possible should read this very lucid and instructive book. BARNARD ELLINGER.

47*. WORLD TRADE. By Ethel B. Dietrich. 1939. (New York: Henry Holt. 8vo. vi + 458 pp. $2.75.)

IN the consideration of questions concerning the regulation of foreign trade, industrialists and import and export merchants require to be reminded constantly of the importance of service items or "invisible" imports and exports. The League of Nations in its publication *Balance of Payments* gives the figures for 36 countries. Some of these countries, *e.g.*, the United Kingdom, only give estimates of the items on current account, while others, the United States in particular, also include short and long term capital movements. This book in its opening chapter performs the useful function of dealing clearly with this aspect of the international intercourse between nations.

Dr. Dietrich then endeavours to answer the question: "How much and what type of executive control over foreign trade is desirable?" Four different types of control are described, but the question is left without any clear answer. The author, however, says that whatever policy a nation adopts, it is essential in order to achieve success (1) to define clearly the purpose to be attained; (2) to select the type of control best suited for each specific object; (3) to integrate each control factor as an element in the national policy of regulation; (4) to consider the effect on foreign commercial relations. If this were done by every nation, a beginning might be made in increasing international trade by doing away with those impediments which are unnecessary to the achievement of the policy which has been adopted.

The author discusses the future. There are, it is said, three schools of thought. First there is the internationalist, of whom M. van Zeeland is given as an outstanding example. "Their object," we are told, "is to achieve the maximum of international exchange of goods which is economically desirable." Secondly, the isolationists, among whom the author claims J. M. Keynes but does not mention Germany or Italy. Their aim "is to reduce the international exchange of commodities to the minimum which is needed in order to promote national self-sufficiency without too great economic sacrifice." The third school are the realists, in which class (in spite of the internationalism of Cordell Hull) the United States is placed. "They concentrate on what is possible rather than on what might be desirable. They believe primarily in bargains."

This book is well worth reading. BARNARD ELLINGER.

48*. WORLD PRODUCTION AND PRICES, 1938–39. 1939. (Geneva: League of Nations, Economic Intelligence Service; London: Allen and Unwin. 4to. 113 pp. 5s.)

THIS publication contains a mass of valuable information for the student of world economic affairs. Tables are given of world production stocks, employment and unemployment, consumption, prices, industrial profits and agricultural income. One table, on the Movement of Industrial Production, shows that taking 1929 as 100, production in the United States in 1938 had declined by 28 per cent., while in the United Kingdom it had increased by 16 per cent., and in Germany by 24 per cent. A very rapid and continuous increase after 1932 took place in Japan, whose production in 1938 was 73 per cent. greater than that of 1929, but the most extraordinary increase is that

of the U.S.S.R., the index number of which was 131 in 1930, and 477 in 1938.

Another table shows that since 1929 world consumption per head of population had remained stationary in wheat and sugar, increased 6 per cent. in potatoes, and fallen 13 per cent. in tea, 10 per cent. in meat, and 2 per cent. in milk.

At the end of the volume are to be found 26 pages of valuable statistical tables.

BARNARD ELLINGER.

49*. REVIEW OF WORLD TRADE, 1938. 1939. (Geneva: League of Nations, Economic Intelligence Service; London: Allen and Unwin. 4to. 85 pp. 2*s.* 6*d.*)

THIS volume contains the usual valuable statistical information concerning international trade for which we now look forward annually to the League of Nations Publication Department, but this year a new section appears for the first time, dealing with the relationship between prices and quantities and giving more information than formerly on value, price, and quantum.

The section dealing with the distribution of trade contains the warning that " the natural conditions of production, particularly of primary goods, are so different, and the advantage of a developed specialisation accordingly so high, that more efficient utilisation of world resources depends upon the multi-lateral exchange of goods. No division of the world, however ingeniously made, into self-contained groups could be made without detriment to the majority of countries." Here is a warning not only to the autarkic States, but also to ourselves, both as regards Empire trade and the advocates of bi-lateral treaties.

BARNARD ELLINGER.

50*. STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, 1938–39. 1939. (Geneva: League of Nations, Economic Intelligence Service; London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 330 pp. cloth, 12*s.* 6*d.*; paper, 10*s.*)

FOR thirteen years in succession, the League of Nations has published this Year Book, which contains a mine of international information on population, employment, unemployment, wages, production, and consumption of upwards of eighty articles entering into international trade, the position of world stocks of the principal commodities, and many valuable tables relating to transport, international exchange of goods and statistics concerning prices, currencies and public finance. There are new tables of vital statistics and information concerning the population changes by age groups, and new tables for the demographists dealing with mortality by age groups, fertility and gross and net reproduction rates, births by age groups of mothers—information which will now only be made available in this country by the recent new Act of Parliament—is given for twenty-eight countries.

BARNARD ELLINGER.

51*. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY ECONOMICS. By Michael A. Heilperin. 1939. (London: Longmans, Green. xiv + 281 pp. 15*s.*)

DR. HEILPERIN makes a scholarly and dignified plea for the adoption of an internationalist point of view in the framing of monetary policy. He argues that nationalism makes for instability and that the national interest is therefore in the long run best served by an internationalist outlook. There is much to be said for this view.

There is a happy consilience of interest between nations in this matter; selfishness and altruism are entitled to join forces in recommending programmes conceived in an internationalist spirit.

Unhappily Dr. Heilperin tends to identify the internationalist programme with fixed and the nationalist programme with flexible exchange rates. This identification is plausible but erroneous, and it is greatly to be regretted that Dr. Heilperin lends the weight of his authority to it.

The case for flexible exchanges from an international point of view is twofold. In the immediate period the attempt to maintain fixed exchanges would be bound to fail before very long, and this will be recognised by judicious people. Consequently the attempt will give rise to greater uncertainty and lack of confidence—since the precise point at which the breakdown will come cannot be foreseen and is bound to have wide repercussions—than the flexible policy which can be executed without sudden jolts and jars.

In the long run, when there is a greater measure of political confidence, perhaps only when the trade cycle has been overcome by international co-operation, the maintenance of fixed rates may once again be practical. But then it will not be desirable. For, when international co-operation revives, it will be natural to opt for the more scientific and rational system. The gold standard belongs to a cruder, more primitive way of thinking. Changes in the international ratio of interchange, in the relative efficiencies of different countries, shifts in demand, and other forces will require movements in the rates of foreign exchange, if the benefits of foreign trade are to be fully secured and productive resources to be fully employed in each country. The changes in the rates need not be a matter for mutual recrimination, since the recognition of common interest, on the basis of which Dr. Heilperin rightly builds his internationalism, will make the adjustment of rates agreeable to all parties.

Dr. Heilperin does not write in a controversial spirit. His style is reflective and tentative. But there is an unobtrusive dogmatism latent in his advocacy which makes it desirable to draw attention to the opposite point of view in an outspoken way. It would be most unfortunate if advocacy of flexible exchanges came to be identified in the popular mind with a nationalist point of view.

R. F. HARROD.

52*. CENTRAL BANKING. By M. H. De Kock. Foreword by Johannes Postmus. 1939. (London: P. S. King. 8vo. xiv + 354 pp. 15s.)

DR. DE KOCK, Deputy Governor of the South African Reserve Bank, here sets out to give some account of recent developments and to analyse the significance of central banking as such. The movement towards banking integration has made very rapid progress in recent years: no less than twenty-four central banks are listed on page 13 as having been started between 1921 and 1936. Moreover, we are reminded that Brazil, Venezuela and Eire are the only countries of economic importance without the privilege (or luxury) of central banking, and even in those countries the matter is under consideration. The movement is understandable: on the one hand, commercial banks feel—in a world of political and economic uncertainty—that it is reassuring to have a lender of last resort to fall back on; on the other, Governments feel that well-disciplined central banks are an asset in that

they make cheap borrowing easier. In addition, some individuals look on central banks as bulwarks against any government with economic or social views which they feel to be too progressive. But, taken all in all, the growth of central banking must be associated with the desire to make monetary management easier.

Dr. De Kock's approach is that of comparative discussion of various functions: bank of issue; government bank; custodian of cash reserves; lender of last resort; discount rate policy; open market policy; action with reference to business cycle. The author draws on a large number of authorities and is cautiously conservative in his attitude. The book is a useful book of reference, but it is disappointing that the author's own experience and judgments do not play a larger part. When so many financial institutions are in the melting-pot or changing out of all recognition, it is interesting to speculate what the central bank of the future will be like. Dr. De Kock is not inclined to speculate, even intellectually. Perhaps it is because good bankers are not supposed to speculate. A. T. K. GRANT.

53. STATE BANKS FOR INDIA: being a study of State Banks and Land Mortgage Credit Institutions in Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and the United States of America, with suggestions for establishing similar Banks in India. By Anwar Iqbal Querishi. Introduction by Professor Allan G. B. Fisher. 1939. (London: Macmillan. viii + 248 pp. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

THE title of this book is misleading. After an introductory chapter, the author examines in turn the State Savings Bank of Victoria, the State Bank of South Australia, the Savings Bank of South Australia, the Rural Bank of New South Wales, the Agricultural Bank of Tasmania, the Agricultural Bank of Queensland, the Agricultural Bank of Western Australia, the Commonwealth Bank of Australia, the Commonwealth Savings Bank of Australia, the Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa, the State Advancer Corporation, New Zealand, the Farm Credit Administration, U.S.A. After devoting a chapter to each of these in turn, the last chapter proceeds to draw a moral applicable to India. The material collected together is interesting: this should be a useful source of reference. A. T. K. GRANT.

54*. THE HISTORY AND MECHANISM OF THE EXCHANGE EQUALISATION ACCOUNT. By Leonard Waight. 1939. (Cambridge University Press. 8vo. 191 pp. 8*s.* 6*d.*)

The operations of Exchange Equalisation Accounts have raised fundamental questions of currency and capital theory, the final answers to which have yet to be given. Of special importance is the question of the conditions under which more or less independent national accounts can operate without getting in each other's way. Mr. Waight's ambitions do not go so far as attempting to solve all these problems, but his account of the operations of the British Exchange Equalisation Fund since its establishment in 1932 is nevertheless a valuable contribution to current economic literature, giving a connected account of important events which is not available elsewhere. A. G. B. F.

55*. SILVER MONEY. By Dickson H. Leavens. [*Cowles Commission for Research in Economics, Monograph No.* 4.] 1939. (Bloomington: Principia Press. La. 8vo. xix + 439 pp. $4.00.)

IN this monograph, Mr. Leavens recites the history of silver from the beginning of the nineteenth century to the opening of the Seventy-

Sixth Congress of the United States in January 1939. He traces the causes of the general abandonment of bimetallism, the silver position in India and China, the effect of the last war, the subsequent American legislation, the relinquishment of the silver standard by China and the measures adopted since that step. The book includes full reports of conferences and proposals concerning bimetallism and an enlarged use of silver coinage. The detailed historical description is well found, and is a valuable authoritative record.

China was the last great country to adhere to a silver standard. She was driven off that standard by the high price to which the purchases of the American Government raised the metal. Mr. Leavens shows that the high price did not increase China's imports, but led to the depletion of her currency, which forced the Chinese Government to abandon silver in 1935, and adopt a managed currency. The dramatic story of the unpinning of the main prop to silver is told in detail. The world's chief buyer suddenly became the world's chief seller—a result unexpected by the silver bloc. It would have been a crushing blow but for the appearance of the American Government as *deus ex machina* in place of the vanished buyer. Overnight, silver became a commodity, instead of a monetary measure. Mr. Leavens paints a clear picture of the scene. When politics cease to govern policy, the end of a high price for silver is near. The reply of the silver bloc is to demand a higher subsidy. That, says Mr. Leavens in substance, is what silver Senators have done for silver.

The author concludes, "The readjustment promises to be much more painful than if the price had been allowed to reach an equilibrium without interference. With China out of the market, the industry must find new users for its product."

As a work of reference, the monograph is well compiled, and should prove of great value to students. A. F. ALGIE.

56*. THE MONETARY ASPECT OF THE RAW MATERIALS PROBLEM AND THE REVIVAL OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE. By Michael A. Heilperin. 1938. (Prepared for the International Studies Conference.) (Paris: International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation. 8vo. 41 pp.)

ALTHOUGH originally drafted before the publication of the reports of the League of Nations Committee on Raw Materials (September, 1937) and of M. Van Zeeland (January, 1938), this memorandum has been revised to quote from and comment on both documents extensively. The general analysis is very similar:

> "The problem of raw materials takes its place within the whole network of problems relative to international trade and is not properly speaking an isolated problem which can be discussed by itself. If the question of raw materials were not linked in current discussion with the question of colonies and of territorial revisions, it is hardly probable that anyone would have thought of making a separate problem of it."

The solution advocated by the author consists in close collaboration between the countries pursuing liberal economic policies. In practice this would amount primarily to the exclusion from the benefits of the most-favoured-nation clause of all countries employing "unacceptable discriminations"—measures of "bilateralism," quotas, exchange control, discriminatory tariffs and embargoes on capital movements. Once constituted, however, the group would aim at "making converts" of the restrictionist countries with the help of

credits and commercial concessions. Opposition may be expected, but

"the Group will have less need of the 'outsiders' than the 'outsiders' of the Group. If it remains firmly attached to the principles incorporated in its 'rules of the game,' time will work in favour of the Group."

B. S. KEELING.

57*. RAW MATERIALS: Information Department Papers, No. 18*a*. November 1939. (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs. Oxford University Press: Toronto, Bombay, Melbourne, Cape Town. 8vo. vii + 83 pp. Diagrams, Statistical Tables. 2*s*. 6*d*. To Members of the Institute, 2*s*.)

Since the publication in April 1936 of *Raw Materials and Colonies*, interest has tended to shift from the colonial to the strategic aspect of the problem of raw materials. The new Paper, while based on *Raw Materials and Colonies*, takes full account of this and also of the Report of the League of Nations Committee on raw materials which was issued in September 1937. Furthermore, unlike its predecessor, it devotes as much attention to foodstuffs as to industrial raw materials. As a result, nearly half of the text consists of entirely new material. The remainder has been completely revised to take account of developments up to August 1939, while all the statistical tables have been brought up to date.

58*. DAS ERDÖL IM WELTKRIEG. By Ferdinand Friedensburg. 1939. (Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke Verlag. 8vo. vi + 131 pp. *Rm*. 10.)

THE author of this book (by profession a mining engineer) has already written extensively on mining matters and on the significance of the more important minerals, particularly coal and iron, as international power factors. These previous works, based on an extensive study of the relevant German and international literature and documentation, have been most favourably reviewed for the judicial and objective manner in which he has handled his subject-matter. "Petroleum in the World War" merits similar praise. Dr. Friedensburg appears to have made judicious use of all reliable sources of information. The sensational and the picaresque, which have inspired so many nimble pens and unstable minds, find no part in this admirably objective study of the part played by petroleum in the war of 1914–1918. Such errors as may have crept in appear to be quite minor in character and in no way to affect the lucidity of the general perspective.

The character of the oil problem was not, he considers, adequately realised by the various war staffs when war first broke out; but that, in turn, finds a partial explanation, at least, in the fact that there was then no foreseeing the complexities of the problem which was to be imposed by the exigencies of fifty-one months of war, and the inventive genius of man. In no small measure the war started on lines determined by the military traditionalists; it ended as a quasi-mechanical struggle, in which oil and the oil engine were almost "*kriegsentscheidende*."

Dr. Friedensburg attempts to draw no moral from his remarkable study of petroleum as a war factor, other than that there can be no effective leadership in war without a full understanding of the economic and material background, and that, in consequence, a proper appreciation of the knowledge and experience so painfully gained more than twenty years ago is indispensable to the leaders in any conflict.

A. C. HEARN.

59*. L'ÉCONOMIE DE GUERRE. By André Piatier. Preface by Admiral Castex. (*Collection d'Études Économiques*, VII.) 1939. (Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence. 8vo. xiii + 304 pp. 31.50 *frs.*)

M. PIATIER has written a useful brief compendium on the more important subjects of discussion which have figured so largely in the recent voluminous German literature on *Kriegswirtschaft* and *Wehrwirtschaft*. The topics are conveniently arranged and summarised; one hesitates before deciding whether the impression of lack of profundity with which the reader is sometimes left (especially in dealing with war finance) is due to the limitations imposed by the necessity for brevity in exposition, or whether it is not rather evidence of the radical irrationality of the whole subject. In the nature of the case, it is impossible, except within quite narrow limits, to test the efficiency of the results obtained from a policy of *Wehrwirtschaft* except through the final arbitrament of war, and even then it is impossible to tell whether other methods might not have been more effective. Doubts whether one can properly speak of a science of war economics are especially strong when one reflects upon the difficulty of adapting any theory of income distribution to war conditions. Inevitably, for practical reasons, the attempt must be made to avoid sharp breaches of continuity by carrying over the general pre-war scheme of income distribution. But as the general conditions, economic and institutional, upon which this scheme depends are inevitably changed in the most radical fashion, the practical reasons which are held to justify this attempt are purely opportunist, and it is difficult to discover any scientific basis for them. ALLAN G. B. FISHER.

60. NATIONAL RESERVES FOR SAFETY AND STABILISATION. By L. St. Clare Grondona. Preface by R. F. Harrod. 1939. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 189 pp. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

MR. GRONDONA'S scheme made its appeal in circumstances in which the accumulation of stocks of essential materials was no doubt rightly believed to be an important part of a defence programme, but he believed that it would at the same time ensure the prosperity of the farming community, and immunity from the ravages of general trade fluctuations. He outlines a plan for a National Reserves Corporation which would stabilise the prices of a large range of primary products by undertaking to buy unlimited quantities at prices some 10 per cent. above a datum line based upon the average normal price received during a selected period in the open market, and to re-sell at a price above the datum line by a similar percentage. Provision is made for revision of the datum line after due notice, in accordance with changes in the fundamental conditions of demand and of production; but it is made clear that downward revisions are to be made with considerable reluctance.

The idea is developed with a certain *naïveté* of expression which encourages doubts as to whether Mr. Grondona fully understands the nature of the fundamental economic problem, the problem of determining how available resources shall be distributed between the various departments of production to ensure the most appropriate relations between the volume of the different kinds of product available for use later. He places, for example, excessive reliance upon the maintenance of the purchasing power of primary producers as a

remedy for the dislocations of trade fluctuations, but though it is doubtful whether in any event Mr. Grondona's scheme could have ensured all the admirable consequences which he envisages, the existing organisation for allocating productive resources to the primary producing industries is so far from perfect that his National Reserves Corporation is well worth consideration as a contribution to the solution of this problem, useful, though more modest than its author had hoped. ALLAN G. B. FISHER.

61*. PROSPERITY AND DEPRESSION: A Theoretical Analysis of Cyclical Movements. By Gottfried von Haberler. New revised and enlarged edition. 1939. (Geneva: League of Nations, Economic Intelligence Service; London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 473 pp. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

62*. STATISTICAL TESTING OF BUSINESS-CYCLE THEORIES. Volume I. A Method and its Application to Investment Activity. By J. Tinbergen. 1938. (Geneva: League of Nations, Economic Intelligence Service. 8vo. 164 pp. 3*s.* 6*d.*)

The revised edition of Professor Haberler's book (reviewed in *International Affairs*, Vol. XVII, No. 1, Jan.–Feb. 1938, p. 101) includes a lengthy supplementary chapter dealing with the rich literature on the subject that has appeared since the book was first prepared, and a large part of which itself represents the reaction, both favourable and unfavourable, to Professor Haberler's earlier exposition.

Professor Tinbergen's monograph is the first of a series designed to follow up Professor Haberler's work by subjecting the various theories of the trade cycle to statistical analysis. The primary purpose of the monograph is methodological. A gallant attempt is made to give a clear statement of the method of multiple correlation analysis which it is intended to use in these studies. The statement still demands intense concentration from the reader, but this is inherent in the nature of the subject, and it is unlikely that the inquirer who finds the effort exhausting or discouraging will fare any better if he turns to any other exposition of this problem. A. G. B. F.

63*. TOWARDS A BETTER ECONOMIC WORLD. 1939. (Geneva: League of Nations, Information Section; London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 90 pp. 1*s.*)

The aim of this pamphlet is to give a simple account of the kind of work done by the economic and financial organisation of the League, and to explain its essential value.

64*. THE CONDITION OF THE WORKERS IN GREAT BRITAIN, GERMANY AND THE SOVIET UNION, 1932–1938. By Jurgen Kuczynski. 1939. (London: Gollancz. Sm. 8vo. 92 pp. 1*s.* 6*d.*)

Useful statistics on earnings and the cost of living in the three countries studied are provided. The author draws attention to the comparatively great advance in the U.S.S.R. in the nine years period, but seems to lay too much stress on the comparison, not taking sufficiently into account the very different bases from which the three countries started in 1932.

M. B.

LAW

65*. THE BRITISH YEAR BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1939. 1939. (London: Oxford University Press. 8vo. vi + 249 pp. 16*s.*)

IN the current (twentieth) issue, Mr. C. Wilfred Jenks contributes an able article on the authority in the English Courts of the judgments of the Permanent Court. Professor Gutteridge, continuing his praiseworthy efforts for the unification of private law, examines in detail the "technique" necessary to render such unification feasible. In

what represents probably the last article written by the late regretted Alexander Fachiri, the plea is put forward that the repudiation by Paraguay in 1938 of the optional clause cannot be justified in law. Mr. Glanville L. Williams discusses the legal fiction on which the doctrine of "hot pursuit" rests both at common law and in international law, whilst Mr. R. Yewdall Jennings gives a good review of the acute problems raised by the refugee question and its international law aspects. The present issue, in addition to the topical "Notes," digests of international judgments and book reviews, contains also an important article on the "abolition of British capitulatory rights in the French zone of Morocco." C. J. COLOMBOS.

66*. REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PACIFIC COASTAL FISHERIES. By Joseph Walter Bingham. 1938. (California: Stanford University Press. London: Oxford University Press. 8vo. vii + 75 pp. 4s. 6d.)

PROFESSOR BINGHAM approaches his subject from the point of view of the American claims for the control of the Alaskan salmon fisheries. He is consequently in favour of the recognition of an extended measure of American jurisdiction over these fisheries, greatly in excess of the traditional three-mile limit of marginal seas. The question of the protection of sea fisheries has of late attracted a considerable amount of attention, as it has been increasingly felt that the destructive methods of fishing employed in certain regions of the sea might seriously affect the productiveness of fisheries. On the other hand, it is necessary to point out that the extended claims advocated by Professor Bingham appear to be diametrically opposed to Article 1 of the 1924 Treaty between Great Britain and the United States, which declared that it was "the firm intention of both countries to maintain the principle that the real limit of territorial waters is at a distance of three nautical miles from the coast." C. J. COLOMBOS.

67*. SELECTED SPEECHES ON THE CONSTITUTION. Edited by Cecil S. Emden. 2 Vols. (The World's Classics.) 1939. (London: Oxford University Press. Sm. 8vo. xv + 238 pp.; viii + 306 pp. 2s. each vol.)

IT was a happy thought to supplement the conventional treatise on constitutional law, which in the hands of anyone but a Bagehot is bound to be a somewhat arid affair, by this collection of notable speeches. They are chosen, not for any special intrinsic merit, but as reflecting changes in the statute law or marking developments in constitutional conditions. The subjects covered—the Sovereign's Intervention in Politics, the Relations of Parliament and People, the Relations of the Two Houses to One Another, the House of Commons in Regard to Foreign Policy, the People, their Rights and their Relations, Imperial Relations—indicate the range of material, and the orators include William Pitt, Charles James Fox, Disraeli, Gladstone, John Stuart Mill, Stanley Baldwin and Lord Curzon. The names of those who have spoken weighty words on women suffrage make an interesting team. W. HORSFALL CARTER.

68. EVIDENCE BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS. By Durward V. SANDIFER. 1939. (Chicago: Foundation Press, Inc. 8vo. xii + 443 pp. $10.)

MR. SANDIFER, who is an Assistant to the Legal Adviser of the U.S. State Department, was led to write this book by difficulties that he

himself met with in ascertaining the existing practice of international tribunals in the matter of evidence. The result is to show that, though an international law of evidence does not, strictly speaking, exist, these tribunals have developed a considerable degree of uniformity in their practice. Not being trammelled by a jury system or by pressure of time in the hearing of cases they are not troubled with the questions of admissibility which bulk so large in Anglo-American courts, and are in the happy position of being able to weigh for themselves the probative force of whatever evidence the parties think useful to offer. The practice that has been evolved relates to such points as time for presentation, authentication, communication to the other side, and many other matters concerned with the manner in which evidence may be brought before the tribunal, and it is with the examination of these that this book mainly deals. It will certainly be found useful by all who have to prepare or to conduct cases before an international court. An interesting conclusion of the author is that the practice has evolved naturally to fit the special needs of international judicature, and owes little to conscious influence either from the common or the civil law systems. J. L. B.

69*. CODE INTERNATIONAL DE L'AVIATION. By Francesco Cosentini, Director-General of the American Institute of Law and Comparative Legislation. 1939. (Paris: Dunod. 8vo. 207 pp. 50 *frs.*)

THIS is a French edition, with added matter, of a work which appeared in English in 1933. In it the author proposes a detailed code of law for the air in peace and in war. His method has been to collate the existing national laws—about 250 in all—upon the subject, supplementing them where necessary by suggestions of his own. The result is a corpus of 800 articles regulating air law in peace and 54 for war. The code for peace, which is a monument of erudition, deals with such questions as the sovereignty of the air, certification of aircraft and pilots, international air traffic, customs, contracts of transport, liability for accidents, insurance, private property in the air, sanitary organisation, sanctions and jurisdiction. The code for war is mainly a reproduction of the rules drafted by the Jurists' Commission of 1923. J. M. S.

70*. LA COSTITUZIONE DEGLI STATI NELL'ETA MODERNA. Saggi storico-giuridici a cura del Comitato Internazionale di Scienze Storiche. Edited by Professor Gioacchino Volpe. Part I, ISLANDS—TCHÉCOSLOVAQUIE, of Vol. II, EUROPA. 1938. (Florence: Felici le Monnier. La. 8vo. 458 pp. 75 *lire.*)

The first volume of this encyclopaedic work on the constitutions of various countries was prepared for the Seventh International Congress of Historical Science at Warsaw in 1933, and the second coincided in date with the Eighth Congress at Zurich in 1938. In the intervening five years considerable changes have taken place in the countries covered in this volume. The sections on the various countries are by distinguished jurists of different nationalities, and the whole forms a most useful work of reference. M. B.

71*. LA RATIFICATION DES TRAITES ET LA COLLABORATION DU PARLEMENT: Etude de Droit constitutionnel Grec et comparé. By Constantin Georgopoulos. Preface by B. Mirkine-Guetzévitch. 1939. (Paris: Librarie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence. 8vo. iv + 131 pp. 25 *frs.*)

A study of the ratification of treaties and the extent to which the legislature controls it. Although the book is concerned with Greek

practice, the author makes a more general contribution to the study of the subject by describing the practice in other countries.

72*. CODE INTERNATIONAL DU TRAVAIL MANUEL ET INTELLECTUEL EN 1284 ARTICLES. By Francesco Cosentini. (Institut Américain de Droit et de Jurisprudence, série française, No. 10.) 1939. (Paris: Dunod. La. 8vo. 343 pp. 80 *frs.*)

A draft code of labour law based on a comparison of the labour laws of different countries and of international conventions. The author, who is Director-General of the American Institute of Law and Comparative Legislation, favours the Corporate State, and has a high regard for the work of the International Labour Organisation, on which he has based his book. E. S.

73*. LAW AS FACT. By Karl Olivecrona. 1939. (Copenhagen: Einar Munksgaard; London: Oxford University Press. 220 pp. *D.Cr.* 8.50.)

COLONIAL QUESTIONS

74*. GERMANY'S COLONIAL CLAIMS. Edited from the reports of the Oxford University British Commonwealth Group by A. L. C. Bullock. 1939. (London: Oxford University Press. 8vo. xii + 274 pp. 7s. 6*d.*)

THIS volume, based on the work of a study group of Oxford undergraduates from all parts of the Empire, deals with the implications of the return of the German territories primarily from the point of view of the present inhabitants of these territories, native and European, and concludes that in the interests of both no return should be made.

This book differs from many others on the same theme in giving a brief sketch of German and British administration in South-west Africa, Tanganyika and the Cameroons. Here the argument is on extremely difficult ground, the more so because such studies of German colonial policy as are available have generally been written with the "colonial lie" in mind. When the recorded facts are so scarce, and direct observation is impossible, nearly every event can be interpreted in opposite ways.

No colonial policy is purely altruistic or purely exploitatory, and attempts to assess on these lines the probable effect of German rule on native interests cannot take one very far. The generation which created the German colonies is not that which would rule such colonies to-day, and to predict the actions of one from those of the other is to accept all the fallacies of the racial theory. In so far as predictions can be made, a safer basis would be the general principles of government which now prevail in Germany, with such statements as have been made as to the specific methods of colonial development which Germany proposes to apply. On the basis of the known effects of such principles and methods it might be possible to reach a really objective conclusion. LUCY MAIR.

75. NEW TENDENCIES IN COLONIAL POLICY. With an introduction by Leonard Barnes. 1939. (London: The Pacifist Research Bureau. 8vo. 16 pp. 2*d.*)

76. WAR AND THE COLONIES: A Policy for Socialists and Pacifists. 1939. (London: The Pacifist Research Bureau. 8vo. 15 pp. 2*d.*)

The first of these pamphlets examines statements on the colonial problem issued by the Labour Party, the Communist Party, the League

of Nations Union, the National Peace Council and other organisations The second enumerates a colonial policy for Socialists and Pacifists.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

77*. THE WHEAT ECONOMY. By G. E. Britnell. Editor's Preface by H. A. Innis. 1939. (Toronto: University Press; London: Humphrey Milford. Diagrams and Plates. xvi + 259 pp. 10s. 6d.)

THIS study was commissioned by the Canadian Institute of International Affairs in co-operation with the Institute of Pacific Relations, as part of a plan of study on standards of living in Canada, in connection with the international research programme agreed on by the I.P.R. in 1933. The title does not describe the whole of the contents, for, as a preliminary to the investigation of standards of living in the province of Saskatchewan, which is the core of the book, Professor Britnell has in fact examined the general economy of the province and its agriculture and its general place in Canadian economy. He shows in some detail how, since 1929, the effects of drought and depression have been reflected in increased public and private indebtedness, the depreciation of public and private equipment and a sharp reduction in the standard of living. Before he attacks the specific problem of standards of living, he therefore discusses in detail the geographical background, communications and demographic development, the system of wheat production, public institutions, etc. He then shows that living standards to-day have been reduced to a level which hardly admits of further depreciation without disaster. One great value of the study is that it shows that none of the various short cuts proposed from various quarters for the rehabilitation of the Province is sufficient taken separately; and he disposes of the fallacies that the conservatism or carelessness of farmers or government neglect is responsible for the present position. The limits of individual initiative and the possibilities of constructive governmental action are both clearly brought out. Professor Britnell also provides a mass of detailed information on all the relevant facts which is indispensable to the student and hitherto only accessible from widely scattered sources. M. B.

78*. AUSTRALIAN STANDARDS OF LIVING. Studies by F. W. Eggleston, E. Ronald Walker, George Anderson and J. F. Nimmo, with an introduction by Dr. G. L. Wood. Issued by the Australian Institute of International Affairs, as a National Council Group, under the auspices of the Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York. 1939. (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press in association with the Oxford University Press. 193 pp. 10s. (Australian currency).)

THE title of this book arouses expectations which unfortunately remain for the most part unfulfilled. Respect for standards of living is commonly supposed to have had unusual influence in determining Australian economic policy, and an analysis of Australian standards would therefore be of great interest and value. The first two sections of this book, however, are concerned mainly with general considerations, and the authors would probably agree that much still remained to be said. The following sections on industrial tribunals and the tariff are useful but not highly original. It is only in the last twenty-five

pages that much is said directly about Australian standards of living, and even there some of the conclusions tentatively suggested are so astonishing that a great deal more work on the whole subject would appear to be called for. ALLAN G. B. FISHER.

79. OUR FOOD PROBLEM: A Study of National Security. By F. Le Gros Clark and R. M. Titmuss. 1939. (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Limited. 184 pp. 6*d*.)

A brief outline of some of the more important problems associated with the maintenance of adequate food supplies in time of war. In indicating the lines along which public policy should be directed, the authors have not altogether steeled themselves against the temptation of supposing that what is desirable from a defence standpoint also conforms, by some extraordinarily happy chance, to the dictates of reason in a peaceful world. The intricate inter-relationships between the various factors which ought to be borne in mind in formulating policy are, however, well brought out.
A. G. B. F.

80*. THE DEFENCE OF BRITAIN. By Captain B. H. Liddell Hart. 1939. (London: Faber and Faber. 8vo. 444 pp. 12*s*. 6*d*.)

IN the course of a little over four hundred pages, Captain Liddell Hart covers a tremendous amount of ground. He roams from a discussion of the general strategic position in Europe before and after Munich to the description of ingenious games of blind man's buff designed to instruct the new recruit in the elements of tactics. He discusses the problem of Imperial Defence in the light of the threat to the Mediterranean route from submarines and shore-based aircraft; he describes the reforms in the administration of the War Office, in the distribution of the Army at home and overseas, and considers its rôle in the defence of the home country, the defence and policing of the Empire and in bringing support to Britain's allies in war.
H. P. S. M.

81*. A.R.P. ORGANISATION AND ITS RELATION TO IMPERIAL DEFENCE. By Major-General H. L. Pritchard. 1939. (London: Simpkin Marshall. 8vo. 47 pp. 1*s*.)

The two lectures delivered at the University of London in February 1939 provide an extremely useful explanation of the reasons for which the elaborate A.R.P. organisation was created in Great Britain, followed by an account of the various services involved. The first lecture, which provides the background of the question of defence, of which A.R.P. is an essential part, is worth studying at a moment when there is a certain impatience with the restrictions imposed.

82. THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE. By Robert Briffault. 1938. (New York: Simon and Schuster. 8vo. viii + 264 pp. $2.00.)

MR. BRIFFAULT claims to write as "a scientist, an anthropologist, a student of the rise and decay of civilizations," but there is little scientific criticism in this schoolboyish outburst of hate. Queen Elizabeth, the East India Company, Rhodes, Victorianism, the Ottawa Agreements, Professor Trevelyan, J. B. Priestley, the Old School Tie, the T.U.C., the English legal system, international football matches—all these are evidence of the perfidy of England and her manifest decadence. Only when the British Empire has been swept away will the Golden Age of Reason come. This book is already out of date. It is often unintentionally amusing. I. M. ROBERTSON.

83. **The Evolution of The British Empire and Commonwealth.** By Sir John A. R. Marriott. 1939. (London: Nicholson and Watson. 8vo. xvi + 388 pp. 12*s*. 6*d*.)

Sir John Marriott has lectured and written much about the British Empire, but he has not hitherto devoted a whole volume to it. This book gives no new insight and offers no new interpretation. Its feature is the emphasis laid upon the imperial federation movement of fifty years ago; Sir John perhaps regrets its failure, but he acquiesces in the subsequent development of Commonwealth relations. There is little examination of the cohesion of the Commonwealth to-day. The problem of Eire is dismissed in four sentences: " the Irish Free State is, happily, *sui generis*," and the Anglo-Eireann agreement of April 1938 is not mentioned. Sir John emphasises the uniqueness of the Empire, without considering whether it may not be the anomaly of a transitional phase, and describes with pride its legal unity, without considering the community of interest which alone can give its force to any law.

Martin Wight.

84*. Their Majesties' Visit to Canada, the United States and Newfoundland. A Chronological Record of the Speeches and Broadcast Addresses delivered by Their Majesties King George VI and Queen Elizabeth during Their Tour of Canada, the United States and Newfoundland. May 17th–June 17th, 1939. 1939. (London: Macmillan, on behalf of the King George's Jubilee Trust. 4to. 64 pp. 3*s*. 6*d*.)

A beautifully illustrated record of the Royal Tour; with the text of the historic speeches and broadcasts delivered.

85*. The Character of British Imperialism. By Vincent Harlow. (Public Inaugural Lecture at King's College, London, on March 1st, 1939.) 1939. (London: Longmans, Green. 8vo. 38 pp. 1*s*. 6*d*.)

The lecturer thinks that the most striking conclusion of the Second British Commonwealth Relations Conference of 1938 was that if the British Commonwealth was to continue as such and to perform a worthy function in the world, it must be " a dynamic " Commonwealth, deriving its inspiration from something outside itself. He himself believes that " something " to be the Christian precept to regard the interests of a neighbour as of equal importance to one's own.

86. Empire Problems. Edited by Hugo Edward Harper. 1939. (London: Frederick Muller. Sm. 8vo. 216 pp. 7*s*. 6*d*.)

This volume contains the Report of the Third Cambridge Empire Conference and includes papers on problems concerning migration, naval affairs, Indian affairs, food, disintegration and military affairs. H. J. C.

87*. Prinzipien der Britischen Aussenpolitik. By Dr. Fritz Berber. (Schriften des deutschen Instituts für Aussenpolitische Forschung, Heft 6.) 1939. (Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt. 8vo. 32 pp. *Rm*. 1.)

EUROPE

88*. Undeclared War. By Elizabeth Wiskemann. 1939. (London: Constable. 332 pp. Map. 12*s*.)

In spite of certain signs of hurried writing (which find their excuse in the precarious situation of last summer), this book is a valuable and welcome contribution to the study of contemporary South-Eastern Europe, providing as it does the most up-to-date survey of

recent political and economic developments. Its facts are reliable, and its proportions good.

Of very special interest, in view of Hitler's new policy of lightning transfers of population, is Miss Wiskemann's account of recent Nazi activities among the German minorities in Hungary, Yugoslavia and Roumania—notably the Volksbund of Dr. Basch in Budapest and the Swabian Kulturbund in Novi Sad. She quotes confidential instructions to the Germans of Slavonia, discouraging mixed marriages with the " half-savage " Croats, and again urging them, while themselves abstaining from alcoholic drinks, to push their sale as widely as possible among the Croats ! She is thoroughly alive to the fundamental importance of the peasant problem throughout the Danubian and Balkan countries, and the extent to which it has been affected by Germany's annexation of Austria and Czechoslovakia, with the double result that the percentages of German export trade to the other Danubian countries have suddenly risen, and that their governments were forced to adopt a very cautious policy, lest their peasantry should lose the best market for their corn. She has many sidelights to throw upon the Reich's foreign investment policy, its attempt to control the Yugoslav mining industry, and its scheme of German land purchase both in Slovenia and in Slavonia.

A second section of the book deals with " Poles, Ukrainians and Balts ", and rightly devotes special attention to the Ukraine as the biggest unsolved national problem in Europe in the interval between the two wars. She balances on the whole very fairly between the rival tendencies under Soviet and Polish rule, pointing out, for instance, the reversal of Moscow policy towards Kiev and Kharkov after 1933, and again the failure of the Polish Peasant Party to agree with the Ukrainians in 1935, at a moment when agreement might have vitally affected the course of Polish domestic and foreign policy. Her account of Ruthenia, the little semi-autonomous province which formed an eastern appendage to Czechoslovakia and for five months after the Munich settlement existed precariously as a federal unit in the mangled Republic, steers a clear course between numerous reefs; but it is characteristic of the breakneck pace of European events that even since she passed the proofs, the whole situation of the Ukrainians has been radically transformed by Hitler's surrender of Eastern Galicia and Volhynia to Soviet Russia.

A brief conclusion deals with Nazi doctrine, showing, incidentally, that it is a complete error to regard it as something invented since 1933, since it is simply a cruder and more energetic version of the old Pan-German creed, which in turn goes back beyond Frederick the Great to the Teutonic Knights. In a brief six years the Nazis played the card of racialism so successfully against their dupes in the West, that in March 1939 they were " ready to discard the racialist cry and admit the imperialism to which they now hoped to reconcile world opinion by historical phrases, but chiefly by appealing to the pacifism which they themselves so much despised " (p. 323). No one who reads this book will have any motive or excuse for being duped again.

R. W. SETON-WATSON.

89*. THE RACES OF CENTRAL EUROPE. A Footnote to History. By G. M. MORANT. With a preface by Professor J. B. S. Haldane. 1939. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 159 pp. 5s.)

MOST of Dr. Morant's work on the characteristics distinguishing the various races of mankind has hitherto appeared in learned publica-

tions not very accessible to the general reader. This little book is not propagandist, but it disposes of the view that the linguistic frontiers of Europe can be regarded as racial frontiers. For example, he shows that on the basis of scientific measurements, records of blood groups and other data, the German-speaking people in Danzig are more closely related to the Poles, among whom they have lived for centuries, than to the various racially distinct groups in different regions of Germany itself, while the Germans of East Prussia are aligned with the western peoples of Germany. Dr. Morant finds that the classical anthropological classifications of the peoples of Europe based on the cephalic index, stature and hair and eye colour are of very little value in discriminating the populations of Central Europe, though they enable some distinction to be drawn between the Western and the Eastern groups, for instance. Extensive records now available for blood groups permit more definite conclusions.

The frontiers of the old Reich, says Dr. Morant, roughly represent a frontier based on craniological types and on blood groups between Germans and the peoples to the east and south of them. To the south and east are found clusters of closely similar type with one another, but extreme linguistic variety. Difference in speech suggests a frontier with Germans on one side and the various linguistic groups on the other. "The physical characters make no frontiers whatever, as they show a gradual transition, or bridge, as it were, leading from a cluster of peoples showing close interrelationship on one side of the arbitrary line to a similar cluster on the other side. The peoples of the south-east of Germany form one of these groups, but it is clear that some of them bear a much closer physical resemblance to some of the non-German peoples to the east of them than they do to some other peoples in Germany. . . . The physical characters make none of the clear-cut distinctions suggested by differences of language."

In fact, there appears to be a gradation of types running across the whole European continent from west to east. "An examination of the same two blood-group criteria in the case of all European populations for which adequate data are available shows that the situation within Central Europe forms an unexceptional example of a situation which applies to the greater part, at least, of the whole continent. In general, the peoples to the west show the highest percentages of O blood group and also the highest A : B ratios, while those to the east show the lowest values. On passing from west to east a gradual sequence between the extremes is found, but the fall is not uniform. It proceeds much more rapidly in the west and then tails off, as it were. The distinctions made between some of the peoples of Germany appear to be much greater than those between the regional subgroups of the population of any other country.

The book is a warning against hasty generalisations on "race," and should be studied by all those interested in Central European problems. M. B.

90*. The Smaller Democracies. By Sir E. D. Simon. 1939. (London: Gollancz. Sm. 8vo. 191 pp. 6s.)

This short, and yet thorough study of the democratic structure of some of the smaller European States is most timely at a moment when democracy is challenged throughout the world. The author shows how in Switzerland the practical experience of administrative work shared by all members of the smaller communes creates a sense of civic responsibility and a fund of ability for administration on a

wider scale. He also provides a comparative study of the really democratic achievements of the Scandinavian countries, of the circumstances in which they have been reached, and of the part played by education of the citizens. A very interesting table (p. 171) shows how much greater is the difference in England between the earnings of labour and of the higher professional classes than in Denmark, Sweden or Switzerland. Whereas in England the salaries of a Judge of the Supreme Court or a Cabinet Minister are to those of a street-sweeper in the proportion 35 : 1, in the other three countries mentioned the ratio is about 5 or 6 : 1 on an average. No statistics of the higher commercial classes are given, but it is clear that there is in none of these countries the same disparity between rich and poor as in England. M. B.

91*. EUROPE GOING, GOING, GONE! By Count Ferdinand Czernin. 1939. (London: Peter Davies. Cr. 8vo. xx + 319 pp. Illus. 8*s.* 6*d.*)

AT first sight this book would appear to be a collection of thumbnail sketches. In some of them the thumb is large and spatulate; it takes a whole chapter to sketch the Germans. In others it tapers to an epigram: "The Spaniards have a thing called mañana, which means the day on which they do most of their work." But always is the sketch kindly and humorous, so long as it deals with nations and their history and their oddities. There is more in the book, however, than sketches and badinage. The writer is an Austrian, proud of his land and his people, and bitterly resentful of the Anschluss. When he comes to the Nazis and their Chief, his tone changes to one of telling irony, and the march and methods of Hitlerism could hardly be described in terms of more stinging reproach.

The conclusion is grave and ominous. After all these wasted years and sacrifices, Democracy must return to the policy of collective security. But that policy will again be a failure unless Democracy makes up its mind to fight Totalitarianism, for Totalitarianism will never be appeased. If it does tackle the enemy, it will win, for "Democracy and Liberty are still the only ideals which the majority of people, now as before, are prepared to lay down their lives for." If it does not make a stand now, European civilisation and European culture are definitely, irretrievably gone. "Good-bye to Europe; she was a nice old thing as long as she lasted." A wise and thought-provoking book. MESTON.

92*. FROM VERSAILLES TO MUNICH, 1918–1938. By Bernadotte F. Schmitt. (*Public Policy Pamphlet No.* 28). 1939. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. London: Cambridge University Press. 8vo. 56 pp. 1*s.* 3*d.*)

THE dismemberment of Czechoslovakia without resistance has no parallel since the partition of Poland; and, as Dr. Schmitt points out, the analogy is not perfect, for Poland was weak and decadent politically, but Czechoslovakia was strong. The author asks many and, to an American, pertinent questions: but he would be a bold astrologer who would forecast the constellations of 1949. H. J. COOPER.

93. Διπλωματική Ἱστορία τῆς νέας Εὐρώπης 1919–1939. *Diplomatic History of Modern Europe* 1919–1939. By George Ch. Christopoulos. 1939. (Athens. 8vo. 316 pp. *Dr.* 150.)

THIS survey of European diplomacy from the peace treaties to

March 23, 1939, embraces the author's two previous studies,[1] and covers a much wider field. Unfortunately the subsequent rape of Albania, the attack on Poland, and the consequent European war have falsified some of his prophecies, so that this treatise is more valuable for its facts than for its opinions. Thus it seems strange to read that "Poland had improved her relations with Germany, and signed in January 1934 a ten years' agreement, to which she attached special significance." The Russo-German alliance has shown the fallacy of the Fascist argument, that "there cannot be diplomatic agreement without ideological agreement," and "the vast Polish plains are" no longer "interposed between Russia and Germany." As a Greek diplomatist, the author writes authoritatively on the natural desire of the small States of South-Eastern Europe to remain out of Armageddon. This was exemplified in the Balkan Pact of Athens in 1934, which was limited to the Balkans, so that Greece could not be involved in war against Italy in the event of an Italo-Yugoslav collision, nor Turkey in war with Russia in case of a Russo-Roumanian quarrel over Bessarabia. But since then, and since he wrote, Greece and Italy have a common land frontier in the Balkans. In his account of the new Italo-German frontier on the Brenner, he underestimates the danger to Italy of having a strong, instead of a weak, neighbour there, especially as the population on the Italian side of the frontier for some distance southward is German. Hitler's declaration that this frontier was "definitive" has the value of similar utterances of that inconsistent oracle. The Berlin-Rome Axis is shown to have been "forged on the war fronts of Spain," and the Abyssinian war prepared, as De Bono has frankly said, in 1933. The book is colourless and impersonal, as is natural; but it provides Greeks with a trustworthy external survey of the events leading up to the present crisis, based on published statements by both sides. British psychology appears to puzzle the commentator; he admits our moral aims, but emphasises our interests. The essential difficulty of international politics is the inability of one nation—and even of its diplomatists—to understand the mentality of another. Linguistic knowledge is essential, but not enough: Ribbentrop knew English, but not England; Venizélos knew both; some ambassadors have known neither. WILLIAM MILLER.

94*. THE EXPANSION OF EUROPE. By Ramsay Muir. 1939. (Constable. La. Crown 8vo. xxxii + 326 pp. 7s. 6d.)

WHEN Dr. Ramsay Muir first wrote, in 1916, this volume of his trilogy, its sub-title was "The Culmination of Modern History." Events have belied that hope; and this edition—the sixth—appeared on the eve of another cataclysm. Dr. Muir has been bringing the book up to date in the intervening issues, and he now adds an introductory chapter which takes the story down to July of the current year. He records the failure of the League of Nations, and sketches the outlines of a new world order by which European civilisation may yet be saved. It is to be a federation of States which will consent to their sovereignty being limited in three definite respects. First, they must abandon the right to be judges in their own cause and to make war at their own pleasure. Second, they must pursue a common policy of opening the channels of trade. And third, they must accept

[1] *The New Phase of the Mediterranean Problem and Greece* (in Greek), reviewed in this Journal, Vol. XV, p. 149; *La Politique Exterieure de l'Italie Fasciste*, reviewed in this Journal, Vol. XVI, p. 636.

a common regulation of the conditions under which subject peoples, whether civilised or backward, are to be governed. This is a very condensed summary of the argument; it is an important contribution to the discussions in which we are all going to be involved.

MESTON.

95*. THE NEW INQUISITION. By Konrad Heiden. Translated by Heinz Norden. 1939. (New York: Modern Age Books, Inc., and Alliance Book Corporation. 8vo. 188 pp. 50 *c.*)

IN the preface of this book, written on Washington's birthday, H. W. van Loon says that Herr Hitler may go down to posterity as a wonderful handler of the latest of humanity's weapons—propaganda. "The first thousand speeches had failed to have any effect. But the thousand and first speech did the trick": the devastating thesis that if the same lie is only repeated for a sufficiently long time the average human being will no longer be able to use his own judgment.

November 9th, 1923, is compared to the same day in 1939. Much of the book is a catalogue of atrocities perpetrated on the unfortunate Jewish subjects of the German Reich. It makes sad reading and is a sadder commentary on the development of modern civilisation. The extremes of human happiness and unhappiness seem to be reached under a benevolent and malevolent autocrat. H. J. COOPER.

96. EUROPE IN THE FOURTH DIMENSION. By V. Poliakoff (" Augur "). 1939. (London: D. Appleton-Century Co. Inc. 8vo. vii + 104 pp. Maps. 5*s.*)

WESTERN EUROPE

97. DIE DEUTSCH-ENGLISCHEN FLOTTENBESPRECHUNGEN IM SOMMER 1908. By Dr.phil. Heinrich Hubert Robertz. (*Das Reich und Mitteleuropa*, No 4). 1939. (Bonn & Berlin: Ferd. Dummlers. 8vo. 151 pp. *Rm.* 3.60.)

IN 1931 there appeared Dr. Uplegger's *Die Englische Flottenpolitik vor dem Weltkriege.* Dr. Robertz's aim, on his own avowal, is to "continue Uplegger's scientific work and amplify his conclusions". This he does with considerable pains and detail. But since Uplegger's conclusions were simply that Britain had no one to blame but herself if naval rivalry led to an Anglo-German cleavage, it is doubtful whether any " amplification " of this, written simply in terms of the diplomatic documents, without any attempt to dig down to the realities beneath, is of any use, save as an oblation to Admiral Tirpitz.

H. G. NICHOLAS.

98. DAS DEUTSCH-ENGLISCHE VERHÄLTNIS VOM UMTSANTRITT BETHMANN HOLLWEGS BIS ZUR HALDANE-MISSION. By Alexander Kepler. 1938. (Erlangen: Palm und Enke. 8vo. 198 pp.)

A REALISTIC examination of Anglo-German relations from 1909 to 1912, based on a thorough acquaintance with original sources and subsequent expositions, German and English. A good deal of the book attempts an explicit refutation of the position taken up in books such as Woodward's *Great Britain and the German Navy.* Consequently there is much special pleading, and the book has more value as the exposition of a case for the defence than as a cool summing up of the period it treats. H. G. NICHOLAS.

99*. THE DEFENCE OF FRANCE. By Edouard Daladier. 1939. (London: Hutchinson. La. crown 8vo. 230 pp. 7s. 6d.)

A COLLECTION of speeches and broadcast addresses delivered by M. Daladier as Prime Minister since April 1938. They strike a note of high courage, translated into resolute action in the spheres of finance, industrial relations and European policy. An excellent sketch of M. Daladier's career, contributed by a political follower, portrays a born leader of men. The translation of the speeches is anonymous, and might have been better. MESTON.

100*. AUFBAU UND VERFALL DES SPANISCHEN STAATES: ein Beitrag zur Erkenntnis der Ursachen des spanischen Bürgerkrieges. (*Schriften des Instituts für Politik und Internationales Recht an der Universität Kiel.* New Series. Vol. II.) By Dr. Günther Rust. 1939. (Berlin–Vienna: Deutscher Rechtsverlag. 125 pp.)

AN account of the foundation of the Spanish National State at the time of the Catholic Kings, and of its gradual disintegration from the eighteenth century onwards. The author takes the view that by 1936 the Spanish State had at last been submerged by party and regional factions and by class war, but that the Nationalist movement may now be able to build up a new State corresponding more closely to the Spanish nation and its traditions. KATHERINE DUFF.

101*. THE KEYSTONE OF EUROPE. History of the Belgian Dynasty 1830–1939. By Emile Cammaerts, 1939. (London: Peter Davies. 8vo. xvi + 393 pp. Illus. 15s.)

PROFESSOR CAMMAERTS'S book, which is plainly designed for the general reader rather than for the scholar, is interesting and readable. Though the author does not ignore certain defects in the character and conduct of Leopold II, his language is generally that of a eulogist. It should, however, be remembered that much of his praise is deserved; for few countries have as good cause to be proud of a dynasty as the Belgians have of Leopold and his descendants. Professor Cammaerts attempts to make plain, and not without success, the precise services rendered by her monarchs both to Belgium and to Europe as a whole. But the reader is not always told as much about Belgian political life as he might desire. For instance, more might well be said of the nature and policy of the Catholic Party and of the causes and character of Flemish Nationalism.

Professor Cammaerts concludes his book with a brief exposition and defence of the neutrality policy which Belgium adopted in 1937. His account helps us to understand why that policy was adopted and shows that, given the then state of Belgian opinion, its adoption was probably wise. But it does not therefore follow that Belgian opinion was enlightened. M. A. T.

102*. MADRID: Cronique. By Cesar Falcon. Translated from the Spanish by Georges Benichou. 1939. (Paris: Editions Sociales Internationales. 8vo. 358 pp.)

AN account of unrest in Madrid following the elections of 1936 and the defence of the town by the Republicans during the Civil War up to the defeat of the Italians at Guadalajara. It is written from the point of view of the working class, and the sympathies of the author are with the Communists. H. F. G.

103*. ITALY. By Camillo Pellizzi. Foreword by H. E. Alberto de Stefani. (*Ambassadors at Large.* Edited by E. H. Carr.) 1939. (London: Longmans, Green. 8vo. xii + 223 pp. 6s.)

104*. FRANCE. By Wladimir d'Ormesson. Translated by J. Lewis May. Foreword by H.E. the French Ambassador. (*Ambassadors at Large.* Edited by E. H. Carr.) 1939. (London: Longmans, Green. 8vo. xv + 228 pp. 6s.)

THESE two books belong to a useful little series which aims at the representation of each country by one of its own advocates. To write without bias of Europe has become increasingly difficult in recent years, and it is perhaps not a bad method to let the nations speak for themselves, provided the spokesman chosen is a man of culture and intelligence. In both cases under review this condition has been fulfilled, and the result is a handy addition to the understanding of our own times.

Of the two, Signor Pellizzi's is probably the more valuable at the moment. The British public is both relieved and bewildered by the latest development in Italian policy, and it must welcome any light that can be thrown on the subject. For this task Signor Pellizzi is admirably suited. Having lived for many years in England, he can understand his readers' difficulty and knows the opinions which are sometimes formed of his country's policy abroad. It would have been easy for him merely to make out a case for that policy. But Signor Pellizzi has done more. He has explained the fundamental motives which have determined the actions of modern Italy since her Unification, and which remain the same whether the régime is democratic or dictatorial. Mussolini himself once declared that nobody but a fool would try to be original in his foreign policy, and recent events have shown how subject are nations to the restrictions of their historical continuity. Signor Pellizzi shows clearly enough where the line of Italy's interests has always lain.

By Contrast Monsieur d'Ormesson is more at pains to justify than to explain. He reviews the foreign policy of France since the last war, and is in no doubt in his mind as to where the blame for the present one lies. I would not recommend this book as an introduction to the study of French foreign policy, but for those with some knowledge of the subject it provides food for reflection. GEORGE MARTELLI.

105*. DER FRANZÖSISCHE NATIONALISMUS. Eine Studie über seinen geistigen Strukturwandel von der französischen Revolution bis auf unsere Tage. By Karl Heinz Bremer. (*Schriften des Instituts für Politik und Internationales Recht an der Universität Kiel.* Editor, Dr. Paul Ritterbusch. Band 6.) 1939. (Berlin-Vienna: Deutschen Rechtsverlag. 137 pp. *Rm.* 4.80.)

DR. BREMER discusses the development of French nationalism from the Revolution onwards. His thesis is that it hesitates between the real and the ideal, between the national, *völkisch*, and the international, *unvölkisch*, conceptions, and he interprets recent French politics along these lines, concluding that French nationalism has not yet become fully established. Once it does so, rooted as it is in the sacred soil of France, it will prove a strong bulwark against the *unvölkisch* disruptive influences of communism. M. L.

106*. SPANISH BASQUES AND SEPARATISM. By the Marquis Merry del Val. 1939. (London: Burns, Oates & Washbourne. Sm. 8vo. 58 pp. 1s.)

THE Marquis Merry del Val has produced a not altogether happy compromise—an animadversion for the use of specialists which is also a piece of special pleading. There is much detail regarding a movement which the events of recent months have deprived of practical significance, at any rate for the time being: what one misses is an attempt to assign a place to Basque separatism within the framework of the much wider phenomenon of Spanish particularism.

W. J.

107.* LA GUERRA CIVILE IN SPAGNA. Vol. 3. La Campagna dei Volontari italiani. By Generale Francesco Belforte. 1939. (Milan: Istituto per Gli Studi e Politica Internazionale. 254 pp. Maps.)

In this volume General Belforte discusses the "political-military moral" reasons of the intervention of the Italian volunteers in the Spanish struggle, then passes on to the story of the Italian aerial escort for General Franco's reinforcements from Morocco, and the defence of the Balearics. He later discusses the foreign intervention in favour of the "Reds," the Malaga campaign, and at some length the Guadalajara action. The narrative is brought down to the Teruel struggle in February 1938. C. J. S. S.

108. LETTRES D'ESPAGNE. By Jef Last. 1939. (Paris: Gallimard, Sm. 8vo. 184 pp. n.p.)

THESE notes by a Dutch Communist on the Madrid front in 1937 emphasise once more the tragedy of cross purposes and frustrated ideals which was the essence of the Spanish Civil War. Russian assistance to the Spanish Government in arms and food is minimised here. In fact, the author believes that if the Russians had intervened on the same scale as the Fascists, they could easily have turned the scales in favour of the Spanish Government. The desperate nemesis wrought on Spain through years of ignorance is tragically illuminated by the remark of some contrite peasant boys responsible for destroying the lovely Renaissance church of their native village: "Nous ne pouvions cependant pas savoir que ces choses-là avaient de la valeur!"

VIOLET CONOLLY.

109*. AGRARVERFASSUNG DER DEUTSCHEN AUSLANDSSIEDLUNGEN IN OSTEUROPA: Im Auftrage der Deutschen Akademie, München. Ed. M. Sering and C. von Dietze. 1939. (La. 8vo. lx + 311 pp. Maps.)

110*. DIE FRAU IN DER DEUTSCHEN LANDWIRTSCHAFT. By Marie Berta Freiin von Brand, Ida Kisker, Lucie Roeske, Toni Walter. (Vols. I and III of the series *Deutsche Agrarpolitik*. Publications of the International Conference of Agricultural Economists). 1939. (Berlin: Franz Vahlen. La. 8vo. xxv + 217 pp.)

FOLLOWING a general historical Introduction by Professor Max Sering himself, the first volume contains essays on German rural settlements in Soviet Russia by Otto Auhagen, in the Baltic States by Hans-Jürgen Seraphim, in Poland by Karl Lübbike, and in the Sudeten and West Carpathian regions by Andreas Meisner. One may note as of current interest Professor Auhagen's conviction that in time the Russian peasantry will strive to return to individual farming; he mentions that through proceedings of the criminal court it became known that in 1937 four collectives broke up and gave back land and

animals to their members. The whole volume, if space allowed, would deserve detailed discussion, being a careful piece of work; as is the monograph on women in German agriculture. At the end of his introduction Professor Sering extols the possibilities of the *Grosswirtschaftsraum* which extends from the Baltic to the Aegean, if only the fourteen customs walls which divide it could be broken down and some common organ could be set up to represent the whole externally.

D. M.

111*. A ALIANÇA INGLÊSA. Notes de História Diplomática. By Armando Marques Guedes. 1938. (Lisbon: Editorial Enciclopédia. 8vo. 358 pp.)

THIS opportune work on Anglo-Portuguese relations is too modestly sub-titled. It admirably fills the need for a calm and objective account of an alliance unique no less for its duration than for the identity of interests on which it rests. The Portuguese reader will find reflected in it most of his country's external and much, though not perhaps enough, of its internal history. English readers will probably turn first to the account of the negotiations touching the Portuguese colonies that Germany, reviving her ambitions of 1898, initiated with Great Britain in 1912 in the belief that the Treaty of Windsor, as a pact between two reigning houses, was invalidated by the declaration of the Portuguese Republic in 1910. The English account has been given in Vol. X of the *British Documents on the Origins of the War* (1938), and left the impression that the name of Albion has still a lot to live down even in Portugal. It is reassuring, therefore, to find here no signs of mistrust. "In 1912, as in 1898, British diplomacy sought to *content* certain German demands by means of projects of secret conventions that were far from precise and full of reserves." In 1898 England "was preparing the solution of her South African crisis." In 1912 she was faced with the naval ambitions of von Tirpitz and the Kaiser.

The outbreak of the Great War saved an uneasy situation, and Portugal responded immediately to the fullest implications of the Alliance. There is an important hiatus in Sr. Marques Guedes' narrative at this point (p. 342). The period from the autumn of 1914, when military co-operation had been decided upon, to December 1915, when the British request was made for the seizure of the German ships detained in Portuguese waters, is telescoped by the omission of the former year. The internal situation in Portugal, that the author does not mention, delayed her entry into the War by nineteen months, and in the end it was Germany, and not Portugal, who delivered the ultimatum.

W. C. A.

112*. VITTORIO EMANUELE III. By Gioacchino Volpe. 1939. (Milano: Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale. 8vo. 254 pp. Illus. *Lire* 12.)

THIS cannot be called a biography of King Victor Emmanuel in the ordinary sense of the word. It is a brief political survey of the years of his reign. In this it is interesting because the author brings back the moral problems of Italian pre-1914 politics. We have to put up with the usual decrying of the parliamentary system of government, but when we have got past that, we are made to feel all the growing-pains, the heart-searchings and uncertainties of a new-born nation. Italy was growing up, trying to put off the old life and put on the new. She

may not have made a great success of her parliamentary government, principally because the people were still politically immature and did not feel responsible for their parliament, nor was parliament responsible for the executive. But even the writer holds (p. 57) that through all the recriminations and local turmoils rife under the liberal system the people were forging their own education better than they could have done under the best paternal government. The character of the King and his influence on the army during the Great War comes out strongly. Nearly half the book is made up of appendices of the King's proclamations and speeches, and finally some pages are included from Lloyd George's memoirs referring to him. G. L. VERSCHOYLE.

113*. THE CORPORATE STATE IN ACTION. Italy under Fascism. By Carl T. Schmidt. 1939. (London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd. 8vo. 221 pp. 4s. 6d.)

THIS short study of economic conditions in Italy under the Fascist régime is the fruit of researches undertaken on behalf of the Social Science Research Council of the United States. It is well documented and has a useful bibliography on the subject treated.

114*. PRE-FASCIST ITALY: The Rise and Fall of the Parliamentary Régime. By Margot Hentze. 1939. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 399 pp. 16s.)

MISS HENTZE'S book records in detail the failure of a great Liberal experiment, and it emerges from her narrative that failure was implicit from the first. The men who made Italy could not make Italians. The fault was partly their own. They were drawn from a small class, untrained in administration and with no backing of popular enthusiasm. But, further, circumstances were against them. Italy was unified too quickly, and the paper of the constitution could not patch over the cracks, or rather the gulfs, between North and South. Finally, the would-be makers of Italians were Liberals in an age when the work of Liberalism in Europe was ending and when the ideals of the Risorgimento were giving way before the social realism of Marx and the French Radicals, and the military realism of Bismarck. Under such conditions it was something to keep Italy going. Here, at least, Italian statesmen succeeded—but only with the apologetic modesty which prompted Carducci's gibe :—

> Zitte, Zitte ! Che è questo frastuono
> Al lume della luna ?
> Oche del Campidoglio, zitte ! Io sono
> L'Italia grande e una.

On the parliamentary side the history of the period is summed up in the achievements of three men—Depretis, Crispi and Giolitti. The first discovered that, in the absence of any real dividing line between Government and Opposition, a Cabinet crisis could be resolved by dropping the Minister who had produced it and bringing in any deputy with a parliamentary following. The second revolted against this system and sought to end it by developing truly national policies. After Adowa had put an end to these experiments, the way was clear for the last of the trio, a resourceful wirepuller who could contrive a working majority whatever the composition of the Chamber.

H. S.

115*. ITALIA E FRANCIA: *Problemi Aperti.* By Virginio Gayda. 1939. (Rome: *Giornale d'Italia* S.A. 8vo. 150 pp. *lire* 6).

116*. ITALIEN UND FRANKREICH: Ungelöste Probleme im Mittelmeerraum. 1939. (Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt. 8vo. 110 pp. *Rm.* 2.80.)

117. IL NODO DI GIBUTI: Storia diplomatica su documenti inediti. By Francesco Salata. (Interessi e naturali asperizioni del popolo Italiano.) 1939. (Milano: Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale. 8vo. x + 339 pp. 15 *lire*.)

CENTRAL EUROPE

118. THE DEAR MONSTER. By G. R. Halkett. 1939. (London: Jonathan Cape. 8vo. 380 pp. 10*s*. 6*d*.)

THE Dear Monster is Germany. This book is a form of autobiography of a man who started life in Weimar as the son of one of the Court Officials there, was educated in the Prussian Cadet Corps, fought his way through the last war, then passed from one job to another in the post-war period of disillusionment, becoming in turn an artist, journalist, stage-producer, bricklayer and airman. He could never reconcile himself to Hitler, the man who united the Germans into a nation by giving them an enemy [the Jews] they could slay, and who was going to lead them against the world if the world did not yield to his commands. So he eventually sought refuge in England, where this book is written. The book is interesting in that it introduces the reader to many different parts of Germany and milieux of German society, and is written with obvious sincerity.

A. ROWAN-ROBINSON

119*. DEUTSCHTUM IM VÖLKERRAUM. By Rudolf Craemer. Vol. I. 1938. (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer. 8vo. x + 420 pp. *Rm.* 12.)

THE German penetration into eastern Europe and the conflict of nationalities which this created is one of the most fundamental processes of modern European history, and cannot be too often studied. The great merit of this book is that it examines the process both on the north-eastern borders of Germany—on the Baltic coast and in Poland—and on the south-east in the Austrian Empire. Unfortunately this first volume carries the Austrian story only to 1867 and the Prussian-Polish story to 1848; the most vital part is left for a second volume, which now we may never receive. The author is an ardent "German," but he does not conceal the truth that, once the Germans demanded their national State instead of being content with a cultural unity, the other nationalities were bound to do the same, and so to resent the continuance of the German minorities within their borders. It is not made equally clear that the German cultural supremacy could not, in any case, continue, once the other peoples regained—as they did in the nineteenth century—their own cultures. The book is written in the "neo-Teutonic" rhapsodic style; but, style apart, it is scholarly, informative and reasonably fair. A. J. P. TAYLOR.

120*. DER POGROM. Vorwort von Heinrich Mann. 1939. (Zürich: Verlag für soziale Literatur. 8vo. xv + 221 pp. 10 *frs*.)

THIS book consists of two parts. The first gives accounts from reliable sources (foreign correspondents, news agencies, eyewitnesses,

etc.) of the Jewish persecution. The second gives texts of speeches and declarations on the subject by leading people, organisations and newspapers. Most of the material is already well known, but the collection of the documents is well done, and affords damning evidence of Nazi sadism in concentration camps and elsewhere. E. S.

121*. DAS NSKK: Wesen, Aufgaben und Aufbau des Nationalsozialistischen Kraftfahrkorps. (Schriften der Deutschen Hochschule für Politik). By H. H. Krenzlin. 1939. (Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt. La. 8vo. 44 pp. 8 *Rpf.*)

A BRIEF account of the development of the Nazi Motor Corps from an instrument of party warfare into a powerful auxiliary of the German army. It has paid particular attention to organising sporting and technical training for youths so that they may be of use in mechanised warfare. E. S.

122. STANDING UP TO HITLER. By Geoffrey Moss. 1939. (London: Michael Joseph. 8vo. 314 pp. 10*s*. 6*d*.)

THE author gives an account of his travels in Central Europe between the autumn of 1938 and the spring of 1939. He meets all manner of people, and recounts in detail his conversations with them, commenting as little as possible himself, and leaving the reader to form his own opinions. Many of the conversations are of considerable interest, but the author has been somewhat over-conscientious in his inclusion of trivial incidents and details which can have but little interest for the average reader. A. ROWAN-ROBINSON.

123*. SIX YEARS OF HITLER: The Jews under the Nazi régime. By G. Warburg. 1939. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 317 pp. 7*s*. 6*d*.)

AN extremely valuable documentation of evidence against the Nazi persecution of the Jews. The sources from which the author draws his information are all set out in an appendix, and would seem to be both exhaustive and reliable. The picture he paints of the ever-increasing pressure which the Government applied to drive out Jews from every branch of life and culture, and at the same time to degrade them in the eyes of the people by depriving them of all rights and privileges, is indeed a depressing one. A. ROWAN-ROBINSON.

124. KRIEG ODER FRIEDEN: Weltpolitik zwischen Nationalsozialismus und Bolschewismus. By Otto Kriegk. 1939. (Berlin: Zeitgeschichte-Verlag Wilhelm Andermann. La. 8vo. 326 pp.)

125. HISTORISCHE FÄLSCHUNGEN ALS WERKZEUG DER POLITIK. By Dr. Helmut Lüpke. (*Schriften der Hochschule für Politik*, Heft 40–41). 1939. (Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt. 8vo. 63 pp.)

VON RIBBENTROP'S Russian pact must have caused as great a confusion in German political literature as it has brought into European politics; for in that field little was produced during recent years that was not in a direct or an indirect way connected with anti-Bolshevist and anti-Russian propaganda. *Krieg oder Frieden* is no exception to this rule. Peace, in Otto Kriegk's interpretation, means the victory of the new "revolution"; short of this victory, the struggle, by bloodless or by military means, must go on between the heirs of the French revolution of 1789 and the powers of the revolution of the

twentieth century, the Fascist States. Herr Kriegk, a journalist of some standing in Germany, expounds with vigour the official thesis that materialism constitutes the Semitic, liberal-socialist, possessive outlook, and that it is fighting a losing battle against idealism of the aryan, national, heroic and creative kind. His book abounds in fantastic pseudo-historical explanations; for example, the early migration of Germanic tribes to the south and south-east of Europe had "nothing to do with predatory instincts," but was a movement of *defence* against the thrust ("Vorstoss") coming from the commercially minded Semitic Byzantines, whose tradition was later continued by the hierarchy of the "almost Semitic" and Pan-Slav Russian Orthodox Church (p. 132).

Herr Kriegk's book, at least, does not make the pretence of being a scientific work; and it is written in the style of a fairly educated journalist. Dr. Lüpke's small work, on the other hand, which deals with faked documents and their influence on the course of history, and which lays claim to be a strictly scholarly study, is merely a superficial pamphlet, fanatically biased, and written in the style of the *Völkischer Beobachter*. E. A. ALPORT.

126*. DEUTSCHLANDS AUSSENPOLITIK 1933–1939. By Axel, Freiherr von Freytagh-Loringhoven. 1939. (Berlin: Otto Stollberg. 8vo. 228 pp. *Rm.* 4.25.)

THE temper in which this account of the foreign policy of the Third Reich is written is perhaps sufficiently indicated in the preface, where the writer maintains that Germany has acted in full accordance with international law during this period. "No German need keep silence under the reproach of broken law. It is Germany which has to complain of the injustice and violence she has suffered for fifteen hard years. Her resurrection has been fought for with the weapons of justice, and there is no blot on the scutcheon of her honour . . . it is the duty of a German not only to be convinced of the justice and right of the acts of his leaders, but to defend this conception, whenever it is called in question." M. B.

127*. GERMANY'S WAR CHANCES: as pictured in German Official Literature. By Ivan Lajos, 1939. (London: Victor Gollancz. 8vo. 160 pp. 3*s.* 6*d.*)

DR. LAJOS' book is valuable because the facts given are taken from official Nazi sources. He exposes at some length the deficiencies of the German army, especially in trained men, the acute shortage of man-power in agriculture, and the general position in raw materials and supplies. M. B.

128*. DEUTSCHLANDS KRIEGSBEREITSCHAFT UND KRIEGSAUSSICHTEN? By Miles. 1939. (Zurich: Europa Verlag. 8vo. 149 pp. *Sw. fr.* 4.)

THE author attempts to estimate the military and economic position of the Reich and its ability to face war against a first-class Power, basing his conclusions on authoritative statements made by German authorities. He deals in turn with the questions of food supply, of war material, of oil supplies, of raw materials and of the German financial position, of the importance of any turn taken by German-American relations and finally with the morale of the German people. M. B.

129*. THE UNEXPURGATED MEIN KAMPF. By Herbert L. Stewart. 1939. (Reprinted from the *University of Toronto Quarterly*, Vol. VIII, No. 4.)

130*. KARL MARX, FRIEDRICH ENGELS, AND THE SOUTH SLAVIC PROBLEM IN 1848–9. By H. Malcolm Macdonald. 1939. (Reprinted from the *University of Toronto Quarterly*. Vol. VIII, No. 4.)

THE first of these reprints is on a familiar theme. The second is an illuminating study of the hostile attitude taken by the founders of modern Socialism towards the national awakening of the Czechs, the Slavonians and the Southern Slavs.

131*. THE NEW GERMAN EMPIRE. Colonies? Raw Materials? Trade Routes? Outlets for Population? Or World Domination. By Dr. F. Borkenau. 1939.

132* GERMANY, WHAT NEXT? Edited by Richard Keane. 1939.

133*. WHAT HITLER WANTS. By E. O. Lorimer. 1939.

134*. I WAS HITLER'S PRISONER. By Stefan Lorant. Translated from the German by James Cleugh. 1939.

135* THE ATTACK FROM WITHIN. The Modern Technique of Aggression. By F. Elwyn Jones. 1939. (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, Ltd. (Penguin Specials.) Small 8vo. 6*d*. each.)

THESE "Penguin Specials" on Germany cover a large field. All were written before the outbreak of war. Dr. Borkenau's book is a study of Germany's "expansion." He believes that however cleverly Germany may use the interests and ambitions of others for the disintegration of her adversaries, she is incapable of any imperial policy other than one of exploitation and oppression, and that, even if the challenge succeeded the end would be in sight, because of her inherent instability. *Germany, What Next?* is a collection of papers by experts on individual aspects of German ambitions. Mrs. Lorimer's book provides a summary of the main points in *Mein Kampf* and Rosenberg's *Der Mythus des 20, Jahrhunderts*; she also gives the official party programme, together with an important correction by Hitler of the "interpretation" of the land policy there laid down; and a summary of Ewald Banse's *Raum und Volk*, including a map for the invasion of England in the "war after next," when Europe has been subjugated. Banse's books were banned, but they remain available for military students. *I Was Hitler's Prisoner* is a reprint of the story first published in 1935. Mr. Elwyn Jones's study of the modern technique of aggression, and especially of the utilisation of German residents abroad for purposes of undermining public opinion, sabotage and espionage is obviously of great topical interest. M. B.

136*. INSIDE GERMANY. By Albert C. Grzesinski. Translated by Alexander S. Lipschitz. 1939. (New York: E. P. Dutton. 8vo. 374 pp. $3.50.)

137*. L'UNITE ALLEMANDE, 1806–1938. By Pierre Benaerts. 1939. (Paris: Collection Armand Colin. sm. 8vo. 222 pp. Frs. 15.)

138*. THE TREATY OF BREST-LITOVSK AND GERMANY'S EASTERN POLICY. By John W. Wheeler-Bennett. 1939. (Oxford University Press. 8vo. 32 pp. 3*d*.)

THIS booklet, in the series of Oxford Pamphlets on World Affairs, was issued before the German and Russian invasion of Poland. It is

a description by a recognised expert of what happened at Brest-Litovsk in 1918, and shows that, besides its influence on the international situation at the time the political implications of the treaty are important to-day. Mr. Wheeler-Bennett points out that as early as 1920 the Weimar Republic, supported by the majority opinion on the German General Staff represented by General von Seeckt, sought to reach a *rapprochement* with the Soviet Union, and largely succeeded in doing so by the Treaty of Rapallo, the German-Russian Non-Aggression Treaty, and the Military Agreement of April 3rd, 1922. There remained, however, a minority school of thought which followed in the Hoffmann tradition, regarding Bolshevism as the root of all evil, and dreaming of the "ultimate realisation of those far-reaching plans for German expansion in Eastern Europe which so sadly eluded them after Brest-Litovsk." For those who have not both the opportunity and the leisure to read Mr. Wheeler-Bennett's larger work on *Brest Litovsk: The Forgotten Peace, March 1918*, this brief statement is extremely useful. M. B.

139*. AUSTRIA, 1918–1938. By Captain Malcolm Bullock. 1939. (London: Macmillan. 319 pp. 8*s*. 6*d*.)

THIS short history of Austria's twenty years of "independence" has considerable merits. Much more detached and balanced than most recent books on Austria, it leaves the impression that the author is genuinely trying to write history rather than to plead a case. It is also, to a remarkable degree, independent of other books on the same subject. The author's general judgment on the main events is sound, particularly when he writes that February 1934 was the real end of Austria. For defects, it has much too little of the background really necessary to understand the story; it is not always well arranged; not always accurate in detail; and sometimes omits important points. To take a few examples: it is incorrect to say (p. 149) that Seipel in 1922 went to Rome, was offered a Customs Union between Austria and Italy, and refused it. In reality, he went to Verona, offered the Union, and had it refused. The famous Wohnbausteuer is never mentioned. It is by no means true that the Hirtenberg affair was a storm in a teacup (p. 236). The way in which the Austrian Government gradually slipped into dependence on Austria's hereditary enemy, Italy, is not clearly brought out. C. A. MACARTNEY.

140*. L'UKRAINE TERRE RUSSE. By Pierre Brégy and Prince Serge Obolensky. 1939. (Paris: Gallimard. Sm. 8vo. 239 pp. 28 *frs*.)

THIS book contains many useful facts, figures, and descriptions, derived from wide reading and first-hand experience. It possesses the additional merit of a frank theme calling for Polish cessions, in order to build genuine Slav bulwarks against German pressure.

The authors give with admirable clarity the origins of Ukrainian nationalism—how the natural sentiments of the inhabitants of a country which was once more cultured than Moscow were employed by the Austrian and German governments as a bulwark against Pan-Slav pressure in Galicia.

If Stalin is genuine Marxist, Polish concessions are simply the prelude to anarchy in Central Europe. If, however, he is "but old Tsar writ large," the way is cleared for Russian Imperialist expansionism.

The reader would have welcomed a clue to this dilemma from authors of such experience. GUY MICKLETHWAIT.

141*. LA DÉFENSE DE LA SUISSE EN CAS D'INVASION. By Max Barthell in collaboration with E. T. Rimli. 1939. (Paris: Payot. 8vo. 183 pp. Illus. 20 *frs.*)

THE comprehensive series of publications—*Collection de Documents et de Témoignages pour servir à l'Histoire de notre temps*—is not confined to episodes in the campaigns of France and her Allies.

After reviewing the strategic position of Switzerland, the author proceeds to a short geographical description, and, by way of a discussion upon the relative merits of a militia or a standing army, to the question of military training. Short chapters follow on totalitarian war, mobilisation, minor operations, a winter and mountain campaign, motorisation and aerial warfare. After a short consideration of some aspects of the economy of war, the book is brought to a close with a chapter on moral defence. The defence of Switzerland is based upon the determination of the people to resist every aggressor in all circumstances and at whatever price.

The book is of considerable interest in that it deals with an original problem—one with which soldiers of the great military nations are but rarely confronted. It is the defence of a mountainous region surrounded by heavily armed potential combatants.

H. J. COOPER.

142*. THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA. By G. J. George. With Preface by Edgar Amel Mowrer. 1939. (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, Ltd. 186 pp. 6*d.*)

THE author is a Czech, and the name George a nom de plume. He tells a tragic and now familiar tale, and at the end provides some useful material for students by a parallel statement of the interviews at Berchtesgaden, Godesberg and Munich, and by an appendix giving a chronology of the crisis of August–October 1938.

143*. DIE PARTEI DER FREIHEIT. By Curt Geyer. 1939. (Paris: Verlagsanstalt Graphia. La. 8vo. 70 pp. 10 *frs.*)

THE publication includes a critical appreciation from the Social Democratic point of view, of the late Otto Bauer's posthumous work *Die illegale Partei*. It also surveys the ideas in the ranks of the Social-Democratic Party of Germany since the advent of Hitler.

SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE

144*. THE EASTERN QUESTION REVIVED. Bulgar Claims on Rumania. By Robert Machray. 1939. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. Paper. 39 pp. 1*s.*)

AN essay giving the origins of the claim of Bulgaria to the Southern Dobruja and suggesting an exchange of populations as a way out of the difficulty.

145*. LES BULGARES DE LA VOLGA ET LES SLAVES DU DANUBE: Le problème des races et les barbares. By Christian Gerard. 1939. (Paris: Maisonneuve. 8vo. 294 pp.)

NOWHERE has medieval history such an influence upon modern politics as in the Balkans; consequently this volume, which covers

the period between 679, when the Bulgarians of the Volga crossed the Danube, and 893, when the National Assembly made Slav their official language and moved their capital from Pliska to Preslav, explains the origin of Bulgaria's attitude to her neighbours and other States to-day. The author makes no claim " to write for specialists"; but, basing his book on such standard works as those of Zlatarski, Vasiliev and Runciman, completed by the recent studies of Dvornik and the excavations at Pliska, he has composed it by the light of modern scholarship. After an introduction tracing the history and origin of the Bulgarians of the Volga, whom he considers to have been Huns, not Finns, and whose division into two tribal groups facilitated the task of Byzantine diplomacy, he shows how they entered the Balkans by way of the Dobrudja (which the Bulgarians claim to-day), and gave their name to their present country, adopting the language of the Slav inhabitants, just as the Norman conquerors of England gradually adopted that of their subjects. Bulgarian diplomacy played off rival Great Powers and Pontiffs, the Pope and the Patriarch, against one another, and the author finds medieval precedents for the *Drang nach Osten*, stopped by Krum, in whom Grégoire found the original of Shakespeare's Prospero. A curious parallel with modern orientations is Serbian assistance to the Greek Empire in preventing Bulgarian access to the Aegean in 840. Much space is devoted to the conversion of the Bulgarians under Boris, whose " reign dominates the history of the Bulgaro-Slav State," in which the Bulgarian-Hun aristocracy was finally merged in the Slavonic masses, the nomads in the agriculturists. Certain physical and moral characteristics of the present Bulgarians are traced to their namesakes of the Volga, though few words of their original language survive. In conclusion the author briefly traces the liberation of modern Bulgaria, first from the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Greek Patriarch in 1870, a thousand years after Boris, then from the political domination of Turkey in 1878 and 1885. He ends with the Pact of Salonika of 1938, but admits that the subsequent European crisis has made its results doubtful. A map and full bibliography complete the volume. Ashburner was not " English," but American; " 637–643 " should be 837–843 (pp. 121, 178). WILLIAM MILLER.

146*. BULGARIAN CONSPIRACY. By J. Swire. 1939. (London: Robert Hale, Ltd. 356 pp. Illus. 2 maps. 12*s*. 6*d*.)

THE author of this book was a newspaper correspondent in Bulgaria from 1932 to 1935, and has carried out extended researches into the authorities on the revolutionary organisations in Macedonia. His book is a contribution to the history of the Macedonian organisations and their activities, and their political relations between the countries immediately concerned.

147*. SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE: A Political and Economic Survey. Prepared by the Information Department of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, in collaboration with the London and Cambridge Economic Service. 1939. (London: Oxford University Press. 8vo. xv + 203 pp. 5*s*.)

IN conjunction with the London and Cambridge Economic Service the Royal Institute of International Affairs has published this book, which is a political and economic review of the development in the

Danube basin and on the Balkans from the conclusion of the Great War to Italy's occupation of Albania on April 7th, 1939.

The book is divided into three parts, of which the first deals with the foreign policy development, particularly the period after 1933. An interesting point in this part is the description of the attempt made by the Germans and Italians to form a bloc which would act as a counterweight on each other's attempt to dominate the Balkans. The second part of the book describes the development of internal politics in the different countries, which in later years has been strongly influenced by Germany. The most important part, however, is the last, which deals with the economic development. In this part the authors managed to collect a lot of material to illustrate the economic influence of the various Great Powers. In particular, Germany's economic expansion is extensively dealt with, and the authors point out that development so far has in many respects been to the advantage of the Southern European countries, since Germany has not exploited her leading position as much as might be expected. The German-Roumanian trade agreement of March 23rd, 1939, appears, however, to contain a change in this respect. A. H. H.

148a*. DIE EISERNE GARDE : *Eine Darstellung der Völkischen Erneuerungsbewegung in Rumänien.* By Dr. Klaus Charlé. (*Schriften des Instituts für Politik und Internationales Recht an der Universität, Kiel.* Hsg. Dr. Paul Ritterbuch, Bd. 3). 1939. (Berlin-Vienna : Deutsches Rechtsverlag. 8vo. 111 pp. *Rm.* 4.50.)

THE objectivity of Dr. Charlé's account of the Iron Guard can be measured by the fact that it derives largely from Codreanu's own book, *Pentru legionari.* He argues away Codreanu's foreign descent, and presents his movement as intensely idealistic; Iron Guardism is marked off from Fascism and National Socialism by its religious character; it is the only political movement within a religious framework.
E. WISKEMANN.

148b*. INVITATION TO ROUMANIA. By Derek Patmore. 1939. (London : Macmillan. 8vo. xii + 157 pp. Illus. 10s. 6*d.*)

THE obvious sincerity of this appreciation of Roumania is attractive, but it is also a little misleading to anyone who wishes to obtain a wholly truthful picture. It is not suggested that Mr. Patmore presumes to write an exhaustive study; true, he covered a great deal of ground, exploring Bucharest, the Regat and Transylvania, but for the most part he stayed in the "big houses," and gives a leisured impression of their atmosphere. The air of those boyars' houses is subtly fascinating, the people are very kind, combining simplicity with wealth, their conversation is cultured and witty, and, more often than not, nostalgic; they belong to more spacious days. But even in these people there is that same core of vitality which is so powerful in the great peasant population; it runs right through the country, inspiring men of all classes who have lived off the soil and have fought for centuries to defend it. The sense of Roumania's beauty is in this book, but not that of her aliveness. The photographs are very fine. W. E. B.

NORTH-EASTERN EUROPE

149*. THE SCANDINAVIAN STATES AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS. By S. Shepard Jones. 1939. (New York: Princeton University Press, American Scandinavian Foundation; London: Oxford University Press. 8vo. xvi + 298 pp. 14s.)

IN view of the present state of affairs, this book makes sad reading. Everyone knows the great work of the Scandinavian States as active members of the League of Nations, and Mr. Shepard Jones has provided us with an excellent study of this subject. He has made use of all available sources of reference, and appends a long and valuable bibliography.

The author is not unbiased against the "Great Powers" when he comes to the fundamental problem of the constitution of the League, or of any such league. Should representation be on a basis of equality, or on a proportional basis, and, if the latter method is selected, by whom and how are the proportions to be decided? This problem of equality as against an ordered and recognised inequality is as insoluble among States as among individuals, and Mr. Shepard Jones' book provides only a confirmation of this view.

Chapter *XIII* is of particular interest in connection with present-day affairs, dealing with the Åland question, mandates under the League, and minorities, as well as the Corfu and Manchurian incidents and the Italo-Ethiopian conflict. S. ENGELSTED.

150*. SWEDEN: A modern Democracy on Ancient Foundations. By Nils Herlitz. 1939. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press; London: Humphrey Milford. 8vo. xiii + 127 pp. 9s.)

"THAT consciousness of common interest, which is the indispensable basis of a sound national life, was created in Sweden in times of war and difficulties, not by the command of a powerful monarch, but by the common work of free men." From the early fifteenth century the Riksdag was summoned at frequent intervals and from the end of the sixteenth century the peasants were elected by popular vote amongst their own number, one for each hundred. At no period even in modern times has any particular section of the people monopolised the Riksdag. Obstruction is unknown and on the whole the Riksdag enjoys universal respect and it would be unfair to say that private interests are placed above the common good. The book contains some slight mistakes in regard to English institutions. An important book.

ANNA STURGE.

151*. REFORMER OCH FORSVAR. (Reforms and Defence). By Åke Thulstrup. 1939. (Stockholm: Orientering i aktuella Ämnen (Albert Bonnier). 8vo. 228 pp. *Kr.* 4.75; bound, *Kr.* 6.25.)

THIS book is an outline of Sweden's history from 1920 to 1937 with particular emphasis on the influence which events in greater Europe had on her internal developments and foreign policy.

It is perhaps regrettable that the author has not added a supplementary chapter giving an up-to-date review of the civil and military measures taken by Sweden to defend her neutrality in case of a world war. The particulars on Swedish defence are very scanty, and in view of the present international situation some more information on this subject would greatly enhance the value of this otherwise very informative book. A. H. HICKS.

152*. MODERN SWEDEN, as seen by an Englishwoman. By Cicely Hamilton. 1939. (London: Dent. 8vo. xii + 226 pp. Illus. 7*s*. 6*d*.)

QUITE a number of books have been published on Sweden in recent years so that it is all the more to Miss Hamilton's credit that she has succeeded in throwing a good deal of fresh light on her subject. There is a slight lack of continuity in her book, but perhaps this adds to its fascination.

I found her chapters on "Own Homes" and on the "City and the Co-operative" of particular interest, as they contained many observations which previous writers on Sweden have not touched upon. Her chapter "concerning edibles" in which she mentions the quite incredible irregularity of Swedish mealtimes is well observed and amusing and will be substantiated by anybody who has had similar experiences. She concludes her book with a short review of the outstanding points in Sweden's history, with particular emphasis on the fine part played by that country in the Great War in alleviating the suffering of the stricken peoples of Europe. A. H. HICKS.

153*. ASPECTS DE LA FINLANDE. By Henry de Chambon. 1939. (Paris: Editions de la Revue Parlementaire. 8vo. 248 pp. Illus. Map. 30 *frs*.)

THIS book leaves the reader free to draw his own conclusions from facts compiled with diligence. The most interesting chapters are perhaps those dealing with the gradual establishment of Finland as an independent State. In 1809, when Sweden lost Finland to Russia, Finland became an autonomous Grand Duchy under Russian rule, and remained in this state until 1914. That year saw a great revival of national consciousness. Finnish patriots first turned to Sweden asking for help in their struggle for independence. But Sweden feared getting embroiled with Russia and refused. The Finns then sent out feelers towards Germany, and in 1915 a small contingent of German volunteers was dispatched. Finns were also recruited for the German army, and fought on the Eastern front up to 1917, when they returned to Finland to help in the struggle for independence. They were aided by the Germans, who intended to use Finland as a base for an attack on St. Petersburg. But after the Russian revolution and the subsequent cessation of hostilities between Russia and Germany, no further German troops were sent. In January 1918 Finnish independence was recognised by both Russia and Germany. Happily the danger of German tutelage was nullified by the victory of the Allies. In 1920 the Aland Islands, claimed equally by Sweden and Finland, were awarded to the latter country by the League of Nations. Of late years, chiefly through the influence of M. Sandler, the Swedish Minister of Foreign affairs, very cordial relations have existed between Finland and the other Scandinavian countries. ANNA STURGE.

154*. DENMARK: A Social Laboratory. By Peter Manniche. 1939. (Copenhagen: G. E. Gad; London: Oxford University Press. 204 pp. 5*s*.)

PETER MANNICHE, the Principal of the International People's College at Elsinore, gives in his book a condensed survey of the development of the co-operative movement in Denmark, its causes and effects.

He explains how Denmark's co-operative movement was not the result of theory, but rather a spontaneous, sporadic and non-political movement prompted solely by practical needs. While the town movement limits the liability of its members and shows the influence of a collective body, the farmers' co-operative is based on its members being jointly responsible for any obligations incurred by them, and shows the influence of a group of individuals. The farmer, freed from the merchandising aspect of his job, is at liberty to concentrate on the production of superior crops and livestock and the adaptation of his production to any changes in the foreign market which may become necessary.

The life and work of Grundtvig, the founder of the Danish folk high schools and the schools themselves, are described. Mr. Manniche emphasises that nobody can understand the peculiar national culture of Denmark without reference to her folk high schools. A further chapter deals with social legislation, of which voluntary sickness insurance appears to be built up on particularly sound principles, and in his concluding chapter Mr. Manniche gives us an attractive picture of life in a Danish village. A. H. HICKS.

155*. DANISH DELIGHT. By Monica Redlich. 1939. (London: Duckworth. 8vo. 272 pp. *8s. 6d.*)

IT is difficult to class *Danish Delight.* The book might be placed amongst the guide-books of foreign countries, but it could equally well find its way into the category of light novels.

It is a journal of a year spent in Denmark. Monica Redlich's impressions, however, are chiefly of Copenhagen, as she came to know it. She has a delightful sense of humour and a very keen perception of things she sees and people she meets.

Although the book has no apparent plan, it succeeds in giving a vivid picture of Denmark, sensible, gay, with a peacefulness which must appeal to readers at home and abroad at this time of general unrest. K. V. BAILEY.

156*. NORWAY: Changing and Changeless. By Agnes Rothery. 1939. (London: Faber and Faber. 8vo. Illus. Maps. 294 pp. *12s. 6d.*)

MISS ROTHERY has put on record a good description of the scenery, the social condition, and the culture of Norway. The book is beautifully illustrated, and is provided with a full bibliography of English and American works on Norwegian history, art and literature.

157. L'ENTENTE BALTIQUE. By Bronius Kazlauskas. 1939. (Paris: Sirey. 8vo. 327 pp.)

DAS IST POLEN! By F. W. von Oertzen. 1939. (München: Albert Langen and George Miller. 8vo. 251 pp. *Rm.* 3.60.)

158*. THE BALTIC STATES: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania. 1938. (London: Oxford University Press, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 8vo. 194 pp. *7s. 6d.*)

THE present book on Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania is issued as a link in a series published by the R.I.I.A. with the object of furnishing a review of the historical background and political and economic development and structure of a stretch of countries as well as of

their relations to their neighbours. An account of the economy of the Balkans was published earlier in the same series.

The present description of the three small Baltic States consists of two parts. The first deals with the historical and political conditions. Thus, for instance, the development away from the democratic constitutions of 1920–22 to the various forms of national dictatorship is explained. Each individual country is described separately—its differences and similarities in development traced. This also applies to each country's position in foreign policy, where emphasis is placed in particular on their relations to Russia, Germany, Poland, Scandinavia and the League. A special chapter deals with special Lithuanian problems : Memel and Vilna.

The second part of the book deals with the economic and financial development of these States. It begins with the description of the 1919–30 period : the building up of the production apparatus, of foreign trade and balances of payment, as well as of finances, *e.g.* standard of coinage, monetary and capital problems, banking and public economy. Along these same lines the effect of the 1931 crisis is examined, as also the laws resulting therefrom and the economic development in general up to the summer of 1938. In conclusion the present economic position of the country is shown against this background. This part of the book contains a great deal of statistical material. A. H.

159*. THE NATIONAL INCOME OF POLAND and POLAND'S FOREIGN TRADE. Monographs Nos. 4 and 5 of the Birmingham Information Service on Slavonic Countries July 1937 and July 1939.

THE first of these documents provides much interesting material on real income in Poland, together with valuable statistics on business conditions over the period 1928–37. The second contains an analysis of the conditions determining the character and direction of Polish trade and of the changes which have taken place in recent years. They form a most valuable guide to pre-war conditions in Poland.

M. B.

160*. POLAND. By W. J. Rose. 1939. (Harmondsworth : Penguin Books, Ltd. Sm. 8vo. 244 pp. Maps. 6*d*.)

PROFESSOR ROSE deals briefly with the history of Poland before 1914, but adequately enough to provide the necessary background for readers who are not acquainted with that great heritage of the Polish nation. He gives in some detail the little-known history of Poland during the war of 1914–18, and the early struggles with the Soviets before the eastern boundaries were agreed early in 1921. But the main part of his book is concerned with the building up of the Polish Commonwealth from countries which had been for over a century under alien rule and had moreover been subject for four years to the devastation of war. Of this work of reconstruction the author was an eye-witness, for he was a social worker in Warsaw from 1919 to 1927. He describes the internal difficulties under which Poland achieved the relative prosperity which was hers until the German invasion in September 1939, and, with a light hand, the foreign policy pursued in recent years by which she sought—in vain as the event proved, to avoid conflict with either of her powerful neighbours.

M. B.

161*. POLENS STELLUNG IN OSTMITTELEUROPA IN GESCHICHTE UND GEGENWART (Schriften der Hochschule für Politik, herausgegeben von Paul Meier-Benneckenstein, Vol. 46). By Dr. Herbert Ludat. 1939. (Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt Verlag. 8vo. 35 pp. 80 *pf.*)

DR. LUDAT is the leader of the seminar for East Middle Europe of the Hochschule für Politik in Berlin. The present study on Poland is part of a series on the conception and form of National Socialism, and is the reprint of a lecture delivered in the Hochschule in February 1939. The date of delivery explains the now somewhat out-of-date statement that the nations of the so-called middle zone, Poland among them, can now rely for defence against Bolshevism on the mighty strength and defence of Greater Germany, "which advances in its National Socialist philosophy the concept of the nation and therefore is conscious of freedom from any kind of Imperialism."

162*. THE AUTHENTIC BIOGRAPHY OF COLONEL BECK. By J. H. Harley. Based on the Polish by Conrad Wrzos. Introduction by Count Edward Raczynski. 1939. (London: Hutchinson. 8vo. Illus. 199 pp. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

THIS brief account of Colonel Beck's life, and especially of his policy in recent years, has a tragic interest at the moment. There is a very useful appendix containing extracts from his more important speeches in the last six years. In the last of these, a declaration in the Polish Seym on May 5th, 1939, he said that peace, like almost all things of this world, has its price, high but definable. "We in Poland do not know the conception of peace at any price. There is only one thing in the life of men, nations and States which is above price—and that is honour."

U.S.S.R.

163*. TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE U.S.S.R. By Michael Florinsky. 1939. (New York and London: Macmillan. 8vo. viii + 245 pp. 10*s.* 6*d.*)

THIS is a wholly admirable survey of Soviet Russia to-day; informative, critical, succinct: not a spare word or a loose idea from cover to cover. Dr. Florinsky first briefly sketches the background of Tzarist Russia which produced Bolshevism, and concludes that the Imperial régime was not really overthrown: it collapsed as a result of its own inner weakness and flagrant ineptitude. In his analysis of the Soviet judiciary, planning, taxation and the reorganisation of the All-Russian Communist party, Dr. Florinsky provides a valuable aid to popular knowledge of the Soviet system. Many fallacies must be exploded by the light thrown on the incidence of indirect taxation in the U.S.S.R., the erratic vicissitudes of the Plan, Soviet participation in World Revolution, especially in Spain. By and large, Dr. Florinsky considers that "even when full allowance is made for the relatively short time the Soviet experiment has been in operation, there is nothing in the record so far to justify its claim to superiority over a system based on private initiative and private enterprise."

Among so much well-balanced comment, the verdict on Soviet education alone seems somewhat arbitrary. Too little credit is given, I think, to the results of equality of opportunity in the U.S.S.R.,

while the pressure of dogmatism in the schools entirely dominates the picture. But this is a small point in a most useful book.

VIOLET CONOLLY.

164*. DIE RUSSISCHE REVOLUTION. Eine kritische Würdigung aus dem Nachlass von Rosa Luxemburg. Erste vollständige Ausgabe herausgegeben von "Neurer Weg." 1939. (Paris: Verlag Jean Flory. 8vo. 64 pp. 7.50 *frs.*)

THIS little pamphlet, originally published in an incomplete text in 1922, was well worth re-editing. What a *rappel à l'ordre* for the debased coinage of Communist propaganda to-day! Here, Rosa Luxemburg critically surveys the course of the Soviet Revolution and roundly denounces its errors. In phrases as axiomatic as prophetic, she admonishes the Proletariat against the "Hurrahstimmung" towards Russia and the folly of making virtues of the Bolshevik necessities. For the Bolshevik Revolution, she points out, was confronted by extraordinary difficulties and forced to hedge and compromise all round. She takes Lenin to task for his short-sighted agrarian policy, for the stifling of political democracy in Russia, for the Soviet nationality policy and for the tyranny of Soviet bureaucracy. The spurious proletarian dictatorship of a "handful of politicians" or "Cliquenwirtschaft," of the Soviet Government thoroughly disgusts her. In all this she shows her genius for hitting the nail on the head, her sturdy intellectual independence, her vehement, racy style. Rosa Luxemburg's revolutionary zeal and her passionate love of liberty landed her in the Socialist's chronic dilemma, though she never faced it squarely. "Freiheit ist immer nur die Freiheit des anders Denkenden," she cries. But how reconcile this fine sentiment with the *Sturm und Drang* of building Socialism in an unregenerate land? Rosa Luxemburg passes serenely on. Nationalism in post-1918 Europe is discussed in a separate chapter, and indiscriminately reviled as a *bourgeois* anti-revolutionary device. But whether right or wrong—and on the nationality problem she rants as glibly as any doctrinaire—Rosa Luxemburg is an exhilarating polemist and a remarkable personality whom history should rescue from her present oblivion.

VIOLET CONOLLY.

165*. SOVIETS IN THE ARCTIC. An historical economic and political study of the Soviet advance into the Arctic. By T. A. Taracouzio. 1938. (New York: Macmillan. La. 8vo. xiv + 563 pp. Bibl., maps. 32*s.* 6*d.*)

WRITTEN under the auspices of the Bureau of International Research, Harvard University and Radcliffe College, this is an important and scholarly study of the Soviet Arctic, its geography, exploration, development and international significance.

By the Decree of April 15th, 1926, the U.S.S.R. claimed all lands and islands discovered or yet to be discovered within the sector from the North Pole to Murmansk on the west and to the Bering Strait on the east. It is not unlikely that Imperial Russian Government archives envisaged such a claim based on the sector theory, and that when the Soviet came to deal with the matter, the outlines of the Decree were ready at hand.

The Decree raises interesting questions of international law, and the author discusses the whole subject in considerable detail and with commendable documentation.

Under the old régime little attention was paid to the development of the Russian Arctic, and much of the pioneering was left to foreign enterprise, of which a notable example was the Kara Sea route sponsored by Mr. Jonas Leid.

Under the Soviet, however, there has been an enthusiastic *Drang nach Norden* and immense activity in opening up the country by sea, land and air. The author has marshalled all the main facts that are available as to these developments, and the value of his work is enhanced by the inclusion of translations of most of the Soviet decrees relating to the subject and by an excellent series of maps and an exhaustive bibliography. NORMAN NEVILLE.

166*. MEMUARI POSLANNIKA. (Memoirs of an Envoy.) By K. V. Ozols. 1938. (Paris: Dom Knigi. 8vo. 268 pp.)

M. OZOLS, a Latvian by birth, was an engineer in the service of the Russian Government during the War and later, by the chances of war and revolution, one of the first Latvian diplomats in Moscow. He writes in Russian and his attitude towards Russia, old and new, is typical of a Russian of the old régime. After the Soviet Revolution he returned to Latvia from America, where he had been on a Russian Military Mission, and was successively member of the Soviet-Latvian Peace Delegation in Moscow, President of the Soviet-Latvian Re-evacuation Commission and Latvian Minister in Moscow: excellent opportunities it might seem for observing not only the course of Soviet-Latvian relations in a critical formative period, but also the development of the Russian revolution at close quarters. The results are disappointing, but perhaps inevitable in the case of a foreign diplomat living in the abnormal conditions of the Legation compound in Moscow. There are many entertaining reminiscences of Soviet personalities of the day, including Lenin, but little or nothing about the general state of Russia. Like an oasis in the Soviet desert, M. Ozols recalls his colleagues of the Moscow diplomatic corps, but unfortunately these pen-pictures describe nobody of much general interest.

VIOLET CONOLLY.

167. RUSSIA—FRIEND OR FOE? By Pat Sloan. 1939. (London: Frederick Muller. 8vo. 200 pp. 5s.)

TORPEDOED on publication by the recent Soviet–Nazi Agreements, this plea for an Anglo–Soviet Pact is now but so much labour lost for Russia. Ideology, Soviet or Nazi, is a treacherous foothold for political prognostication and, in Mr. Sloan's case, a fatal sophistical trap.

But the book is open to criticism on other points than this fortuitous *reductio ad absurdum* of its main thesis. The author's prejudice in favour of Soviet Communism and against Fascism is so strong that he cannot see straight in either case. His picture of the internal state of Russia is as wildly exaggerated as is his account of the anti-social tendencies of Fascist Italy. Then his handling of the *bourgeois* bogey of world revolution is clumsy. The plain fact is that since 1925–26 Soviet Russia has deliberately soft-pedalled world revolution, but rather than admit this in so many words, Mr. Sloan embarks on an euphuistic etiolation of world revolution *qua* People's Governments which, instead of reassuring, would alienate all conservative opinion. Mr. Sloan emphasises Russia's fine international peace record, although

all the official quotations in the world would not prove that communism has not been and may not be spread by force. I also cannot agree with Mr. Sloan's debonair dismissal of the effect of the big purges on the Army and industry. VIOLET CONOLLY.

168*. L'ASIE CENTRALE SOVIETIQUE ET LE KAZAKHSTAN. By Charles Steber. 1939. (Paris: Editions Sociales Internationales. 8vo. 301 pp. Maps. 35 *frs.*)

NEAR EAST

169*. LA VIE JURIDIQUE DES PEUPLES: Bibliothèque de droit contemporain, sous la direction de H. Levy-Ullmann et B. Mirkine-Guetzevitch. TURQUIE. 1939. (Paris: Delagrave. 8vo. 404 pp. 80 *frs.*)

THIS work, written by a panel of Turkish jurists, is published under the editorship of the two eminent Professors of the University of Paris; their foreword is perhaps the best review for it.

Every chapter has a historical *résumé* giving a glimpse of the old order which has been superseded by the new. Perhaps this is the difference between the political philosopher and the reformer; the latter does not wait for the customs of the people to formulate the need for new legislation: he anticipates it. The reader, lay or professional, will learn in this book how a country ruled for centuries by the laws of Islam changed suddenly the "Cheriat" and the "Fikih" for laws borrowed with magnificent impartiality from Roman, Teuton or Gaul. If the reader perseveres until p. 154, he will find that the marriage laws of Calvin's country have been successfully adopted where before a man could have not more than four wives, and a woman enjoyed half the privileges of man, except that he could have been bastinadoed and she could not.

Future historians will rate the present reform with great racial movements or deep changes in past centuries. Their success already makes the political aspirations contained at the end of the book an established fact. Turkey is at present engaged in a great industrial plan; she is well aware of the growing-pains of her Western sisters, and the social legislation, amply expounded in the present volume, is calculated to overcome such drawbacks. NESTOR.

169a*. DIE BEDUINEN. By Max Freiherr von Oppenheim, unter Mitarbeitung von Erich Bräunlich und Werner Caskel. Band I: Die Beduinstämme in Mesopotämien und Syrien. 1939. (Leipzig: Harrassowitz. 8vo. xi + 387 pp. *Rm.* 24.)

THIS is the first volume of an ambitiously planned survey of all the Bedouin tribes in the Near East, which has been in preparation for over twenty-five years. The main part of the work consists of detailed and annotated lists of tribes and sub-tribes, with the names and genealogies of their shaykhs, approximate numbers and ranges; to each is prefixed a short historical account, compiled for the most part by Dr. Werner Caskel. The value of the work to historians and to students of contemporary affairs is self-evident, and it can only be regretted that the issue of the four remaining volumes will probably be suspended. H. A. R. G.

170. SYRIA AS IT IS. By Helen Cameron Gordon. 1939. (London: Methuen. 8vo. viii + 211 pp. 10s. 6d.)

SYRIA as it is—a brave title! Helen Cameron Gordon obviously has a love for the parts of the country in which she has twice travelled, but to sum up Syria " as it is " baffles those who have given their lives to the study and service of the country. This same difficulty was, probably unconsciously, in the mind of the author, for over ninety of its 211 pages are devoted to the telling of legends and history of long ago. Indeed, the motives which prompted Zenoubia, Antar and Habla, Sief-ed-Danla, are easier to gauge than those of present-day politician and ecclesiastic.

Syria is most " as it is " and at its very best to the one who will go back year by year to the same village and remain there through harvest and grape-picking and all the really important things of life. The book includes some good photographs of buildings, one being that of a fascinating, dark, mysterious street of Aleppo, the most ancient city of the world and the least altered. MARGARET KINNAIRD.

171*. THE SUEZ CANAL, ITS PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE. By Lt.-Col. Sir Arnold Wilson. Second Edition. 1939. (London: Oxford University Press. 215 pp. 15s.)

The first edition of this standard work was reviewed in the *Journal* in the May–June issue, 1934.

AFRICA

172. THE LAND OF EGYPT. By Robin Fedden. 1939. (London: Batsford. 8vo. 120 pp. Illus. 12s. 6d.)

THIS is a book that would profit an intending visitor to Egypt to have under his hand. Embellished by a hundred and thirty illustrations of varying merit and interest, and provided with a map, it presents an attractive study of the country and its inhabitants, and though it is not easy to find something fresh to say upon a subject so familiar, Mr. Fedden has contrived to do so. He has certain qualifications essential to every descriptive writer, notably the capacity to remark and record the picturesque, and the instinct to discard the commonplace. For this reason the book is often provocative, a virtue of no small merit in one of its type. Incidentally his style would be improved by less flamboyancy, and fewer adjectives.

The main theme is the fellah, and the fellah's reaction to modern conditions. This reaction Mr. Fedden analyses shrewdly, and his conclusions are interesting. He recognises his subject's good points, but considers that the fellah " lacks drive, he can create and energise no new idea."

No one who knows provincial Egypt will quarrel with the judgment. On the other hand, others may disagree with Mr. Fedden's belief that the fellah's " crimes are repented an hour later." Repentance, as the West understands the word, is unknown in Egypt.

Other outstanding chapters are one dealing with the arts and handicrafts, and another an historical retrospect of Alexandria. Finally the author considers the political future, stating the problem thus: " To create a nation is one thing, to govern it another," and suggests that the solution lies with the middle classes. That is a reasonable conjecture: less so, perhaps, is his belief that " the social scene at present

is a perfect setting for a revolution." But, as has been said already, this book is pleasantly provocative. P. G. ELGOOD.

173*. THE CAMEROONS AND TOGOLAND: A Demographic Study. By Robert R. Kuczynski. 1939. (London: Oxford University Press, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 8vo. xviii + 579 pp. Maps, bibl. 30s.; to Members, 21s.)

OF the valuable material collected by Dr. Kuczynski in connection with the African Research Survey, the present volume represents no more than a section. It comprises an exhaustive and objective study of the material relating to the demography of two areas in the administration of which three colonial Powers, each with a different policy, have participated. German, French and British sources have all been carefully sifted; and the book is noteworthy for the discriminating use to which the author has put the annual reports of the mandatory Powers to the Council of the League of Nations and the Minutes of the Sessions of the Permanent Mandates Commission. The general conclusion of the study is that there is no evidence as to whether in the territories as a whole the native population has increased or decreased since the first contacts with European administration; and the same is true of the individual parts, but with the striking exception of British Togoland where the population has increased since the grant of the Mandate to the British.

There are no adequate census returns and the registration of births and deaths can hardly be said to have begun; and it is only for certain special categories of Natives, such as plantation and railway labourers and prisoners, that information on diseases and mortality is readily available. In this field of inquiry there is evidence to show that the mortality rate among the plantation labourers of German Cameroons remained high all through the régime, in spite of the good living conditions which obtained during at least its later years. There is no doubt that the rate was high among the labourers engaged by the French administration in the construction of the Cameroons Central Railway between 1922 and 1928, being as high as 100 per 1000 in each of the first two years. On the other hand, Dr. Kuczynski is able to state that the mortality rate among plantation labourers in British Cameroons is much lower than it was under the German régime.

The book is not written for the general reader and, unless the student has some knowledge of the geographical background it is not always easy for him to appreciate the full significance of the statistics with which it deals.[1] Yet it contains material on matters of common interest, especially its incidental references to German, French and British methods of colonial administration in so far as they are reflected in the demographic situation. Especially interesting is the light which its figures throw on the opportunities for the settlement of German nationals in the former German colony of Cameroons. In British Cameroons the confiscated plantations were put up for auction in 1924, and most of the buyers were the former German owners, who in the following year entered once more into possession. This development is reflected in the statistics: "While the great majority of the 71 white inhabitants in 1924 were British, the 179 white inhabitants of 1925 included 125 Germans." The number of Germans in British

[1] The chapters on the Cameroons should be read in conjunction with M. Labouret's *Le Cameroun*, which provides that general background against which it is important to set the results of statistical inquiry.

Cameroons has grown steadily, until in 1937 they numbered 253 out of a total population of 408; whereas the British population in the same year was 85, or slightly more than a third of the German total.

S. J. K. BAKER.

174*. ETHIOPIA. An Empire in the Making. By Fernando Quaranta. With a Foreword by Lord Hailey. 1939. (London: P. S. King. xi + 120 pp. Map and illus. 7s. 6d.)

THE author, who is attached to the Study Section of the Ministry of Italian Africa, writes with full knowledge of his subject, which is the rapid examination and development of the resources of Ethiopia. Italy has spared neither money nor effort nor brains in the work. There has been money in abundance and specialist skilled advice and direction in matters of settlement, scientific research into health services for men, plants and animals, and in every other department. The settlement experiment will be watched with great interest.

There are at present three forms of settlement. One is carried out by the Association of ex-Service Men, and consists of peasant settlement on the highlands on somewhat the same lines as that in the Pontine Marshes in Italy, and has so far provided for 103 families; a second, by land companies, assisted by State loans, is run on the *métayage* system, and by May last had provided for 330 families; a third provides for large farming calling for a considerable use of native labour; in addition, there are some 300 ventures in market-gardening, etc. If these plans are extended in scale, the results may be important; Lord Hailey points out in his foreword that success would mean a change in the balance of European interests in Africa if Ethiopia ever became the seat of a large permanent European population.

The greatest visible achievement is in the provision of roads and the improvement of communications. Surveying for minerals has not so far resulted in the discovery of petroleum, but gold and tin, and, on a rather larger scale, platinum, are being worked. Good progress is being made with the health and veterinary services and with scientific preparations for the growing of coffee, cotton and other crops on a large scale.

Baron Quaranta's book is concerned with material development, and, though something is said of the rebuilding of native villages, there is little information on the policy which has been adopted on native administration generally, though he states that administrators refrain, wherever possible, from interfering with local traditions and customs, and that active steps are being taken to increase the purchasing power of the natives and thereby raise the standard of living by fostering and improving native agriculture and native stock-raising. On the general questions of the relations between the State and its Ethiopian subjects there are many points on which information would be welcomed, but all of those are outside the scope of the present work.

The book is provided with maps, and is admirably illustrated.

MARGARET BRYANT.

175. L'ETHIOPIE ET LA SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS. By Léon-Jean Gibot. 1939. (Paris: Donit-Montchiestien. 137 pp. *Frs.* 25.)

176*. MOROCCO AWAKES. By Captain F. H. Mellor. 1939. (London: Methuen. 8vo. xviii + 260 pp. 8s. 6d.)

177*. QUADERNI DELLO STUDIO FIORENTINO DI POLITICA ESTERA, Nos. 4 and 5. 1939. APPUNTI SULLA QUESTIONE TUNISINA and FRANCIA ED ITALIA DI FRONTE AL PROBLEMA DI GIBUTI. By Mario Toscano. (Florence. 8vo. 34 pp. 53 pp. 4 *lire*.)

Fully documented studies of the Jibuti and Tunis questions from the Italian point of view.

178*. FÜR DAS ROTE KREUZ IN ÆTHIOPIEN. By Sidney H. Brown. 1939. (Zurich/New York: Europa Verlag. 248 pp., maps. 6 *Sw. frs.*)

INDIA

179*. THE PROBLEM OF MINORITIES OR COMMUNAL REPRESENTATION IN INDIA. By K. B. Krishna. 1939. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 359 pp. 15*s.*)

THIS work is by a convinced Communist who wholeheartedly approves the conditions created by the Bolshevist régime in Russia and who wishes to see a similar state of affairs created in his native country, India. According to Mr. Krishna the whole problem referred to in his book is the creation of the Imperialist Government in its attempt to keep India in subjection by a policy of counterpoise, *i.e.*, of setting class against class. This policy has been followed consistently from the days of Warren Hastings to the present day and is still being followed. The attempt is to break up the national forces which should be united in claiming Swaraj and reduce them to suppliants for favour. The various "interests, classes and communities" were at first sought out by the Government, but later developed of their own accord. The author considers them quite artificial. As an orthodox Marxist he denies that there are any vital questions other than economic questions which should unite or separate human beings. The problem is to organise all inhabitants of India, Hindus, Moslems, Christians, Parsees, etc., even including the Anglo-Indians, into a United National Front that will sweep away Imperialism and incidentally Communalism. In fact the worst Communalist is the Hindu or Moslem who observes his religion in the day and disregards it in the dark when convenient: *e.g.* the Hindu who surreptitiously butchers cattle and competes with the Moslem butcher, or the Sikh who cultivates tobacco in competition with non-Sikhs and who in aid of his business has to invoke religious antagonism against his rivals as his real motives must be hidden. No doubt the author would abolish all religions. "Neither the Hindu nor the Moslem can emancipate himself without freeing the Indian Society from Islam and Hinduism." In any case the unfortunate "Imperialist" Government can clearly do no good. When Communalism is abolished, as in Ceylon, the motive is the same, the maintenance of the counterpoise policy. Incidentally when the day of Swaraj comes the masses of India are expected to deal with their middle classes in the ruthless manner of their comrades in Russia.

H. S. CHATFIELD.

180*. CHANGING INDIA. An anthology of Writings from Raja Rammohun Roy to Jawaharlal Nehru. Edited by Raja Rao and Iqbal Singh. 1939. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 271 pp. 5*s.*)

THE compilers of this anthology have set out to give a comprehensive idea of the development of Indian thought during the last

hundred years, by means of extracts from the writings of twenty-one representative thinkers. They believe that the evolution of Indian thought has not been haphazard, but consistent and logical, and they discern in its development three phases. The first was one of bewildered admiration and imitation; the second was marked by hostility and resistance; and the third, as yet barely recognised either in India or Great Britain, shows signs of a more correct perspective and juster understanding.

It is in the light of this third phase, and of a juster estimate of what the impact of Western on Indian civilisation has done for their country, that Mr. Raja Rao and Mr. Iqbal Singh have written their admirable biographical introductions to each of the authors quoted. It is seldom in recent Indian publications that one meets such objective and illuminating attempts to assess the formative influences in Indian thought. The introductions are succinct, pregnant and fair.

The extracts, running to about two thousand words each, begin with a quotation from the writings of Raja Rammohun Roy, "first of the moderns," and end with three selections from the writings of Jawaharlal Nehru, "with whom Indian Nationalism has come of age. The majority of those quoted are political writers, but poets, artists, a scientist and social reformer are also included in the anthology, and the selections from their writings have been carefully made to summarise, as far as possible, the philosophy of the person quoted. H. GRAY.

181. HEALTH AND NUTRITION IN INDIA. By N. Gangulee. 1939. (London: Faber and Faber. 307 pp. 15s.)

PROFESSOR GANGULEE has performed a signal service by bringing together the main facts with regard to the modern science of nutrition, the extent and results of malnutrition in India and the social and economic conditions responsible for the present disastrous prevalence of malnutrition in India. As an agricultural economist he is well qualified to make recommendations designed to promote better cultivation and to enable an improved output to result in a more adequate diet for the workers. His chief contribution is, perhaps, the emphasis that he places on the need for immediate action, and the recommendations made for such action. The principal immediate cause of malnutrition is, he argues, fundamentally economic. "The working class suffers from malnutrition not because it is ignorant, but because it is poor." Remedies should therefore be sought in the directions of agrarian reform, a reorientation of Indian agriculture, the arresting of soil impoverishment, research into plant genetics, and the provision of adequate financial resources to prosecute the desired reforms. VERA ANSTEY.

182. THE MAN BEHIND THE PLOUGH. By M. Azizul Huque. 1939. (Calcutta: The Book Company. 385 pp. *Rs.* 5.)

MR. M. AZIZUL HUQUE—with his great experience both of the daily life of the Bengal peasant, and as a member of numerous local authorities, Boards of Inquiries and Committees—is admirably qualified to present a realistic picture of the trials and tribulations of the Indian ryot. He undertakes an excellent factual survey of the physical and agricultural conditions and of the legal background of the problem in Bengal, and supplies his own interpretation of the situation and solutions for the fundamental defects revealed. Finally he presents a short summary of the various agricultural "plans" adopted in

various countries, and suggests the lines along which experience gained elsewhere may be applied in India. VERA ANSTEY.

183*. THE RESTORATION OF THE PEASANTRIES: with especial reference to that of India. By G. T. Wrench. 1939. (London: C. W. Daniel. 8vo. 147 pp. 6*s.*)

IN an earlier inquiry, *The Wheel of Life*, Dr. Wrench showed the ultimate dependence of human health and life on the condition of the soil. The present work is in the main an impassioned plea for the maintenance or, where it is disappearing, the restoration of peasant agriculture as the best method of preventing the destruction of the fertility of the soil by reckless exploitation, and by modern systems which fail to return to the soil the elements of which it is robbed. The outstanding example of the scrupulous return to the soil of the riches which it loses in cultivation is the age-long tradition of Chinese farming, in a country continuously cultivated through the ages.

Dr. Wrench's thesis is that the progressive destruction of the village community, with its traditional knowledge and practice of agriculture, undermined in every country where the modern money economy penetrates, should be stemmed if even more wholesale destruction of the soil is to be prevented. This cannot be done in Asia by economic means alone. He agrees with Mr. Gandhi that the preservation of the simple agricultural virtues in the Indian village, for instance, depends not merely on defence against usury and other evils, but on the maintenance of the principles of simplicity of life and self-control inculcated by Indian religions. M. B.

184. BHOPAL IN 1936–1937. Issued by the Publicity Officer, Government of Bhopal. 1939. (Bombay: Times of India Press. 8vo. 121 pp.)

A review, admirably written, of the administration of one of the most progressive of the Indian States. Its most interesting points are the failure of probibition and the drastic action which had to be taken against political agitation fomented by the Congress organisation in British India. MESTON.

185. INDIA'S DEMAND FOR FREEDOM! 1939. Published for the University Labour Federation by Laurence and Wishart Ltd. (London. 8vo. 32 pp. 2*d.*)

186*. DEMOCRACY FOR INDIA. By H. N. Brailsford. Tract Series No. 248. 1939. (London: Fabian Society. 8vo. 15 pp. 2*d.*)

FAR EAST AND PACIFIC

187*. NETHERLANDS INDIA: A STUDY OF PLURAL ECONOMY. By J. S. Furnivall. Introduction by Jonkheer R. A. C. de Graeff. 1939. (Cambridge University Press. 8vo. xxiv + 502 pp. Maps. 25*s.*)

188*. LA POLITIQUE MUSULMANE ET COLONIALE DES PAYS-BAS. By G. H. Bousquet. 1939. (Paris: Paul Hartmann, for the Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangère. 8vo. xi + 167 pp. *frs.* 25).

THE science of colonisation embraces no study more fascinating or instructive than that of the "plural economy" system developed by the Dutch in their Far Eastern empire, particularly as compared with the British system, and to this study Mr. Furnivall's book is an important contribution. He has succeeded in presenting in admirably

readable form the results of an intricate technical examination, the extent of which may be gauged by his long index of references.

"Plural Economy" is explained by the author as resting upon Dutch recognition of the plural, or, as they prefer to call it, the dual character of Netherlands Indian society, and it finds its general expression in the conservation of the native social order by a policy of indirect rule; herein lies a major point of contrast with what he terms the "nationalist" system of the British. Which will prove the more successful, he says, only time can show, "if, that is," as he rather ominously adds, "time allows for the conduct of either experiment to any end but anarchy."

A pleasing aspect of this book is its unbiased approach. Mr. Furnivall surveys, one by one, the successive administrations which have held sway in Netherlands India during its long and picturesque documented history. A valuable comparison is drawn between the work of Raffles and that of Daendels, his predecessor, in which due credit is given to the relative advantages enjoyed by the former. In another arresting section Mr. Furnivall makes impartial criticism of the respective Dutch and British colonial educational policy. "In education, as in so many aspects of social life, the attempt to make Netherlands India a home for Europeans has made it a better home for Orientals."

The same scrupulous fairness has been applied even to the deplorable tragedy of 1623 at Amboyna, which, in his words, "is still known to English historians as 'the massacre of Amboyna' and to Dutch historians as the 'massacre' of Amboyna."

Professor Bousquet's book is notable as providing the first French examination of Dutch colonial policy for almost forty years. Having carefully traced the development of the native Nationalist movement through all its stages, he concludes, while paying generous tributes to the Dutch methods, that the ideal system would be found in a judicious fusion of these with the French. H. S. BANNER.

189*. THE RECENT DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC FOREIGN POLICY IN THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES. By J. van Gelderen. (Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva No. 20.) 1939. (London: Longmans, Green. 8vo. 90 pp. 5s.)

THE population of the Netherlands East Indies number about 67 millions—that is to say, its population is comparable to that of the whole of the British Colonial Empire. It is also a country very rich in natural resources, especially in rubber and tin, and a long series of tropical food products. And this rich country or group of countries is held by the Dutch without the protection of a strong national navy. The country has hitherto avoided the cupidity of envious States, partly because of its generous economic foreign policy. Foreigners have been wlecome; Chinese and Japanese play important parts in economic life, foreign capital has been freely admitted for the exploitation of natural resources, and there has been no preferential treatment for Dutch imports.

This state of affairs lasted until the world depression which began in 1929 became acute and brought planters, traders and workers in 1934 to the brink of disaster. Professor van Gelderen's task is to show why a new policy of economic defence had to be adopted, quotas placed on imports, and a rigid system of control imposed in many departments of economic life, and to explain the complicated regulations now in

force. Dr. van Gelderen concludes that the restoration of the "open door" in the old sense of the word can only be expected if certain conditions in the world at large are fulfilled. He asks whether free competition on equal terms is still compatible with modern business and the growing influence of totalitarian methods in trade. The country must be protected against political penetration and against the strangulation of native economic life. The change in external policy has its counterpart in more active intervention in economic life within the territory evidenced by the organised transfer of large numbers of people from crowded Java to the Outer Islands, and the State-aided industrialisation which is now taking place.

MARGARET BRYANT.

190*. BRITISH FAR EASTERN POLICY. By G. E. Hubbard. 1939. (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1s.)

191. INSIDE ASIA. By John Gunther. (London: Hamish Hamilton. 8vo. 659 pp. Maps. 12*s*. 6*d*.)

192*. THE CHINA YEAR BOOK, 1939. Edited by H. G. W. Woodhead. (Shanghai: North-China Daily News and Herald Ltd. 8vo. xxiv + 662 pp. £2 2*s*.)

THIS addition to the R.I.I.A. Information Department papers gives in a very few pages a concise account of the history of British policy in the Far East, to show how that policy has now come into collision with Japanese imperialism. Although the American Secretary of State, Mr. John Hay, usually gets the credit for inventing the "open door" policy, Mr. Hubbard is able to show conclusively that it was Great Britain's aim as far back as the 1850's, consistently followed down to the present day, when it is challenged by Japanese exclusiveness. The record of the Japanese occupation of China leaves the impression that the mere existence of the League of Nations unfortunately, but directly, told against China's receiving any practical help. But British diplomacy in that crisis is not such as one can look back on with any pleasure. One thing for which Mr. Hubbard may specially be thanked is the unanswerable evidence he has collected that Great Britain did *not* go to war with China in 1840 to force opium upon her.

Mr. Gunther's book is an example of high-pressure journalism which makes one gasp. Racing through Asia from the Philippines to Palestine in a few months, he has, with incredible industry, collected an incredible number of sketches, anecdotes and appreciations. Some are apocryphal, like the alleged naming of "Henry" Pu-yi and the hoary mendacity about dogs and Chinese in Shanghai parks, which no amount of repudiation can ever kill. Some of the personal sketches, which are his special feature, are breezy and entertaining—the Soong dynasty in China, the mercurial but very forceful Manoel Quezon, the sabre-like Shah of Iran. The underlying idea is to contrast the old imperialisms with the new. Of British rule in India Mr. Gunther writes with the acidity one might expect, but with an admiration that he cannot quite repress. The Japanese, as the new Imperialists, have yet to prove themselves with something else than bombs and bullets. As a whole, *Inside Asia* should be amusing—and harmless enough—for those who know nothing of Asia.

It is indeed to the credit of the editor and publishers of the *China Year Book* that they have been able to carry on with this invaluable work of reference in spite of the war. Collection of exact facts and

statistics in China is always a heartbreaking task: what it is like now one can hardly imagine. Yet the 1939 edition—which, by the way, will be good till well on into next summer, the usual date of publication—shows no falling off. In addition to all the usual tables and references, some excellent chapters on various aspects of the war are added, impartially compiled from all sources. Among the biographies, members of Japan's puppet governments in China are included. No one with any interest in China should be without this informative book.

O. M. GREEN.

193*. THE PEOPLE'S WAR. By I. Epstein. 1939. (London: Gollancz. 8vo. 384 pp. 7s. 6d.)

THE publishers of this book quote Mme. Sun Yat-sen as saying that "every friend of China should read it." While, however, the author shows unbounded admiration for the Chinese and castigates the Japanese unsparingly, it would be difficult for even the most ardent friend and admirer of China to close his eyes to the distortions of facts and the over-statements with which the book is interspersed.

When the author is describing the Taierchuang operations, or the guerilla warfare and partisan movement in North China, or the songs of Nich Erh and their influence on the Chinese people in their present struggle with Japan, the narrative is full of interest and provides material of real value to the thoughtful reader; but when he sets out to tell of the Marco Polo Bridge incident, the Chinese capitulation at Shanghai in 1932, the handling of the Brussels Conference, or the Japanese-Soviet clash at Chankufeng, bias and inaccuracy are interjected in more or less equal proportions. M. D. KENNEDY.

194*. MOWRER IN CHINA. By Edgar Ansel Mowrer. With six maps by Marthe Rajchman. 1939. (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, Ltd. Sm. 8vo. 216 pp. 6d.)

195*. CONFLICT. China, Japan and Christ. By A. M. Chirgwin. 1939. (London: Student Christian Movement Press. Paper. Sm. 8vo. 144 pp. 2s.)

EDGAR ANSEL MOWRER, one of the most famous of American foreign correspondents, has hitherto written on European affairs. He went to China in 1938 and saw the armies in action. He came to the carefully guarded conclusion that given adequate leadership, maintenance of morale and unity, credits, economic development in the South-west, an open line of communication for the import of war material, China ought not to be beaten. The dilemma before Japan would then be withdrawal to North China with the prospect of a new war in five years' time, or a long, indecisive struggle bound to end in exhaustion—*always supposing there is no general war in the meantime.* The italics are ours.

Conflict deals specifically with the progress of Christianity in Asiatic countries; incidentally it throws some light on the problems of war and peace in the Far East. M. B.

196*. JAPAN'S ECONOMIC OFFENSIVE IN CHINA. By Chuan-Hua Lowe. 1939. (London: Allen. 179 pp. 7s. 6d.)

DR. CHUAN-HUA LOWE describes the economic objectives of Japan in China and the consequences, particularly to British and American interests, should she attain them. He has collected some useful material upon the methods adopted by the Japanese in their attempted exploitation of Chinese resources, notably concerning the various

industrial and commercial organisations subsidiary to the two large holding companies in North and Central China. F. C. J.

197*. GRAN BRETAGNA E GIAPPONE IN ESTREMO ORIENTE. By Carlo Avarna di Gualtieri. (Extracted from the Review *Asiatica*, Rome, Volume 5, No. 4.) 1939. (Rome. 4to. 21 pp.)

The author sees in the attitude taken by Great Britain in the Far East the results of British realisation of the impossibility of confronting simultaneously conflicts in the East and in the West, and he exposes the various weaknesses of the British Empire in the Pacific. The reprint is provided with a useful map showing the main lines of aerial communication between Great Britain and the Pacific, also principal and secondary naval bases.

198*. MY COUNTRY AND MY PEOPLE. By Lin Yutang. (New and enlarged edition with an account of the Sino-Japanese War.) 1939. (London: Heinemann. xx + 419 pp. 7*s*. 6*d*.)

To this new and revised edition of his well-known work Dr. Lin Yutang has added a chapter entitled "A Personal Story of the Sino-Japanese War," in which he traces the origin and course of the conflict and makes some prophecies of the ultimate result and the effects on both the combatants.

199*. THE OPEN DOOR POLICY AND WORLD PEACE, Being the Richard Cobden Lecture for 1939. By H.E. Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo. 1939. (Oxford University Press. 8vo. 24 pp. 1*s*.)

200. THE CASE AGAINST JAPAN: A concise survey of the historical antecedents of the present Far Eastern imbroglio. By C. R. Shepherd. 1939. (London: Jarrolds. x + 224 pp. 7*s*. 6*d*.)

This book contains an account of Sino-Japanese relations from 1894 to the outbreak of the present conflict in the Far East. The author is a Professor at Canton University. His book is based on secondary authorities and traverses what is now familiar ground.

201*. MENACING SUN. By Mona Gardner. 1939. (London: John Murray. 8vo. Illustrated, with map. xx + 303 pp. 15*s*.)

The author relates the story of her travels in Indo-China, Siam, Malaya, the East Indies against the background of twelve years residence in Japan and experience as a newspaper correspondent in China. She sees Japan as bound to expand sooner or later, and she questions the ability of some of these countries to withstand the shock if it comes, but, happily, she is not too much obsessed with these fears to provide many charming pictures of life in all of them.

202*. MIGRATION AND ENVIRONMENT. A Study of the Physical Characteristics of the Japanese Immigrants to Hawaii and the Effects of Environment on their Descendants. By H. L. Shapiro, assisted by Frederick S. Hulse. (Issued under the auspices of the University of Hawaii.) 1939. (London: Oxford University Press. La 8vo. xi + 594 pp. $7.50.)

UNITED STATES

203*. THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS IN 1938. By Whitney H. Shepardson and William O. Scroggs. 1939. (New York and London: Harper Bros. for the Council on Foreign Relations. 8vo. xiii + 436 pp. 12*s*. 6*d*.)

AN American Survey of 1938 by two practised hands would in any case have been of exceptional interest. There is no need to emphasise the fact that the problems discussed in this volume are now of vital importance. It is significant that the authors begin by pointing out that it has been necessary to deal much more fully than usual with European events in order to make the attitude of the United States understandable. They review also the previous post-war

years in a first chapter entitled "Not in Battle Only," in which they point out that at the end of 1938 the majority of the people of the United States had already decided they wished to supply the democracies with munitions.

> "All this [they add] without benefit of twist or wangle from the 'merchants of death'; for if any single banker or munitions maker in the past few years has expressed his opinion on these matters, or has said a pertinent word in Washington except under the prod of a subpoena, his name is not known to the authors of this book."

Nevertheless the Neutrality Bill was not changed before war broke out, and the Survey shows how easy it was for Americans to be confused as to the issues involved. The incorporation of Austria was prefaced by the resignation of Mr. Eden, for reasons, say the authors, "God only knows"—a phrase rarely used in a treatise of this kind. Munich means that Great Britain has bowed to force for the first time "in a century or more," and that consequently the United States must make greater efforts than hitherto if she wishes her own interests protected. In all this Mr. Chamberlain is let off lightly. *The Times* is the villain of the "peace," and more than one reference is made to what the authors obviously believe to be its sinister influence.

On neutrality itself the authors stress what is often forgotten in Great Britain: that concessions to sea-power belligerents help Japan as well as Britain and France. They describe how the Administration used its influence to get over this fact. They insist that a policy of "non-recognition" of the results of aggression, coupled with a refusal to take sides against the aggressor while the force is being applied, is rather like closing the stable door after the horse has been stolen. Canada, of course, is a special case, and President Roosevelt's pledge is given great prominence.

In a chapter on Trade Agreements, the authors make the point that they are the only means of preserving a "free economy," and are thus one of the best defences against the totalitarian States. This is especially true as regards Latin America. Mr. Cordell Hull's restraint in his dealings with the Mexican challenge is sympathetically described, in spite of the fact that the precedent of the oil expropriation was considered very menacing to other American interests in Latin America. Indeed, the problem of how to handle the "good neighbour" who becomes a "bad neighbour" is a very embarrassing one. One method of tackling the whole problem of Latin America was an increase of radio communications, and another to subsidise American ships which will be rechristened *Argentina*, *Brazil*, and *Uruguay*. All these things have produced considerable effect, but, as Lima was to show, it was still possible to make a counter-attack with considerable success. On all these matters there is much judicious observation in this volume. A knowledge of them is essential to the proper understanding of our present problems, and it may be hoped that this survey will be widely read. X. X.

204*. AMERICA IN MID-PASSAGE. By Charles A. and Mary R. Beard. 1939. (London: Jonathan Cape. 977 pp. 18s.)

THE difficulties of the European who wants to follow the complex trends and changes in American life have been immensely increased in the last six years. For the "New Deal" is not a mere party slogan or programme. It is truly and in almost every respect a new era in the progress of the United States. It marks the transition from "rugged individualism" to social democracy, with the United States

bending her strength, as the authors say, " to provide the economic and cultural foundations indispensable to a free society." Under the stress, and with the opportunities, of a great emergency, and with the good fortune to find at the vital moment a fearless, dynamic and progressive leader, the United States have been able to telescope into a few years the changes of generations; and that by using only the traditional democratic methods and instruments. The new problems and ways, without fuss and almost unnoticed, are indirectly changing the constitutional structure also. The United States are rapidly being welded into a nation; Washington is at long last becoming the country's capital.

Dr. and Mrs. Beard have not only covered all this transition in generous detail, marking also the changes in the arts and sciences, but they have put it in its historical framework with a mastery which only the authors of *The Rise of American Civilisation* could have commanded. Their sympathies are radical, but their treatment is detached; only in the chapters on foreign policy do they show any bias, where their isolationism fails to see the international conditioning of their national aspirations. The book is a real achievement, and a boon to the foreign reader. D. M.

205*. CANADIAN–AMERICAN RELATIONS. 1849–1874. By Lester Burrell Shippee. 1939. (New Haven: Yale University Press; London: Humphrey Milford. 8vo. 514 pp., map. 14*s.*)

THIS study of the relations between Canada and America in the critical years 1849–1874 is so thorough that it will never have to be told again, and if the other volumes in this group of work which American historians are intending to publish are of the same quality, it augurs well for the publication of a very good series. The book covers a quarter of a century of Canadian–American diplomatic relations, and of course it covers the period of the American Civil War. The year 1849 is chosen as the beginning, as it marked the birth of a limited movement for the union of Canada and the United States. The year 1874 is taken as a conclusion, as in that year there began a short respite from the constant agitation which had been affecting the two countries.

This is an interesting discussion of the political and economic forces which affected the relationship of these two countries during one of the most eventful periods of their history. In its discussions of such questions as reciprocity and the trade agreements, independence and annexation, it presents a background to the consideration of the Ottawa Agreement and present-day American and Canadian relations.

R. W. G. MACKAY.

206*. AMERICA NOW. Edited, with an introduction, by Harold E. STEARNS. 1939. (New York and London: Scribner. La. 8vo. x + 606 pp. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

MR. STEARNS has set out by means of papers by thirty-three Americans and three foreigners—one Chinese, one Mexican and one Englishman, to give a cross-section of American civilisation to-day. This rather ambitious " intellectual adventure " is surprisingly successful, mainly because of the excellence of most of the papers. There is one startling omission—there is no paper on Agriculture, in which 20 per cent. of the American population are employed—though it is a tribute to the teaching of William Allan White that there is a paper on " The Small Town."